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 Abstract 
 
 
Rolf I. Vaernes, The Poetics of Being 
 
          
The aim of The Poetics of Being is to inquire into how the 
apperception of the Being of beings is produced. We will 
recognize this production not primarily in philosophy, but in a 
medium accessible to us all, theatre. Although the Romantic 
tradition of literary criticism from Herder to Bloom has noted 
that Shakespeare produces an exceptional sense of what is 
[true], so much so that he is said to create the impression of 
nature or life, no one has so far attempted to show how 
precisely Shakespeare affects this experience. Contrary to T. 
S. Eliot, who is unable to discern any kind of poetics in 
Shakespeare’s plays, we have discovered an insistent and 
consistent pattern of inadequation, a kind of mismatch. The 
thesis argues, that the predominant tropes of inadequation are 
falsity, dissimilarity, nothing, indefinition, elision and 
substitution. We shall show that these figures of inadequation 
are the universal means by which Shakespeare, almost 
imperceptibly, compels the spectator to infer the apperception 
of what is [true].  
 
On the basis of these tropes of inadequation the thesis makes 
the fundamental philosophical claim that the cognition of Being 
through non-Being is a negative form of what Heidegger calls 
the ontological difference. We call this the negative ontological 
difference. The thesis demonstrates that with the exception of 
some Pre-Socratic thinkers, Plato in the Sophist, the work of 
Pseudo-Dionysius, and the writings of Derrida, the bulk of the 
tradition of Western philosophy has argued Being in terms of 
positivities. While the thesis does not question the possibility 
of realizing the ontological difference in a positive fashion, as 
does Heidegger’s philosophy of unconcealment, the thesis 
claims that the negative ontological difference, or ontological 
contradiction, is the more forceful process by which we 
become aware of what is [true]. 
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 C0 INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]   In Shakespeare’s King Lear neither Edmund nor Edgar appear as what 
they ‘truly’ are. Regardless of the reason the one has for not revealing his 
intentions and the other his identity, regardless of whether one is ‘good’ and the 
other ‘evil,’ they have something in common. For it is their false appearance, 
Edmund as a man with good intentions, and Edgar as an unknown beggar, which 
grants to these men the unquestionable sense that they are alive. What can be said 
of Edmund and Edgar equally applies to many characters on Shakespeare’s stage; 
that their appearance does not correspond to what they really are. Yet 
surprisingly, these deceptive beings produce in the spectator’s mind a more 
powerful sense of reality than any straightforward representation. The thesis 
makes two major claims: one, that Shakespeare’s plays systematically employ false 
representations to achieve their reality effects; the other, that the success of 
Shakespeare’s work rests on a general philosophical principle, a negative form of 
the ontic-ontological difference, to be defined a little later in the introduction. 
  
[2]     If one were to first glance at the bibliography of this thesis instead of 
reading the text, one would perhaps have the impression that this work appears to 
be somewhat random, based on unclassified and uncategorized material. This 
impression would prevail if one did not note, as Kant does towards the end of The 
Critique of Judgment, that it is a ‘revolutionary idea’ that binds all parts together. 
The ‘revolutionary idea’ here is that a negative ontic-ontological difference – that 
what is presented as ‘not’ is more persuasive than what is as it triggers an 
ontological leap beyond what is perceived to be untrue to a negative sense of its 
Being - is produced by art in an exemplary fashion. This ‘idea,’ without which all                                                    Introduction                                                    2   
 
  
   
elements would appear as they did to Walter Benjamin, as fragments scattered by 
the winds of History, has carried this project from the beginning to the end. 
Certainly, we have been in pursuit of an idea, a notion to which no phenomena 
may possibly correspond.
1 However, if the thesis were to make any essential 
claims, the thesis would certainly have destroyed its intention, not articulated The 
Poetics of Being. If poiesis generally is ‘to produce something where there 
previously was nothing,’ as Plato, Aristotle and Heidegger all contend,
2 we will 
expose another techne, where the impression of what truly is, is produced by the 
encounter with what is not or what is false, the profound apperception of Being 
created from the cognition of non-beings. It is the task of The Poetics of Being to 
grasp how the singular impression of [th]is
3 negative ontic-ontological difference is 
produced so laboriously and apperceived so effortlessly that the beholder often 
seems to believe that she is confronted with the apperception
4 of that which is in-
different from her own life. 
 
[3]  Instead of speaking of the ontological difference as such without any 
qualifications we shall repeatedly say in this thesis that the ontological difference 
between Being and beings is negative. Neither Aristotle nor Hegel invented a new 
word for dialectics but a new meaning for what Plato called ‘dialectics’. The 
                                                 
1 For Kant’s inessential definition of idea, see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A327/B384, p. 371. 
2 Plato, Sophist, 265b Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VII, 1032a11-1034b7 Heidegger, Building 
Dwelling Thinking, in Basic Writings, p. 361. 
3 As St. Dionysius uses it to suggest that God is beyond his name, and St. Thomas this to convey the 
singularity of existence, so shall we use [th]is as an ontological marker throughout The Poetics of 
Being to indicate the negative ontic-ontological difference and its apperception, the emphatic sense 
of Being it produces. 
4 In this thesis we will clearly distinguish between perception and apperception. Following Kant, we 
shall say that whereas one through perception may empirically grasp what is essentially true/untrue, 
through apperception one grasps that which allows all [individual] attribution to take place, that 
apperception is the condition for the unity or integrity of all perceptions. For a more extensive 
elaboration of ‘apperception,’ see further Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A107-A108, and perhaps 
especially A109, where Kant, as he also does in A115 and B132 and A354, empties ‘apperception’ of 
all essential content. In this thesis, the Being of beings is apperceived, whereas the essential 
appearance of beings, whether true or false, is perceived.                                                    Introduction                                                    3   
 
  
   
novelty of this procedure is, even in contradistinction to Derrida,
5 to interpret 
‘ontology’ negatively as a science or philosophy of Being. It is crucial that we 
emphasise the negative understanding of the ontological difference that is argued 
in this thesis. Just as there is a positive and a negative theology, I want to suggest 
that there is a positive and a negative ontology. And just as one has not renounced 
all theology simply by renouncing all gods, one has not destroyed ontology by 
simply denouncing the positivity or substantiality of all beings. One should not 
necessarily, like Kleist, believe that the Being of beings has been an-nihilated 
simply because Kant destroyed the belief in the substantiality or permanence of 
each individual being. For Being may still be thought – perhaps even be – 
negatively, each being individuated most convincingly by what it is not rather than 
by what it is. Following such a negative course, we endeavour to produce a 
negative ontology as much as Dionysius the Aeropagite produced a negative 
theology. At the heart of this negative ontology is a negative understanding of the 
ontological difference to counter, to contradict Heidegger’s concept of Being. For 
whereas Heidegger progresses from the understanding of individual beings to what 
may comprehend, produce the understanding of, the Being of all, we counter by 
saying that the apperception of Being is most convincingly produced by non-
beings, that it is the [negative] experience of what is not, which almost 
imperceptibly guides us to the most forceful appreciation of what is. When we find 
Heidegger dwelling on a pair of farmer’s boots in one of van Gogh’s paintings or a 
fountain unconcealed in the poetry of Hölderlin, we easily recognize that 
Heidegger begins his contemplation on Being with what is truly unconcealed. In 
contradistinction to Heidegger, it is easy to see that what we encounter in what 
                                                 
5 For my dissociation from Derrida’s understanding of ‘ontology,’ see pp. 106-107.                                                    Introduction                                                    4   
 
  
   
reception history has judged to be Shakespeare’s major dramas; Hamlet, Macbeth, 
Othello, King Lear, are not true but false appearances. We shall therefore learn 
that false appearance gives or grants the more emphatic sense of life, and that 
therefore negativities and not positivities produce the most profound sense of 
Being.  
 
[4]   The novelty of my negative interpretation of the ontological difference does 
perhaps necessitate a brief historical clarification. Starting with Plato, we could 
easily have interpreted, located the ontological difference in Plato’s philosophy as 
the essential idea, as Plotinus does.
6 What we do is the opposite, by identifying, 
even in stark opposition to Derrida, the ontological difference itself in Plato’s 
works as khora.
7 Similarly, in Aristotle’s philosophy, it would be easy to recognize 
the ontological difference positively as ousia or thing and this thing to have a 
substance. Again we do not. Against all tradition the novelty of our approach is 
that we recognize the ontological difference in Aristotle’s oeuvre in what he prides 
himself of having invented for the first time a discourse for, namely place,
8 which is 
nothing but that empty locus which grants the possibility for anything to appear 
and hence is what grants each being, singularly, its life. The negativity of these 
concepts - of khora and place - should stand out clearly, but what should be made 
equally clear, is that identifying the ontological difference in such a manner is not 
only entirely novel, but rests solely on the textual evidence that this negative, but 
hidden, tradition still provides. If we proceed to the origin of this negative 
interpretation of ontology, it is easy to see that my interpretation of Plotinus finds 
                                                 
6 For an exposition of Plotinus inherently essential idea of Being, see, Cf. p. 366n. 
7 See below, ‘§2.5 Derrida’s Khora.’ 
8 For a novel philosophical exposition of place, see Jeff Malpas, Place and Experience: A 
Philosophical Topography, Cambridge University Press, 1999.                                                    Introduction                                                    5   
 
  
   
him attempting to get rid of this negative ontological difference, as it, like all 
phenomena, contradicts every positive but hidden idea. By making an attempt to 
remove the ontological difference of matter, by denouncing it as an insubstantial 
mirror for the projection of essential ideas, what Plotinus in fact does, is, as we 
shall see, to reinforce the impression of the negativity of the ontological difference. 
Against all tradition this thesis recognizes the negative concept of that which 
Plotinus is unable to rid himself of as the ontological difference. In our treatment 
of Nietzsche, the thesis likewise does not recognize the ontological difference in 
anything positive, but in a concept by which we interpret Nietzsche to make an 
attempt to surpass the positive interpretation of man, namely in the concept  of 
‘chaos’ or ‘eternal recurrence.’ Finally, Derrida is introduced, not because he 
believes he is speaking of the ontological difference in a negative manner – as is 
made clear, his interpretation of ‘ontology’ is entirely positive – but because he 
involuntarily expresses the negativity of the ontological difference through his 
exposition of khora and the contemplation of his own death. Finally, there is to us 
a second more important aspect to the ontological difference, namely an 
inessential, insubstantial and unsubstantiated sense of what is hidden. As is well 
documented, there is a positive and a negative theology in Dionysius. We could 
easily have identified the ontological difference positively as that absolute, but 
hidden, power which gives rise to everything that is. Again, we do not. We 
recognize the ontological difference in Dionysius as that which remains hidden 
after everything has been taken away, which remains regardless of its 
insubstantiality , however negatively apperceived, if at all. Similarly, when 
interpreting Kant’s Third Critique, we do again stress how Kant’s ‘Paralogisms of 
Pure Reason’ conveys to us an unreified but clearly hidden sense of Being.                                                    Introduction                                                    6   
 
  
   
[5]   It is now time to define the negative ontological difference. While this ontic-
ontological difference can be regarded as a pyramid of positivities [beings] 
pointing to the apex of a likewise positive Being, and where Derrida replaces 
Heidegger’s pyramid of positivities by an ‘assemblage’ of differential relations 
‘governed’ by the principle of differánce, the negative ontic-ontological difference 
argued here looks somewhat different. Reduced to its formal relations it 
constitutes a pyramid of negativities: falsity, dissimilarity, nothing, indefinition, 
elision, substitution [in its many aspects of deceit, disguise, lie, deception, mask, 
pretense, subterfuge, etc.], pointing towards a more forceful sense of what is, that 
is Being. I consider the negative ontological difference to be negative in three ways. 
Firstly, the negative ontological difference contradicts or negates what may be 
perceived at the surface. Transgressing all appearances it is nevertheless what 
grants the empty possibility of apperceiving the Being to all appearances. [1
st 
moment of negativity] Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the bare 
impression of this negative ontic-ontological difference is most effectively induced 
by beings confronted with beings that appear as who or what they are not, that is 
beings that appear negatively. We could even say, following Aristotle, since false 
appearances do not exist and are therefore non other than non-beings, that non-
beings most persuasively grant to its spectators the most emphatic sense of Being. 
[2nd moment of negativity] Thirdly, the negative ontological difference is either 
concealed or unconcealed. [Third moment of negativity].
9 In either case we end up 
with a stronger sense of what is. For where the sense of Being is granted as a 
                                                 
9 We shall later use the concept ‘ontological contradiction’ indistinguishably from ‘negative 
ontological difference,’ simply because there are three contradictions implied in the ‘negative 
ontological difference.’ Firstly, the negative ontological difference contradicts what may be 
perceived, secondly, the paradox that what is not offer the most profound sense of what they appear 
to contradict, namely Beings, as likewise false appearances give the most intense sense of what is 
true. The third contradiction is, as we shall see, that Being is either concealed or unconcealed.                                                    Introduction                                                    7   
 
  
   
contradiction of what is or does appear, one is offered a hidden sense of Being. And 
where the sense of Being is offered by presenting or experiencing an appearance as 
a contradiction of what previously was concealed, one has been given a logical or 
luminous sense of Being. In both cases, whether hidden or revealed, what remains 
is the experience of that which inessentially grants this being place to appear or the 
mystic impression of that which hidden upholds the Being of this appearance.  
 
[6]   Even though there are no true philosophers on Shakespeare’s stage, and 
Shakespeare never essays to express a coherent philosophy, The Poetics of Being 
will nevertheless attempt to throw light on a philosophical foundation of the 
Shakespearean drama.  In this sense, The Poetics of Being promises to be to 
Shakespearean drama what Walter Benjamin’s Ursprung des Deutschen 
Trauerspiels is to the German Baroque Drama and Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Birth 
of Tragedy to Greek drama, namely an elucidation of the philosophical legacy that 
is expressed with or without the intention of its author. No doubt, the claims of The 
Poetics of Being are controversial. First of all, in opposition to Heidegger, it shows 
both historically and systematically that the ontological difference is negative, that 
deceit, lie, deception, disguise, more than any true appearance, give a more 
convincing sense of Being. Secondly, and in opposition to any vague Romantic 
critique the thesis attempts to define what Shakespeare produces a powerful 
impression of, the Being of beings. It shows that Shakespeare presents a sense of 
life or Being, where non-beings most persuasively grant to its spectators a sense of 
what is. Thirdly I show, and here breaching the bounds of mimesis which cannot 
explain how one play may come across as more alive than another, that 
Shakespeare systematically uses certain figures or tropes of inadequation; falsity,                                                    Introduction                                                    8   
 
  
   
dissimilarity, nothing, indefinition, elision, substitution, whereby negativities 
produces a forceful sense of Being.  What we offer is not an historical, sociological 
or psychological reading of Shakespeare. Rather, we are offering interpretative 
incisions in the reading of some of some of Shakespeare’s major work.  
 
[7]   By employing the negative ontological difference, our exposition of the 
ontological difference in Shakespeare’s drama clearly distances itself from 
Gadamer’s approach, who, following the philosophy of the early Heidegger, 
interprets the ontological difference in theatre in a positive fashion as merely the 
manner of Being present [on the stage].
10 It is my contention that Shakespeare 
massively uses false appearances, disguises, lies, deceptions, to systematically guide 
the reader to a cogent apperception of what is concealed. As is evidenced by 
Shakespeare’s major plays, the negative experience of beings that fully or partly 
appear as what they are not, grants to its spectators the most emphatic sense of 
Being uncluttered by any essential or substantial distortions. And, as Shakespeare 
might have said, had he been theoretically inclined, the ontological difference is 
best understood as an excess pointing beyond what is perceived, transgressing the 
character of any appearance to grant to it a more profound apperception of life, if 
not life itself.  
 
[8]     To anticipate the road ahead, we shall conduct an allegorical exposition of a 
work that has been neglected as much by this thesis as it was ignored by tradition. 
Pseudo-Aristotle’s On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias will accompany the 
reader in this introduction much like a kind host whose invitation to a 
fundamental comprehension of the negativity of the ontological difference, that 
                                                 
10 Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 113, 116, 130.                                                    Introduction                                                    9   
 
  
   
non-being creates the most profound sense of Being, has long been declined. 
Paradoxically, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias appear like a preface written 
for The Poetics of Being centuries before it commenced. Ominously, Pseudo-
Aristotle’s On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias is placed in front of Metaphysics 
in The Complete Works of Aristotle,
11 and it is surprising to see that this work has 
been neglected by philosophers as acute as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, who 
all place such importance on Hesiod’s chaos. For the most subtle commentary on 
Hesiod’s chaos is not found in Aristotle’s Physics, which uses Hesiod’s chaos to 
illustrate the concept of place,
12 nor in Metaphysics, which uses Hesiod’s chaos to 
display the most basic understanding of love,
13 but in Pseudo-Aristotle’s On 
Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, which uses chaos to illustrate the sophistical 
notion of what Alexander calls, ’the third man’.
14 Perhaps only an unnatural 
subjection to authority, or as Horst Ruthrof says, ‘the cult of the signifier,’ could 
explain why this text, which displays the negativity of the ontological difference 
with such ease and logical clarity, has been neglected for so long. However, we are 
not so much concerned with the authenticity of the person behind the argument as 
with the argument itself, which we shall follow in order to more easily indicate our 
own. But we shall first say that there is an ontological tradition which has found 
renewed actuality in the common pursuit of philosophy and theology. Secondly, 
that the understanding of the production of what they have in common was 
blocked by the abstraction of philosophy from literature. Thirdly, that literature, 
                                                 
11 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, in The Complete Works, Volume Two, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
12 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV. 
13 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, Chapter 4. 
14 For whereas the general idea or form is one and the particular idea or form is second, the singular 
which provides the occasion for [th]is general or particular idea or form to be unconcealed, to take 
place, is singularly third.                                                    Introduction                                                    10   
 
  
   
while conscientiously attending to the particulars and the universals of their 
science, neglected the negative production
15 of what is third: the techne of what is 
singular. Fourthly, as science naturally makes progress through distinction, an 
analysis should not indifferently expose the apperception of the ontological 
difference as concealed and unconcealed, but display with clarity the negativity of 
the ontological difference. Fifthly, when considering the production of the 
ontological difference, one cannot indifferently suspend the question of what is true 
and false, when it is evident that the false, more emphatically, offers the profound 
apperception
16 of what is, more persuasively displays [th]is in-difference through 
inadequation.
17  
 
[9]     To grant the production of [th]is negative ontological difference a definite 
shape or form, we need to say that its apperception follows an inferential leap from 
the cognition of what beings are not to the groundless apperception that they truly 
are. Further elaboration of the negativity of the ontological difference is necessary. 
Following Pseudo-Aristotle, we should first admit that there may be no ontological 
difference, that things may simply generate things ad infinitum, as he says, ‘in and 
endless series.’
18 This is however unlikely as those who have asserted that there is 
an ontological difference are, as Pseudo-Aristotle observes, ‘no ordinary men, but 
                                                 
15 We speak of ‘negative production’ where the end of production is negative; an unverifiable and 
unreified sense of Being. 
16 We speak of ‘apperception’ in like manner to Kant to indicate that which provides the 
fundamental or living integrity of each appearance. That the integrity of what is perceived is neither 
substantial, nor perceptible or describable, will often necessitate the qualification ‘negative.’  
17 The original contribution of The Poetics of Being does not only reside in the second, fourth and 
the fifth of these abstractions, but in the synthesis of all the particular moments, to have gathered 
them all in the same place. One cannot invent everything. Certainly, one takes as much pleasure in 
receiving as contributing to tradition, as much delight in reproducing a tradition one loves as 
making an original contribution to it. 
18 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 975a25.                                                    Introduction                                                    11   
 
  
   
some of those who are looked upon as sages.’
19 In straight opposition to Melissus 
and Parmenides, who believe that ‘it is impossible that anything can come into 
being from nothing,’
20 Pseudo-Aristotle finds that Hesiod asserts the exact opposite 
when he declares of that which unconceals all beings to all, 
 
‘First of all in the world was Chaos born, and thereafter 
Broad-bosomed earth arose, firm seat of all things forever 
And Love that shineth bright amid the host of Immortals,’
21  
 
As the author comments, ‘All other things, he says, came into being from these, but 
these came into being out of nothing.’
22 So the first point is clearly: There is an 
ontological difference. However, we shall not only take a sage’s word for it but 
evoke the image of that philosophical tradition which, in Hesiod’s wake, has 
attempted to grasp [th]is ontological difference, albeit in a negative way. 
 
[10]     In philosophy, ontology denotes a tradition that is recognized by more than 
its name, for even without a name there is a philosophical tradition that inquires 
into being qua Being.
23 These inquiries were pursued long before Goclenius first 
launched the term and Wolff put it in circulation and made it a valuable 
philosophical coin to express the inquiry into that which crowns or grounds all 
beings, the Being of beings.
24 For the ontological difference between Being and 
                                                 
19 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 974b9. 
20 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 974a1-3. 
21 Hesiod, Theogony, 116-120, as quoted in Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 
974b11-13.  
22 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 974b11-13. 
23 It would, of course, be absurd to contend that there is no metaphysics in Aristotle simply because 
he never used the term. When distinguishing between praxis, poiesis and theoria, Aristotle saw 
Proto Philosophia not as something beyond any of these intellectual activities but as what unites 
them all. What unifies all these human pursuits may easily be ignored, for as Pseudo-Aristotle lets 
Empedocles say of the many, ‘they have seen of the whole but a little.’ [Aristotle, On Melissus, 
Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 976a37.]  
24 For the conceptual history of ‘ontology,’ Farrell Krell’s note to Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche 
is very enlightening: ‘The term ontology apparently was coined by Goclenius in 1613, then taken up                                                    Introduction                                                    12   
 
  
   
beings was as much pursued in the Presocratics’ elemental inquiries into the arche 
of all things, as it was passionately pursued in St. Thomas’s search for the 
determining trace of incarnation or the principle of individuation, as it more 
recently was exposed in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Similarly it was 
patiently sought in the works of one whom Heidegger recognized as having 
launched the ontological investigations of Plato and Aristotle with new vigour, 
namely Kant.
25 The most recent actualization of these ontological inquiries, the 
surge of Being that tempts some philosophers to surf and others to dive, has been 
identified by Hent de Vries as The Religious Turn and Dominique Janicaud as The 
Theological Turn.
26 Certainly, the most renowned of all living representatives of 
[th]is quest are Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion, who often inquire into the 
Being of beings by expressing what it is not, a negative procedure which often 
begins by denouncing the very name, ‘ontology.’
27 The theological turn is 
foregrounded in John D. Caputo’s study of The Mystical Elements in Heidegger’s 
Thought,
28 which indicates its origin in the works of Heidegger, who early, as 
Gadamer observes, announced himself as a theologian.
29 More fundamentally, 
however, this theological turn is a re-cognition of that which Aristotle professed 
ontology and theology have in common, the study of what is highest or what is first, 
                                                                                                                                               
by the Cartesian philosopher Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665) into his Metaphysica de ente sive 
Ontosophia of 1656, and finally established in the German language around 1730 by the Leibnizian 
rationalist Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Attacked and eclipsed by Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy, ‘ontology’ emerged once again at the forefront of philosophical inquiry only with 
Martin Heidegger and his onetime Marburg colleague Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), author of 
Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie (1935) and Neue Wege der Ontologie (1942).’ [Farrell Krell, note to 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume IV: Nihilism, p. 154n]. 
25 Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 151. 
26 Cf. Hent de, Vries Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, 1999. Dominique Janicaud, [ed], 
Phenomenology and The ‘Theological Turn,’ 2000. 
27 Jacques Derrida, ‘Khora,’ in On the Name, pp. 97, 103, and Jean-Luc Marion, God Without 
Being, p. 37. 
28 John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, 1986/1990. 
29 Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, pp. 169-70, 182.                                                    Introduction                                                    13   
 
  
   
the Being of beings. It is to [th]is tradition that [th]is thesis belongs, even if in a 
negative manner. 
 
[11]     However highly we value the philosophers above, not one has recognized 
that the ontological difference may, in an exemplary sense, be produced by art. If 
[th]is production has been suggested at all, it is doubtless that no one has attempted 
to comprehend the techne of [th]is art before us, and that therefore The Poetics of 
Being is the first of its kind. Pseudo-Aristotle refers to Empedocles’s contention 
that ‘whatsoever exists, no art no device can destroy it.’
30 We are clearly of the 
complementary view. For whereas [th]is [observation] may be self-evident in life, in 
art nothing is more difficult than to create the apperception of the ontological 
difference. That is, whereas in life it is almost impossible to eradicate [the 
apperception of] the ontological difference, in art it is the most difficult to produce. 
We shall later identify inadequation as a set of negative tropes that effortlessly, 
almost universally, produces the apperception of the Being of beings. 
Furthermore, we shall identify the most effective means for [th]is singular 
production: falsity, dissimilarity, nothing, indefinition, elision and substitution. 
[Th]is production shall moreover not be considered abstractly, but ascertained in 
Shakespeare, the one who most persuasively produces the impression of what we 
take to be inseparable from [our] nature,  indistinguishable from our own lives. 
Regardless of how much the Romantic tradition [of literary criticism] may think 
itself elevated above the many, it too failed to recognize in Shakespeare’s plays the 
ontological difference as such. We shall emphasize that this thesis is not primarily a 
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study of Shakespeare, but of how the apperception of the ontological difference is 
produced.  
 
[12]     There is one question we need to address in [th]is Introduction: Why has 
the production of the ontological difference not been studied? The answer may 
have to do with the division of labour in the humanities. We could perhaps blame 
the unnatural separation of poiesis and theoria, or the artificial separation of 
literature and philosophy. In a Commonplace Book which Nietzsche kept in 1872 
under the heading, ‘The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle Between Art and 
Knowledge,’ Nietzsche acutely identified a great dilemma that has still not been 
resolved: ‘whether philosophy is an art or a science?’
31 It is easy to see that this 
problem would never have arisen if one had not discarded the possibility of 
synthesis, if one had not too subserviently adhered to a separation between the 
intellectual pursuits of praxis, poiesis, and theoria. Certainly, Aristotle never meant 
this division to be anything but preliminary, an heuristic classification to better 
understand the intellectual excellence of man as a whole as he stands apart from all 
other beings. Nevertheless, Plato’s and Aristotle’s definitions of poiesis preclude 
the possibility of a singular production, for what is brought to unconcealment is 
the idea or the morphe, the idea or the form which may be perceived, never the 
apperception of the Being of negative beings.
32  
 
[13]     Francis Bacon is right not only when he points out what can easily be 
experienced by all, that imagined riches are the root of all poverty, but equally 
                                                 
31 Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth – Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870s, ‘The 
Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle Between Art and Knowledge,’ ed. Daniel Breazeale, 
Fragment 53, p. 19. 
32 Cf. Alexander, Commentarius Metaphysica, in Aristotle, The Complete Works, F 186 R, 80.3, p. 
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when he recognizes that progress has often been halted by ‘the overmuch credit 
that hath been given unto authors in sciences, in making them dictators.’
33 Among 
what Bacon calls ‘the vices or diseases of learning,’
34 none ranks perhaps higher 
than ‘the over-early and preemptory reduction of knowledge into arts and 
methods.’
35 A too rigid classification easily destroys the potential for making 
progress: hence it is timely that Jacques Derrida regretted the division of labour 
between philosophy and literature, that Richard Rorty mourns the separation of 
poetry from science.
36 For as much as a philosopher without theology could claim 
to be in possession of all the Aristotelian excellences without comprehending that 
which ensures the integrity of them all,
37 a philosopher without literature does 
seem like a man of many parts without any wherewithal. If you are willing to 
follow the example of Kant, it is easy to acknowledge that Philosophy without 
literature is blind, as much as Literature without Philosophy is empty. Only the 
synthesis of the two pursuits could make possible the understanding of the 
production of that which transcends experience, namely the apperception of the 
Being of negative beings which art makes available to man.  
                                                 
33 Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, p. 143. Emphasis added. 
34 Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, Book I, p. 142. Emphasis added. 
35 Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, Book I, p. 145. 
36 Nietzsche, who throughout his life attempted to overcome the Aristotelian classification, is not 
only right when he considers philosophy ‘a form of artistic invention,’ as the freest of the sciences, 
it is also true that, ‘There is no appropriate category for philosophy; consequently, we must make 
up and characterize a species [for it].’ [Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth – Selections from 
Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870s, ‘The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle Between 
Art and Knowledge,’ ed. Daniel Breazeale, Fragment 53, p. 19]. 
37 Speaking of Derrida’s negative theology, Hent de Vries identifies the possible in-difference 
between theology and ontology by first quoting Of Grammotology, ‘The ‘theological’ is a 
determined moment in the total movement of the trace.’ [de Vries, The Theology of the Sign and the 
Sign of Theology, in Flight of the Gods – Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Theology, p. 184.] It 
is however more valuable what de Vries himself says about [th]is common ground, in his fine book 
on Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, ‘it is not so much that there is a mystery beyond what can 
be said about existence … ; the enigma is rather to be found in the very understanding of this 
existence … itself. … Where it comes into its own, existence becomes a mystery to itself.’ [de Vries, 
Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, ‘On Becoming a Mystery to Oneself,’ p. 227-228.] It is the 
systematic production of [th]is mystery which we have recognized in Shakespeare.                                                    Introduction                                                    16   
 
  
   
 
[14]     Although we can easily join Gadamer when he praises Aristotle for having 
included the Wirkung, the effect, on the spectator in his definition of tragedy,
38 he 
could not with greater ease have contradicted our position, when he, in an attempt 
to identify the cause of the ontological import of tragedy, indicates, ‘The thing 
presented is there (Das Dargestellte is da).’
39 Gadamer does little more than to 
repeat Leucippus’s positive argument that everything that is perceived is, when it 
is easily observed that whereas a dead and a living man may equally be perceived, 
only one is apperceived to be [alive]. Similarly in theatre, not all [re]presentations 
are indistinguishably granted Being simply because they, like all things, happen to 
occur.
40 It is sad to see that Gadamer’s attempt to convey his understanding of the 
ontological difference in tragedy only testifies to its neglect. We could not disagree 
more than when Gadamer points out - as if incomprehensibly taking pride in 
rendering art indistinguishable from science - that the experience that tragedy and 
all imitative arts offer is ‘knowledge, furthermore a ‘knowledge of the essence.’
41 In 
contradistinction to Gadamer, we shall show that what theatre most 
fundamentally offers, is not the positive experience of something known, but the 
apperception of something unknown, the Being of beings, which is entirely 
inessential, and moreover, [is] either concealed or unconcealed. What will be 
shown furthermore is that any such ontological difference is typically negative. 
 
[15]     It is not easy to grasp what is, and we may, like the stranger in Plato’s 
Sophist, at times be in as much confusion about what is as what is not.
42 We cannot 
                                                 
38 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 130. 
39 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 113. 
40 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 116. 
41 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 114. 
42 Plato, Sophist, 243b.                                                    Introduction                                                    17   
 
  
   
simply and without distinction erase the ontological problem by saying, like 
Leucippus, that ‘all objects of cognition must exist.’
43 For, as Pseudo-Aristotle 
rightly points out, ‘what we see is not more because we see it, … what we think … 
not more for that.’
44 It is apparently so that some things offer the impression that 
they are whereas others do not. As Pseudo-Aristotle has to admit, ‘of which kind 
the true things are is uncertain.’
45 Whereas Pseudo-Aristotle maintains an 
indefinite concept of the ontological difference, referring indeterminately to the 
arche of all things as ‘that which is all water or all earth, or whatever this being 
is,’
46 that is ‘individually similar to itself,’
47 we will show that the ontological 
difference is apperceived as a contradiction that is either concealed or unconcealed. 
While Heidegger’s aletheia is the unconcealment of positivities, Pseudo-Dionysius 
produces what is hidden in a negative fashion. Like Pseudo-Dionysius this thesis 
presents the ontological difference negatively, for appearances that are not true, 
like angels or impostors, produce a more ineradicable impression of that they are, 
the Being of beings. From this position it is easy to recognize that Shakespeare’s 
reputation as a poet, his renown as the maker of makers, to a large degree rests on 
his ability to produce the apperception of what is concealed, through false 
appearances, inadequations, offer a mystical notion of Being, which is not only 
apperceived spontaneously and persuasively by most [modern] audiences, but in 
great part is apperceived as in-different from their own lives. 
 
[16]     Although there are epochal shifts in the apperception of Being, neither its 
production nor its apperception is arbitrary or entirely subjective. The Poetics of 
                                                 
43 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 980a8. Emphasis added. 
44 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 980a15-16. 
45 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 980a18-19. 
46 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 976a24. 
47 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 976b1.                                                    Introduction                                                    18   
 
  
   
Being simply disavows any relativistic doctrine of Being, and will do so not by 
asserting itself but by tracing what art does to us all. As Aristotle says in 
Metaphysics, if there is a science that unknowingly belongs to us all, ‘if the science 
[i.e. episteme or knowledge of what is first] is innate, it is wonderful that we are 
unaware of our possession of the greatest of sciences.’
48 Even more wonderful 
would it be to possess that art which is able to produce the apperception of what is, 
to move us, to persuade us, even to guide us by playing on [th]is transgression, the 
most ancient, if not first of all sciences, i.e. the knowledge of what is first. 
 
[17]    If Parmenides was the first to prohibit the invention of such a science,
 49 i.e. 
negative ontology, Gorgias, more democratically, and in line with the Athenian 
spirit, offered, as Pseudo-Aristotle points out,
 50 the first sustained argument 
against its possible existence, against that which would uphold such a science, 
namely the ontological difference. Gorgias argument boils down to [th]is, that even 
if there is nothing, it is impossible to convey without something different from it, 
i.e. words or appearances, that would negate that which one were trying to 
ascertain in the first place, namely that nothing exists. Secondly, if one could 
convey the experience of that which is dissimilar from words or appearances, the 
audience will not be left with the same experience. It is easy to refute these 
arguments. For as self-evidently as words are different from what they express, so 
what is effected/affected may be an experience beyond what is perceived, namely 
the apperception of the ontological difference. For words may convey an 
                                                 
48 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, Chapter 9, 993a1-2. 
49 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 980b16-20. It is surprising to see that the only 
fragment that has survived from the famed Gorgias - the grandest of all Greek orators - is an 
argument against the ontological difference, but even more so that it is offered in the context of one 
who indicates that Gorgias position cannot be sustained, namely Pseudo-Aristotle in On Melissus, 
Xenophanes, and Gorgias. 
50 Plato, Sophist, 237a.                                                    Introduction                                                    19   
 
  
   
experience which itself is not [explicitly] named, but effected/affected, and [th]is 
effect/affect experienced without a word. This is easy to acknowledge. Gorgias 
second argument is equally flawed, as it does not recognize the difference between 
perceptions and apperceptions.
51 For whereas anyone may understand that we may 
all perceive things differently, and hold different opinions about the same, it is not 
easy to contend that we would have different opinions if we did not have different 
opinions about the same [thing]. And, whereas our opinions may be true or false, 
we may through art produce the apperception of that which our true and false 
opinions have in common, namely the ontological difference, which is more 
emphatically produced through inadequation rather than adequation. 
     
[18]     To take one concrete example that resembles the many we will encounter in 
Shakespeare’s plays. One who appears to walk off a cliff and does not expect to fall 
appears to be more alive than one who jumps off the same cliff never expecting to 
rise again. The one has adequate cognitions, the one apprehends the world 
adequately, the other inadequately, one truly, one falsely, but what they 
experience, at least, what they encounter, is undeniably the same, i.e. that which is 
given irreconcilable properties: ‘that from which I may not fall,’ and ‘that from 
which I may fall to never rise again.’ The apperception of the same, is, moreover, 
more emphatically pro-duced, we are left with a more persuasive apprehension of 
the same, if it is inadequately apprehended. Even a relativist cannot from any 
perspective deny that whether one has adequate perceptions/apperception and the 
other inadequate, they do encounter in-differently the same. And the same is that 
which asserts itself regardless of our opinions, that which all true and a false 
                                                 
51 From Gorgias argument that ‘a man may scarcely perceive the same thing as someone 
else,’[Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 980b17.] does not follow that what is 
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opinions have in common, namely [th]is. Evidently, Shakespeare never laboured to 
give rise to millions of opinions about his work, but to offer the immediate 
apperception of the same to everyone, the undeniably impression of that which, 
like the arche of all things, is, as Pseudo-Aristotle indicates, ‘individually similar to 
itself.’
52  We shall note that Shakespeare’s works could only break into so many 
pieces when that which kept them together was not acknowledged, when the 
understanding of that which sustains the integrity of them all was missing: not 
only the appreciation of its production, but the awareness of the ontological 
difference itself, as a negativity, a kind of pyramid of negative beings that produce 
a powerful sense of Being. 
 
[C1]  Chapter 1 The Hermeneutics of Being, begins by exploring the Romantic 
creation of the Shakespearean aporia. This aporia is unmade by acknowledging 
that what Shakespeare most fundamentally offers, is not primarily a meaningful 
experience, but the apperception of the Being of negative beings that only a 
hermeneutics of Being may adequately discover. 
 
[C2]   Chapter 2 Philosophies of Unconcealment, denies Adorno’s view that there is 
no ontological difference, by exploring a philosophical tradition that has 
discovered [th]is difference as unconcealed: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Nietzsche, 
and Derrida. However, we do not acknowledge [th]is as the ontological difference 
per se, but only as an aspect of the ontological contradiction. 
 
 
                                                 
52 Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 976b1.                                                    Introduction                                                    21   
 
  
   
[C3]   Chapter 3 Philosophies of Concealment, denies Heidegger’s view that the 
ontological difference is by necessity unconcealed, by discovering a non-reified and 
unsubstantial tradition that explores the ontological difference as concealed. This 
tradition is traced back through history from Derrida, to Kant, and finally to 
Pseudo-Dionysius, where we find its most profound and influential expression in 
negative and symbolic theology. 
 
[C4]    Chapter 4 The Techne of Being, investigates the inadequacy of Aristotle’s 
concept of mimesis by identifying that it cannot explain what makes one 
[re]presentation more effective than another in producing a sense of what is [true]. 
The poiesis of Being is identified as belonging to an art of indequation where the 
most fundamental tropes of this techne are falsity, dissimilarity, nothing, 
indefinition, elision and substitution. 
 
[C5]    Chapter 5 The True Production of Being, inquires into the fundamental 
unfamiliarity of some of Shakespeare’s plays by discovering that it is founded on a 
logic of Being, which truly belongs to a Neoplatonic tradition that is profoundly 
unfamiliar to modern man. Shakespeare is shown to make himself inseparable 
from ourselves when he betrays this tradition, and, more emphatically, produces 
an apperception of Being as inessentially and insubstantially concealed. 
 
[C6]   Chapter 6 The False Production of Being, rejects Aristotle’s claim that the 
false merely [re]presents what does not exist, a position which denies the function 
of any false [re]presentation. The chapter demonstrates how Shakespeare 
produces a more profound sense of Being by, paradoxically, offering false 
[re]presentations that invariably bequeath a more emphatic sense of what is [true].                                                    Introduction                                                    22   
 
  
   
[C7]    Chapter 7 The Production of Being through Dissimilarity, displays concretely 
the inadequacy of any mimetic theory of [re]presentation, when it is shown how 
Shakespeare, by presenting dissimilarities rather than similarities, offers a more 
irrefutable sense of Being. For by [re]presenting beings as what they are not, the 
spectator is left with the undeniable impression that they are concealed. 
 
[C8]   Chapter 8 The Production of Being through Nothing, finds that the battle for 
nothing has predominantly been a fight between Platonism and Neoplatonism. We 
discover that Shakespeare concretely continues a Platonic tradition by using three 
variations of this trope of inadequation to produce the apperception of the Being of 
beings: ‘nothing,’ indefinition and elision, through which the spectator is offered 
an unreified experience of what is either unconcealed or concealed. 
 
[C9]   Chapter 9 The Production of Being through Substitution, recognizes that the 
function of substitution in Shakespeare’s plays is to produce the reinforced 
realization of the Being of that which is not apperceived. The thesis discovers a 
dialectics of inapperception and misapperception whereby the spectator is 
imperceptibly persuaded to give herself away, and thereby offered an emphatic 
sense of Being. 
 
[C10]    Chapter 10 The Paradox of Being, sums up how Shakespeare has produced 
contradictions to facilitate a dialectics of substitution that lies at the heart of all 
tropes of inadequation. For paradoxically, the contradiction experienced by the 
spectator creates the reinforced apperception of that which is contradicted, namely 
what is, the ontological difference. 
  
 
C1 THE HERMENEUTICS OF BEING 
 
§1.1 Making the Shakespearean Aporia 
§1.2 Unmaking the Shakespearean Aporia 
§1.3 The Topology of Being 
 
C1 EXPOSÉ 
            
[1]     In Chapter 1, The Hermeneutics of Being, we will witness how the aporia of 
Shakespeare, for centuries, has been created and recreated by a Romantic 
tradition, which, often unaware of what Shakespeare produces the apperception 
of, praises his plays as highly as it praises what is unknown. To make further 
progress possible it was necessary to formulate a problem. We therefore propose 
that Shakespeare, more than any of his peers, produces the apperception of the 
negative ontic-ontological difference, the contradiction between non-beings and 
that which they more profoundly offer the profound impression of, the Being of 
beings. It is the art of expressing the ontological difference negatively, i.e. The 
Poetics of Being, which makes Shakespeare’s plays stand out as truly grand and 
sometimes overwhelming. In Chapter 2, Philosophies of Unconcealment and in 
Chapter 3, Philosophies of Concealment, we will present two different aspects of the 
ontological contradiction, before we, in Chapter 4, The Techne of Being, more 
systematically, reveal how the apperception of [th]is
1 negative ontological 
difference is produced. The general means and the most applicable and effective 
instruments for [th]is poetic production, are all identified as belonging to the art of 
                                                 
1 [th]is, is used as an ontological marker to highlight the apperception of what is, the Being of 
beings. The form of [th]is experience will be clarified as we proceed, abstractly in Chapters 2, 3, 4, 
concretely in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. We should however indicate that Being contradicts that 
which it makes possible the Being of, beings. Moreover, the ontological difference is itself 
considered as a contradiction, [which] is either concealed or unconcealed. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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inadequation. The instruments that most effectively achieve [th]is end, are: falsity, 
dissimilarity, nothing, indefinition, elision,
2 and substitution. We will have a look at 
Shakespeare’s unequalled mastery of these means of inadequation for the 
production of the ontological contradiction – the contradiction between non-beings 
and that which they offer an almost ineradicable impression of, the Being of beings 
- in Chapter 5, The True Production of Being, Chapter 6, The False Production of 
Being, Chapter 7, The Production of Being through Dissimilarity, Chapter 8, The 
Production of Being through Nothing, Chapter 9, The Production of Being through 
Substitution, before we finally discuss a figure of inadequation which may sum up 
the effect of all these devices, in Chapter 10, The Paradox of Being.  
 
[2]     If all arts receive their name from their end, painting from painting, music 
from music, and if an art is a means to that end and Being names the negative 
ontological difference, we are attempting to write no less than The Poetics of Being. 
To the one possessing the virtue of [th]is poetry will belong a techne or an art, as it 
does to Shakespeare, of making the apperception of the ontological contradiction, 
or quite simply, as we portray in Chapter 4, The Techne of Being.  For, as we shall 
see, non-beings offer the most profound impression of that which they appear to 
contradict, namely that which transgresses all beings but nevertheless lends to 
them the apperception that they are [alive]. The clarification of the negative history 
of the ontological difference, in Chapter 2, Philosophies of Unconcealment and in 
Chapter 3, Philosophies of Concealment, is followed by a general chapter on how 
[th]is ontological contradiction is produced, negatively. After the abstract 
                                                 
2 Where the method of aphairesis is applied to the gradual or violent removal of properties from an 
individual being so as to convey a glimpse of its singularity, we shall speak of elision and not 
aphairesis, where all attributes, be they perceptual or intelligible, are taken away from the world at 
large. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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consideration of the instruments that belong to the techne of Being, and the end 
that they pro-duce, the apperception of ek-stasis, Being in the light, or hypo-stasis, 
Being in the dark, of Being concealed or of Being unconcealed, we will consider 
how these means of inadequation are applied, so unnoticeably that even when we 
know and have recognized these instruments they appear to vanish before our very 
eyes, to evaporate as we grasp that which they produce the solid impression of, 
while they themselves melt into thin air.  
   
[3]     Judging from the testimony of tradition, it is obvious that Shakespeare in 
most of his plays, in an exemplary manner, presents living beings, produces the 
apperception of something that is alive, whereas, for example, Goethe creates 
immaculate representations, that the first is admired for the life he creates as much 
as the last is admired for the ideas he represents dramatically.
3 In order not to 
pretend that we have created [th]is poetics from nothing, we will show that the 
disembodied principle of  inadequation, has already been incarnated on 
Shakespeare’s stage. However, if we in [th]is work only consider the poetic 
productions of Shakespeare, the reader should be informed that we are laying 
down principles of a poetics that may be applied to the understanding of any play, 
novel or film, in order to separate the works that produce the apperception of 
Being, from those that merely offer the impression of representations. For as the 
concept of the negative ontological difference suggests, it is the negative experience 
of beings that offer the most profound sense of Being. Still, we cannot say that the 
abstract considerations of The Poetics of Being did exist prior to reading 
                                                 
3 Whether the Faust legend has its origin in an obscure or hermetic past or a more recent origin in 
the legendary life of Paracelsus, it is obvious that it is the idea of the Faust Drama, what is 
essentially represented, that fascinates and never the experience of life that this legend occasions, be 
it in a play by Christopher Marlowe or Goethe or a novel by Thomas Mann. For the most notable 
expressions of the Faust legend, see Marlowe, Faustus, Goethe, Faust, and Mann, Doctor Faustus. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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Shakespeare’s plays, but that The Techne of Being slowly developed over time 
much like a map is developed from carefully reading the landscape. And yet, we do 
not expect Shakespeare’s plays to merely illustrate the abstractions.
4 If the 
concrete chapters offer a portrait of Shakespeare as an artist, a glimpse into his 
laboratorium, we are the first to acknowledge that Shakespeare is so much more 
than we can capture in one painting and that in The Poetics of Being, he is solely 
presented as The Master of Inadequation. We are also aware that there could have 
been painted many other portraits of this artist, and that the hermeneutical 
process will ensure that the paint never runs dry. 
§1.1 Making the Shakespearean Aporia 
       
[4]   We shall witness the creation of the Shakespearean aporia, the judgment 
that we in part or fully neither know what Shakespeare creates the experience of 
nor how he creates this ineffable experience. This aporia, which we acknowledge 
the existence of, is created and prolonged by a Romantic tradition which heralds 
Shakespeare as a supreme maker, that is able to produce an experience almost if 
not wholly indistinguishable from what the Romantic without further attempt at 
definition would call, ‘Nature,’ ‘Truth,’ ‘Life,’ ‘Reality,’ and sometimes ‘God.’ 
One should not blame any reader who does not immediately grasp the significance 
of any of these words, which seem like signifiers longing for a long lost beloved, the 
signified, which here appear to be ungraspable. But, for the Romantic, the lure of 
any of these terms, is, of course, that they produce a signified, a transcendental 
signified, that is bound to be ungraspable, and it is this indefinite, if not wholly 
                                                 
4 The relation between the abstract considerations in Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, and the concrete 
considerations of Shakespeare’s plays in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 is truly dialectical: there is always 
an abundance in concreta, something that always invites the inquisitive to take one step further into 
the unknown, if there is time. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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empty concept that itself produces a longing for that which we are unable to grasp 
with our senses. We do take our cue from this Romantic tradition, which like a 
kind host points out that what Shakespeare produces the supreme impression of is 
beyond what we may [immediately] perceive, as the Romantic says of his plays, 
they are ‘ineffable,’ ‘insurmountable,’ ‘inscrutable,’ etc.. 
  
[5]   Following this Romantic tradition, it is not difficult to agree with one of its 
latest grand exponents, George Steiner, when he says of Shakespeare, ‘Could one, 
without everlasting peril, match something of [Shakespeare’s] rights and powers of 
conception, of calling into life?’
5 Immediately we agree with Steiner, although we 
find it hard to define what we agree about when we agree about ‘life’? In his 
beautiful book, Grammars of Creation, which has a negative trait throughout as it 
searches for that inexhaustible source that creates all aspects of life, Steiner 
summons all powers of creation: psychological, poetical, mythological, 
philosophical, musical, technological, and gives a tour de force of some of the 
thinkers within our Western tradition that explicitly voices their poetical views. So 
there is a poetics for Dante as one may find a poetical discourse in Dante’s works, 
as there is for Hegel, of whom Steiner shows to have an intimate knowledge. But 
Steiner’s exposition of the Grammars of Creation comes to a halt where he does not 
                                                 
5 We shall see that what Steiner calls ‘life,’ we shall later recall through the concept of the 
ontological difference. It is perhaps surprising that a book, which on such a grand historical scale 
considers creation in all its facets, omits mentioning the ontological difference, the vantage point 
from which Heidegger made it possible to consider the Being of all beings. The mistake does not lie 
with Steiner, who considers Heidegger briefly, but with Heidegger himself. For, as is clear, 
Heidegger takes the Being of beings for granted, whereas Steiner considers all aspects of creation, 
whether this making is theological, poetical, mythological, philosophical, technological or musical. 
There is however one thing we would like to point out. When considering what is, according to 
Aristotle, highest or first,[Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, 983a4.] the Being of beings, the distinction 
between theology and ontology does often become blurred. We shall therefore place a comment by 
Gadamer next to Steiner’s remark, ‘Heidegger’s ontology is grounded in a constant ‘keeping at 
bay’ of the theological.’ [Steiner, Grammars of Creation, p. 16n] For as Gadamer indicates, ‘In a 
letter to Karl Löwith in 1921 [Heidegger] said of himself, “I am a Christian theologian.”’ 
[Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, ‘Being Spirit God (1977),’ p. 182].  [See also, Gadamer, Heidegger’s 
Ways, ‘The Religious Dimension,’ p. 170]. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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recognize its own discourse. To emphasise that it is not I but Steiner himself who 
points out the aporia that faces all Shakespearean scholarship, I will let Steiner say 
this, ‘There are magnitudes and complexities of vision before which ordinary 
scholarship and criticism are lamed. Only the facts can be made out.’
6 Steiner does 
even suggest that the road to a theoretical discourse about Shakespeare’s poetics 
may forever be inaccessible, when he says, ‘Shakespeare may, most wisely, have 
chosen not to put the question of creation to himself or to articulate it in his works. 
Augustinian-Aquinian Dante can and must do so./Thus Dante provides privileged 
access to almost the entirety of our theme [i.e. creation in all its facets], whereas 
Shakespeare’s absence from this theme [i.e. creation in all its facets] – he is its deus 
absconditus – renders such access problematic.’
7 If not, we should rather say, 
‘aporetic.’  
 
[6]   By exposing the aporia of Shakespeare, Steiner shows the way to what any 
criticism of Shakespeare will have to go through if it is to discover Shakespeare’s 
explicit powers of creation.  And we believe what Steiner says, in Grammars of 
Creation, when he lucidly exposes the basis of that Romantic aporia which we later 
will attempt to solve. For nowhere is there ‘in Shakespeare a theorizing discourse 
on aesthetics, let alone any disclosure of his personal experience of creativity.’
8 The 
irrational ground of the Shakespearean aporia is further clarified by Steiner when 
he remarks, ‘Was there ever a sensibility more receptive of the manifold disorders 
and instabilities of human existence, of the energies of unmastered being as they 
                                                 
6 Steiner, Grammars of Creation, p. 66. 
7 Steiner, Grammars of Creation, p. 69. 
8 Steiner, Grammars of Creation, p. 67. Emphasis added. Immediately after Steiner ads, again to 
stress the same point, ‘Nowhere is there any sustained reflection on what it is to be Shakespeare, on 
what it is to be a supreme maker.’[Steiner, Grammars of Creation, p. 67]. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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spill over the confines of doctrine or of reason?’
9 Everything points to the excessive 
or irrational nature of Shakespeare’s plays that makes it impossible to grasp an 
underlying poetic structure with reason, the lack of discourse barring access to his 
[poetic] laboratorium. There is however something missing in Steiner’s insightful 
assessment of Shakespeare. For even though there cannot be found, as Steiner 
says, ‘anywhere in Shakespeare a theorizing discourse of his personal experience 
of creativity,’
10 not finding a discourse does not mean that the grammar does not 
exist, for obviously, there are grammars even for languages where these rules have 
not yet been detected, and there may be a poetics for what transcends reason. 
Although I am grateful for Steiner pointing out the aporia, which we have no 
doubt exists, I shall preliminary say this:  Shakespeare may very well adopt a 
philosophy that transcends reason, that grounds a poetics which concretely enables 
him to create the apperception or experience of what we all may vaguely call ‘life.’  
 
[7]     The Shakespearean aporia is not made by me, but by a Romantic tradition 
that continues to this very day. Even the most renowned of all living Shakespeare 
scholars, Harold Bloom, confesses that he has dedicated his life’s work to what still 
remains a mystery to him; Shakespeare.
11 Speaking of the ‘miracle’ of 
Shakespeare’s creations,
12 thus placing himself securely within a Romantic 
tradition that never seize to create wonder,
 13 Mr. Bloom soon admits, ‘The more 
                                                 
9 Steiner, Grammars of Creation, p. 67. Emphasis added. 
10 Steiner, Grammars of Creation, p. 67. 
11 In his greatly readable book, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, Mr. Bloom admits, ‘I 
have read and taught Shakespeare almost daily for these past twelve years, and am certain that I 
see him only darkly. His intellect is superior to mine.’ [Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the 
Human, p. 2]. 
12 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. xix. 
13 Mr. Bloom says, ‘Essentially, I seek to extend a tradition of interpretation that includes Samuel 
Johnson, William Hazlitt, A. C. Bradley, and Harold Goddard, a tradition now mostly out of 
fashion.’ [Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. xx.] Speaking of his Romantic debt, 
Mr. Bloom says, ‘Romantic criticism, from Hazlitt through Pater and A. C. Bradley on to Harold The Hermeneutics of Being 
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one reads and ponders the plays of Shakespeare, the more one realizes that the 
accurate stance toward them is one of awe. How he was possible, I cannot know.’
14 
But where are we to locate the crux of the Shakespearean aporia, what is it that 
makes or grounds this impassability, this unanswerability? As Bloom says in the 
introduction to his intimate, psychological readings of Shakespeare, which are 
fabulously nuanced, ‘Some critics of Shakespeare may conservatively contend that 
Shakespeare’s originality was in the representation of cognition, personality, 
character. But there is an overflowing element in the plays, an excess beyond 
representation, that is closer to the metaphor we call “creation.”’
15 It is this 
‘overflowing element,’ this ‘excess’ that creates the Shakespearean aporia, where 
we dumbfounded appear to not know what we are facing the wonder of. 
 
[8]   There would, of course, not be a Shakespearean aporia if one did not 
discover it in any of his plays. The Tragedy of King Lear, which Bloom rightly calls 
the ‘height of literary experience,’
16 may also be the culmination of this aporia. As 
Bloom says, ‘Hazlitt thought that it was equally impossible to give either a 
description of the play itself or of its effect upon the mind. Rather strikingly, for so 
superb a psychological critic, Hazlitt, remarks, “All that we can say must fall far 
short of the subject; or even of what we ourselves conceive of it.”’
17 But what is it 
we are not able to apprehend, comprehend, understand, fathom, when we are 
reading or watching King Lear? What is it that remains beyond comprehension, 
incomprehensible? Is it possible to define or circumnavigate that which to us 
                                                                                                                                               
Goddard, taught that what matters most in Shakespeare is shared by him more with Chaucer and 
with Dostoevsky than with his contemporaries Marlowe and Ben Jonson. Inner selves …’ [Bloom, 
Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 1]. 
14 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. xix. Emphasis added. 
15 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. xx. 
16 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 477. 
17 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 484. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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remains incomprehensible, that place where we find nowhere to go? First of all, we 
could say this; it would be difficult to find answers to scientific questions when 
reading the Bible or Homer. Similarly, it may be that not all answers to 
Shakespeare’s plays, The Tragedy of King Lear in particular, are found by posing 
psychological questions. If we do think so we are almost certain to, as Hazlitt 
proves and Mr. Bloom shows, end up with an aporia, an unpassable critical abyss 
where one may stand, if one will, and wonder. But what if one were to ask another 
kind of question, a non-psychological question? But, one may ask, are there then, 
would there then be any other question to pose to the Shakespearean play, that 
more than other ways could bear fruit, create a clearing, and perhaps provide an 
answer? 
 
[9]   If we allow ourselves to both consider Bloom’s point of view that 
Shakespeare is the inventor of what we call [psychological] ‘personality,’
18 but also 
allow Foucault to intervene in this discourse and say that at the time of 
Shakespeare, the psycho-logical may not yet have been invented, we could at least 
be tempted to look for other than psychological solutions for the often enigmatic 
behaviour of Shakespeare’s creatures.
19 It may be time to begin an ontological 
                                                 
18 Bloom, Shakespeare – The Invention of the Human, p. 4. 
19 The only thing troubling with Mr. Bloom’s theoryless or ‘aesthetic’ [Bloom, Shakespeare – The 
Invention of the Human, p. 9] reading of how Shakespeare invented the human, is not its universal 
claims, but rather that there is not, in more than seven hundred pages, an inkling or a hint that 
Shakespeare also incorporates experiences that are not our own. For example, Eugene M. Waith 
says in his thoughtful introduction to The Two Noble Kinsmen, ‘If uncertainty about the authorship 
of The Two Noble Kinsmen is one reason for its neglect by directors and its dismissal by some 
reviewers as inferior or downright silly, surely another is the problem posed for any contemporary 
spectator or reader by the conventions of chivalric romance. As some awareness of the laws of 
heroic behaviour in Homer’s time is needed for an understanding of Achilles, so an awareness of 
the ideals of chivalry is a necessary first step in approaching Palamon, Arcite, Emilia, and 
Theseus.‘ [Waith, ‘Introduction’ to Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, p. 43.] Although it is 
undeniable that an ahistoric or psychological approach such as Mr. Bloom’s [See for example, 
Bloom, Shakespeare – The Invention of the Human, p. 1] is itself the greatest and simplest 
expression of history, and that Mr. Bloom, like all of us, is bound to speak of, even erect, something 
other than what he intends to, and that history, irrevocably, speaks allegorically in all The Hermeneutics of Being 
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interrogation of Shakespeare’s plays, by simply asking; how does Shakespeare 
create the almost unquestionable experience that what appears before the 
spectator is? Or, as Mr. Bloom, quoting Shelley, puts it, ‘“forms more real than 
living men.”’
20 Let us look at one character larger than life. When Mr. Bloom 
points to Edgar as the main enigma of King Lear,
21 that Tom O’Bedlam is ‘the 
central emblem of the play: philosopher, fool, madman, nihilist, dissembler,’
22 we 
could not agree more.  As Mr. Bloom justifiably says, ‘We can wonder at the depth 
and prolongation of the self-abasement, but then Edgar would not have been 
Edgar without it.’
23  Truly, the right word is ‘depth’? But what kind of depth are 
we speaking of? A social depth? A religious depth? A psychological depth? Would 
it not be possible, for the first time in Shakespeare, to seek an ontological depth, to 
finally say that Shakespeare offers the negative, the profound impression of that 
without which all things would seize to be, the Being of beings?  
 
[10]  It may be true, as Mr. Bloom says, as he again poses the Shakespearean 
aporia, that ‘Every attempt to mitigate the darkness of this work is an involuntary 
critical lie.’
24 Truly we believe that no psychological reading alone can disentangle 
the Gordian knot created by the many characters in The Tragedy of King Lear.  
But if we look at the enigma that lies at the hear of King Lear, as if at the core of 
                                                                                                                                               
interpretations, that all interpretations inevitably are bound to have no other subject than our own, 
it is nevertheless clear that as scholars we cannot always allow ourselves the undisciplined pleasure 
of committing ourselves to a one-sided representation, which, however much it keeps history alive, 
would soon lead to the death of history as a science. It is therefore clear that no scholarly approach 
to Shakespeare can avoid also an exact awareness of the historical context without which any 
interpretation of Shakespeare would remain or become precisely what all scholarly activity is: an 
attempt to rid itself of what is merely subjective. Chapter 5, The True Production of Being will show 
that Mr. Bloom has exposed one-half of the experiences that Shakespeare’s ouevre makes available 
to man, if not all the experiences available to modern men, which is to say not a little. 
20 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 7. 
21 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 480. 
22 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 489. 
23 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 485. 
24 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 485. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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the Shakespearean aporia, we find one central fact, namely, as Mr. Bloom 
recognizes, Edgar’s ‘consistent unwillingness to reveal himself.’
25 Again Mr. 
Bloom says something truly profound, ‘Whether as a bedlamite or poor peasant, 
Edgar refuses his own identity for more than practical purposes.’
26 But what other 
purposes are there? Social? Legal? Religious? Psychological? Moral? As Bloom 
points out, psychological reasons alone does not explain Edgar’s ‘unwillingness to 
reveal himself to Gloucester, his father.’
27 But what then? Considering this 
impasse, would it not be possible, finally, to read this non-revelation along with 
Shakespeare’s non-dramatization of the encounter where Edgar finally reveal his 
identity to his father,
28 differently: onto-logically, poeto-logically. For is it not, as 
we shall see, clear that it is and remains Edgar’s false appearance as Tom 
O’Bedlam, the fact that he is never recognized, that creates the most profound 
sense of his Being. To some extent, it can be argued, Mr. Bloom takes for granted 
that Edgar already is a ‘philosopher, fool, madman, nihilist, dissembler,’
29 when it 
is this very lack of revelation, his false appearance that truly creates, as we shall 
see, the profound apperception of his Being [in the first place].
30 For is it not false 
rather than true appearances, unrecognition rather than recognition, that most 
convincingly persuade the spectator that what appear before him is? Does not 
unrecognition quite simply provide a sense of depth where recognition often does 
not? We wish to elaborate, but need to fully expose the aporia before the problem, 
                                                 
25 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 480. 
26 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 480. Emphasis added. 
27 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 480. 
28 Mr. Bloom has finely characterised the non-dramatization of ‘the recognition encounter’ between 
Gloucester and his son as ‘one of Shakespeare’s great unwritten scenes,’ [Bloom, Shakespeare – The 
Invention of the Human, p. 481] Although this may emotionally ring true, I reserve the right to 
disagree on its possible poetic effect/affect, as I believe that to Shakespeare, non-recognition rather 
than recognition produces the more profound sense of Being. 
29 Bloom, Shakespeare – The Invention of the Human, p. 489. 
30 For my particular reading of the false encounter between Lord Gloucester and his unrecognized 
son Edgar, when he appears as Tom O’Bedlam, see pp. XXX-XXX. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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those places where even the most prominent of all Shakespeare scholars seem to 
find no way out. Thence, we shall continue. 
 
[11]     As there is among rhetoricians a common figure of denying a denial, there 
is among Romantics a common gesture of making the inexpressible inexpressible, 
to obscure what is already obscure, to offer an encomium of the unknown. De 
Quincey is likely to be on opium when he repeatedly speaks of the knock on the 
door at Macbeth’s Castle, which in the middle of the night sounds much like the 
last beat of a single heart after the host has killed his guest. The obsession with the 
inexplicable clearly finds De Quincy, the dream-diarist and opium-eater, in 
ekstasis, when he says, ‘the knocking at the gate, which succeeds the murder of 
Duncan, produced to my feelings an effect for which I never could account.’
31 
Elaborating on his profound experience, obscuring what is already unknown, he 
says, ‘why it should produce such an effect [I don’t know] …In fact, my 
understanding said positively that it could not produce any effect.’
32 No one should 
expect a Romantic to solve the puzzle he presents. Neither does De Quincey, who 
guards the secret, keeps what is inexplicable in the dark, protecting one riddle with 
another riddle, each one moving us further away from what is inexplicable, not, 
however, without these layers creating the superficial apperception of depth, an 
impression that remains almost regardless of what has been said. 
 
                                                 
31 De Quincey, ’On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth,’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on 
Shakespeare, p. 432.
 The reference is to Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act II, Scene ii.56-73. 
32 De Quincey, ’On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth,’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on 
Shakespeare, p. 432. Emphasis added. What De Quincey in effect says is that, not only do I not 
understand the knock on the door in the middle of the night after Macbeth has slain King Duncan, 
but I do not understand why I do not understand the knock on the door in the middle of the night 
after Macbeth has slain King Duncan. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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[12]     What often happens within the Romantic discourse on Shakespeare is, 
perhaps because there appear to be nothing left to grasp, that the subject able to 
produce the apperception of the inexpressible becomes more worthy of devotion 
than the inexpressible itself. Loudly expressing the Romantic encomium, the credo 
of the unknown, De Quincey speaks of Shakespeare, ‘O mighty poet! Thy works 
are not as those of other men, simply and merely great works of art; but are also 
like the phenomena of nature, like the sun and the sea, the stars and the flowers; 
like the frost and the snow, rain and dew, hail-storm and thunder, which are to be 
studied with entire submission of our own faculties, and in the perfect faith that in 
them there can be no too much or too little.’
33 Shakespeare is simply said to erase 
the difference between art and nature, to make his spectators unable, when faced 
with his productions, to distinguish between nature and art. For once we agree 
with De Quincey, and may I add, that it is as helpful to follow the inspiration of a 
Romantic, as it is to learn from the failures or advancements of the enemy. For it is 
obvious that the phenomena of art and nature could only be seen as 
indistinguishable, if they give rise to the apperception of something more than what 
we can or may essentially perceive through which they may be or become 
experienced as inseparable. As we will continue to show throughout this thesis, in a 
certain sense, Shakespeare’s art produces the experience of nature, not because art 
mirrors nature, as Aristotle would say,
34 or nature mirrors art, as Plato would be 
                                                 
33 De Quincey, ’On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth,’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on 
Shakespeare, p. 435. Emphasis added. 
34 As Richard Mckeon says in his introduction to Aristotle’s Poetics, ‘Aristotle is fond of repeating 
the observation that the objects of art are produced as nature would have produced them, and that 
in the processes of production and the objects produced, art imitates nature. [Richard McKeon, 
Introduction to Aristotle’s Poetics, in Aristotle, Introduction to Aristotle, New York: Random house, 
1992. Emphasis added.] A perhaps humorous case in point is when Aristotle, having observed that 
‘the poet [is] an imitator just like a painter,’ [Cf. Aristotle, Poetics, 1460b8] adds that ‘it is a lesser 
error in an artist not to know, for instance, that the hind has no horns, than to produce an The Hermeneutics of Being 
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more inclined to contend,
35 but rather, because they both yield, life necessarily and 
art masterfully, the apperception of the Being of beings, the apperception of that 
which is more than what we may possibly perceive. Through [th]is ontological 
contradiction, that which is more than what we can possibly perceive, the 
phenomena of nature and the phenomena of art may appear to be indistinguishable. 
For both art and nature may convey the apperception of the ontological 
contradiction, not the direct perception of what anything essentially is, but the 
apperception of that without which [th]is would not be anything at all.
36  
 
[13]     An unwillingness to explicate one’s understanding may in fact stem from a 
true incapacity to do so. However, what is helpful in the Romantic praise of 
Shakespeare is that it often recognizes that Shakespeare produces the experience of 
‘life,’ ‘nature,’ ‘truth,’ ‘reality,’ however vaguely they may consider or use any of 
these terms. The one who expresses this experience most forcefully, even 
pathetically, is none other than Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, who says of 
Shakespeare’s plays, ‘I cannot recollect any book, any man, any incident of my 
life, has produced such important effects on me … They seem as if they were 
performances of some celestial genius, descending among men, to make them, by 
                                                                                                                                               
unrecognizable picture of one.’[Aristotle, Poetics, 1460b31, in Aristotle, Introduction to Aristotle, 
New York: Random house, 1992, p. 707]. 
35 Speaking pedagogically, Socrates states that in the [ideal] republic it is necessary to ‘supervise the 
storytellers. We’ll select their stories whenever they are fine or beautiful and reject them when they 
aren’t. And we’ll persuade nurses and mothers to tell their children the ones we have selected, since 
they will shape their children’s souls with stories much more than they shape their bodies by 
handling them.’ [Plato, Republic, 377b-c]. 
36 The dispute over the priorities of art and nature is truly an essential debate that undoubtedly is 
superficial from the perspective of the question of the Being of beings. For only superficially do 
these positions clash. Claiming that art mirrors nature or nature art contains merely a superficial 
contradiction, for the common and sole focus, which shows that they agree about what is 
fundamental, is on what is essentially reflected. A discourse that focuses on the question of the 
primacy of art or nature, whether it is Plato or Aristotle, Nietzsche or Oscar Wilde, is likely to 
neglect the question of the ontological difference, as it is concerns itself, almost solely, with what 
beings essentially are, and not the Being of beings. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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the mildest instructions, acquainted with themselves. They are not fictions.’
37 But 
perhaps this effect of being experienced as not fictions is only presented in the right 
light when seen next to Tieck, where one Romantic may shed light on another. For 
Ludwig Tieck says, ‘[Shakespeare] had learnt what produces an effect on people’s 
minds by studious observation of mankind, and he created his words of art 
according to his own instinct and the rules which he had derived from experience. 
This is the reason why most of his plays are so generally effective in performance 
and when read, and why they must necessarily be effective, for perhaps there is not 
one poet who has calculated the theatrical effect of his works as carefully as 
Shakespeare.’
38 Neither Tieck nor Goethe do however explicate the means through 
which Shakespeare achieves this baffling end, [th]is inexplicable effect, and we 
could, like Wilhelm Meister, capitulate before the aporia of the Shakespearean 
play, and simply announce that they are ‘the most mysterious and complex 
productions of creation.’
39 What is brought to mind in the Romantic discourse is 
again the superlative of not knowing, the praise of what remains concealed. Thus 
the Romantic shows, time and again, tirelessly and almost without interruption, 
that he does not hope, does not even desire to reveal anything, that he more than 
anything takes care to guard what is, what perhaps must remain, secret.  
 
[14]     To Charles Lamb and so many Romantics the depth of nature witnessed in 
Shakespeare’s plays seems unfathomable. ‘It is common for people to talk of 
Shakespeare’s plays being so natural; that everybody can understand him. They 
                                                 
37 Goethe, ‘Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1796),’ as presented in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on 
Shakespeare, p. 67. Emphasis added. 
38 Tieck, Ludwig, ‘Shakespeare’s Treatment of the Marvellous,’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on 
Shakespeare, p. 61. 
39 Goethe, ‘Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1796),’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on Shakespeare, 
p. 68. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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are natural indeed, they are grounded deep in nature, so deep that the depth of 
them lies out of the reach of the most of us.’
40 Acknowledging Lamb’s difficulties, 
we shall nevertheless try to penetrate [th]is mystification whose sole purpose is to 
pride oneself with ignorance. We shall maintain, with Schlegel, that the impression 
of [th]is depth was consciously produced, that Shakespeare did not produce the 
apperception of [th]is depth without thinking. Schlegel stands positively on the side 
that attributes Shakespeare’s excellence, not to the coincidences of nature, but to 
the mastery of an art. Schlegel, quite simply considers Shakespeare’s ‘dramatic 
composition, one of the most thoughtful productions of the human mind,’
41 which, 
long before the play was ever staged, went in conscious pursuit of the ‘theatrical 
effect.’
42 Schlegel explains,  
‘To me [Shakespeare] appears a profound artist, and not a blind and wildly 
luxuriant genius. I consider, generally speaking, all that has been said on 
the subject a mere fable, a blind and extravagant error. In other arts the 
assertion refutes itself; for in them acquired knowledge is an indispensable 
condition of clever execution.’
43  
 
[15]  There are, of course, those who are of the opposite view of Schlegel, who 
still assert that the ground of Shakespeare’s productions cannot be attributed to an 
art, and if it can, it is impossible to produce its theory, which would be even more 
inexplicable than its effect. Adam Müller appear to say at first sight that,  
                                                 
40 Lamb, Charles, ‘On the Tragedies of Shakespeare, considered with reference to their fitness for 
stage representation (1811),’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 117. 
41 Schlegel, ‘Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature (1808-11),’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on 
Shakespeare, p. 94. Emphasis added. 
42 Schlegel, ‘Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature (1808-11),’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on 
Shakespeare, p. 94. Emphasis added. 
43 Schlegel, ‘Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature (1808-11),’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on 
Shakespeare, pp. 93-94. Commenting on the rumour that Shakespeare was no more than a wild 
genius, Schlegel says, ‘An idea, however, soon became prevalent that Shakespeare was a rude and 
wild genius, who poured forth at random, and without aim or object, his unconnected 
compositions. Ben Jonson, a younger contemporary and rival of Shakespeare, who laboured in the 
sweat of his brow, but with no great success, to expel the romantic drama from the English stage, 
and to form it on the model of the ancients, gave it as his opinion that Shakespeare did not blot out 
enough, and that as he did not possess much more to nature than to art. The learned, and 
sometimes rather pedantic Milton was also of this opinion.’ Schlegel, A. W. von, ‘Lectures on 
Dramatic Art and Literature (1808-11),’ The Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 89. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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‘It is impossible to derive from [Shakespeare’s] work vulgar rules for the 
craft of poetry, or poetic calculation; it is quite impossible to imitate him; 
but to be seized by him and swept along in the mighty stream of life, into 
the freedom from all oppressive, restrictive forms - that is certainly 
possible.’
44 
 
However, when emphasizing the freedom of Shakespeare’s plays from the 
‘constraint’ or conformity to [poetic] rules, Adam Müller [1806], admits that 
Shakespeare ‘appears at one and the same time to sound the depths of nature and 
to create it artificially.’
45 But there is and remains a double aporia here. For not 
only does Shakespeare produce the apperception of that which is beyond 
comprehension, we also have no idea of how he achieves [th]is end. We cannot 
simply comprehend how Shakespeare produces the apperception of what is 
incomprehensible. Again, the means by which Shakespeare produces the ineffable 
remains unknown. As Goethe already said of Shakespeare’s plays, ‘We experience 
the truth of life - how, we do not know!’
46 To sound persuasive to the unknowing, 
the Romantic does often make Shakespeare appear less as an artist and more like a 
magician.
47 No one does perhaps more clearly than Carlyle express the 
mystification, if not the naïveté, of the Romantic criticism, when he says, 
‘Shakespeare’s Art is not Artifice; the noblest worth of it is not there by plan or 
precontrivance. It grows-up from the deeps of Nature, through this noble sincere 
                                                 
44 Müller, Adam, ‘Fragments Concerning William Shakespeare (1806),’ in Bate [ed.], The 
Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 83. 
45 Müller, Adam, ‘Fragments Concerning William Shakespeare (1806),’ in Bate [ed.], The 
Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 83. Emphasis added. 
46 Goethe, W. von, ‘Shakespeare and no End (1815),’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on Shakespeare, 
p. 71. Emphasis added. We should perhaps not fail to point out the perspective through which 
Goethe fails to understand the art of the Shakespearean theatre. Goethe approaches the secret of 
Shakespeare’s incarnations/characters from within, and not from without. That is, from what is 
known about these characters, and not from the point of view where these characters remain 
unknown to the other. It seems that Goethe suffers from the enlightened reluctance to identify, if 
that is the right word, with the unknower. This incapacity makes Goethe unable to understand how 
the experience of these characters as living beings is created.  
47 Claiming that Shakespeare appears much like a magician, one has, of course, admitted that one 
does not know what one is speaking of. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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soul, who is a voice of Nature.’
48 Being like so many Romantics fond of origins, 
archae, Carlyle goes on to name the founder of the topos of Shakespeare as the 
artless creator. Carlyle says, ‘Novalis beautifully remarks of him [Shakespeare], 
that those drama of his are products of nature too, deep as nature herself. I find a 
great truth in this saying.’
49 We can easily see that Thomas Carlyle thinks that 
Shakespeare wipes away all traces of production, as if he had committed a crime 
and much less written a drama.
50   
§1.2 Unmaking the Shakespearean Aporia 
 
 
[16]     Theatres like Shakespeare’s Globe were first built after the performance of 
theatre in the streets of London was forbidden.
51 Prior to this prohibition, it could, 
of course, at one time or another, in the great marketplaces of London, happen 
that an actor was mistaken for a man and a man taken to be an actor, the one 
confused with the other, so much so that the world suddenly became a stage and 
the stage no less than the world. It is this ambition to incorporate everything on 
                                                 
48 Carlyle, Thomas, ‘The Hero as Poet (1840),’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 252. 
Emphasis added. 
49 Carlyle, Thomas, ‘The Hero as Poet (1840),’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 252. 
50 It would perhaps be fair to indicate that Carlyle adds that what Shakespeare above all produced 
the impression of, is something deep. According to Adorno, Kant - a contemporary of Carlyle - is 
considered no less than the philosopher of depth par excellence. Not unnaturally, Kant will come to 
our assistance, when we more precisely than Carlyle, attempt to define what Shakespeare produces 
the impression of.  We will mark out that the hidden is not only expressed but produced, and is 
apperceived by the cognitive faculties, more specifically, by Reason [Vernunft]. We shall point out 
how Shakespeare succeeds in [th]is production, of what only Reason can grasp at a depth beyond 
Understanding [Verstand]: the noumenon, be the illusory apperception of [th]is substance called, 
self, world or even God. 
51 Parrot and Ball adds the reason for this prohibition:  ‘The city officials from the beginning, 
unlike the Queen and her court, were chary of public play-acting, partly on moral grounds, more 
definitely for fear of three menaces: fire, sedition, and the plague. These were no idle fears. Fire 
was a constant danger to old London, which was at last almost wiped out by the great fire of 1666. 
The two largest theatres, the Globe and the Fortune, were burnt to the ground in 1613 and 1621. 
Plague was endemic in London: the deaths from this source averaged forty to fifty a week. When 
they rose above this number, the theatres closed until it seemed safe to reopen them. The disorderly 
groundlings sometimes stormed the stage or indulged in rioting among themselves. One theatre, the 
Phœnix, was almost destroyed by rioting apprentices in 1617.‘ Parrot, Thomas Marc and Ball, 
Robert Hamilton, A Short View of Elizabethan Drama, pp. 48-49. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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one stage that resonates in the name Shakespeare gave to his theatre, the Globe, 
the confusion of theatre and life no less intended by the banner that greeted all its 
spectators before they entered the theatre, ‘All is True.’
52  
 
[17]     Concerning the question as to what Shakespeare produces the unequalled 
apperception of, we shall follow history, taking history in the sense of historein, 
experience, and present the aporia before the problem. A problem is a question for 
which there are two diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive answers where 
there are proponents or arguments for both propositions, which both cannot be 
true at the same time.
53 An aporia, however, is a question for which there is or 
appears to be no answer, or rather, as Aristotle points out in Metaphysics, a 
philosophical question for which there immediately appears to be no answer.
54 
Again, a problem is a question for which there exist two mutually exclusive 
answers, an aporia is a question for which there exist none, and so obscure, so 
indistinct may [th]is aporia appear to be, that one may even be unable to pose the 
question, ‘What is it that Shakespeare produces the unequalled apperception of?’ 
Obviously, what Shakespeare has produced so far, to philosophers and spectators 
alike,
55 is not a philosophical problem, but an aporia. For there exists to date not 
                                                 
52 Parrot, Thomas Marc and Ball, Robert Hamilton, A Short View of Elizabethan Drama, p. 15. It is 
perhaps a true token of the potential in-difference between stage and life, theatre and the world, 
when on the premiere of Henry VIII (or All is True) on 29 June 1613, the Globe finally burned 
down to the ground. [Waith, ‘Introduction’ to Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, p. 5]. 
53 For Aristotle’s definition of the impossibility of resolving a problem except through dialectical 
means, that is, by appealing to the views or opinions of the many or the few, see Aristotle, Topics, 
Book I, 104b29-37. 
54 For Aristotle’s views on, even praise of the necessity of aporia, see Aristotle, Metaphysics, where 
he says, ‘those who inquire without first going through aporiae are like people who do not know 
where they have to go, … in addition, … one <who has not gone through aporiae> does not even 
know whether he has ever found the object sought for or not.’ [Aristotle, Metaphysics B, 995, a31-
37, p. 1]. Trans. Arthur Madigan. 
55 We do recall that the distinguishing mark of all philosophers:  attending the Olympics they would 
not be found among the athletes, neither among the tradesmen, but among the spectators. Cf. As 
related of Pythagoras by Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Volume II, VIII.6-8, 
trans. R. D. Hicks, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 327f. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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two mutually exclusive answers as to what Shakespeare produces with such 
mastership, but rather none. Nor do there exist two mutually exclusive answers as 
to what means Shakespeare uses to produce an almost unequalled effect on his 
audience. 
 
[18]     The Romantics did not only lead us to the end of the road where we 
experience the inexplicable effect of the Shakespearean play, but more so, it was 
the Romantic himself who made [th]is end, who made [th]is aporia. Evidently, if 
you erase the road towards an end, you will have nowhere to go, you will, as is 
obvious, already be at the end. But, as Aristotle asserts in Metaphysics, an aporia is 
not simply to encounter a problem that seemingly cannot be resolved, the 
experience of reaching a dead end or a dead beginning.
56 Aporia is also that which 
you have to go through to reach the end.
57 A mountain is an aporia until you build 
a tunnel; a fjord is an aporia until you build a bridge.
58 If Aristotle and a 
Romantic were suddenly to discover an aporia, we are quite sure what would have 
happened. Whereas we believe the Romantic would be inclined to admire its depth 
and perhaps be tempted to suicide, Aristotle, being a more practical man, would 
                                                 
56 Approaching the aporia, Derrida appears somewhat impatient, erasing the road as he walks 
along, neglecting that negative theology, as a methodos, is but a means to an end. For signs of 
Derrida’s impatience, or his reluctance to move ahead or even his desire to produce the impression 
of an aporia, see for example his definitions of ‘aporia’ in Aporias. Cherishing the aporetic 
experience, Derrida says, when he encounters ‘aporia’ in Aristotle’s exposition of place in the 
fourth book of Physics, ‘that ‘aporia’ ‘concerns the impossible or the impracticable. (Diaporeo is 
Aristotle’s term here: it means ‘I’m stuck … I cannot get out, I’m helpless.’[Derrida, Aporias, 13] 
How different is not the patience with which Arthur Madigan, the translator of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics B, notes the three-stage process through which aporiae are resolved in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle says, ‘We must, as in other cases, posit the phainomena and first go 
through aporiae, and thus prove, if possible, all the endoxa about these affections or, if not, most of 
them and the most authoritative; for if the difficulties are solved and the endoxa left, the matter 
would be sufficiently proven.’[Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VII.I.1145b2-6, as quoted by Arthur 
Madigan in Aristotle, Metaphysics B and K 1-2, p. xviii.] Evidently, Derrida’s valuation of aporia 
differs considerably from Aristotle’s, where aporia is an unavoidable part of any significant 
investigation, of any great advance to a known end from a beginning unknown. 
57 Aristotle, Metaphysics B, 995a25f. 
58 Like Aristotle, we are using metaphors to speak simply about what is very difficult. The Hermeneutics of Being 
 
43  
find a way to build a bridge to reach the other end. For, as was said, even the 
aporia is man-made. In this thesis, we will attempt to unmake [th]is aporia. Hence, 
the thesis could have been subtitled, ‘The Making and the Unmaking of the 
Shakespearean Aporia.’ Certainly, what is at stake in any aporia, is, as Derrida 
says, the experience of ‘’not knowing where to go.’’
59 But a problem proposes that 
there are two ways to go, and we will lead the reader to the concrete realization 
that Shakespeare in some plays produces the apperception of what is concealed, in 
others of what is unconcealed, but in both cases, he produces, almost without rival, 
the profound impression of the ontological contradiction, the Being of beings. 
 
[19]     There are two questions that arise when we consider the belief and trust in 
Shakespeare’s unequalled ability to create life, his almost unparalleled capacity to 
present, to convey beings that do not merely represent, as actors do, something 
beyond themselves, but beings that appear to be so persuasively that even the stage 
disappears before them. The first question is to locate those who praise 
Shakespeare for [th]is power or genius to create life or nature. That is not too 
difficult, for since the upsurge of Romanticism more than two centuries ago, the 
choir of believers have, as Kittredge testifies,
60 gradually grown larger and larger, 
so huge that Harold Bloom today at last can say that Shakespeare sings for us all, 
simply expresses what humanity is.
61 Secondly, we would have to find, not merely 
the scenes and characters these Romantics indicate to illustrate Shakespeare’s 
unequalled powers of poetic creation, but in order to recognize their scholarship, 
the concepts they use to throw light on what they, unlike any passer-by coming into 
                                                 
59 Derrida, Aporias, p. 12. 
60 Kittredge, An Address, p. 27f. 
61 See the introduction to Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, ‘Shakespeare’s 
Universalism,’ pp. 1-17. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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the warm theatre from the cold streets, would immediately recognize as especially 
true to life or lifelike. Finding the concepts that these Romantics use to explain 
Shakespeare’s unparalleled craftsmanship, we would certainly have an invaluable 
tool which would enable us to recognize the irreplaceable quality that they so often 
find to empower the characters, the scenes, the language and the appearances, in 
many if not all of Shakespeare’s plays. We would even, through these tools, be able 
to measure the master against himself, against his own standards of craftsmanship. 
Sadly, we encounter in the works of these Romantics no such conceptual efforts. 
All we find are words without definition, concepts with boundaries so weak they 
seem unable to contain anything at all: ‘nature,’ ‘life,’ ‘real,’ ‘true.’ The words 
‘nature,’ ‘life,’ ‘real,’ ‘true,’ are so repeatedly used without any thought being 
given to their content, that when listening to the Romantic praise of Shakespeare, 
one often has the impression of listening to machines rather than anything 
lifelike.
62 For rather than blindly worshipping Shakespeare like a god, we will 
inquire into how he most systematically uses non-beings to create the profound 
apperception of Being, be [th]is called ‘nature,’ ‘life,’ ‘reality,’ or ‘truth,’ words 
which in the Romantic vocabulary are no more than unsuccessful attempts to 
grasp the Being of beings, the ontological contradiction. 
 
[20]     The Romantic interpretation of ‘life,’ ‘nature,’ so crucial to this movement, 
is surprisingly never defined, but simply spoken of as what evades conceptual 
definition, what is ineffable, inexplicable, etc.
63 It is, of course, disheartening that 
                                                 
62 Pinocchio was a Romantic creation. Undoubtedly, there would be no story if Pinocchio did not 
walk away from the workshop, finally escaped his master. The allegory of Pinocchio is obvious: 
there would be no history of man if not the created rebelled against the creator, if not man walked 
away from God. 
63 Schlegel is, of course, a remarkable exception, when he, in On Freedom, so unlike Kant, speaks of 
‘nature’ and ‘freedom,’ even of man as ‘the redeemer of nature,’ [Schelling, Of Human Nature, 411, The Hermeneutics of Being 
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people who value life so highly that they may, like Werther, be driven to suicide to 
prove its worth, never attempt to define or conceptualize what ‘life’ or ‘nature’ is. 
Contrarily, Heidegger shows that what Aristotle means by ‘nature’ is the self-
presencing of what essentially is, the coming to light or appearance of morphe, the 
essential form, and that Aristotle’s physis or nature, to no little degree, 
corresponds to Plato’s idea.
64 And, as we shall later see in Chapter 2, Philosophies 
of Unconcealment, whereas [th]is nature or physis is expressed or comes to light 
through place,
65 [th]is idea is expressed or comes to light, through khora.
66 The 
absence of any real effort to delineate that quality which the Romantic above all 
praises as ‘nature’ or ‘life’ is so apparent, that he only seems willing to praise that 
which he knows nothing about, that which is beyond his comprehension, that 
which he may not properly speak of, or that which makes him stammer or stutter, 
or simply, not say a word.  
  
[21]     We need not quote all Romantics on Shakespeare, for, as if they were one 
being, as if they had already attained the unity they aspire to, they utter a similar 
cry, appearing not unlike a ghost who, to this day, still haunts Shakespeare’s 
theatre. Herder, who are among the first Romantics to haunt us, cries, ‘When I 
read [Shakespeare], it seems to me as if theatre, actors, scenery all vanish! Single 
leaves from the book of events, providence, the world, blowing in the storm of 
history.
67 And later, ‘This is not a poet, but a creator! Here is the history of the 
                                                                                                                                               
p. 92.] a constellation which makes Kant appear entirely unromantic. Novalis is another exception, 
but then, he was more a scientist than a philosopher. 
64 Heidegger, On the Essence and Concept of physis in Aristotle’s Physics B, in Pathmarks, p. 219ff. 
65 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV. 
66 For Plato’s exposition of khora, see Plato, Timaeus, 48d-52d, but also, the delightful myth of Er 
that concludes the Republic with an allegory of a human soul looking for a place [to be] 
unconcealed. [Plato, Republic, 614b-621d].  
67 Herder, ‘Shakespeare,’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 41. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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world!’
68 Herder even takes time to deprecate some of Shakespeare’s spectators, 
saying that if they do not experience Shakespeare’s theatre as real, they have 
probably seen nothing at all.
69 For when conceiving Macbeth, Shakespeare was, 
according to Herder, not merely construing a play, but ‘was turning over in his 
mind as a fact of creation the terrible regicide, the tragedy called Macbeth.’
70 If you 
now think Herder means to stress some individual occurrence in that play, which 
especially evokes or creates the experience of something real, you would be 
mistaken. For Herder places all incidents, all actions into one and the same black 
bag before he ties it up and raising it before the audience, declaims, ‘This is life.’ It 
does not, however, take long before one man rises to accuse the Romantics of 
mystification. For in his (in)famous introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1807), Hegel condemns the Romantics for seeking ‘indeterminate enjoyments,’ of 
wailing in ‘rapturous haziness.’
71 We will not gladly give in to these unknown 
pleasures, and do not hesitate to agree with Hegel when he concludes, ‘Still less 
must this complacency which abjures Science claim that such rapturous haziness is 
superior to Science.’
72  
 
[22]     Speaking against the Romantic encomium of the unknown, Hegel could say, 
‘just as there is an empty breath, so too there is an empty depth,’
73 an ‘intensity 
without content.’
74 And it is easy to concur when Hegel, accusing the 
                                                 
68 Herder, ‘Shakespeare,’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 44. 
69 Herder, ‘Shakespeare,’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 46. 
70 Herder, ‘Shakespeare,’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 45. Emphasis added. 
71 More specifically, Hegel speaks against those who ‘pursue the indeterminate enjoyment of this 
indeterminate divinity,’ Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ 
Paragraph 9, p. 5. 
72 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 9, p. 5. 
73 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 10, p. 6. 
74 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 10, p. 6. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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contemporary spirit for its own poverty,
75 says, ‘The Power of the Spirit is only as 
great as its expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to spread out and lose 
itself in exposition.’
76 We also agree with Hegel that this appeal to the unknown is, 
more often than not, an excuse for not thinking, and does often make the thinker 
appear unnecessarily feeble. However, even without this pathos, the unknown still 
remains. Not only would there remain something unknown, like something would 
remain after the party of science is all over, but the apperception of [th]is 
unknown, the ontological contradiction, would still be produced, even before any 
guest has arrived, be that which tempts us all, like Romeos, to crash all parties.
77  
 
[23]     What has been overlooked, in Hegelian terms, by self-consciousness or the 
absolute spirit, is that the apperception of something unknown is not something we 
can take for granted, but will itself have to be produced. Where there is a lack, 
where the consciousness of [th]is production is missing … or rather, nowhere is 
one more persuaded of the unknown than where one does not know that also the 
apperception of what is unknown has been produced. For the incapacity, even, the 
unwillingness, to acknowledge that the apperception of [th]is unknown has been 
produced creates, more profoundly, the impression that [th]is unknown is 
indistinguishable from our own ‘nature,‘ inseparable from what is [alive]. For 
what is unknown is not thought to represent life, but to be indistinguishable from 
                                                 
75 Hegel, ‘The Spirit shows itself as so impoverished that, like a wanderer in the desert craving for a 
mere mouthful of water, it seems to crave for its refreshment only the bare feeling of the divine in 
general. By the little which now satisfies the Spirit, we can measure the extent of its loss.’ Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 8, p. 5. 
76 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 10, p. 6. Emphasis 
added. 
77 Throughout this thesis, metaphor is only an heuristic device, applied to explain what is more 
difficult by what is more simple, to thereby, more clearly, produce an impression of what is first, 
the ontological difference. On the expediency of this analogical principle of exposition, note for 
example when Aristotle, in Book XII of Metaphysics, compares nature to a house where each being 
has its place. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1075a19. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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what is, indifferent from life. The effect of the unknown is not simply cancelled by 
not being aware of its production, but, paradoxically, its effect is enhanced by 
ignorance. The incapacity or unwillingness to acknowledge the production of the 
ontological contradiction, the apperception of that which negates and upholds the 
Being of all non-beings, reinforces the impression of that which one is unknowingly 
affected by, the ontological contradiction. For there is no time when we are more 
easily convinced of the unknown Being of what stand before us, than when we are 
not conscious of its production. In short, the effect of the unknown is reinforced 
when the traces of its production have been erased, and what affects us is 
unidentified, indefinite, inexplicable, ineffable. We could not agree more when 
Hegel speaks deridingly of those who hide ‘the truth from itself: by spurning 
measure and definition.’
78 We shall therefore make an attempt to define, more 
closely, what the Romantics have an impression of when witnessing the 
Shakespearean theatre, but not without first giving the word to a man with less 
pathos and perhaps more measure, Doctor Johnson. 
 
[24]     Following the Shakespearean reception, we shall look more closely at some 
attempts to define the effect or experience of the Shakespearean drama. It is 
obvious that, for example, Doctor Johnson identifies Shakespeare’s mastership 
with what he essentially produces the impression of. This can be gleaned from the 
pages of Preface to Shakespeare, where it is clear that the unsurpassed quality that 
Doctor Johnson recognizes in Shakespeare’s plays is that of representing 
characters as what they truly appear to be in life. The Shakespearean dialogue is 
                                                 
78 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 10, p. 6. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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nothing less than, ‘a diligent selection out of common conversation,’
79 where the 
incidents of the plays appear to be taken from the ‘common occurrences’ of life.’
80 
In short, when Doctor Johnson says that Shakespeare’s ‘drama is the mirror of 
life,’
81 this simply means that Doctor Johnson thinks Shakespeare’s drama is a 
mirror of what life essentially is, that no one knows more about what life essentially 
is than Shakespeare. That this unquestionably is Doctor Johnson’s position, 
becomes clear when he identifies that there are no heroes in Shakespeare’s plays, 
as for example in the basically unread works of Spencer’s Fairy Queen or Sidney’s 
Arcadia, that his scenes are occupied only by men.’
82 Shakespeare’s characters 
appear to be more lifelike simply because what they represent is like what the 
characters we stumble on or converse and commerce with in daily life actually are. 
Evidently, it is the mimetic quality of Shakespearean play that, according to Doctor 
Johnson, deserves our praise. For as he says of those authors who are unable to 
imitate our lives, ‘The theatre, when it is under any other direction, is peopled by 
such characters as were never seen conversing in a language which was never heard 
upon topics which will never rise in the commerce of mankind.’
83 And we’ll let 
Johnson conclude his exposition by pointing out the crux of the Shakespearean 
experience, ‘This therefore is the praise of Shakespeare, that his drama is the 
mirror of life.’
84  
                                                 
79 Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare (1765), in Gerould [ed.], Theatre Theory Theatre, p. 223. 
80 Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare (1765), in Gerould [ed.], Theatre Theory Theatre, p. 223. 
81 Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare (1765), in Gerould [ed], Theatre Theory Theatre, p. 224. 
82 Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare (1765), in Gerould [ed.], Theatre Theory Theatre, p. 224. 
83 Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare (1765), in Gerould [ed.], Theatre Theory Theatre, p. 223. 
Emphasis added. 
84 Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare, in Gerould [ed.], Theatre Theory Theatre, p. 224. Evidently what 
should be stressed in ‘mirror of life,’ is mirror and not life, where mirror is understood in a modern 
and limited sense as the place where an original and essential being is reflected. For the two 
differing, but, for long, commonplace understandings of mirror as both the original place of 
unconcealment and as the place where an original being is reflected. [Cf. Sabine Melchior-Bonnet, 
The Mirror - A History.] For a more lively exposition of the intrinsic connection between mirrors, The Hermeneutics of Being 
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[25]     Quite unromantically, Doctor Johnson admits that even though 
Shakespeare’s characters mirror life, they are never mistaken for life, appearing to 
contradict what Mr. Bloom says, that Shakespeare’s characters even taught us 
how to live.
85 As Doctor Johnson says, ‘It is false, that any representation is 
mistaken for reality; that any dramatic fable in its materiality was ever credible, 
or, for a single moment, was ever credited.’
86 ‘The truth is,’ Doctor Johnson 
continues, ‘that the spectators are always in their senses, and know, from the first 
act to the last, that the stage is only a stage, and that the players are only 
players.’
87 Speaking of the delectables of drama, Doctor Johnson may even state, 
‘The delight of tragedy proceeds from our consciousness of fiction; if we thought 
murders and treasons real, they would please no more. Imitations produce pain or 
pleasure, not because they are mistaken for realities, but because they bring 
realities to mind.’
88 By this quality of ‘bringing realities to mind,’ the stage appear 
to be nothing more than a stage for memories, mere representations of something 
that is not anymore [alive]. Doctor Johnson’s position is clearly that Shakespeare 
simply, perhaps enthusiastically, construes [re]presentations that we delight in 
because they accurately represents what life is, not because it presents beings 
whose Being we apperceive, what to us no longer appear to be representations, but 
to be alive.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
indeed, any shining surface, and an original and untouched place of unconcealment only available 
to souls untainted by sin, see Kittredge, Witchcraft in Old and New England, ‘Chapter XI, Mirror 
and Thieves,’ pp. 185-203.   
85 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 1. 
86 Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare, in Gerould [ed.], Theatre Theory Theatre, p. 231. 
87 Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare, in Gerould [ed.], Theatre Theory Theatre, p. 232 
88 Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare, in Gerould [ed.], Theatre Theory Theatre, p. 232. Emphasis 
added. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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[26]     We find numerous voices that disagree with Doctor Johnson. The Romantic 
assessment is generally that Shakespeare makes us mistake players for persons, 
theatre for life, the stage and the world. Among the more analytically inclined of 
Romantic critics, we find Wilson Knight, who alleges that Shakespeare’s drama 
does not present a copy of life, but life itself, that ‘The Shakespearean play is … 
not a copy of experience, it is itself experience.’
89 Wilson Knight, to whom Harold 
Bloom gladly acknowledges his debt,
90 believes that Shakespeare is actually able to 
present something more than what life essentially is. His argument is that a memory 
can easily hold or keep the impression of what life is. However, a memory cannot 
easily persuade us that it presents life itself. Speaking of ‘representations,’ perhaps 
heuristically, as ‘memories,’ Wilson Knight points out the obvious, that a 
representation is not life. Wilson Knight attempts to grasp [th]is difference in the 
concept of what is actual,
91 believing that [what] Shakespeare produces with such 
unsurpassed mastery is not only, like a journalist, [the facts of] what essentially 
happened, but the experience of [th]is actually happening before our very eyes. As 
Wilson Knight could have concluded, ‘[T]he Shakespearean play … recreates, the 
actual, the world of experience, the reality of life.’
92 
 
[27]     Of course, there are, in the Romantic choir of unknowing, those who 
actually attempt an exposition of the Shakespearean aporia by trying to formulate 
a problem. Wilson Knight says that, ‘We can distinguish the Shakespearean artist 
from the newspaper reporter saying that the latter presents only one of the two 
                                                 
89 Wilson Knight, The Christian Renaissance, ‘The Shakespearean Art-Form,’ p. 38. 
90 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. 9. 
91 Wilson Knight, The Christian Renaissance, ’The Shakespearean Art-Form,’ p. 37. 
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elements necessary to art. He tells us the facts and no more.’
93 What separates the 
poet from the reporter is, according to Wilson Knight, who conceptually struggles 
to make this distinction, that  
‘Shakespeare is interested not only in facts but in their significance. The 
one gives us a series of memorized incidents, the other a dynamic and living 
experience. Therefore the Shakespearean play is not realistic in the usual 
sense. It is not like events we remember, and our knowledge of the world is 
almost entirely a matter of memory; rather it is like experience itself. The 
plays are vivid experiences, to be lived through and judged not as life-
memories but as life, not as distillation of experience but as experience.’
94  
 
What Wilson Knight simply means to say is that Shakespeare’s plays are not 
merely mimetic, and, being more than [re]presentations, unlike memories that 
[re]present events, they appear to be, to unconceal the events themselves.  
 
[28]     What we often learn from a Romantic is the difficulty of describing the 
effect of the Shakespearean drama. It is therefore surprising to find that Wilson 
Knight defines [th]is inexplicable effect of the Shakespearean play, when he says, 
that it offers an experience  of what is hidden, but also, that nothing is hidden, that 
nothing is actually hidden.
95 Being among the few who actually attempts an 
exposition of what Shakespeare produces the apperception of, although without 
suggesting the means to [th]is end, we shall say that we superficially agree with 
Wilson Knight when he indicates that Shakespeare produces the apperception of 
what is mysterious.
96 Particularly, we concur when Wilson Knight alleges that the 
                                                 
93 Wilson Knight, The Christian Renaissance, ‘The Shakespearean Art-Form,’ p. 37. 
94 Wilson Knight, The Christian Renaissance, ‘The Shakespearean Art-Form,’ p. 37. 
95 We will later have a look into nothing in Chapter 8, The Production of Being through Nothing, and 
there also qualify our own understanding of nothing and how it distinguishes itself from Wilson 
Knight’s interpretation. Evidently, nothing is not difficult to hide, for even if you show nothing it 
does often remain undiscovered. See C8.[6]. 
96 We shall see that Wilson Knight does not draw a distinction between the mystical as concealed or 
unconcealed, which we shall later do in Chapter 2, Philosophies of Unconcealment and Chapter 3, 
Philosophies of Concealment. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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mysterious is what is most familiar, not something remote or distant or rare, but 
simply what is actually [t]here. As Wilson Knight says,  
‘Memory falsifies actuality, abstracts from it, while the unique and 
immediate actuality eludes us: nothing is so mysterious as the actual – and 
all our poets and prophets labour to draw the veil which shuts us from the 
life we live.’
97  
 
As the term ‘mystery’ is often applied without limits, we should perhaps clarify 
that Wilson Knight maintains that the actual is hidden, that nothing is more hidden 
than what is actual. Hence, Shakespeare excels in the production of what is 
concealed, his mastery lies in the production of what is hidden. One should 
perhaps not blame the Romantic tradition for not finding what Shakespeare 
attempted to hide already from the beginning. According to Wilson Knight, who 
makes an admirable attempt to qualify his position, what is concealed and lures 
the spectator into Shakespeare’s theatre time and again, is not something remote 
or distant or rare, but that which is immediately present to all, the actual, what is 
actually hidden to all. Moreover, as we are concerned not only with an 
epistemological, but an ontological problem, what is hidden, the actual, is what 
sustains the life of all, the Being of all beings. 
 
[29]     We shall continue the search for the Shakespearean aporia, but first say 
that Shakespeare evidently manages to produce the apperception of what is 
beyond saying, produces an effect where the possibility of description often ends. 
Shakespeare’s mastery, his craft, if you will, lies, precisely, in purposefully 
producing the apperception of that which we are unable to describe, that which, 
however indescribable, still leaves an undeniable impression. Being indescribable 
                                                 
97 G. Wilson Knight, The Christian Renaissance, ‘The Shakespearean Art-Form,’ pp. 37f. Emphasis 
added. The Hermeneutics of Being 
 
54  
does not give less but rather lends more power to that which is beyond description. 
Moreover, as we shall see, [th]is indescribability, is not something history can 
dispense with at will, but something that indispensably belongs to that which 
cannot essentially be described, the ontological contradiction, the Being of beings.
98 
§1.3 The Topology of Being 
 
 
[30]     Since Schleiermacher, the human sciences have solely been concerned with 
meaning, which is almost incomprehensible, since the search for meaning is only 
made possible by its negation. For, as Schleiermacher, the founder of modern 
hermeneutics and the guiding light of all his predecessors, says in the critical 
paragraphs that launches the infinite project of modern hermeneutics, 
‘Hermeneutics proceed from not understanding, and there will be no end to this 
art if we in the beginning did not not comprehend.’
99 Schleiermacher does 
therefore stand upon, as on mud, like all hermeneutical enterprises, the ground of 
incomprehension, which is why the house of hermeneutics, inevitably, is bound to 
move. In this thesis we will not occupy ourselves with what is scarce, but rather, 
with what is most abundant. Compared to Being, meaning appears to be no more 
than wrapping paper. We shall therefore focus on that which makes any search for 
                                                 
98 There is method that attempts to describe, more analytically than is customary for a Romantic, 
not the end of Shakespeare’s productions, but rather the way in which he effects the mind to 
achieve [th]is end. For rather than speaking of the production of an immediate encounter with that 
which we cannot seize to believe in, Coleridge takes the negative road by saying that what 
Shakespeare does, is not to produce the belief or the apperception that [th]is is, but contrarily, to 
suspend, as when experiencing a dream, the belief that [th]is is not. Thus is created, according to 
Coleridge, the apperception of, as in a dream, not a positive, but a negative reality. See Coleridge, 
‘Remains,’ in Bate [ed.], Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 528. 
99 We should perhaps remind the reader of the first three principles Schleiermacher sets up for a 
General Hermeneutics: 1. Hermeneutics rests on the fact of the non-understanding of discourse: 
taken in its most general sense, including misunderstanding in the mother tongue and in everyday 
life. 2. Non-understanding is partly indeterminacy, partly ambiguity of the contents. So it is thought 
of without any fault on the part of the utterer. 3. The art of explication is therefore the art of 
putting oneself in possession of all the conditions of understanding. Schleiermacher, ‘General 
Hermeneutics,’ in Hermeneutics and Criticism, p. 227. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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meaning, any inquiry possible in the first place, Being, which, like a cornucopia, 
unconceals or conceals all beings to all. We could almost say, paraphrasing 
Heidegger, that if we were to write an ontology, which we have often been tempted 
to do, we would not use the word ‘meaning.’
100 What is most crucial to [th]is 
enterprise, could be interpreted, as Adorno says, from what we often, if not 
completely, avoid to speak of, the concepts we do not use. And as much as Kant 
avoids the word ‘essence,’
101 we shall try to avoid ‘meaning,’ although to the 
humanist, ‘meaning’ always remains the greatest temptation. 
  
[31]     Our approach differs considerably from a hermeneutics of meaning, whose 
sole goal is to gain an understanding of the meaning of any text, which we consider 
to be as easily available to any man, as easily grasped as the meaning of an 
instrument is grasped through its function, an axe comprehended through its use. 
It is also given that there is no meaning in nature, but only artifices. Things made 
                                                 
100 Jean-Luc Marion notes that the word Heidegger would avoid if he were to write a theology, is 
the word ‘Being.’ Stressing the importance of what is to be avoided, Marion says, ‘Let us cite, for 
once, the little-known original: ‘Wenn ich noch eine Theologie schreiben würde, vozu es mich 
manchmal reizt, dann dürfte in ihr das Wort ‘Sein’ nicht vorkommen.’ … [Aussprache mit Martin 
Heidegger an 06/XI/1951, privately issued edition by the Vortragsaschuss der Studentenschaft der 
Universität Zürich (Zurich, 1952).’ Marion, God Without Being, pp. 211n-212n.] The reason why 
Heidegger would exclude ‘Sein’ from a theology can be gleaned from his preliminary reflections on 
death in Sein und Zeit, p. [Ger.]248/230 [Eng.], where he states that ‘’The this-worldly, ontological 
interpretation of death comes before any ontic, other-worldly speculation.’ Heidegger, Being and 
Time, ‘How the Existential Analysis of Death differs from Other Possible Interpretations of This 
Phenomenon,’ S. 248/p. 230] We shall carefully mark the gathering of ‘otherworldly’ and ‘ontic’ in 
the same place.  For generally Heidegger imagines theology in the light of Revelation, which 
presents beings without Being [to the faithful], beings which will [be] without Being until the 
parousia, the second coming, when all [ontic] beings [described or promised by Revelation] may 
forever be. There is, however, another sense of theo-logy, in which there is no difference between 
the ontological and the theological pursuits, that is, when considering, as Aristotle did in the first 
place, being qua Being.[Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV, and Book I, esp. 983a5-10.] For this 
ontological concept of theology, see Heidegger, Parmenides, pp. 110-113. Perhaps we should listen 
when he says, ‘’A-theism,’ correctly understood as the absence of the gods, has been, since the 
decline of the history of the West as the basic feature of this history itself.’ [Heidegger, Parmenides, 
p. 112] ‘But how is an appearance of the divine at all supposed to be able to find the region of its 
essence, i.e. its unconcealedness, if, and as long as, the essence of Being is forgotten and, on the basis 
of this forgottenness, the unacknowledged oblivion of Being is elevated to a principle of explanation 
for every being, as occurs in all metaphysics?’ [Heidegger, Parmenides, pp. 112f.]. 
101 Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 208. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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and created have ‘meanings,’ carry meaning, as they are produced, and it is taken 
for granted that most things are not produced without an intention. We do not 
deny this intention, do not contend that the author is without intention, we in fact 
take it for granted that he does, that he intentionally produces meaningful 
sentences, actions and wares. For the most part our intentions are not obscure. We 
cannot all be Hamlets.  
 
[32]     The hermeneutic program, and the modern inception of hermeneutics by 
Schleiermacher, does explicitly say that the act of hermeneutics does not start with 
understanding but with the incomprehensible, and that there would be no art or 
science of hermeneutics without our immediate incapacity to understand.
102 
Hermeneutics as an art rest on our immediate inability to comprehend, even, on 
our immediate capacity to not understand, to not apprehend what presents itself as 
wholly or partly incomprehensible, where even the reasons for this obscurity 
remains hidden. To Hermeneutics, the reason for misunderstanding boils down to 
cultural differences which are either synchronic or diachronic, in short, what 
Gadamer would say are, following Schleiermacher, based on different horizons of 
understanding.
103 We could, of course, based on these prejudices, speak of 
‘horizons of misunderstanding,’ and, from this vantage point write The History of 
Misunderstanding. Evidently, such a history would follow a real route and not an 
ideal, perhaps even be closer to Realgeschichte than Geistesgeschichte could ever 
dream of becoming. Like Aristotle, we adhere to a dialectical principle of 
                                                 
102 Schleiermacher, ‘General Hermeneutics,’ in Hermeneutics and Criticism, p. 227. 
103 Gadamer says, ‘The task of historical understanding also involves acquiring an appropriate 
historical horizon, so that what we are trying to understand can be seen in its true dimension. If we 
fail to transpose ourselves into the historical horizon from which the traditionary [sic.] text speaks, 
we will misunderstand the significance of what it has to say to us.’ Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 
303. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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exposition,
104 take it for granted, as most people do, that the one speaking to us 
does so within our own culture, our own horizon, our own class. The ‘meaning’ of 
what is said, is more often than not so perfectly clear, so transparent that from the 
point of view of everyday life, the humanities’ search for meaning seems almost 
incomprehensible to those who do not participate in this scholarly exercise. 
 
[33]     This investigation does not follow the habitual hermeneutic path, as we 
shall take it for granted that we, what faces us, is immediately understood, that 
nothing is as apparent as the meaning of what is said. But, one could ask, is there 
then anything to question, anything to search for or into or investigate if the 
‘meaning’ of a play is obvious? Most humanists would possibly be immediately 
inclined to say that there is not. But as it is with the question of ‘meaning,’ the 
immediate impression is often of what is confused or what is incomprehensible. 
One should not be surprised to find that some have searched for the ‘meaning’ of a 
‘play’ as they have searched for the ‘meaning’ of life, that is, in vain. Perhaps the 
failure can be explained by, if, in this incessant search, one ascribes to a basic 
principle of interpretation that allows only one meaning in one play. We shall not 
object to this, but take it for granted that a play may have one, more or many 
‘meanings,’ even many ‘meanings’ for one person or no meaning for many 
personae. We shall take this for granted, and proceed from this realization, that a 
play would not be studied and watched and applauded and cried and laughed 
about, if it did not provide us with a sense of Being. We shall also come to 
understand that the apperception of Being, that which separates the impression of 
                                                 
104 See, for example, Aristotle’s exposition of love and friendship in Book VIII of Nicomachean 
Ethics. For the principles of a dialectical exposition, that is, a demonstration based on the reputable 
opinions of the many or the good few, or what is commonplace to all, see the first book of 
Aristotle’s Topics and the first book of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.  The Hermeneutics of Being 
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all living beings from those that are not, is not merely or arbitrarily produced, but 
produced in accordance with certain principles, which can be discovered, although 
the topos of the undiscoverability of these principles, as we have seen, has had a 
long and prestigious tradition and thus hindered any real progress or 
enlightenment.  
 
[34]     Like what is meaningful, what is meaningless equally has a history. There 
are, as we shall see, different interpretations of what is meaningless. According to 
Schleiermacher, all hermeneutics opens with the meaningless, not with what is 
meaningful. Indeed, there would be, as he states in Hermeneutics and Criticism, no 
hermeneutics without what is meaningless. Most generally, we could say that 
‘meaningless’ is ‘that utterance for which either the subject or the predicate is not 
comprehended.’ Another way to approach definition, stemming from the two 
different ways to express ‘meaning’ in German, is to say that ‘meaningless’ is ‘that 
proposition which has neither subject [Bedeutung, reference] nor predicate [Sinn, 
meaning].’ Bertrand Russell adheres to this position, saying that a statement which 
is without a reference, which has no Bedeutung, may however not be without Sinn, 
meaning.
105 For Russell there are other statements than false statements that are 
meaningless. First among equals is what von Wright, in The Logic of Negation, 
calls ‘negative affirmations,’
106 which Aristotle already named, ‘indefinitions.’
107 
Russell simply excludes indefinitions, like false propositions, from meaningful 
discourse, as they are statements without predicate or subject.
108 But, of course, 
even if there can be made rules against uttering such statements, no one can deny, 
                                                 
105 For Russell’s position, see, Von Wright, The Logic of Negation, p. 1. 
106 Von Wright, The Logic of Negation, p. 2. 
107 More concretely, ‘indefinite verbs.’ Cf. Aristotle, de Interpretatione, 16b13. 
108 Von Wright, The Logic of Negation, p. 6. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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as we shall see in Chapters 4 and 8, that it is possible to break those rules, and that 
we habitually do so, and not without achieving the most spell-binding, persuasive 
effect on our audience. Hegel, on the other hand, presents in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit his own interpretation of the meaningless as the faintest trace of 
subjectivity.
109 And why faint, because it is unrecognized. To Hegel, the 
meaningless is a trace of a spirit without consciousness, without self-awareness. To 
Hegel, the ‘meaningless’ would be the impression of what is essentially empty, 
where the subject fails to take, to assume responsibility for this essential emptiness, 
as when it hears the meaningless word ‘God’ and thinks of nothing, not only is 
God neglected, but the self.
110 We do not simply, as Adorno, a true Hegelian, does 
in Negative Dialectics, ascribe ‘meaningless’ to that history which is without 
intention or end or to that history which transcends any man’s hopes, wishes or 
desires,
111 but call, more fundamentally, that truly meaningless which first makes 
possible any historic event and consequently makes possible the assessment of any 
historical event as either meaningless or meaningful depending on whether they do 
or do not conform to our ideas, hopes or intentions. We shall therefore maintain 
that truly meaningless is the ontological contradiction prior to its apprehension, 
the incomprehensible is. If we have no notion of Being, we may very well, as does 
Wittgenstein, stumble on an aporia. We could speak of the aporia of meaning. 
Meaning becomes an aporia if we unknowingly, like Wittgenstein, are searching 
for what is meaningless. For Wittgenstein’s failure to approximate what is entirely 
                                                 
109 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 22, p. 12. 
110 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 22, p. 12. 
111 Cf. Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 186-187. In Negative Dialectics Adorno even 
speaks of how the ontological difference is nothing less than Heidegger’s attempt to ‘invest 
absurdities - i.e. the positive, history, holocaust - with sense’ by invoking ‘ a ‘mythical concept of 
fate,’ and Angst as the only experience adequate to this mode of existence. Adorno, Negative 
Dialectics, pp. 118-119. Adorno contradicts the ontologisation of the ontical by asserting, ‘If 
ontology were possible at all, it would be possible in an ironic sense, as the epitome of negativity,’ 
Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 121, i.e. subjectivity. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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and completely singular, and therefore his inability to complete his Philosophical 
Investigations, can easily be ascribed to the fact that while searching for what 
makes each language game singular, he did not acknowledge that what provides 
the singularity of each utterance does not itself belong to or reside in language, 
more precisely, that what is entirely singular is not meaning, but Being.
112 
However, in one concept Wittgenstein himself appears to intimate what he is 
incapable of understanding, when he names that which is indispensable for each 
language act but itself does not reside in language, Lebensform.
113 The failure of 
Philosophical Investigations can be ascribed to the attempt to approach [th]is 
Lebensform solely through the positive meanings or positive functions words have 
in and within each particular, each primitive language game, when he could easily 
have continued [th]is road beyond the aporia or made a right turn if he had 
realized that [th]is Lebensform is always out of reach of language, is never 
meaningful, is even that which meaningless makes all meanings possible, the Being 
of beings. It is safe to say that since Schleiermacher and Dilthey, and perhaps more 
                                                 
112 We can well understand Wittgenstein’s reluctance to publish Philosophical  Investigations, even 
the bashfulness that is displayed in Wittgenstein’s own preface to the English Edition of 
Philosophical Investigations. For would one not be shy if one was compelled to display one’s 
shortcomings, to publish an aporia? However, what in Philosophical Investigations remains 
commendable, is Wittgenstein’s effort to approach the singularity of the act of language, the 
singularity of each word-exchange, but what he fails to acknowledge is that the reason for [th]is 
singularity cannot be ascribed to the positive meaning of any particular word or any particular 
proposition, but is and remains beyond language. The singularity of language does not reside in 
different meanings a word or a statement may or may not have, but, on the contrary, the 
singularity is provided by what is unconcealed, which Wittgenstein seems to totally overlook. It is 
not surprising that one should not find what one is looking for if one is searching in the wrong 
place. 
113 Horst Ruthrof identifies Lebensform or ‘forms of life’ as ‘a cultural frame for language that … 
Wittgenstein was moving towards.’[Ruthrof, The Body in Language, p. 136.] Ruthrof marks the 
instances were Wittgenstein uses Lebensform/Lebensformen in Philosophical Investigations, namely 
Fragments 19, 25, 23, 357, 358. Wittgenstein thereby indicates the position he never arrived at. 
Tellingly, Wittgenstein has left the most significant utterance unnumbered on page 226 of 
Philosophical Investigations [1953], where it is said, ‘What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one 
could say - forms of life.’ Ruthrof defines ‘forms of life’ as ‘cultural specific clusters of nonverbal 
signs,’ [Ruthrof, The Body in Language, p. 136. Emphasis added.] before he points out what is most 
fundamental to any enterprise: ‘The presence of nonverbal interpretations in both language and 
social life enables us to make sense of the world.’ [Ruthrof, The Body in Language, p. 136].  The Hermeneutics of Being 
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recently, since Gadamer, Heidegger’s most influential student who, perhaps 
unknowingly, betrays his master, the humanities have been solely focused on 
meaning. Contrary to this tradition, we are, like Heidegger, more inclined to write 
the history of what is meaningless. The praise of what is meaningless, 
incomprehensible, unacknowledged, neglected, forgotten belongs to a Romantic 
tradition. Even so, it is quite clear that this Romantic tradition neither 
understands nor grasps what it is reaching for when it is reaching out, as for 
another blue flower, for what is inexplicable. For in the end as well as in the 
beginning, meaningless is the apperception of what is, even though Heidegger 
would say that the meaningless is what escapes the end but is at the very 
beginning.
114 
 
[35]     Within the Heideggerian corpus, it is customary to make a clear distinction 
between, on the one hand, the exposition of the meaning of Being or Dasein in 
Being and Time, and, on the other, the exposition of Time or Da that occurs as 
early as Heidegger’s inaugural lecture at Freiburg University from 1928, where he 
displays no little impatience with his earlier efforts in the essay entitled What is 
Metaphysics? Heidegger’s Kehre amounts to one single but crucial step of 
transferring emphasis from Being to Time, from Dasein to simply Da. Heidegger’s 
transformation encouraged some to speak of a dividing, if not divine, experience, 
not long after the publication of the unfinished Being and Time, that Heidegger 
never speaks of, that suddenly made Heidegger change his ways, that led to 
Heidegger’s Kehre.
115 In his last testament of 1955, Identity and Difference, 
                                                 
114 What is meaningless is saved by death, which guarantees the incompleteness of Dasein. What 
remains, is as Derrida would say, autre. The apperception of [th]is incompleteness is the trace of 
what is meaningless: the Being of beings. 
115 For a negative intimation of this experience, see Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, p. 21. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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Heidegger shows again impatience with his earlier efforts, transposing the 
emphasis as he attempts to unconceal an additional dimension of Da, speaking no 
longer of Da or Dasein, Time or Being, but Arrival and Overcoming.
116 Following 
Heidegger’s shift from Dasein to Da, his Kehre from Being to Time,
117 one 
immediately notices that time, which in a certain sense is indistinguishable from 
place, leaves us with nothing to grasp or hold on to, is an attempt to express that 
which cannot be objectified, to describe or present that which remains 
indispensable to [th]is being but nevertheless remains indescribable, the Being of 
beings. We will not divert our attention to what is Da, but rather focus on how the 
apperception of Da is produced. Of course, that would not be possible without 
having at least a superficial sense of what is Da. Heidegger considers both the 
inner experience of time, in the Bergsonian sense of dureé, and chronological time 
to be vulgar interpretations of what time is.
118 To avoid the vulgar understanding 
of time, we would have to say that without time nothing would take place. And the 
notion of place will, in the next chapter, provide us with an opening to a 
presentation of Being beyond Heidegger’s Kehre.
119 
                                                 
116 We find Stambaugh’s translation of Heidegger’s Ankunft and Überkommnis as arrival and 
overwhelming inappropriate. Much closer to what Heidegger intends to convey as the beginning, 
namely an interpretation of what is first, is to not speak of overwhelming but overcoming. 
Stambaugh’s Identity and Difference, an otherwise remarkable translation of Heidegger’s Identität 
und Differenz, does perhaps display its own lack of assurance by including the original German 
essay side by side. [Cf. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 64]. 
117 Nowhere does Heidegger explain the Kehre more clearly than in Letter on Humanism, when he, 
speaking of ‘this other thinking that abandons subjectivity,’ comments on the fragmental character 
of Being and Time, says, ‘the third division of the first part, “Time and Being,” was held back … 
because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning [Kehre] and did not succeed with the 
help of the language of metaphysics. The Lecture “On the Essence of Truth,” thought out and 
delivered in 1930 but not printed until 1943, provides a certain insight into the thinking of the 
turning from “Being and Time” to “Time and Being.” [Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in Basic 
Writings, p. 231]. 
118 For the exposition of the vulgar or common understanding of time, see Heidegger, Being and 
Time, S. 18 [Ger.]/p. 16 [Eng.]. 
119 Heidegger’s first attempt to save the Being of beings from beings is found in his inaugural 
lecture at Freiburg, What is Metaphysics? in 1929, where he presented, as he stepped up to take the 
chair of Husserl, a lecture on nothing. For nothing is certainly not a being, or, if you consider The Hermeneutics of Being 
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[36]     Even though we will be the first to acknowledge our debt to Heidegger, even 
say that this thesis would be impossible without his ontology, his persistent search 
for and expression of the ontological difference, we would have to admit that our 
ways depart drastically from his, make it clear, already from the beginning, the 
three ways in which our ways depart from his. Initially, we do not attempt to 
eliminate but maintain the epistemological concept of truth as adequatio. Secondly, 
we do not agree with Heidegger that there is only one true sense of Being, that is, 
the unconcealed, aletheia. We do not consider the concealed to be secondary to 
what is unconcealed, something that only amounts to a forgetfulness or a 
withdrawal of Being. Rather, we contend that the concealed and the unconcealed, 
both, on an equal footing, are expressions of what is, even, that the concealed is 
often closer to our immediate apperception of what is, more effectively produces 
an immediate apperception of the Being of beings. Thirdly, we depart from 
Heidegger in that we, by keeping the epistemological concept of truth as adequatio, 
have the means to investigate how the apperception of the Being of negative beings 
is produced. It is the production of [th]is negative ontological difference - the 
realization that the apperception of what is most persuasively ensues from the 
encounter with what is not - which has made us flag our position already from the 
                                                                                                                                               
nothing to be in any way similar to a being, there would not be found many that believe you are 
sane. The second way in which Heidegger attempts to save the Being of beings from beings occurs 
in his presentation of man’s Da-sein as ekstasis, which is particularly clear in his Letter on 
Humanism of 1946. [Cf. Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings, pp. 233ff.] Obviously, 
Heidegger’s presentation has here the same ground, since Da is prior to Sein, since place is prior to 
what a man essentially is, man is ek-static, he is [in] [th]is place in which he is unconcealed, before 
he conceals [th]is place through the interpretation of subjectivity, which only hides or covers [th]is 
place of unconcealment away from apperception. But one thing is important to realize, that for 
Heidegger, [th]is place is, in one of many ways, called the place of the happening of truth, and since 
truth is considered negatively as un-concealment, it is obvious that we perhaps should, change the 
order, and look at what appears negatively, and not at what is first posited.  Heidegger’s third, and 
final attempt to save the Being of beings takes place in his last and final masterpiece, the 
remarkably simple essay, Identity and Difference from 1955. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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beginning, and without attempting to hide anything have called [th]is thesis, The 
Poetics of Being.  
 
[37]     There is however one element from Heidegger that we truly keep, and that 
is Heidegger’s methodological sense of place or Stelle, although it is safe to say that 
we are not looking for the same places. Reading Shakespeare, we cannot simply 
relate everything, and will therefore only discover places that truly stand out. 
Whereas to Heidegger, a place is where the ontological difference itself is 
unconcealed,
120 we discover a place where Shakespeare has produced, and, in most 
cases, let the spectator experience, the ontological contradiction, a negative 
experience of beings so convincing that the spectator does not even know that he 
has made an inference to what is either concealed or unconcealed, the Being of 
beings. We do not need many illustrations to prove that Shakespeare is a master of 
inadequation, the techne of Being, bearing in mind that not even Kepler needed 
more than seven planets two prove his cosmological laws and Newton no more to 
prove the law of gravity.
121 
 
[38]     Before we in the next chapters encounter The Poetics of Being concretely, 
we need to point out methodologically how we are to identify these ontological 
places, the places where we are most likely to be given the most persuasive 
apperception of what is first, what is in the very beginning. Heidegger speaks of 
Stellen or topoi where the Being of beings is more luminously unconcealed. In his 
                                                 
120 Heidegger writes in Letter on Humanism, ‘beings might appear in the light of Being … Man does 
not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how God and the gods or history and 
nature come forward into the clearing of Being, come to presence and depart.’ [Heidegger, Letter 
on Humanism, in Basic Writings, p, 234.] Another point in which our approach will differ from 
Heidegger’s is that he in the main emphasizes the truth-character of Being, whereas we will point 
out that nothing is experienced as more [true] than what is false. 
121 For the first expression of these cosmological laws, see Kepler, Mysterium Cosmographicum and 
Newton, Principia Mathematica, as related in Boorstin, The Discoverers and in Will Durant, History 
of Philosophy. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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lectures on Parmenides, Heidegger defines ‘topos’ by saying, ‘topos is the Greek for 
“place.” The place is the originally gathering holding of what belongs together 
…’
122 In the same lectures, Heidegger clarifies how this place relates each being to 
the Being of beings, ‘The Greek thinkers speak of, “to save what appears” that 
means to conserve and to preserve in unconcealedness what shows itself as what 
shows itself and in the way it shows itself – that is, against the withdrawal into 
concealment and distortion.’
123 We will locate the places in Shakespeare’s plays 
that most convincingly ‘save appearances’ to Being, that is, the places where 
Shakespeare most persuasively produces a sense of the ontological contradiction, 
not [th]is time, as unconcealed, but predominantly, as concealed. Like Homer or 
Rilke, what Shakespeare gathers in these places is the apperception of what is first, 
the Being of beings. 
 
[39]     We rely on the methodology, or, in Greek, the way in which Heidegger 
approaches literature. Whether it is Greek epic or German poetry, whether it is 
Homer or Rilke, Hesiod or Trakl, Heidegger’s approach remains the same: to find 
in these texts, traces of a specific mode of Being, whether concealed or 
unconcealed. It is no secret that Heidegger finds in Rilke, as much concealed,
124 as 
much neglected, as in Hölderlin or Trakl,
125 and even more, in Homer,
126 he finds 
unconcealed. We shall follow Heidegger’s method, but look for other places, 
bearing in mind that Heidegger, as Gadamer says, ‘never claimed to espouse a new 
                                                 
122 Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 117. 
123 Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 120. 
124 See Heidegger’s exposition of Rilke’s concept of what is open, Heidegger, Parmenides, pp. 152ff. 
125 For Heidegger’s exposition of the stranger in Trakl’s work, see ‘Language in the Poem,’ in 
Heidegger, On the Way to Language, pp. 159-198. For Heidegger’s elucidation of how Hölderlin 
creates the impression of what is without a word, see, Heidegger, ‘Words,’ in Heidegger, On the 
Way to Language, pp. 139-156. 
126 Heidegger, Parmenides, pp. 31f. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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doctrine. When the large edition of his writings, the one that followed his own 
arrangement, began to appear, he gave it the following epigraph: “Ways, not 
works.”’
127 One of these ways is found in Heidegger’s Parmenides, where a method 
for identifying ontological places provides a Lichtung where all our illustrations 
may be gathered, before we attempt the exposition of what they conceal. 
 
[40]     Heidegger’s topology is not a significant part of his production and has so 
far, to my knowledge, failed to have a reception history, that is, an application 
beyond interpretations of Heidegger’s philosophy. Nonetheless, [th]is ontological 
topology provides a method for reaching places, topoi or Stellen where the Being of 
beings is exceptionally expressed or clarified. To have a clear view of Heidegger’s 
methodology, how he recognizes and exposes the topography of these places, we 
shall say that Heidegger considers these Stellen as indicative. That is, they do 
themselves unconceal a certain mode or experience of Being and provide not 
merely an illustration for an already existing theory. When Heidegger is looking 
for the Greek experience of what is false, he does not merely search for a concept, 
but for the places where, even without a word, the false discloses itself, and by doing 
so, saves a certain experience of Being. Heidegger says of [th]is method of 
indication, of the places that discloses the Greek notion of what is false,  
‘Now it is time, however, to leave the word to the Greeks themselves, so we 
may have a witness testifying that, and to what extent, pseudos belongs to 
the essential realm of concealing and unconcealedness. Let us cite two 
places, the one from Homer, the other from Hesiod. These places [“Stellen”] 
are not mere authorities [“Belegstellen”], which by the simple accumulation 
of a large number would gain demonstrative power; for it is not a matter 
here of demonstrating and arguing, but of a pointing out that opens our 
eyes.’
128  
 
                                                 
127 Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, ‘Existentialism and The Philosophy of Existence (1981),’ p. 11. 
128 Heidegger, Parmenides, pp. 30f. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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[41]     What Heidegger suggests by ‘a pointing out that opens our eyes’ becomes 
clear only within the context of the lectures as a whole, as it indicates Heidegger’s 
understanding of the self-unconcealing activity of theoria, which makes available a 
certain experience of Being if not Being itself. Of the Greek sense of theory, 
Heidegger simply says,  
‘The look of Being, which looks into beings, is in Greek thea. The grasping 
look in the sense of seeing is in Greek horao. To see the encountering look, 
in Greek thea-hora, is theorao-theorein, theoria. The word ‘theory’ means, 
conceived simply, the perceptual relation of man to Being, a relation man 
does not produce, but rather a relation into which Being itself first posits 
man.’
129  
 
What Heidegger conveys in this passage is not only the understanding of the Greek 
experience of theoria, how it relates beings to place and place to Being, but also 
how our ways depart from his. For we will consider that man may, through art, 
through drama, deliberately produce such places that will allure the spectator, that 
will not only seduce him or her to arrive at [th]is place, but keep them there. We 
will not simply say that the production of these places nor their consumption quite 
simply indicates a self-disclosure of the Being of beings, but say that if one is 
capable repeatedly and throughout history, like Shakespeare, to make these 
spectators not only come visit these places, but to keep them there, that one in 
these places have perhaps unconcealed a mode of Being in-different from our own 
lives. Of these ontological places, which Heidegger considers to be the clearest 
unconcealment of the ontological difference itself through art, to the point where 
there is left no trace of its [subjective] production, Heidegger says, ‘What is 
decisive here is not the sheer number of the places, in the quotation of which 
generally one place is left in darkness as much as the other, in the expectation that 
                                                 
129 Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 147. The Latinized spelling of the Greek concepts are emphasized. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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the one unclear place would clarify the others and then that the darkness of all the 
places taken together would result in clarity.’
130 Elaborating on Heidegger, we 
would mark that these places are not already there, Da from the very beginning, 
but that the apperception of these irreplaceable places, which convey an 
experience of the Being of beings in-different from our own lives, may be 
deliberately produced.
131 As easily as it is noticed that not all places are 
experienced as in-different from our lives, so it is clear, that [th]is, the 
apperception of the Being of beings that is expressed in these exceptional places, 
may be produced more or less successfully.
132 
 
[42]     It is obvious that one does not always end up where one began. Whereas we 
begin with Heidegger’s true topology of Being, we end up mapping out the 
topography of inadequation in Shakespeare’s plays, based on a distinct topology of 
inadequation, which is not so much a topology of Being as it is a typology of the 
methods that most effectively produces the apperception of the ontological 
contradiction, that which transgresses all beings and lends to them the empty 
impression of life. But let us first acknowledge what our own topological method is 
different from. Heidegger’s topological method has three elemental steps: 1. 
Abstract place. 2. Concrete place 3. Exposition. First, Heidegger identifies the 
abstract place, for example, the Greek experience of what is false, pseudos. 
Secondly, Heidegger locates the concrete place, found in Book II of the Iliad, which 
                                                 
130 Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 29. 
131 If we are to speak metaphorically, to mark out how our method differs from Heidegger’s ways: 
the ontological difference is not like the clearing along a path you may simply follow, but what an 
artist consciously, intentionally and systematically has to produce the apperception of, so that the 
spectator may be lead through the woods, as if through a clearing, as if a long a path that he thinks 
is already there. 
132 As we shall later see in Chapter 4, The Techne of Being, [th]is incomparable sense Being,  these 
exceptional places that are experienced as indistinguishable from our own lives, are not produced 
without method. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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he quotes or indicates. Thirdly, the commentary clarifies how the Being of beings, 
the ontological difference itself unconceals the events [falsely], and the experience 
or non-experience of [th]is [false] unconcealment.
133 We shall likewise follow three 
steps in the methodological process from abstract topos to concrete place and 
further to its exposition. But we shall add a dimension to [th]is place, for we shall 
investigate how [th]is place was deliberately produced, and also find and 
distinguish clearly between the different instruments that most emphatically 
produce these ontological places. Furthermore, we shall name the abstract place 
after the instrument used to produce the apperception of [th]is ontological 
                                                 
133 To get a concrete sense of Heidegger’s topological method, we should let him quote the place 
from the Iliad where Zeus falsely unconceals the events of the future, not without, of course, 
influencing the true course of events through [th]is false unconcealment. Heidegger, identifying the 
event, says, ‘The quotation from Homer is taken from the second book of the Iliad (B 248ff.). Here 
the poet has Nestor say that for the Greeks there is no hope of returning home from the battlefield 
of Troy: … 
 (as) “previously, from the lightning-thrower we knew whether he was out to 
deceive us or not.” 
The reference is to Zeus, and the event called to mind took place the day the Greeks in Argos 
boarded their ship to go to Troy. … 
 
“On the right his lightning flashed, a sign portending good fortune.” [Heidegger, 
Parmenides, p. 31, sic.] 
 
In the exposition of [th]is place, Heidegger surely appears to be inspired. Almost like a rhapsode 
commenting on the Homeric poems, Heidegger says, ‘Such a sign is in every case a concealing that 
shows. But the question remains whether this type of concealment holds back (i.e. holds back the 
glimpse into destiny) or whether it is a showing whose concealing aspect dissembles what is to come. 
In that case, the holding forth on the part of the showing which appears, and thereby the sign itself, 
are pseudos. The concealing is a dissembling.’ [Heidegger, Parmenides, page 32] To ensure that the 
reader is not given a false impression of Heidegger’s ontological approach to literature, Heidegger 
similarly exposes a true place from book XXIII of the Iliad, verse 358ff, where Achilles is 
unconcealed, by the Gods who does not fail to indicate the future. [Heidegger, Parmenides, page 32] 
As Heidegger points out, the winner, Achilles, is already unconcealed before the chariot race begins. 
[Heidegger, Parmenides, page 128f] As Heidegger shows, to the Homeric Greeks, even the false is 
true or takes part in unconcealment, is that through which [th]is is brought into light and 
unconcealment. But of all places of unconcealment, no one in Heidegger’s works is perhaps more 
memorable than when, in Rilke’s Duino Elegies, he recognizes its withdrawal, recognizes the place 
of withdrawal where the open has degraded into empty space and that which is no longer is 
experienced as mysteriously unconcealed, but already given, thus rendering the Being of beings 
entirely unrecognized, withdrawn and forgotten. In the exposition of Rilke’s place, Heidegger 
defines the open as what is unconcealed, before he shows us that the open place of Rilke’s Duino 
Elegies does not comply with, but negates his concept, appears to be no less than the negation of 
what is unconcealed, confirming again that the ontological difference is no longer apperceived but 
forgotten. [Cf. Heidegger, Parmenides, pp. 152-153.] The Hermeneutics of Being 
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contradiction, to show that non-beings, what is not, grant the most irrefutable 
sense of what is, the Being of beings. 
 
[43]     Finally, whereas to us the sense of place remains the same, we will, more 
often than not point in the opposite direction of Heidegger, to the apperception of 
what is concealed and not unconcealed. Secondly, we will not only discover an 
outstanding experience of Being, but rather, how [th]is experience was 
systematically produced. We will therefore go in search of, not like Heidegger 
immediately only the true or false places themselves, but rather, how [th]is 
exceptional place was produced, discover not only these concealed or unconcealed 
places but the negative principles for their production. In Chapter 4, The Techne of 
Being, we therefore make distinct certain instruments of incarnation, identify the 
means of inadequation that most effectively, that is, immediately and without 
being detected, produce the apperception of the ontological contradiction, i.e. that 
non-beings offer the most irrefutable sense of what is. For pro-duced through these 
instruments of inadequation, is the forceful apperception of that which no being 
can be without if it is not to give up all claims to existence. As instruments of 
inadequation we predominantly recognize: falsity, dissimilarity, nothing, 
indefinition, elision,
134 and substitution. These are the primary instruments of 
incarnation, means of inadequation which we shall focus on in Chapter 4, The 
Techne of Being, although it is safe to say that there are other means, which are 
part of a more general topos of inadequation; doubt, aporia, contradiction, 
                                                 
134 Elision, is the transposition of the negative method of aphairesis to the gradual or violent 
removal of attributes from an individual [being], so as to effect the profound apperception of that 
which remains, the Being of that being which everything has been taken away from. The Hermeneutics of Being 
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nonsense, even [truth],
135 all figures that less convincingly dis-cover the negative 
ontological difference and hence the apperception of life.
                                                 
135 ‘Truth’ is here understood in the negative and ontological sense as what is unconcealed, not in an 
epistemological sense as the correspondence between a proposition and something already given. 
That is, truth is not only understood but experienced negatively as that which is un-concealed.  
 
C2 PHILOSOPHIES OF UNCONCEALMENT 
 
§2.1 Plato’s Khora 
§2.2 Aristotle’s Place 
§2.3 Plotinus’ Mirror 
§2.4 Nietzsche’s Chaos 
§2.5 Derrida’s Khora 
 
C2 EXPOSÉ 
 
[1]     In this chapter and the next, I will present the contradiction of Being, the 
ontological difference as either concealed or unconcealed, in order to convey that 
which Shakespeare produced the apperception of. Beginning by tracing the history 
of the unconcealed through Plato’s khora, Aristotle’s place, Plotinus’ mirror, 
Nietzsche’s chaos, Heidegger’s Lichtung and Derrida’s khora, we shall see, in [th]is 
unparalleled historic display of Being, [th]is unequalled Gallery of Philosophies of 
Unconcealment, that Adorno is certainly not siding with history when, speaking 
against all tradition, he says that there is no ontological difference.
1 For not once 
does Adorno take time to consider the arguments of those who have so profoundly 
shaped the tradition that Heidegger, whom Adorno speaks so forcefully against, is 
only the culmination of.
2 In the next chapter we shall focus on Pseudo-Dionysius, 
                                                 
1 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 97, more sarcastically on the following page, where he says, ‘If we 
try to accomplish Heidegger’s distinction of Being from the concept that circumscribes it logically, 
we are left … with an unknown quantity which nothing but the pathos of its invocation lifts above 
the Kantian concept of the transcendent thing-in-itself.’ Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 98. 
2 There is a similar understanding of what is mysterious, ineffable in Thomas Aquinas’ concept of 
this as presented in his essay On Being and Essence. [St. Thomas, On Being and Essence, in Thomas 
Aquinas, Selected Writings, p. 35ff.] Defining the determinate this by expressing what this is not, 
Thomas says, ‘The unity of genus stems from this very indetermination or indifference,’ [St. 
Thomas, On Being and Essence, in, Thomas Aquinas, Selected Writings, p. 36.] meaning that this 
alone is what escapes any essential category and existence alone what allows [individual] 
incarnation. Wittgenstein is only one of the last to express the understanding of the mystical as Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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Kant and Derrida, to convey the ontological difference as concealed. What unites 
these three philosophers is that they avoid what Aristotle, Descartes and Leibniz 
do not. However different these last three philosophers may be, they did not resist 
the temptation to hypostatize or reify the concealed as substance, be this called 
hypokeimenon, cogito or monad. There is then, as we shall see, a tradition for 
understanding the ontological difference as insubstantially concealed, a negative 
tradition, moreover, which Heidegger completely neglects as he attempts to 
convince the reader that the ontological difference, the Being of beings, is never 
concealed, what is concealed, the ontological difference.
3 
 
[2]     Denouncing the withdrawal, the forgetfulness of Being, Heidegger speaks as 
if Being necessarily and unavoidably is unconcealed, and that [th]is is unconcealed 
prior to any subjective ascription. It is [th]is necessity, [th]is unrecognition [of the 
subject], that grounds Adorno’s critique, his assessment of Heidegger’s philosophy 
as an attempt to mystify the ontic, a fetishization of what is already positively 
given. Adorno believes Heidegger’s ontology and the expression of the ontological 
difference is nothing but an attempt to mystify the world as it is given, a 
mystification covering up the reification of an objective world which makes it 
possible to not recognize that whatever is is not given but the result of a social and 
historical production which, according to Adorno and in good Hegelian tradition, 
should not be irresponsible but subjective, that is, ascribed to the positive and 
                                                                                                                                               
what is unconcealed and not what is hidden, when he rather emptily asserts the presence of that 
which I cannot speak of, [Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 7, p. 189] after he did point 
out ‘There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself: it is the mystical.’[Wittgenstein, Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus, 6.522, p. 187]. 
3 See for example The Introduction to Being and Time where Heidegger once and for all demarcates 
his position, ‘The Being of beings can least of all be something ‘behind which’ something else 
stands, something that ‘does not appear.’’ Heidegger, ’Introduction to Being and Time,’ Basic 
Writings, p. 82. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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negative labours of the subject.
4 In Negative Dialectics Adorno stresses the negative 
labours, the labours that are yet undone in a world subject to the powers of 
fascism and capitalism.
5 
 
[3]     According to Adorno there is either no ontological difference or the 
ontological difference is merely a mystification of the ontic, which amounts to an 
expression of what the apperception of this ontological difference more 
fundamentally is, an alienation from whatever is positively given, that is, for 
Adorno, the beings that already are. In this view, Heidegger’s ontology is nothing 
but a covert or disguised positivism of the sort that gives or lends a false aura of 
inevitability to whatever is at hand, to whatever can be grasped by your fingers – 
to whatever is present and makes that which is already there, [th]is presence, look 
inevitable, necessary and even fated.
6 Fundamentally Adorno believes Heidegger’s 
ontology has its ground in that world from which it is alienated, a world over 
which one has lost control. In these ‘uncontrollable’ or objective forces, where the 
subject does not recognize itself, one catches, again and again, according to 
Adorno, ‘falsely’ a glimpse of something holy, that which always is beyond the 
reach of man, which makes it again possible to hail what is meaningless as what is 
most profound.
7 It is, furthermore, this mystification that, according to Adorno, 
gives legitimacy to any political or economic system or any systemic suppression, 
                                                 
4 Perpetuating and reinforcing a Hegelian tradition, there is, to Adorno, nothing that is not 
produced. Everything is fabricated, even ‘facts’ forget their origin, something we do not easily 
forget when it is brought to our attention that the Latin ‘facere’ simply means, ‘to make.’ 
5 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 119f. 
6 Adorno never shows any desire to speak anything but polemically, and speaking with Marxian 
mannerism, he cries out, ‘Mana is raised up under the name of Being, as if our dawning impotence 
resembled that of pre-animistic primitives in a thunderstorm.’ Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 106. 
7 Adorno, Negative Dialectics. For Adorno’s thoughtful elaboration on Schiller and the Romantic 
praise of what is meaningless as what is most profound in tragedy, see also Adorno, Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason, pp. 183-185. For a similar view of the sublime impression that tragedy offers, see, 
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Book III, § 51, pp. 161ff. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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as it justifies the status quo by suggesting that the current state of affairs is, as if 
handed down by the gods, without which nothing would be unconcealed. 
 
[4]     Speaking of Heidegger’s ontological difference as a paralogism, not without 
alluding to Kant’s The Paralogisms of Reason,
8 Adorno says in the polemic, the 
tirade that opens Negative Dialectics, ‘The paralogism is evinced by the fact that 
we cannot conceive such a supposedly pure substrate of “is.”’
9 Adorno clarifies 
this by saying that ‘”is” has no substrate without synthesis.’
10 This means that 
there is no apperception of the Being of beings without beings, no apperception of 
[th]is without what [th]is essentially is, and hence, that the Being of beings is 
secondary, and not, as Heidegger thinks, something first, prior to any being. Of 
course, this does not suggest, as Adorno seems to think, that the Being of beings is 
nothing. For [th]is impression or apprehension may indeed follow upon synthesis, 
be consequent to synthesis and not anticipate it. Or, regardless of whether the 
apperception of the Being of beings is first or last, antecedent or consequent to the 
apperception of what [th]is is, to [th]is phenomenological perception, we will 
maintain throughout [th]is thesis, that there is, regardless of whether [th]is 
apperception is first or second, primary or secondary, an apperception without 
which [th]is phenomenon would not appear to be [real/true].
11 Basically we do 
                                                 
8 For the insurmountable chapter that precedes or opens the noumenological analysis in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, see ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
A341/B399-A405/B431, pp. 383-441. Also note the invaluable commentary by Karl Ameriks in 
Kant’s Theory of Mind - An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. 
9 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 105. 
10  Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 105. 
11 We shall maintain a use of ‘true’ and ‘truth’ throughout the thesis which may ring unfamiliar. 
We will often use the word ‘true’ where it would be more common, habitual to use the word ‘real.’ 
We do not thereby attempt to destroy the commonplace distinction between truth and reality, but 
acknowledge that we need to apply the word ‘true’ in a twofold way, in an ontological sense of what 
is, and in an epistemological sense of the correspondence or adequation to whatever is or is not. It 
is, as we shall see more systematically in Chapter 4, The Techne of Being and throughout this thesis, Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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agree with Heidegger that there is an ontological difference, and although we 
acknowledge Adorno’s dialectical critique of ontology as no more than a 
‘mystification of the ontic,’
12 we will argue against this view. The argument is, of 
course, not our own but the sustained argument of tradition. For Heidegger, 
whether he acknowledges this or not, and however much he gives the impression of 
destroying the tradition or being without precursors, places himself securely 
within a philosophical tradition.
13 
§2.1 Plato’s Khora 
 
[5]     Speaking of the ontological difference, Heidegger observes in What is Called 
Thinking,  
‘An interpretation decisive for Western thought is that given by Plato. He 
says that between beings and Being there prevails the khorismos; e khora is 
the locus, the site, the place. Plato means to say: beings and Being are in 
different places. Particular beings and Being are differently located. Thus 
when Plato gives thought to the different location of beings and Being, he is 
asking for the totally different place of Being, as against the place of 
beings.’
14  
 
Although it is not made explicit, it is clear that the difference between these places 
is essential, or rather, that the place of the Being of beings is inessential, whereas 
the place of any particular being is not, [th]is simply because the particular is the 
concretization of the universal idea, essence or concept. [Th]is means that the place 
                                                                                                                                               
our inadequate perceptions or apperceptions that most distinctly, most emphatically create the 
apperception of what is [true], that is, in commonplace parlance, what is [real]. 
12 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 116, 122. 
13 As I use the tradition in this chapter to make an argument against Adorno by presenting an 
undeniable tradition named by what they expose, Philosophies of Unconcealment, so will I, in the 
next chapter, use the tradition to make an argument against Heidegger. I draw attention to a 
complementary tradition to emphasize another notion of Being, which gives expression to what 
Heidegger consistently does not. By thus presenting Philosophies of Concealment alongside 
Philosophies of Unconcealment, my hope is that our apperception of Being will not appear to be 
unnecessarily normative, even prejudiced, and that, by thus suspending judgment, by showing 
preference for neither side, my presentation will not, already before this ship is launched, 
knowingly risk capsizing. For both traditions give different expressions to the ontological 
difference, the contradiction of the Being, whether concealed or unconcealed. 
14 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, p. 227. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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of Being is an inessential place, devoid of any essential properties, whereas the 
place of beings is the place where these essential properties are incarnated in one 
particular individual. It will later become clear that also Aristotle has presented 
[th]is inessential place and hence unconcealed the Being of beings. 
 
[6]     Before Timaeus begins his exposition of khora he performs a prayer for its 
unconcealment. For khora itself to be unconcealed, he desires khora to guide him 
through the expression of what he could not have spoken of, what would remain 
unuttered, if khora did not take place. And surely, if Plato’s theory of khora is true, 
not even the following prayer would have been unconcealed without khora, ‘Let us 
therefore at the outset of this discourse call upon the god to be our saviour this 
time, too, to give us safe passage through a strange and unusual exposition, and 
lead us to a view of what is likely. And so let me begin my speech again.’
1516 Prior 
to any presentation of Plato’s khora in Timaeus, it is perhaps important to notice, 
as does Mr. Cooper in his splendid introduction, ‘Plato, as author of the work, is 
responsible for all Timaeus’ theories.’
17 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Plato, Timaeus, 48d. 
16 As is well known, in Timaeus, Plato lets Timaeus perform a very long speech that describes the 
creation of the world, which resembles, or at least, reminds us of, a theogony. But it is not, for what 
is described is not the creation of the Gods, as in Hesiod’s books, but rather, the creation of the 
world, a cosmogony, and the creation of man, an anthropogony. In his introduction to Timaeus, 
John M. Cooper, says this to clarify, ‘Timaeus, who appears to be a dramatic invention of Plato’s, 
comes from Southern Italy, noted for its Greek mathematicians and scientists. He bases his 
cosmology on the Platonic division, familiar, for example from Phaedo and Republic, between 
eternal, unchanging ‘Forms’ and their unstable ‘reflections’ in the physical, perceptible world of 
‘becoming.’ But he introduces a creator god, the ‘demiurge’ (Greek for ‘craftsman’), who crafts 
and brings order to the physical world by using the Forms as patterns – Timaeus does not conceive 
the Forms as themselves shaping the world. And he develops the theory of a ‘receptacle’ underlying 
physical things [khora], onto which, as onto a featureless plastic stuff, the Formal patterns are 
imposed.’ Plato, Timaeus, Complete Works, Introduction by John M. Cooper, p. 1224. 
17 Plato, Timaeus, Complete Works, Introduction by John M. Cooper, p. 1224. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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[7]     The negativity of the ontological difference is clearly expressed as 
unconcealed in Plato’s concept of ‘khora,’ a concept that, from the very beginning, 
states that the subject is always in a different place. However different, [th]is place 
is not only where the subject is unconcealed, but prior to subjectivity, a first place, 
a proto topos, indispensable to the phenomenological Being of any being. Khora is, 
as Aristotle will say of his place, and Heidegger will say of his clearing, first.
18 But 
the place that is without subject, and delivers and receives all subjects, is the place 
of all origins, as it makes the unconcealment of all subjects possible in the first 
place. And so it is that khora, the mother of unconcealment, is the recipient of all 
beings unconcealed. For there would be no birth without khora, without khora 
nothing unconcealed. And Being different from each being, but nevertheless 
fundamental to all beings, khora is indistinguishable, in-different from the 
existence of all beings, and does therefore, as place and clearing, name the 
ontological difference, the Being of beings. 
 
[8]     Plato thinks of khora as that which is without any essential characteristica, 
Being without predicates.
19 Clearly, khora is not an idea. Without properties one 
cannot say what khora is, except that it is. In Timaeus Plato performs many 
metaphorical expositions of khora, one in which khora is likened to a mother,
20 
another to gold,
21 a third to a neutral base for fragrant ointments.
22 In the fourth 
exposition khora is likened to that which is without a face but projects all faces,
23 a 
fifth presents khora as similar to a canvas upon which all things of ‘unsleeping, 
                                                 
18 For Heidegger’s exposition of clearing, see for example, Heidegger, On the Essence of Truth, 
Basic Writings, p. 137f. and Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings, pp. 229ff. 
19 Plato, Timaeus, 50d-e. 
20 Plato, Timaeus, 50d. 
21 Plato, Timaeus, 50a. 
22 Plato, Timaeus, 50d-e. 
23 Plato, Timaeus, 50d-e. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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truly existing reality,’ are painted.
24 What is implied in [th]is last metaphorical 
exposition of khora, is that khora, like a canvas makes [th]is phenomenon appear 
essentially, projects the idea by allowing or making possible or delivering its 
appearance, which is no more than a singular dream compared to the ‘unsleeping, 
truly existing reality’ of things/ideas.
25 Through khora, what is delivered is not 
only an image, but existence, not only an image of life but life itself. The idea being 
that the picture is different from the idea pictured.
26 An idea is delivered or 
received in an element different from itself, which makes what is essential appear 
through [th]is khora. Having made a clear division between ideas, phenomena and 
khora,
27 Plato says,  
‘It provides a location for all things that come to be. It is itself apprehended 
by a kind of bastard reasoning that does not involve sense perception and it is 
hardly even an object of conviction. We look at it as in a dream when we 
say that everything that exists must of necessity be somewhere, in some 
place and occupying some space, and that that which doesn’t exist 
somewhere, whether on earth or in heaven, doesn’t exist at all.’
28 
 
The phenomenon unconcealed clings to Being not like paint sticks to a canvas, but 
more like a man, a climber clinging to a mountain wall, so steep, that one may 
easily slip and become, as Plato says, ‘nothing at all.’
29  
 
[9]     Khora does not appear or disappear, but rather, through khora all things 
are unconcealed singularly. Khora remains the same, the name of that which 
receives, delivers all beings to Being, and delivering the multitude of beings, the 
Being of beings remains inseparably one. Speaking of khora, Timaeus says,  
                                                 
24 Plato, Timaeus, 52b. 
25 Plato, Timaeus, 52b. 
26 Plato, Timaeus, 52c. 
27 Plato, Timaeus, 52a-b. 
28 Plato, Timaeus, 52b. 
29 Plato, Timaeus, 52c. The reader should be informed that metaphor is only applied for heuristic 
purposes, in order to enlighten about what often remains obscure. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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‘We must always refer to it by the same term, for it does not depart from its 
own character in any way. Not only does it always receive all things, it has 
never in any way whatever taken on any characteristic similar to any of the 
things that enter it. Its nature is to be available for anything it makes its 
impression upon, and it is modified, shaped, and reshaped by the things 
that enter it. These are the things that make it appear different at different 
times.’
30  
 
And stressing what is most significant in this passage, but within another khora, 
‘these are the things that make it appear different at different times.’
31 And khora 
is prior to all things. 
 
[10]     Again, to make the apprehension of what is most difficult easier, Timaeus 
likens khora to gold. There would be no similitude without the experience of a 
common ground. So comparing khora to gold does not only speak of its value, its 
transformations, but also of its immutability. Timaeus says, that if gold can be 
shaped into every possible form, moulded into every thinkable shape, still the 
answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ would be the same. For be this a ‘triangle or 
any of the other shapes that come to be in the gold, your safest answer by far, with 
respect to truth, would be to say, ‘gold.’
32 Obviously there would be no metaphor 
without the perception of a common ground. Clearly, Plato believes khora brings 
beings into shining presence, unconceals ideas like gold unconceals forms, 
patterns, for like gold khora too is distinct from the forms it receives. And as 
cosmos appears indistinguishable from the chaos that receives it,
33 as the ornament 
appears indifferent from gold, Being is indistinguishable from all beings. And 
again, if khora is a canvas that projects every phenomena, to render these distinct, 
even contradictory, ideas perfectly, it would itself have to be without properties, 
                                                 
30 Plato, Timaeus, 50b-c. Emphasis added. 
31 Plato, Timaeus, 50c. 
32 Plato, Timaeus, 50a. 
33 As is evident from the common Greek belief poetically presented by Hesiod, Theogony, 116, and 
quoted by Aristotle at the opening of his books on nature, Physics, Book IV, 208b30.   Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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for showing all faces it is itself faceless,
34 revealing all phenomena, it is itself not a 
phenomenon.
35 And as it brings forward everything that can be looked at, it can 
itself not be seen. And it is through [th]is khora, from [th][is faceless mother, that 
Er, the soul who lingers in another world looking for a place to be born, is finally 
incarnated, at last transgresses beyond the ideal to become a true man, 
unconcealed, aletheia.
36 
§1.2 Aristotle’s Place 
 
[11]     Hegel is the first to recognize that Aristotle’s Metaphysics is no more than a 
compilation, and to remark the ‘peculiar drawback’ that neither Aristotle nor any 
of the ancients did know this work by that name, but as proto philosophia.
37 But 
Hegel helps us along the way by clarifying the intention of this science, which is to 
be among all sciences, regardless of name, a science of what is first. Proto 
Philosophia is clearly distinct from the other sciences by being ‘the science of that 
which is, in so far as it is.’
38 It is therefore quite paradoxical, that whereas Aristotle 
in Metaphysics merely speaks about a science of what is first, it is only in Physics 
that Aristotle proposes or suggests an answer to what the ontological difference is. 
Whereas Hegel speaks of substance/ousia, as what is necessarily first,
39 even 
                                                 
34 Plato, Timaeus 50d-e. 
35 Plato speaks of a kind of ‘bastard reasoning’ involved in the apperception of khora. [Plato, 
Timaeus 52b.] In his essay on Khora, Derrida, speaking of the logic of khora, emphasizes what Plato 
merely suggests, ‘a hybrid, bastard, or even corrupted reasoning (logismo notho).’ [Derrida, Khora, 
in, On the Name, p. 90]. Th]is corrupted reasoning is, of course, what makes it almost impossible to 
present khora without the assistance of metaphor or allegory. Hence, the abundance of metaphor, 
hence, the story of Er that ends the Republic and begins the life or Er. 
36 For Plato’s story of the incarnation of Er, see Plato, Republic, 614b-621d. 
37 Hegel, History of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, p. 137. 
38 Hegel, History of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, p. 137. Emphasis added. 
39 Hegel says, ‘The main object which Aristotle has in view (Metaphysics VII.1) is the definition of 
what this substance (ousia) really is’. Hegel, History of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, p. 
137. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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Aristotle has to admit that there may be something prior to [th]is substance. As 
Aristotle concludes the fourth book of Physics,  
‘These considerations then would lead us to suppose that place is something 
distinct from bodies, and that every sensible body is in place. Hesiod too 
might be held to have given a correct account of it when he made chaos 
first. At least he says: “First of all things came chaos to being, then broad 
breasted earth,”
40 implying that things need to have space first, because he 
thought, with most people, that everything is somewhere and in place. If 
this is its nature, the power of place must be a marvellous thing, and be 
prior to all other things. For that without which nothing else can exist, while 
it can exist without the others, must needs be first; for place does not pass 
out of existence when the things in it are annihilated.’
41 
 
[12]     What we are pursuing in this chapter are different interpretations of the 
ontological difference [as unconcealed], of what is, as Heidegger says, ‘most 
indefinable.’
42 If there is such an ontological difference between Being and beings, 
[th]is would not only be different from beings, but there would be no beings 
without [th]is difference. Aristotle’s place, no less than Plato’s khora and 
Heidegger’s Lichtung, are clearly interpretations of the same. For all these 
concepts announce that two identical beings cannot be in the same place, and that 
no being would be without [th]is place, khora or clearing. They all attempt to give 
conceptual clarification to the ontological difference, of the Being of beings by 
announcing what is unconcealed.
43 Before we continue our exposition, we should 
perhaps let the reader have a sustained look at [th]is place [of unconcealment], let 
the Philosopher himself speak, 
 
 
                                                 
40 The Fragment is taken from Hesiod, Theogony 116. 
41 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, Chapter 1, 209a1-2. 
42 Heidegger, Being and Time, ‘Introduction,’ in Basic Writings, p. 43. 
43 Reading Aristotle’s exposition of place in the fourth book of Physics, one is reminded of the 
paradoxical opening of Hamlet, where Shakespeare makes the entrant speak out of place. For the 
one who is to relieve the other on watch, speaks as if he is already on guard, and therefore, before 
he has re-placed [th]is guard, before Barnardo has re-placed Francisco, he speaks as if [Being] in 
another place, when he asks, as when stopping an intruder, ‘Who’s there?’ Shakespeare, Hamlet, 
I.i.1. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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‘Hence the place of a thing is neither a part nor a state of it, but is separable 
from it. For place is supposed to be something like a vessel – the vessel 
being a transportable place. But the vessel is no part of the thing./In so far 
then as it is separable from the thing, it is not the form; and in so far as it 
contains it, it is different from the matter.’
44  
 
It is easily overlooked that also in common idiom an occurrence takes place, and 
that if something does not take place it does not happen, and if it never occurred, it 
has no claim to existence, and that therefore, also in common parlance, place is not 
forgotten as the true place of unconcealment without which nothing would ever be. 
In this light it is perhaps clear why an immediate understanding of what takes 
place is most easily obtained by an understanding of what does not.
 45 For example, 
Aristotle makes a clear distinction between natural and mathematical objects when 
he says that ‘the objects studied by mathematics … have no place.’
46  
 
[13]     In his exposition of place, Aristotle pretends or claims to be without 
precursors, saying that in the exposition of place, ’we have inherited nothing from 
previous thinkers, whether in the way of a statement of difficulties or of a 
solution.’
47 Although no one would question that Aristotle invented logic, it is clear 
that, however much his immanent critique of place is different from Plato’s 
transcendent exposition of khora, he does indeed exaggerate the novelty of his 
investigation, not, I believe, to throw more than a little honour on his vain 
person.
48 To justify his claim to novelty, Aristotle identifies khora as indifferent 
from space or matter, saying,  
                                                 
44 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, Chapter 1, 209b26-31. The reference is to Immanuel Bekker’s 
standard edition of the Greek text of Aristotle of 1831. 
45 In Chapter 4, The Techne of Being, and in Chapter 8, The Production of Being through Nothing, 
we shall witness the production of [th]is indefinite place through indefinition, a proposition which 
truly gives us nothing to perceive, but yet produces the apperception of [th]is place. 
46 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, Chapter 1, 208b23. 
47 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, Chapter 1, 208a34. 
48 As is heard from the anecdotal evidence of Diogenes, Aristotle was not a little vane, and although 
he credits Plato with creating a discourse about the essence of place, of whether place is inessential, Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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‘This is why Plato in the Timaeus says that matter and space are the same; 
for the ‘participant’ and space are identical. (It is true, indeed, that the 
account he gives there of the ‘participant’ is different from what he says in 
his so-called unwritten teaching. Nevertheless, he did identify place and 
space.) I mention Plato because, while all hold place to be something, he 
alone tried to say what it is.’
49  
 
 
[14]     I shall continue the exposition of Aristotle’s topos with Hegel’s clarifying 
comments on its place within the Aristotelian ‘ontology’ as a whole.
50  
‘In this ontology or, as we call it, logic, he investigates and minutely 
distinguishes four principles (Metaphysics I.3): first, determination or 
quality or quality as such, the wherefore of anything, essence or form; 
secondly, the matter; thirdly, the principle of motion; and fourthly, the 
principle of final cause, or of the good.’
51  
 
There is, however, something that even to Aristotle escapes the essential definition 
of being, but which beings cannot be without, namely, place.
52 While first 
attempting to think the different causes that, to Aristotle, essentially defines what a 
Being is,
53 Hegel goes on to think with Aristotle, what is necessary for beings to be 
which is not part of their being, but is, more crucially, still indispensable to all 
beings.
54 For as Aristotle says, after having analyzed kinesis in Physics III.1-3, ‘… 
it is necessary that the natural philosopher should consider the subject of place 
(topos).’
55 To firmly understand the ex-position of place within Aristotle’s Physics, 
it is perhaps necessary to take directions from Heidegger’s essay on Aristotle’s 
                                                                                                                                               
Aristotle on many occasions did his utmost to embarrass and discredit the aging Plato in disputes in 
the Academia, which is perhaps why Aristotle was not offered the place as Plato’s successor as the 
head of the Academia. Aristotle, of course, went on to found a school in another place, the 
Lykeion/Lyceum. See, Diogenes Laertius, Lives, Volume One. 
49 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, Chapter 1, 209b10-15. 
50 Hegel’s presentation of Aristotle’s fundamental ontology is found in History of Philosophy II: 
Plato and the Platonists, pp. 137ff, his elaboration on Aristotle’s concept of ‘place’ in Hegel, History 
of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, pp. 165f. 
51 Hegel, History of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, p. 138. 
52 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, 1-5, 184a10-240b7. 
53 Hegel, History of Philosophy, Volume II: Plato and the Platonists, pp. 137, 138. 
54 Hegel, History of Philosophy, Volume II: Plato and the Platonists, pp. 165, 166. 
55 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, as quoted in Hegel, History of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, 
p. 165. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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Concept of physis in Physics B. For Heidegger reminds us that Aristotle 
understands physis or nature as the self-placing into appearance, regards nature as 
nothing more than that which shows or unconceals itself.
 56 Obviously, there would 
be no unconcealment without place. Hegel right away gives us a sense of the Greek 
definition of place by elegantly and simply distinguishing between space generally 
and the particular space of place,
57 which leads to the fundamental question, a 
question which concerns the Being of beings, ‘Is place a body?’
58 Politely, Hegel 
lets Aristotle answer his own question, ‘But the place cannot be body; for if it were 
there would be two bodies in the same place.’
59 Place is evidently a principle of 
unconcealment, for, as Hegel clarifies, ’place, according to Aristotle, is the 
boundary, the negation of a body, the assertion of a difference, of discretion.’
60 
What this means is that place does not take part in what a being is, neither 
formally, materially, essentially or teleologically. Nevertheless, [th]is negation is 
first, marking off that place which no being can escape if it is to enjoy more than 
the hope, the potential, of Being. 
 
[15]     Speaking of how place appears in relation to the other principles or causes 
of what beings essentially are, Aristotle says the following about place, which shows 
clearly that place is a way of thinking about what is not essential to a being, but 
what is necessary for its unconcealment. Aristotle says,  
                                                 
56 Heidegger, On the Essence and Concept of physis in Aristotle’s Physics B, pp. 219ff. 
57 Hegel, History of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, p. 165. 
58 Hegel, History of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, p. 165. 
59 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, 209a6, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume One, p. 356. Hegel, 
History of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, p. 165. The principle of non-contradiction 
demonstrates that two bodies cannot be in the same place. Still, as we shall see in Chapter 9, The 
Prodcution of Being through Substitution, the cognitive transgression of this principle, produces, 
through the experience of [th]is impossibility, not despite, but because these two bodies cannot be in 
the same place, the apperception of the unavoidable separation between beings and the Being of 
beings. 
60 Hegel, History of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, p. 165. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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’But in truth there is no difference between the point and the place of the 
point, so that if place is not different from the other forms of limitation, 
neither is it something outside of them. It is not an element, and neither of 
corporeal nor of incorporeal elements, for it possesses magnitude, but not 
body. The elements of bodies are, however, themselves bodies, and no 
magnitude is produced from intelligible elements. Place is not the material 
of things, for nothing consists of it – neither the form, nor the Notion, nor 
the end, nor the moving cause; and yet it is something.’
61  
 
The negativity of the ontological difference, insofar as there is a difference between 
beings and the Being of beings, cannot be expressed any more clearly. And by 
exposing [th]is place of unconcealment, where nothing essential remains, no one 
can accuse Aristotle of reifying everything that is. 
 
[16]     A concrete illustration of the principle of place will perhaps suffice, and is 
perhaps necessary at this point. Although two identical twins or clones, which 
essentially are the same, can be in different places at the same time, two identical 
beings cannot be in the same place at the same time. [Th]is means that place and 
not being, in the essential sense, is the individuating principle for what is essentially 
the same, as much as it is the principle of unconcealment for all beings that are 
essentially different. For the first time, cloning, which superficially shows an 
extreme neglect of what is unconcealed, the Being of beings, may yet provide the 
clearest opportunity for its apprehension. For if perfect cloning is possible, the 
same two essentially identical beings may easily be in two different places, but no 
two essentially identical beings may be unconcealed in the same place, which 
clearly shows that place is different from the essential characteristics of each being 
although it remains, is indispensable for its unconcealment, its Being. Cloning 
provides an excellent occasion for the comprehension of the Greek sense of place, 
which may be indistinguishable from our sense of time. For even if one may 
                                                 
61 Hegel, History of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, p. 165. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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succeed in creating identical clones, even if a man would one day make a perfect 
copy of himself, of what he essentially is, still [th]is being would be in a different 
place. In [th]is place, insofar as there is such a place, a different being will be 
unconcealed or [th]is being will be unconcealed differently. Hence, the ontological 
difference.
62 
§2.3 Plotinus’ Mirror 
 
 
[17]     It is well known that Plotinus performed his lectures without paper, 
papyrus or book, that the trance in which he performed his lectures was not 
broken by the interruptions he allowed from his students or disciples.
63 In one of 
these trances Plotinus spoke of khora, or as it is written down by his meticulous 
student Porphyry.
64 One of the most influential of the numerous interpretations of 
Plato’s Khora is given by Plotinus, a rather forceful composition, a tirade against 
khora, which, as it is identified with matter, is considered to be no more than a 
mirror, that is, as something which itself is without existence or essence. 
Immediately one recognizes the simplicity with which Plotinus’ names and 
presents khora in a way that almost sounds too familiar, as transparent as mirror. 
Let us remind ourselves that mirror does not merely denote what it does today, but 
also the insubstantiality of phenomena, the insubstantiality of that place where each 
phenomenon is [perceived]. We are witnessing Plotinus’ displacement of Plato’s 
                                                 
62 Concerning the relation of time and place, we could certainly say that there is no time, if time 
only signifies place or is a metaphor for the relation of place to place, like ‘night’ is a metaphor for 
‘being in the shadow of the earth.’ If ‘time,’ ‘chronology’ is merely measured by ‘the relative 
movement of heavenly bodies,’ there would be nothing to measure but place, or place would be 
what is fundamental and time not what is first. 
63 As can be gathered from the testimony of Porphyry, ‘On the Life of Plotinus and The 
Arrangement of His Work,’ in Plotinus, The Enneads, p. cix and cxv. 
64 Porphyry, ‘On the Life of Plotinus and The Arrangement of His Work,’ in Plotinus, The 
Enneads, p. cix. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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discourse on khora. Compelled as he perhaps must have been, in an age of both 
scepticism and mysticism, to produce an argument for the non-existence of 
phenomena, Plotinus adds another dimension to the ontological discourse on 
khora, an epistemological element, as he not only considers the Being/non-Being of 
khora, not only how the world presences itself, but how we may possibly 
apperceive what is non-existent.
65 For, as will become clear, Plotinus doubts the 
existence of khora, or rather, even if it unconceals everything, it is itself nothing. 
Whereas we could say that Plato’s presents the khora of Being nowhere more 
clearly than when naming that which gives birth to what comes to essential or ideal 
presence, the ‘wetnurse of becoming,’
66 Plotinus’ takes away the Being of that 
which presences all things, all phenomena. In Plotinus’ Ennead III, 6.7 it is clear 
that Matter is bodiless, powerless, without Being, invisible, and is neither what is 
referred to nor what is expressed when expressing Being.
67 ‘[I]t is in itself invisible, 
eluding all effort to observe it, present where no on can look,’
68 absolute lack of 
Being, ‘like a mirror showing things’ as in itself when they are really elsewhere,’
69 
‘containing nothing, pretending everything,’
70 ‘in itself, a false thing,’ ‘like an 
image in a dream or against water or on a mirror.’
71 Apparently, it is not 
                                                 
65 It is said in Ennead VI.7 that we were not given our senses, our sight and hearing, without reason. 
As we shall hear, there is to Plotinus neither lack of agent nor telos in creation, a creation which 
both has a subjective cause and an intelligible end, where the Being of [th]is end or [th]is cause 
appear to depend on a god or a demiurge who acts as [th]is subject. Of course, Plotinus recreates 
the impression of the Demiurge of Timaeus, when he says, ‘God, or some one of the gods, in sending 
the souls to their birth, placed eyes in the face to catch the light and allotted to each sense the 
appropriate organ, providing thus for the safety which comes from seeing and hearing in time and 
seeking or avoiding under guidance of touch.’ [Plotinus, The Enneads, p. 197.] But, this is not where 
Plotinus speaks of the mirror. 
66 Plato, Timaeus, 52d. 
67 Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead III, Tractate 6, ‘The Impassivity of the Unembodied,’ Chapter 7, 
p. 197. 
68 Plotinus, The Enneads, III.6.7, p. 197. 
69 Plotinus, The Enneads, III.6.7, p. 197. 
70 Plotinus, The Enneads, III.6.7, p. 197. 
71 Plotinus, The Enneads, III.6.7, p. 197. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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impossible to apperceive this non-entity, which in itself is nothing, khora, for 
without khora no beings could be perceived, however falsely, as incarnated.  
 
[18]     What is most surprising in Plotinus’ transparent concept of mirror-
matter/matter-mirror is that nowhere does there arise, as it does in, e. g. St. 
Thomas, the understanding that matter is a principle of individuation. For the 
singularity which matter, according to St. Thomas, gives birth to or, in St. 
Thomas’ own vocabulary, ‘determines,’ is not considered at all, is even ridiculed as 
an empty idea, only considered as an attempt to taint the spotless idea which, 
according to Plotinus, is without being incarnated, is without taking place. That 
matter is neither a principle of individuation nor existence could perhaps be 
explained by Plotinus’ doctrine of individual substances or ideas.
72 It seems to be 
the inability to grasp the principle of existence for everything that is, as anything 
but essential, which makes it impossible for Plotinus, except involuntarily, to 
accept the ontological difference between what beings are and that beings are, 
between [th]is and what [th]is is, between beings and the Being of beings. As with 
modern science Plotinus’ denies the existence of and discourages the probing into 
anything but that which essentially is, for otherwise, there is nothing. It is, of 
course, this essential simplification, which makes it so easy for Plotinus to speak of 
procession and return of ideas – that is definitions of what beings essentially are - 
of that which is only insofar as it essentially is.
73 
                                                 
72 See Plotinus’ Ennead V.7, ‘Ideal Archetype of Individual Beings,’ and Ennead IV.3, ‘Problems of 
the Soul (I).5,’ p. 257 to which John Dillon marks that when Plotinus here speaks of ‘identical 
being’ and that ‘each soul is permanently a unity (a self)’ it supports the view that ‘Plotinus 
believed in the forms of individuals.’ Plotinus, Enneads, IV.3.5 note p. 257 by John Dillon. 
73 No tractate in The Enneads displays Plotinus’ theory of procession and return more simply and 
beautifully than the treatise ‘On the Intellectual Beauty,’ which, by the way, also is the clearest 
expression of Plotinus’ aesthetics. As Plotinus says, ‘The art exhibited in the material work derives 
from an art yet higher.’ Plotinus, The Enneads, V. 8, ‘On The Intellectual Beauty,’ p. 411. For 
Plotinus apophatic aesthetics, see particularly Plotinus, The Enneads, I.6.9.  Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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[19]   To Plotinus, mirror/matter is less than nothing. [Th]is mirror/matter is not 
an individuating principle, neither is it a principle that explains what beings 
essentially are or a principle that announces their irreplaceability. Mirror is 
neither a principle for beings nor the Being of beings. Plotinus’ concept of mirror 
can indeed provide us with nothing, appear to provide us with no ontological 
difference. After having given a résumé of Plato’s concept of khora as ‘the ground 
on which individual things appear and disappear,’
74 Plotinus seems to have one 
problem with Plato’s presentation, one point in Plato’s presentation of khora which 
he cannot possibly accept. As Plotinus goes on to say, ‘The description may be 
challenged as situating [i.e. locating or placing] the Ideas in space.’ Of course, this 
is a challenge Plotinus takes up by saying, the ideas are never in space, not even in 
[th]is place. No idea ever takes place. It, the idea, is simply not there. For there is, 
to Plotinus, no principle of incarnation, and even matter is not a principle of 
incarnation and/or individuation. For, to Plotinus, matter is merely a screen, a 
pro-jector through which something that is not there, namely, the individual 
and/or essential form, the particular and eternally self-identical ideas are made 
present. Matter itself takes part in neither essence nor existence, is so fully and 
totally devoid of anything, without any form whatsoever, that hardly a trace 
remains, all traces being wiped out, eradicated to such a degree that in itself 
matter does not even appear to take place. It is nothing. Matter is nothing or 
merely a mirror unseen, unrecognised, as such. 
 
[20]     Plotinus says of matter, ‘Mirrors and transparent objects even more, offer a 
close parallel; they are quite unaffected by what is seen in or through what is seen 
                                                 
74 Plotinus, The Enneads, III.6.13, p. 204. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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in or through them: material things are reflections, and the Matter on which they 
appear is further from being affected than is a mirror.’
75 Plotinus continues to 
speak of the non-incarnation, the non-reception of the idea in matter, or rather, the 
non-presence of the idea in matter. Speaking of what appears to our senses and 
shows itself as a phenomenon, [th]is appearance of the idea, Plotinus asks his 
disciples rhetorically,  
‘Is this then a pseudo-entry into a pseudo-entity, a false entry into a false 
thing, a non-entry into nothing, something merely brought near, as faces 
enter the mirror, there to remain just as long as the people look into it? 
Yes: if we eliminated the Authentic Existent from this Sphere, nothing of all 
now seen in sense would appear one moment longer.’
76  
 
Finally we should reveal that the name of Ennead III.6 is ‘The Impassivity 
[apatheia] of the unembodied’. It should now be clear from what we have said, 
what is ‘unembodied,’ namely ‘matter,’ which is that which, like a mirror, is 
totally without pathos. And there we let Plotinus rest. 
§2.4 Nietzsche’s Chaos 
 
 
[21]     Heidegger raises the Nietzschean concept of chaos out of oblivion. There, in 
the tenth lecture of What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger speaks of Nietzsche’s 
concept of ‘eternal recurrence,’ as he does of Nietzsche’s concept of chaos in his 
lectures on Nietzsche, as an attempt to name the Being of beings.
77 Through his 
concept of eternal recurrence, Heidegger believes that Nietzsche superseded 
himself, for, in the beginning, ‘the more profound origin’ of time remained closed 
to Nietzsche.
78 As Heidegger here speaks of the concept of eternal recurrence as a 
fundamental interpretation of time, it is obvious that he is weighing Nietzsche on 
                                                 
75 Plotinus, The Enneads, III.6.9, p. 198. 
76 Plotinus, The Enneads, III.6.13, p. 204. 
77 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, Part I, p. 227n.  
78 Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 94. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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the scales of his own concept of aletheia, unconcealment.
79 Evidently, what 
Heidegger indicates by a more profound origin of time is its non-subjective, non-
metaphysical origin, a horizon from within which Heidegger easily detects the 
subjective distortion in Nietzsche’s apperception of time in his early works. 
Heidegger writes,  
‘In the earlier, immensely important essay, “On truth and Lie in an Extra-
Moral Sense (summer 1873),” Nietzsche, still perfectly in tune with 
Schopenhauer, writes that we “produce” representations of space and time 
“in us and out of us with the necessity of a spider spinning its web” (X, 202). 
Time too is represented subjectively and is even defined “as a property of 
space” (WM, 862).’
80 
 
[22]     To clarify [th]is misapperception of time, and to clear Nietzsche of all 
suspicion of reification, we recall Derrida’s reference to Heidegger’s lectures on 
Nietzsche in his essay on Plato’s Khora.
81 The note on Nietzsche’s ‘chaos’ and the 
reference to Heidegger’s note on ‘khora’ or khorismos, makes it clear that Derrida 
senses a resemblance, a Wahlverwandtschaft between the platonic khora and 
Nietzsche’s chaos, which is, as Heidegger points out, another name for Nietzsche’s 
eternal recurrence of the same,
82 a concept inseparable from any understanding of 
Nietzsche’s later works. The note in Derrida’s Khora, which begins a trace we shall 
follow, reads,  
‘Cf. also Heidegger, Nietzsche, I: 350: “Chaos, khaos, khaine, signifies the 
yawning [das Gähnen], the gaping, that which is split in two 
                                                 
79 It is made clear in Heidegger’s essay On the Essence of Truth, that unconcealment, aletheia, is the 
word which most clearly announces Heidegger’s Kehre, the turn away from Being to Time, from 
Dasein to what is quite simply Da. See Heidegger, The Essence on Truth. In this essay from 1930, it 
appears that Heidegger values his earlier Being and Time [1927], its exposition of Dasein or 
subjectivity, as merely a preparation for the explication of Da, or Time, in its priority to all beings, 
to anything Da. 
80 The last quote is from Wille Zur Macht, Fragment 862, the quote found in, Heidegger, Nietzsche, 
Volume II: Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 90. 
81 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 102n. 
82 From the perspective of the ontological difference, the attention should be given to ‘the Same,’ 
the unrepeatable event, the irreplaceable appearance, the incomparable unconcealment of that 
which is more singular than any being, that which makes each being appear different at different 
times, although time remains unchanged, unaltered, ‘the Same.’ Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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[Auseinanderklaffende]. We understand khaos in close connection with an 
original interpretation of the essence of the aletheia inasmuch as it is the 
abyss which opens (cf. Hesiod, Theogony). The representation of Chaos, in 
Nietzsche, has the function of preventing a ‘humanization’ [Vermenschung] 
of existence in its totality. The ‘humanization’ includes as much the moral 
explanation of the world on the basis of the resolution of a Creator, as its 
technical explanation on the basis of the activity of a great artisan 
[Handwerker] (the Demiurg).”’
83  
 
[23]     In the note provided by Farrell Krell in Heidegger’s Nietzsche, we are made 
aware that Heidegger’s reference is to Line 116 of Hesiod’s Theogony, where it is 
said, ‘And in the very beginning Chaos came to be.’
84 Krell does not, however, 
mention that Aristotle quotes the same passage in Physics at the beginning of his 
exposition of place,
85 but what Krell does say is very illuminating, ‘I know of no 
detailed discussion of Hesiod in Heidegger’s works, but suggest that khaos might 
be interpreted along the lines of the Timean khora, the “receptacle” of “space,” 
namely, as the open region in which all beings can first appear and be in being.’
86 
What Farrell Krell indicates when speaking of khora, is, of course, not space, but 
rather, place, or if you will, following Aristotle, ‘particular space.’
87 In this light, 
viewing the possible indifference of khaos and khora, we may again quote Hesiod, 
‘And in the very beginning Chaos came to be.’
88 We should immediately reveal 
what both Heidegger and Derrida have willingly or unwillingly suppressed, that it 
                                                 
83 Derrida, ‘Khora’, in On the Name, p. 148, note 4. The passage can be found in a slightly different 
translation by Farrell Krell, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume II: Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 91. 
Emphasis added. 
84 David Farrell Krell’s note in Heidegger’s Nietzsche, p. 90f. 
85 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, Chapter 1.30. 
86 Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume II: Eternal Recurrence of the Same, note by David Farrell Krell, p. 
92. Farrell Krell continues, ‘The gap of Chaos is usually interpreted as resulting from the 
separation of earth and sky - even though both Gaia and Ouranos are explicitly said to emerge 
after Chaos came to be. The confusion is intensified by Hesiod’s use of the verb to become, rather 
than any form of to be. For Hesiod, the differentiation seems to come to be prior to all and sundry 
beings; its very genesis suggests that differentiation is prior. Yet such priority is given no name. For 
a presentation of the basic sources, Farrell Krell refers the reader to G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, 
The Presocratic Philosophers: A critical History with a Selection of Texts (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 24-37.’ 
87 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, as quoted in Hegel, History of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, 
p. 165. 
88 Hesiod, Theogony 116. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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is exactly this passage on khaos, which is quoted at the opening of Aristotle’s 
treatment of place in his fourth book on Physics.
89 
90 Th]is is not insignificant as it 
suggests the continued and consistent focus on what is unconcealed in the works of 
Aristotle, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida. Moreover, Heidegger speaks of chaos 
as indifferent but in name from the eternal recurrence of the same. And if chaos is 
an interpretation of khora, it will soon be clear that Nietzsche’s chaos adds a 
dimension to this discourse not mentioned so far, the [non]psychology of 
chaos/khora. For the attempt to avoid humanization, this attempt to produce a 
logic of what is not human, is, in the philosophical tradition, expressed by the 
ontological difference.
91 
92 
 
                                                 
89 Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, Chapter 1, 208a30. 
90 As Heidegger reminds us in his remarkable essay on the second book of Physics, ‘nature’ is that 
which unconceals itself, distinct from that which does not unconceal itself or is only unconcealed 
through art. Heidegger, On the Essence and Concept of physis in Aristotle’s Physics B, pp. 219ff. 
91 Derrida’s reference to Heidegger’s note on Plato’s khora in Heidegger’s What is Called 
Thinking?, p. 227, can be found in Derrida, ‘Khora,’ in On the Name, p. 148n5. 
92 What Heidegger is searching for, and Derrida in his wake, is another logic, a logic not of beings 
but the Being of beings. The logic of Da which negates or at least supplements a logic of 
Dasein/beings, a predicative logic which can only grasp what beings essentially are, if it is 
successful. For traditional logic relates solely to the interpretation and manipulation of the essence 
of [logic] beings, while what Heidegger suggests is, as he already does in The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic, that, ‘There is another logic.’ [See, Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations 
of Logic, p. 5.] Heidegger repeats this wish for another logic in The Introduction to Being and Time, 
but also later, in the concluding remarks to Letter on Humanism. [Cf. Heidegger, ‘The Concept of 
Logos,’ Introduction to Being and Time, Basic Writings, pp. 77ff. and Heidegger, Letter on 
Humanism, Basic Writings, p. 265.] More concretely, however, Heidegger makes an attempt to 
make this wish come true in his lectures on Parmenides, where he indeed makes a sustained effort 
to clarify, preliminary, a logic of unconcealment, truth or aletheia, a logic so all-encompassing that 
it even would include what is false, pseudos. If there is such a logic, it evidently does not concern 
itself with what beings essentially are, but with that which furthers and makes possible, perhaps 
gracefully, the Being of each being. But in order to present or make a logic of the ontological 
difference viable, one needs first to know what Being is. Of course, Derrida is continuing the 
negative labours of Heidegger, saying that the logic of Being is not the logic of beings, without ever 
coming to the point where he clearly can state the rules of [th]is other logic, nor lay out the 
grammar of the unknown. Derrida’s dream of ‘a logic other than the logic of the logos,’ begins with 
this quote from Jean-Pierre Vernant,  ‘Raisons du mythe,’ Mythe et Societé en Grèce Ancienne 
(Paris, 1974), p. 250. Derrida, Khora, p. 88ff. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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[24]     The new element in Nietzsche’s chaos, his concept/ion of the eternal 
recurrence of the same,
93 what it adds to our understanding of khora, if there 
between these concepts is homology whereby thinking one, one necessarily, at least 
involuntarily, thinks the other, is nothing. Nietzsche apperceives a beckoning 
nihilism at the heart of Europe, which no longer has a positive will, hence, in the 
hearts of Europeans is nothing already undisclosed. Sometimes Nietzsche speaks of 
the will as an old superstition already lost,
94 at other times, as in Twilight of Idols, 
he speaks of the outstanding task, the negative labour of hammering out the will, 
this old superstition from the body of Europe, to remove [th]is fantasy from the 
minds of Europeans, to finally reveal, nothing inside.
95 There is, of course, a 
striking contradiction in Nietzsche’s authorship, as if he in one book actively 
pursued the elimination of what in another book mourned the loss of. In both 
cases, however, Nietzsche apperceived the ecstasy of living without [will]. 
Therefore, Twilight of Idols only appears to contradict The Will to Power. For with 
an obvious reference to the opening of Twilight of Idols, Nietzsche speaks in The 
Will to Power of ‘the hammer’ that will finally destroy all European superstitions.
96  
 
[25]     Whereas it is commonplace to think that what is hidden is valuable, 
Nietzsche presents an argument to the contrary, that khora is gold, that khora is 
Being without will. Nietzsche discovers at once the reluctance to give away 
something that modern man has acquired so recently, which is why Nietzsche 
suggests that one may need torture to remove the false spirit of subjectivity. The 
                                                 
93 See the last and concluding envelope in Nietzsche’s The Will to Power, ‘The Eternal Recurrence 
of the Same,’ pp. 544ff. Der Wille Zur Macht, translated and edited by Walter Kaufmann. 
94 Implicitly in The Will to Power the will is already considered as enfeebled, corrupted if not 
already departed. See for example, Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 55, p. 35. 
95 Nietzsche, Twilight of Idols, ‘Foreword,’ p. 3. 
96 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1053 and Fragment 1054, p. 544. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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superstition of subjectivity needs to be hammered out, exorcised. This is, of course, 
not easily done, and it is therefore surprising that such an exorcism actually occurs 
in Shakespeare’s The Comedy of Errors.
97 To the relief of many, in The Comedy of 
Errors, this exorcism is entirely unsuccessful. But unlike theatre, in life Nietzsche 
has paradoxically already detected a certain ‘cultivation’ through which the will is 
about to be finally annihilated.
98 He even goes on to ask in Fragment 1054 whether 
Europe could ‘will’ ‘will’s ‘destruction,’ and next, in Fragment 1055, he speaks of 
an ecstasy of nothing, an ‘ecstatic nihilism’ which would seem to follow after the 
substratum has been exorcised.
99 
 
[26]     It is clear that the sole purpose of the new hammer, which is what Nietzsche 
calls his Twilight of Idols, is to remove all metaphysical beliefs, just as the old 
hammer, The Malleus Maleficarum was used by the Inquisition to exorcise pythons, 
devils and undead souls that presumably possessed witches. Likewise, the new 
hammer will exorcise the most fundamental of all modern superstitions, what 
seems to be what no modern man can be without, the will. Nietzsche, clearly 
imagining himself as the grand inquisitor of Metaphysics, expresses his hope to the 
jury of posterity, that after the exorcism, if it is successful, the subject [will], after 
much torture and doubt, confess that it has none, that it may in fact be without 
[will].
100 However, the obliteration of subjectivity does not only suggest the pure 
apperception of what is unconcealed, but its affirmation.
101 In Fragments 1053 and 
                                                 
97 Shakespeare, A Comedy of Errors, Act IV, Scene iv.48-55. 
98 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 220, p. 128 and Fragments 1053-1057, pp. 544f. 
99 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1055, p. 544. 
100 For the expression of this hope, see, Nietzsche, ‘Error of Free Will,’ Twilight of Idols, VI, 7, p. 31. 
101 Hence, Nietzsche does, in Ecce Homo, his philosophical autobiography, present the proper 
attitude to chaos, the eternal recurrence of the same, as amor fati, to love one’s destiny, to affirm 
what is unconcealed. In Fragment 1041 of The Will To Power Nietzsche repeats this formula for 
existence, saying, ‘The highest state a philosopher can attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationship to 
existence – my formula for this is amor fati.’ In the note provided by Walter Kaufmann, it says, Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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1056, chaos is seen as the ‘great cultivating idea,’ which promises, if we are to look 
away from Nietzsche’s reference to ‘degenerate and decaying races,’ ‘a new order 
of life.’
102 Clearly, what belongs to man is the right to erase himself, to be 
unconcealed without metaphysical delusions or substantial hyperbole.
103 
 
[27]     When Nietzsche speaks of a ‘Cultivation of Ecstasy,’
104 of Being suspended 
across [th]is great divide without the safety-net of subjectivity, what is implied is 
not only that it belongs to each man to erase himself, but that ‘the eternal 
recurrence’ specifically circumscribes the place where man is not himself, and that 
clearly Nietzsche speaks of the cultivation of that place of unconcealment, where 
prior to any false inference to subjectivity, soul or substratum, man is, but not 
himself.
105 It is made clear that this ecstasy of Being is prior to subjectivity, and 
that prior to ecstasy there is no ‘substance,’ nor subject to suspend, but that 
substance is an empty attempt to self-secure or anchor, an empty attempt to escape 
the ecstasy of Being. For in ecstasy, within the non-subjective man is prior to being 
a subject. And, as Nietzsche says, we might do very well, or even better without 
any subjective interpretation or valuation of phenomena. There is of course in 
non-ecstasy, in subjectivity, something most of us are not willing to forego, that is, 
as Nietzsche points out in Fragment 1059, the, perhaps false, certainty of being a 
subject. Not many are willing to exchange the Descartian certainty of being a 
subject with the uncertainty of Being unconcealed. For as Nietzsche informs the 
                                                                                                                                               
‘Love of fate. Nietzsche introduced this term in The Gay Science, section 276: ‘Amor fati: let this be 
my love from now on.’ He used it twice in Ecce Homo, in ‘Why I am so clever,’ section 10, and ‘The 
Case of Wagner,’ section 4: and also near the beginning of the Epilogue to Nietzsche contra 
Wagner.’ Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 536n. 
102 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1055, p. 544. 
103 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1056, pp. 544f. 
104 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1060, pp. 545f. 
105 Cf. Heidegger’s presentation of the ecstasy of Being, see Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in 
Basic Writings, esp. pp. 229-234. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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unwilling, Being ecstatic we would, ‘No longer [find] joy in certainty but in 
uncertainty.’
106 And, so he adds in the same fragment, neither would we rejoice in 
anything ‘merely subjective.’
107 
 
[28]     We should perhaps at this point ask ourselves what directions Nietzsche’s 
concept of chaos [eternal recurrence of the same] gives to our investigation from 
behind this thick veil of metaphors. We learn most of all that what stands in the 
way of comprehending the ontological contradiction, the priority of Being over 
beings, is the being that stands in his own way, man, when he insists on Being a 
subject.
108 Blocking the possibility for the apperception of chaos as what is 
unconcealed, is man himself, when he insists on subjectivity, defining himself by 
will. For without either, Nietzsche imagines a life in ecstasy, an ecstasy that is, 
moreover, prior to subjectivity, which is no more than the dream-interpretation, 
the wishful thinking of a governess.
109 It is easy to spot the attractiveness of these 
passages to Heidegger after his Kehre,
110 for Nietzsche is approaching or at least 
seeking a way out of subjectivity, beyond metaphysics which only comprehends 
beings as what they essentially or substantially are. What Nietzsche’s concept of 
‘eternal recurrence’ adds to Aristotle’s and Plato’s exposition of what is 
                                                 
106 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1059, p. 545. 
107 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1059, p. 545. 
108 In Zarathustra, Nietzsche presents man as an aporia, an unsurpassable divide. A tightrope-
walker may pass this great, deep divide of his own Self, to reach over onto the other side, into the 
open. But it is soon made painfully clear to Zarathustra, who arrives from the solitude of the Alps 
only to see the tightrope-walker fall, that the many rejoice knowing that he was not capable of 
transgressing beyond himself, subjectivity, knowing that if indeed he made the attempt to step, even 
dance beyond man, to become Overman, Hyperman, Übermensch, he would not make it. 
Paradoxically, by not completing this Sprung, by diving to his own death, the self is resurrected, the 
false impression of substantiality reinforced, indeed saved. And so, Zarathustra walks away, 
without illusions. For this allegorical presentation of man as an aporia, see Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 
‘Zarathustra’s Prologue,’ pp. 41-48. 
109 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, ‘The Free Spirit,’ Fragment 36, p. 35. 
110 For the clearest expression of Heidegger’s Kehre, his movement from Being to Time, from Dasein 
to Da, see Heidegger, What is Metaphysics?, Heidegger, The Essence of Truth and Heidegger, Letter 
on Humanism, Cf. The Poetics of Being, pp. 52-53.  Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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unconcealed, is the assurance that man lives in ecstasy before his attempt to, 
presumably falsely, anchor [th]is ecstatic existence in a substratum, that man’s life 
is ecstatic before it is substantial or subjective, and that life, long before it belongs 
to him, belongs to another, to that which grants or welcomes [th]is ecstatic being 
into existence. That is, prior to having a subject man has none, although [th]is does 
not mean that man has no intentions, no purposes and that man’s life has ‘no 
meaning,’ only that [th]is purpose, [th]is intention, [th]is meaning would first have 
to appear, and nothing would appear without chaos/khora. [Th]is means that 
man’s intentions are not primarily or primordially his own, but are given to him. It 
is in this view, and only from [th]is perspective, that the word ‘creativity’ becomes 
utterly perplexing, incomprehensible, we could almost say with Hegel, merely a 
‘sound.’
111 Exposing the non-subjective ground of the ‘continually creative’ of 
Fragment 1059,
112 Nietzsche says in Fragment 1066, ‘The concept “create” is today 
completely indefinable, unrealizable; merely a word, a rudimentary survival from 
the ages of superstition.’
113 And speaking of superstition, it becomes clear as 
Nietzsche arrives before sunrise, that he is carrying more than one hammer in his 
hand, for in one hand he holds The Twilight of Idols and in the other The Will to 
Power.
114  
                                                 
111 Hegel speaks of the meaningless sound, ‘God’ in Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On 
Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 22, p. 12. 
112 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 545. 
113 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1066, p. 548. 
114 According to Heidegger, Nietzsche presents two mutually contradictory principles throughout 
his philosophy, pursues two contradictory trajectories. On the one hand, Nietzsche reaches for ‘the 
supreme humanization of beings’ through his doctrine of The Will to Power. On the other hand, 
Nietzsche’s concept of chaos and the eternal recurrence of the same are attempts to utterly 
dehumanize man and to de-deify the world, to rid the world of any trace of a hidden soul or a God 
concealed. Heidegger says, ‘In Nietzsche’s usage, the word chaos indicates a defensive notion in 
consequence of which nothing can be asserted of being as a whole. Thus the world as a whole 
becomes something we fundamentally cannot address, something ineffable – an arreton.’ 
[Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 94f. Emphasis added.] In 
the note accompanying the translation, Farrell Krell says that ’Arreton, the negation of rheton, is 
found in Homer, Hesiod, and throughout Classical Age. It means what is unspoken, inexpressible, Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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[29]     If we, in some way, are excluded from these ecstasies, precluded from the 
pleasures and pains of [th]is ‘boundlessly creative God,’ it is, as Nietzsche explains, 
because in some way, ‘the old God still lives.’
115 What is almost incomprehensible 
to modern man is that the ‘boundlessly creative’ is not subjective, does not belong 
to subjectivity, but to what makes man create in the first place. To a large extent 
[th]is explains man’s reluctance, his unwillingness to embrace [th]is principle of 
unconcealment, as chaos/khora does not belong to him, but to another, if you will, 
to God. It is easy to recognize in chaos, as Heidegger does, Nietzsche’s God-
inventing spirit
116 in the eternal recurrence of the same, his desire to create, as 
Jean-Luc Marion remarks, at least a notion of God again.
117 For following 
Nietzsche’s clear lead, not even the gods would be were they not made, nor would 
they be unmade if one did not close the theological workshop.
118 As Heidegger, 
quite surprisingly, presents Nietzsche’s doctrine of chaos as a kind of negative 
                                                                                                                                               
unutterable, shameful, not to be divulged.’ [Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume II: The Eternal 
Recurrence of the Same, note by Farrell Krell, p. 95n]. 
115 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1062, p. 547. 
116 Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence, p. 95. 
117 Jean-Luc Marion is elaborating on Nietzsche, when he says of the ‘god-forming [gottbildende] 
instinct,’ [Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1038, p. 534], ‘Thus, one idolatrous apprehension 
succeeds another: the manifestation of the divine only passes from one (moral) condition to another 
(Wille zur Macht), without the divine’s ever being freed as such.’ [Marion, God Without Being, p. 38. 
Emphasis added.] It is not without reason that we attempt to free ourselves from ‘the old gods,’ 
[Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1062] or ‘free’ the ‘new gods’ from ourselves [Nietzsche, 
The Will to Power, Fragment 1038] as we in all theology, as Marion says, ‘never stop seeing 
ourselves, to the point of obsessional disgust.’[Marion, God Without Being, p. 38.] However, one 
may find, like Nietzsche, that the gods yet again look pleasing through chaos or khora, that indeed 
they may appear to be dancing. [Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1038] Dance suggests a 
divine sense of place or loco-motion as naturally as the third book of Aristotle’s Physics on kinesis is 
followed by the exposition of topos. That Nietzsche, perhaps unknowingly, has a notion of the in-
difference between God and chaos, is already pronounced in the opening of the fragment where he 
speaks anachronically of that which is irreplaceable, unrepeatable, in an attempt to escape all 
reification or what Marion calls idolization, says, ‘how differently, how variously the divine has 
revealed itself to me each time.’ [Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Fragment 1038, p. 534]. 
118 Cf. Marion, God Without Being, p. 59. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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theology,
119 it is perhaps justified to deliver Heidegger’s argument in extenso. 
Heidegger says,  
’The most fundamental point to be made about Nietzsche’s notion of chaos 
is the following: only a thinking that is utterly lacking in stamina will 
deduce a will to godlessness from the will to a de-deification of beings. On 
the contrary, truly metaphysical thinking, at the outermost point of de-
deification, allowing itself no subterfuge and eschewing all mystification, will 
uncover that path on which alone gods will be encountered if they are to be 
encountered ever again in the history of mankind.’
120 ‘What to common 
sense looks like ‘atheism,’ and has to look like it, is at bottom the very 
opposite. In the same way, wherever the matters of death and the nothing 
are treated, Being and Being alone is thought most deeply – whereas those 
who ostensible occupy themselves solely with ‘reality’ flounder in 
‘nothingness.’
121  
 
[30]     If khora and chaos are indistinguishable, Nietzsche teaches us in the last 
fragments of his last book, The Will to Power,
122 about our subjective, if not 
personal, relation to khora, that there are different ways of Being in khora, even 
ways of hiding away from khora, an unwillingness to be where one is not a subject. 
Rather than rejoice in khora, in non-subjectivity, man still takes pride in being 
himself, which makes him, as is suggested, his persona less creative, his life darker, 
his soul heavy, as he carries what he needs not, according to Nietzsche, a soul 
[inside] his chest, which keeps him from taking part in Being ecstatically. The 
implications of Nietzsche’s last envelope, is that philosophy was already 
sidetracked from the very beginning when Thales was asked, ‘What is most 
difficult?’ and answered, ‘To know yourself.’
123 To the contrary, what is most 
                                                 
119 Heidegger continues, ‘What Nietzsche is practicing with regard to the world totality is a kind of 
negative theology, which tries to grasp the Absolute as purely as possible by holding at a distance all 
‘relative’ determinations, that is, all those that relate to human beings. Except that Nietzsche’s 
determination of the world as a whole is a negative theology without the Christian God.’ Heidegger, 
Nietzsche, Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 95. Emphasis added. 
120 Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p94. Emphasis added. 
Again, by ‘eschewing mystification,’ Heidegger is again stressing the negative path to what is 
unconcealed, and there, Da, to its apperception. 
121 Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 208. 
122 Cf. Nietzsche, The Will To Power, ‘The Eternal Recurrence,’ pp. 544-550. 
123 Plato, Protagoras, 343a/b, p. 774. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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difficult is to not know your self, and even more, to be not yourself. But posing 
these questions is already approaching the problem from the wrong angle.  In the 
beginning there is no self to escape from or remove. In the beginning, there is only 
the non-self, what is unconcealed, be it chaos or khora, which we escape from by 
anchoring [th]is ecstasy in the illusion of Being a subject.
124 Evidently, Nietzsche 
denounces the Oracle of Delphi, claiming that nothing is more superfluous than to 
know yourself, nothing more fundamental than to know khora, and that only the 
acceptance of khora could one day make man become hyperman, that is, no longer 
himself, but khora. When the Oracle asks every man, ‘Know Thyself,’ it appears, 
from [th]is perspective, as if God through the oracles was asking for something 
that was impossible, that could not possibly be accomplished, only to keep himself 
secret. 
 
[31]     What we finally come to realize, and any reader that has followed his 
exposition, is that at the heart of Nietzsche’s attempt to dehumanize man is the 
opposite drive to redivinization, and that the attempt at apotheosis came about 
through a kind of negative theology. What superficially appeared to utterly 
disenchant the world, was nothing but an attempt to reenchant the lives of all 
beings through a kind of negative theology that was so subtle or so apparent that 
                                                 
124 On the illusion of subjectivity, see particularly. ‘The Four Great Errors,’ in Nietzsche, Twilight 
of Idols, pp.26-32, but also ‘One The Prejudices of Philosophers,’ in Nietzsche, Beyond Good and 
Evil, pp. 5-24, esp. paragraph 16, where Nietzsche humbly says, ‘What gives me the right to talk 
about an ‘I,’ and beyond that an ‘I as a cause,’ and beyond that yet ‘I as the cause of thoughts?’ 
Anyone who dares to answer such metaphysical questions promptly by referring to a kind of 
epistemological intuition … will be met with a smile …’ [Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, page 17].  
Perhaps we should let Nietzsche explain, ‘There is thinking, but to assert that ‘there’ is the same 
thing as that famous old ‘I’ is, to put it mildly, only an assumption …[a] grammatical habit.’ 
[Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, page 17] And finally, speaking aporetically of that which is 
impossible to erase in all attempts to think without erasing the thought or utterance itself, namely 
place, Nietzsche makes an impossible prognostication, ‘perhaps some day logicians will even get 
used to doing without that little ‘there’ (into which the honest old ‘I’ has evaporated).’ [Nietzsche, 
Beyond Good and Evil, p. 18]. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
 
103  
it, for the most part, remained undiscovered. That Nietzsche, as a classical 
philologist, and also, but not least, a trained orator, could foresee that announcing 
the death of God,
125 was perhaps the simplest way to awaken all the Gods, makes it 
possible to understand why Nietzsche speaks of Götzendämmerung, The Twilight of 
the ‘Gods,’ not only their demise, but their final appearance after everything 
hidden has been taken away.
126 Having by detour found that Nietzsche’s ‘God is 
Dead,’
127 is in fact a theo-logical statement, we have indeed discovered the same 
God of unconcealment which Plato addressed in the prayer opening the exposition 
of khora in Timaeus.
128 I then end [th]is exposition not only with a parousia, the 
constantly deferred, and never expected, apotheosis of man, but at least a foretaste 
of that ecstasy man could take part in if he was ever truly unconcealed. And 
having arrived here, we appear to be where we began our exposition, only 
acknowledging that another has answered Plato’s prayer. For through sheer luck 
or kind grace, benevolence or hard labour we have discovered that what Plato, in 
the beginning, was praying for, is indistinguishable from what he was praying to, 
that is, khora, which is, with or without man, what is highest or first, that which 
nothing can be without, the Being of beings. 
                                                 
125 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 41. 
126 By ‘dämmerung,’ Nietzsche announces that everything hidden will finally be brought to light and 
nothing will be hidden; neither causes, feelings, principles or wills,[Nietzsche, Twilight of Idols, pp. 
26-32] which will all disappear as swiftly as Hamlets from under Juliet’s balcony when the sun 
breaks. [Shakespeare, Hamlet, II.ii.176]. 
127 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 41. 
128 Plato, Timaeus, 48d. To facilitate comparison with any other edition, we list the marginal 
references in The Complete Works of Plato, which refers to the Greek text of Plato as edited (Paris, 
1578) by the French scholar Henri Estienne (in Latin, Stephanus). Cf. ‘Editorial Notes’ to Plato, 
Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper. p. xxvii. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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§2.5 Derrida’s Khora 
 
 
[32]     Derrida begins his essay on Khora by saying that the title does not only 
name what is beyond language, but is itself a testimony to ‘the incapacity for 
naming.’
129 Khora does not simply name what is beyond language, but rather, 
khora names the possibility for Being unconcealed. Derrida claims that in every 
act of representation, khora is always missing, as it is beyond representation. We 
will later make a contrary, at least supplementary, claim by saying that there is no 
khora, that the apperception of khora may or may not be produced, but not 
without letting Derrida give us a clear sense of what is missing.
130 In [th]is text, 
what Derrida speaks about and what speaks through [th]is text is inevitably 
different. The elegance of [th]is text is not only that it expresses khora doubly, both 
discursively and performatively, but that Derrida, almost effortlessly, is able to 
make us apperceive the unconcealment of khora as we read. Thus we become 
                                                 
129 Derrida, Khora, in, On the Name, p. 89. 
130 What is odd is not that Derrida always finds a lack in language, but that some of his opponents 
do not. Derrida mourns his own misreception, and clarifies his own position by, perhaps 
wrongfully, distancing himself from the philosophy of language as represented by Richard Rorty. 
[Derrida’s A Taste for the Secret, p. 10.] For through such concepts as trace, differance, khora, 
Derrida attempts to express that which is inevitably beyond language and makes possible any 
discourse, a way for the apperception, if not Being, of everything that is. [For Derrida’s 
acknowledgment of his mis-reception, see also Derrida, How to Avoid Speaking: Denials, p. 77] I 
should add that Richard Rorty himself mourns the ontological vacuum in linguistic philosophy. 
[Rorty, In epilogue to the reedition of the influential, The Linguistic Turn, ‘Twenty-Five Years 
After,’ 1992, pp. 371-374] Rorty confesses, ‘The slogan that ‘the problems of philosophy are 
problems of language’ now strikes me as confused.’ [Rorty, ‘Twenty Five Years After,’ in The 
Linguistic Turn, p. 371] No one can deny the fecundity of the new philosophical program that Rorty 
announces in his conclusion, ‘If ‘philosophy’ comes to be viewed as continuous with science (as 
Quine wishes it to be) one the one hand and as continuous with poetry (as Heidegger and Derrida 
often suggest it is) on the other, then our descendants will be less concerned with questions about 
‘the method of philosophy’ or about the ‘nature of philosophical problems.’[Rorty, ‘Twenty Five 
Years After,’ The Linguistic Turn, p. 374.] Strangely, Derrida announces a similar philosophical 
program in his conversation with Maurizio Ferraris, however, not without being concerned, 
‘Another criterion is needed, and the search for this criterion can and must destroy the great 
ensembles that give us Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hegel on one side, and Homer, Shakespeare, Goethe 
on the other … If we look … closely …, we shall find a Platonic literature that is not the literature 
of Hegel, and a Shakespearean philosophy that is not the philosophy of Dante, Goethe or Diderot. 
What we have, then, is an enormous research program, in which the received - or receivable - 
categories of academic scholarship must not be trusted.’ [Derrida, A Taste for The Secret, pp. 11-12]  Philosophies of Unconcealment 
 
105  
conscious, even self-conscious, of khora, as if [th]is handsome text is aware of itself, 
even presents the self-consciousness of khora. Khora conscious of itself cannot be 
likened to a man conscious of his own looks, but is more like a mirror conscious of 
itself and the way it unconceals not reflections, but beings, that is, the Being of 
beings. Derrida’s performance is inevitably different from what he speaks of, and 
it is [th]is self-conscious display of the unconcealment of khora, as if we are 
witnessing khora in the very act of unconcealing itself, which is what Derrida 
brings to the discourse of khora, and what separates Derrida from Plato and 
Plotinus, the urge to be, if he has not already become, as Nietzsche prophesized, 
indifferent from khora.
131  
 
[33]     It is the difference between the unconcealing, the ‘performative element,’ if 
you will, and the discursive element of khora, which makes Derrida speak of an 
inevitable ‘oscillation,’ of the discourse on khora Being the site of an inevitable 
contradiction. Derrida says, ‘Let us recall once more, under the heading of our 
preliminary approach, that the discourse on the khora, as it is presented, does not 
proceed from the natural or legitimate logos.’
132 And making clear that he is 
simultaneously approaching a negative understanding of the ontological 
difference, and making [th]is ontological difference perform before our eyes, 
Derrida notes,  
‘The oscillation of which we have just spoken is not an oscillation among 
others, an oscillation between two poles. It oscillates between two types of 
oscillation; the double exclusion (neither/nor) and the participation (both 
                                                 
131 No doubt, superiorly Derrida displays the self-consciousness of displaying khora. As an example 
of [th]is self-awareness, we may quote the following passage from Khora, ‘What we have just put 
forward, for example, for the sake of the example, on the subject of ‘khora’ in the text of Plato’s 
discourse, reproduces or simply brings back, with all its schemas, Plato’s discourse on the subject 
of the khora. And this is true even down to this very sentence in which I just made of the word 
schemas.’ [Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 95]. 
132 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 90. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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this and that). But have we the right to transport the logic, para-logic or the 
meta-logic of this super-oscillation from one set to the other? It concerned 
first of all types of existent thing (sensible/intelligible, visible/invisible, 
form/formless, icon, or mimeme/paradigm, but we have displaced it toward 
types of discourse (mythos/logos) or of relation to what is or is not in 
general.’
133  
 
Having at the same time ‘displaced’ khora ‘towards types of discourse’ ‘or’ - and 
her lies the site of the oscillation, the locale for the inevitable ‘teleological 
anachronism’ - a ‘relation to what is or is not in general,’ Derrida has made clear 
that what he attempts to express, both, discursively and as a happening, is the 
ontological difference, which through [th]is anachronism, if not the simultaneity of 
[th]is discourse and [th]is happening, we are made aware of. 
 
[34]     Of course, it is not easy to immediately understand what ‘teleological 
anachronism’ is, would be, but it becomes clear, as ‘telos’ means ‘end,’ that 
speaking of khora is always to speak of another end. That is, it is impossible, 
according to Derrida, to express the khora of that which you speak of, or that 
which you attempt to [re]present. Therefore ‘khora’ is without reference; if 
anything, it is rather [th]is, the sign which in its attempt to signify something shows 
that it is not even a sign, it even erodes or implodes its own significatory, 
[re]presentative function when it is expressed. For khora is not a sign, which is why 
it has no reference. Khora is not even a sign, as it is expressed, or rather, ‘khora’ is 
even undermined as a word when it is expressed, as if it has no reference, is not 
even self-referential. As Derrida [de]scribes it, ‘Deprived of a real referent, that 
which in fact resembles a proper name finds itself also called an X which has as its 
property (as its physis and as its dynamis, Plato’s text will say) that it has nothing 
                                                 
133 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 91. Emphasis added. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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as its own and that it remains unformed, formless (amorphon).’
134 Obviously 
Derrida is clearly thinking beyond language, attempting, through khora, to think, 
‘what is and is not.’ [Th]is counts for, would explain the numerous times he 
mentions ‘ontology’ in the essay, although it is rather clear from what  he says that 
when he is speaking of ‘ontology’ he is not speaking of what is ontologically 
different, the negativity of the ontological difference, but when he is speaking of 
khora, he is. That Derrida uses ontology or ontotheology as a synonym for a 
metaphysical science of beings and not a poetics of Being is evident throughout the 
text. But even though Derrida speaks derogatorily of ontology as a metaphysical 
science, he does nevertheless, perhaps involuntarily, present the negativity of the 
ontological difference through khora, and what occupies us here is not how 
Derrida understands the word ‘ontology’ but rather how he understands the 
negativity of the ontological difference as khora.
135 
 
[35]     What Derrida finds in khora is an attempt to express that what is highest, 
or what is first. For our purposes, we find it unnecessary to emphasize Derrida’s 
positive use of the word ‘ontology,’ a use which runs with the meaning implied in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, namely, ‘a science of beings,’ but nevertheless does not 
conceptually acknowledge Heidegger’s distinct differentiation between the ontic 
and the ontological, where the first science will, if it is successful, describe the 
                                                 
134 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 97. 
135 To show that Derrida’s use of ‘ontology’ is an expression of his true understanding of the word 
and not merely displaced or a misunderstanding, we should listen to Derrida when he speaks of 
ontology as if it was an overreaching or universal science in an Aristotelian sense, ‘This 
encyclopaedic logos is a general ontology, treating of all the types of being, it includes a theology, a 
cosmology, a physiology, a psychology, a zoology. Mortal or immortal, human and divine, visible 
and invisible things are situated here.’ [Derrida, ‘Khora’, in On the Name, p. 103. Emphasis added.] 
Conceptually Derrida confuses or mistakes the ‘ontic’ and the ‘ontologic,’ a confusion not his own, 
but stemming from Aristotle. That is, the concept of ontology, which Derrida here uses, is that 
implied in the metaphysical tradition founded by Aristotle’s Metaphysics, where obviously the 
ground for the confusion between Being and beings may have been laid once and for all. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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substantial properties of any being, whereas ontology will not describe what is 
essential to any being, but what will allow them to be, that which is indispensable 
to all beings. In what Derrida says we agree with everything except his positive use 
of the word ‘ontologic’, but, of course, the misuse of a word is quite insignificant if 
what you have expressed is [not]. Derrida says, 
‘… there is only one khora, and that is indeed how we understand it: there 
is only one, (however divisible it be), the referent of this reference does not 
exist. It does not have the characteristics of an existent, by which we mean 
an existent that would be receivable in the ontologic, that is, those of an 
intelligible or sensible existent. There is khora but the khora does not 
exist.’
136 
 
[36]     Derrida seems reluctant to confess that he is speaking of the negative 
ontological difference between Being and beings, when he maintains that there is, 
‘es gibt’ is implied in all negative theology, adding the immediately perplexing, but 
‘what there is, there, is not.’
137 What is taken for granted in this statement is two 
different uses of ‘is,’ one ontic and one ontological, corresponding to, if you will, to 
the uses of positive theology, which believes in heavenly beings, and of negative 
theology, which renounces all phenomenological attempts to express the Being of 
beings. In one sense, ‘is’ is used as a copula to connect a being to what it essentially 
is, in the other, to say that it is even without having these properties described. 
Derrida attempts to make this distinction clear, ‘[I]t will be risky to see in it 
[khora] the equivalent of a es gibt, or the es gibt which remains without doubt 
implicated in every negative theology, unless it is the es gibt which always 
summons negative theology in its Christian history.’
138 We can therefore let 
Derrida unconceal his fundamental argument, ‘Now what we can read, it seems, of 
                                                 
136 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 97. 
137 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 96. 
138 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 96. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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khora in the Timaeus is that “something,” which is not a thing.’
139 There is no 
simpler way to unconceal, without the word, the negative ontological difference, to 
express the Being of beings, negatively.  
 
[37]     Exposing the essential emptiness of khora, Derrida says, ‘Not having an 
essence, how could the khora be [se tiendrait-elle] beyond its name? The khora is 
anachronistic; it ‘is’ the anachrony within being, or better: the anachrony of being. 
It [khora] anachronizes being.’
140 [Th]is ‘teleological anachronism,’
141 is moreover 
a ‘structural anachronism,’ which is of course to say, that it is unavoidable. ‘[The 
structural anachronism] would be the inevitable effect produced by something like 
the khora – which is not something, and which is not like anything, not even like 
what it would be, itself, there beyond its name.’
142 We do agree with Derrida, that 
khora is untranslatable, or will always have to appear as khora, beyond language, 
without language, without a word, as it makes something, anything, even a word 
open up as it steps out into khora. Although khora more properly signifies the 
place that makes possible any phenomenal appearance, exactly where the singular 
and unrepeatable placing of beings in the clearing takes place, one cannot disagree 
that also a word would have to take place in order to be expressed. Derrida says, 
’And yet, “khora” seems never to let itself be reached or touched, much less 
broached, and above all not exhausted by these types of tropological or 
interpretative translation.’
143  
 
                                                 
139 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 96. 
140 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 94. 
141 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 93. 
142 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 94. 
143 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 95. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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[38]     We shall finally speak of [th]is untouchability, the unreachability of khora, 
where khora appears not unlike another blue or Romantic flower. Derrida asserts 
the impossibility of speaking of another man’s khora or the khora of another, as if 
what is unconcealed as the khora of another is inescapably your own. [Th]is 
inability to represent, possibly even to apperceive, another man’s khora, reminds 
us of what Kant, in seeming contradistinction to [th]is position, says in Critique of 
Pure Reason, that the Being of the other is always my own, that the other has no 
Being without me.
144 For through khora, the other is without me and I am solely on 
my own. Through [th]is isolation, Derrida’s khora resembles Leibniz monad, were 
not the first unconcealed and the other hidden, if not it is more true to say that the 
khora of the other is always hidden to me, and what I apperceive as the khora of 
the other, the birth of the other, is always my own, and he could not have been 
born without me, that again, the Being of the other is my own. We shall here not 
neglect the fundamental difference between a self, a soul concealed and khora 
unconcealed. For that which cannot be replaced or represented is through khora 
unconcealed, through the self concealed. But we cannot always speak of ourselves, 
although Derrida says we inescapably do. Derrida holds that I can speak of the 
essence of the other, but never [of] his khora. The khora of the other is beyond 
what I may possibly speak [of].
145  
 
[39]     The impossibility of representing another man’s life, his Being, is of course, 
solely our own. [Th]is problem does not belong to Plato, for Plato lets Timaeus 
present a theory of how ideas appear as phenomena in [th]is world, that is through 
                                                 
144 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A353, p. 391. 
145 Derrida limits khora unnecessarily to the sphere of discourse, representation and to 
reproduction, when it is easily noticed that what khora names is the way in which phenomena, 
images, likenesses, are allowed to appear. Philosophies of Unconcealment 
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khora, and not of how we experience or apperceive khora, and much less how it is 
possible or impossible to participate in a discourse about khora, impossible to 
discursify khora, which indeed, Derrida says it is, as khora cannot be an object of 
discourse as the unconcealment of khora is inevitably displaced. Of course, without 
an object there would be no discourse, but the paradox of khora is that – even if 
[th]is is impossible - each discourse will nevertheless make khora appear, present 
khora, inevitably. However, a discourse on khora is impossible, as khora cannot 
essentially be described and therefore any possible common platform or ground 
has, already from the beginning, been taken away. Nevertheless khora is 
expressed, but not the khora of the other. Again, I can speak of the being or the 
essence of the other, but not his khora. For when I speak or perceive him I will 
inevitably speak from without, within another khora. And if I do attempt to speak 
of his khora, the khora of the other, I am bound to speak anachronistically, 
ateleologically, of another end [telos], in another time [place], inevitably … [I am 
bound to speak anachronistically, for speaking of his khora, I do it from within my 
own] …   
 
C3 PHILOSOPHIES OF CONCEALMENT 
§3.1 Derrida’s Death 
§3.2 Kant’s ‘Paralogisms of Pure Reason’ 
§3.3 Dionysius’ Mystical Theology 
 
C3 EXPOSÉ 
 
 
[1]    In this chapter we will discover Pseudo-Dionysius’ unreified theory of what 
is concealed in his symbolic and negative theologies, theologies that make possible 
not only the interpretation but the production of what is concealed through the 
two distinct methods of aphairesis and dissimilar similarity.
1 We will further find 
that Kant similarly produces the apperception of what is concealed through a 
philosophy that does not accentuate what is unavailable to man, the thing-in-itself,
2 
but rather, what he believes man unavoidably makes an inference to or is the 
condition for everything that he may know and not know, the noumenon, whether 
[th]is, which remains concealed, is called Subject, World, or God.
3 We shall thirdly 
see, that Derrida, however much he attempts to emulate and develop the 
philosophy of Heidegger, however he may do so at times successfully, he ends up, 
perhaps voluntarily, although we shall not speculate on the causes for [th]is 
betrayal, with a subversion of Heidegger’s ontology. Derrida presents the exact 
                                                 
1 For Dionysius’ method of aphairesis, his apophatic or negative theology, see Pseudo-Dionysius, The 
Mystical Theology. For Dionysius’s Symbolic Theology, Dionysius himself makes a reference to a 
book there is no further trace of in history. [Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 
‘Chapter 2, That divine and heavenly things are appropriately revealed even through dissimilar 
symbols,’ The Complete Works, pp. 147-153, and Letter 9, The Complete Works, pp. 280-288]. 
2 For Kant’s continued emphasis on the false interpretation of what is and must remain unavailable 
to man, be it the essence of spirits, angels or God, see the almost untimely essay, Dreams of a 
Visionary Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics from 1766, in Kant, The Philosophy of Kant, ed. Carl 
J. Friedrich. 
3 For the illusory production of singular noumenona, see the incomparable chapter in Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogism of Pure Reason,’ A341/B399-A405/B432, pp. 382-441. Philosophies of Concealment 
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opposite of what he intends to emulate, for when he accentuates Heidegger’s 
presentation of death as that which makes [th]is irreplaceable, he makes death into 
a negative, but clearly hidden principle for life or Being. Nothing could be further 
from Heidegger’s heart, or, if you will, more concealed. 
§3.1 Derrida’s Death 
 
 
[2]     Any investigation throws on its subject the suspicion that it would not have 
been studied, never become the subject of investigation, if what was studied was 
still alive. That is Baudrillard’s critique of Foucault in one of his earliest works, 
Forget Foucault,
4 that neither the power-structures nor the subject that Foucault 
studies the birth and disciplination of, as he does in The History of the Prison or in 
The History of Madness, would have been available to the archaeological 
procedures of Foucault, if they were not already dead. Only then would it be 
possible to analyse and dissect this subject.
5 After having shaken off his youthful 
exuberance for the unconcealed, Heidegger admits, in his remarkably simple essay 
of 1955, Identity and Difference, that there are, in the history of Being, different 
ways in which the Being of beings is destined to show or not show itself. What 
follows is a list of the different incarnations of Being, so long that it seems to 
exhaust the possibilities for Being. However it is safe to say it does not. Heidegger 
says in the second lecture on Identity and Difference entitled ‘The Onto-Theo-
Logical Constitution of Metaphysics,’  
 
                                                 
4 Jean Baudrillard, Forget Foucault (1977), 1987. 
5 Although Vesalius, in the name of science, dissected a living man before the birth of subjectivity, it 
may be true that Foucault was more civilized, that he waited until the subject was dead. For the 
birth of modern anatomy see Daniel Boorstin, The Discoverers. Philosophies of Concealment 
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‘There is Being only in this or that particular historic character: Physis, 
Logos, Hen, Idea, Energeia, Substantiality, Objectivity, Subjectivity, the 
Will, the Will to Power, the Will to Will. But these historic forms cannot be 
found in rows, like apples, pears, peaches, lined up on the counter of 
historical representational thinking.’
6  
 
Giving this positive listing of the historical incarnations of the Being of beings, it is 
obvious that what is, at all times neglected in the totality of Heidegger’s writings, is 
the unreified expression and experience of Being as what is concealed.
7 
 
[3]     Like scales weighed down on one side or the other by the Zeitgeist, the 
scales of Being, dark-light, concealed-unconcealed, make Being advance into 
shining presence or retreat into obscure withdrawal. Clearly, Kant’s ‘unavoidable’ 
inference to what is hidden, the noumenal ground apperceived by Reason behind 
every phenomena that presents itself to the Understanding, is to Heidegger an 
expression of the obscurities of Metaphysics which neglects what is present or 
already unconcealed. The Being of beings, not only the awareness of the clearing 
but the clearing itself, withdraws into oblivion.
8 The Being of beings changes its 
aspect, its expression, as it leans on one foot or the other, from the unconcealed to 
the concealed. But Heidegger claims that there is only one authentic, primary or 
original aspect of Being, and not acknowledging [th]is is tantamount to 
forgetfulness, if not a withdrawal of Being itself. Heidegger’s argument in Identity 
and Difference is only the latest eloquent testimony to what his writings make clear 
all along, that Heidegger never attempts to write a descriptive, but a normative 
                                                 
6 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 66. The Greek characters in the original are emphasized. 
7 By his early inquiry into the mystic traits of Heidegger’s thought, John D. Caputo alerted us to 
what was not made entirely explicit by his analyis, that Heidegger is a proponent of a mysticism of 
light, in tradition with Plotinus, Augustine and Eckhart, but that he most emphatically contradicts a 
mysticism of darkness, as expressed most forcefully by Pseudo-Dionysius’s The Mystical Theology. 
[Cf. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, 1990.] On the difference between these 
two strains of mysticicm, see also Henry, Paul, ‘The Place of Plotinus in the History of Thought,’ 
1991. 
8 On Heidegger’s understanding of the oblivion of being, see for example Heidegger, Identity and 
Difference, p. 68ff, and Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, Basic Writings, p. 232. Philosophies of Concealment 
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ontology. Allowing myself the privilege of honest disagreement, I will modestly 
point out that Heidegger’s enumeration of Being does not exhaust all its aspects. 
For there is the Being of what is hidden, and nowhere is this more clearly 
expressed than in Kant’s concept of the noumenon that conditions all phenomena, 
the unseen that conditions everything that we may properly see. It is clear that the 
faculty for or the function of making distinct judgments, disjunctive propositions 
that separates one thing from another, does not produce the apperception of the 
noumenon, but phenomena as they stand apart, individuated, as one being 
different from another, abstracted from everything it is not. But appearing in the 
world as one phenomenon distinct from another, would to Kant give you no claim 
to Being, for the Being of beings, the noumenon is to Kant entirely concealed, 
beyond perception, imperceptible. But still it is, so unlike the thing in itself, which 
remains beyond apprehension, [in]apperceived.
9 
 
[4]     Showing a clear taste for images, towards everything that is brought to 
light, Heidegger evidently turns his back on Kant as he favours phenomena, shying 
away from everything hidden. Judging from Heidegger’s admiration of van 
Gogh,
10 we may say of Heidegger, as we undoubtedly may of Nietzsche, that 
                                                 
9 Kant’s negative concept of the thing in itself is nowhere more easily grasped than through his 
critique of Leibniz’ monad. In order to demarcate his position, Kant says in ‘Amphiboly of 
Concepts of Reflection,’ ‘Leibniz turned all substances, because he conceived them as noumena, 
into simple subjects endowed with powers of presentation - in a word, into monads.’ [Kant, Critique 
of Pure Reason, A266/B322.] ‘Appearances was for him the presentation of the thing in itself.’ 
[A270/B326] However, as Kant concludes his exposition of Leibniz, ‘what things may be in 
themselves I do not know - nor indeed need to know, since, after all, I can never encounter a thing 
otherwise than in appearance.’[A277/B333] We should perhaps take note of what distinguishes a 
critique from other intellectual inquiries. ’All objections can be divided into dogmatic, critical and 
sceptical ones. A dogmatic objection is one directed against a proposition; a critical objection is one 
directed against the proof of a proposition. [Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A388] The critique does 
not prove that an assertion is incorrect, but takes away the proof on which the assertion is based, 
[A388]  ‘it topples the theory; it does so by withdrawing the theory’s alleged foundation, without 
seeking to establish anything else.’[Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A389]. 
10 See Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art, in Basic Writings, pp. 158 ff., for Heidegger’s 
exposition of a pair of farmer’s boots in one of van Gogh’s Stilleben; and Gadamer, Heidegger’s Philosophies of Concealment 
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perhaps he could not imagine a finer life than ein Bilderleben.
11 Undoubtedly, 
Heidegger looks away from the negative presentation of what is concealed as it is 
found in both Kantian philosophy and Dionysian theology. In [th]is light, it almost 
appears to be an act of karmic justice, when, as we shall soon see, the most 
outstanding of all Heidegger’s followers, one who almost explicitly attempts to 
emulate Heidegger’s philosophy, ends up unknowingly subverting his position, 
giving voice to what Heidegger always attempts to avoid, the concealed. 
Principally, Heidegger looks away from another mode of Being as he identifies 
Metaphysics with the reification of what is hidden, be it defined as cause, essence 
or substance. Therefore, Heidegger never speaks of X, what is inessentially or 
unsubstantially concealed in his attempt to destroy metaphysics. Throughout his 
entire life, Heidegger never acknowledges the possibility of a negative presentation 
of what is concealed, for what is hidden may be presented as clearly and as 
negatively as he himself presents the appearance of any phenomenon as 
unconcealed. Heidegger strives to present the open, die Licthtung, the phenomenal 
clearing, as negative, and thereby to disclose the ontological difference as 
something unreifiable, what negatively comes to presence by negating its own 
concealment. Heidegger depreciates the hidden by presenting it as the unfounded 
knowledge of something merely positive or ontic. This reification is twofold, it may 
rest on a faith in heavenly beings, as it occurs in theology, or, as in the 
metaphysical tradition which begins with Aristotle, be hypostatized as the 
hypokeimenon of any phainomenon, the substance of any Erscheinung. A 
                                                                                                                                               
Ways, ‘Existentialism and The Philosophy of Existence [1981],’ p. 7, where Gadamer notes how 
precious van Gogh’s correspondence was to Heidegger. 
11 Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth - Selections from Nietzsche’s notebooks from the early 1870s, ed. 
Daniel Breazeale, ‘The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle Between Art and Knowledge 
[1872],’ Fragment 62, p. 23. Philosophies of Concealment 
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hypostazation, moreover, which Heidegger claims is an inference to what is 
concealed from what is prior to [th]is concealment, the unconcealed without which 
[th]is inference could not be made. What Heidegger therefore looks away from, or 
even decides to look away from, as if it was a decision he merely and arbitrarily 
could make, is the negative disclosure of the concealed, whereby what is hidden is 
not hypostatized, but what remains. 
 
[5]     There is perhaps no clearer testimony to Heidegger’s complete neglect of 
what is concealed, than his misapperception of negative theology. The only time 
Heidegger uses this term, it is used to pronounce Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal 
recurrence, the chaos left after God is dead, as ‘a kind of Negative Theology.’
12 It 
is clear that Heidegger’s use of ‘negative theology’ on this occasion speaks against 
all tradition, for, as witnessed,
13 what is expressed through chaos and eternal 
recurrence is the apperception of what is unconcealed, but, as we shall see later in 
this chapter, as most logically expressed by Pseudo-Dionysius, what is exposed by 
negative theology is never anything but what is concealed. Instead of admitting 
that there is another side to the apperception of the ontological difference, as 
Adorno would say in his lectures on Kant, ‘a metaphysical experience,’
14 perhaps 
another state of Being, Heidegger appears to have made an arbitrary decision 
when without a word he leaves the tradition in the dark that presents the 
ontological difference as concealed. We shall therefore continue, with one who 
appears to follow in Heidegger’s footsteps, but along the way discloses what 
                                                 
12 Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence, p. 95. 
13 What is negatively expressed through ‘God is dead,’ [Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 41.] 
judging from Nietzsche’s comments on the soon to be lost belief in any hypostatized God or in any 
substantial soul in The Will to Power, his unrealised and final achievement, is undoubtedly what is 
unconcealed. Cf. Chapter II, Philosophies of Unconcealment, ‘§2.4 Nietzsche’s Chaos.’ 
14 For Adorno’s assessment of the metaphysical experience implied in the Kantian critique, see 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 110 ff. and 175 ff. Philosophies of Concealment 
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Heidegger never did. For unlike his precursor, Jacques Derrida does 
unquestionably have A Taste for The Secret.
15 Reading Derrida’s Aporias, it 
becomes clear that Derrida betrays the philosophy of Heidegger by attempting its 
emulation. Questioning death, Derrida acknowledges, even masterly exposes, what 
Heidegger, throughout all his works attempted to avoid, a presentation of what is 
concealed. By thus willingly or unwillingly, consciously or unconsciously, 
undermining the philosophy of Heidegger, Derrida becomes the last, a living 
philosopher, to convincingly deliver an interpretation, to present an understanding 
of the Being of beings as concealed. [Th]is is remarkable, not because death is 
presented as a negative principle of life, as it also is in Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
but when we discover what [th]is means. For in Aporias, the Being of beings is 
presented negatively, is only signalled by the death of my appearance. Certainly, 
what is most valuable to Heidegger, the phenomenally unconcealed, dies in the 
hands of Derrida, who presents the phenomenal as a principle of death, whereas 
life is only Being signalled by something more, unappearing, hidden. Let us now 
look at Derrida’s exposition of the ontological difference, a theory, which, in effect, 
says, my death is my only appearance, where you may no longer catch a glimpse of 
what is [hidden], my life, my Being. 
 
[6]     Being in perfect contradiction to Heidegger’s intent, Derrida’s enthusiastic 
misinterpretation of Being and Time, his pretence to follow what he severely 
undermines, does not seem accidental, as it amplifies and reinforces the impression 
of exactly that which Heidegger attempted to avoid, the withdrawal of the Being of 
beings, where [th]is is no longer unconcealed. I do not, however hold [th]is against 
                                                 
15 The opening quote of Derrida and Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret, is simply Derrida’s confession, 
‘I have a Taste for the Secret.’ [Derrida/Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret, p. 1].  Philosophies of Concealment 
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Derrida, do not attempt to take sides, but will show that by, perhaps unknowingly, 
contradicting what he attempts to emulate, Derrida has in fact given not only the 
most profound, but also the clearest expression to another state of Being, a state of 
Being which Heidegger is guilty of neglecting. Derrida turns Heidegger’s 
exposition of the incompleteness of Being upside-down, for death comes to indicate 
exactly what it does not to Heidegger, a negative principle of the hidden life of all 
beings. Although to the untrained eye, for one with A Taste for the Secret, the 
ontological analysis of death in Being and Time may appear to disclose something 
hidden, what is revealed is exactly its opposite, what is unconcealed. For even in 
the ‘preliminary’ analysis of death,
16 Heidegger, who distastes anything secret, 
never attempts to disclose the Being of beings as anything but unconcealed. Still, 
Derrida attempts to imagine what Heidegger did not, namely his own death, 
thereby revealing death as a negative principle of the concealed life of all beings. 
For to Derrida, death denotes the event whereby the phenomenal is left alone, 
where a being is without depth, and therefore no longer is, a being among beings. 
My own death is unimaginable, what is beyond me, the pure perception of my own 
[pure] appearance, where I finally appear without having anything to hide. For my 
death is my only true appearance. Only the living has anything to hide. The dead 
have nothing to hide. I can never witness or take part in this event, which is truly 
hidden to me. 
 
[7]     That Heidegger anticipated, if not already experienced, the 
misapperception of the sections on death in Being and Time, may well be the 
reason that he never returned to complete or develop what he himself deems ‘a 
                                                 
16 Heidegger, Being and Time, ’50. A Preliminary Sketch of the Existential and Ontological 
Structure of Death,’ S. 249-252/p. 231-233. Philosophies of Concealment 
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preliminary sketch.’
17 To Heidegger, death fundamentally guarantees that my life 
is never essentially complete. By stressing [th]is incompleteness that death 
guarantees the living, to Dasein, as to the dead there are no remaining projects, no 
other places to go, it is perhaps obvious that Heidegger’s death guarantees 
something that it does not to Derrida, and that is a principle of unconcealment. 
Certainly, Derrida, in Aporias, by his constant misreading, gives voice to the 
opposite of what his mentor expresses, the exact opposite to what he thinks he is 
about to emulate, that is a principle of concealment. Propounding the ontological 
difference as concealed, Derrida comes to incarnate the inevitable teleological 
anachronism that he speaks of in Khora, that you are bound to speak of another 
end, inevitably will speak of another khora.
18 But even to Derrida it could be 
surprising that he was bound to express its forgetfulness, the withdrawal of khora. 
 
[8]     Derrida perhaps involuntarily gives himself away from the beginning, 
unknowingly suggesting his own betrayal, when he begins his discourse on the 
limits of truth by quoting Seneca. For as much as Caesar came to incarnate the 
betrayal of the Republic, Seneca became the father of the double standard, who 
executed exactly in life what he was speaking against in his writings. Derrida 
quotes Seneca, saying that life is a property man squanders without thinking of his 
own death.
 19 But when Derrida follows Seneca’s counsel, trying to imagine his own 
death, he soon discovers that it is impossible. It is perhaps ironic that Derrida 
                                                 
17 Heidegger, Being and Time, Section 50, ‘A Preliminary Sketch of the Existential and Ontological 
Structure of Death,’ S. 249-252/p. 231-233. 
18 Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 94. 
19 Derrida quotes Seneca saying,  ‘You [men] have all the fears of mortals and all the desires of 
immortals … What foolish forgetfulness of mortality [Quae tam stulta moralitatis oblivio] …. ‘ 
[Seneca, On the Shortness of Life, Ibid, Book 10.3.5-4.2, in Derrida, Aporias, p. 4. Quoted from 
Seneca, ’On the Shortness of Life,’ in vol. 2 of Moral Essays, trans. John W. Basore (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1932): Book 10: 3.1-4 (translation modified). Derrida, Aporias, p. 83n. Philosophies of Concealment 
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begins his discourse by quoting Vita Brevis, The Shortness of Life, which was 
written by a man who was forced to take his own life, after the conspiracy to kill 
Emperor Nero was discovered.  
 
[9]     It is when speaking of Heidegger’s famous definition of death in Being and 
Time, ‘the possibility of the pure and simple impossibility for Dasein,’
20 that 
Derrida suggests the impossibility of writing the history of death as it would 
clearly be a history without a subject.
21 Despite this negative introduction, Derrida 
goes on to state positively that it is death that guarantees my singularity through 
the impossibility of dying in the place of another, of dying for another. Again 
Derrida is referring to, and appears to emulate, what has already been said by 
Heidegger’s sections on death in Being and Time, 49-52, ‘that it is impossible to die 
for the other in the sense of ‘to die in his place.’
22 In the section on death in Being 
and Time, ‘Chapter 46, The Possible Being-a-Whole of Da-sein and Being-toward-
Death,’
23 Heidegger basically says that it is possible for me to represent what 
another person is, on stage as in life, but that the possibility of representation ends, 
when it comes to representing that [th]is person is, for I can, as Heidegger notes, 
not die for another. Heidegger notes, ‘The broad ways of being-in-the-world in 
which one person can be represented by another extends only to the used-up 
modes of public being. Here one Da-sein can and must, within certain limits, “be” 
another Da-sein.’
24 ‘However, this possibility of representation gets completely 
stranded when it is a matter of representing the possibility of being that constitutes 
                                                 
20 Heidegger, Being and Time, Section 50. Derrida, Aporias, p. 23. 
21 Derrida, Aporias, p. 25. 
22 Derrida, Aporias, p. 25. 
23 Heidegger, Being and Time, S. 239/240, p. 223. 
24 Heidegger, Being and Time, ‘Chapter 46, The Possible Being-a-Whole of Da-sein and Being-
toward-Death,’ S. 239/240, p. 223. Philosophies of Concealment 
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the coming-to-an-end of Da-sein and gives its totality as such. No one can take the 
other’s dying away from him.’
25  
 
[10]     As clearly as Heidegger believes that dead are those who have nothing left 
to unconceal - where nothing is outstanding - that without ever Being encountered, 
death nevertheless guarantees that no one can unconceal anything in my place, so 
Derrida, like an apprentice, turns his back on his master, saying, with a 
gourmand’s taste for secrets, that dead are those who have nothing left to hide. 
The living stand apart from the dead as Being hidden. For even though my death is 
hidden from me, it is equally true that the dead have nothing to hide. Incapable of 
hiding anything, life itself becomes a secret. For whereas a living man may hide a 
dead man cannot [hide]. In Being and Time, Heidegger states that ‘Dying is not an 
event, but a phenomenon to be understood existentially in an eminent sense still to 
be delineated more closely.’
1 It is when attempting to develop Heidegger’s analysis, 
when thinking why this event may never occur, may ‘never take place,’ that 
Derrida discovers an aporia, ‘the experience of aporia,’
26 that it may be possible 
that it may never happen, that he will never be around to witness his own death, 
that his own death [is] always hidden from him. 
 
[11]     Being undiscoverable, death is an event I can never take part in, and this 
event, which I can never take part in, nor experience, belongs to me, is nevertheless 
mine. I am the occasion for this event, although I will never be around to witness 
its performance. In the staging of my death, ‘death’ is the meaningless symbol of 
what is inevitably hidden from me, not only what I cannot comprehend, but what I 
                                                 
25 Heidegger, Being and Time, ‘Chapter 46, The Possible Being-a-Whole of Da-sein and Being-
toward-Death,’ S. 240/p. 223. 
26 Derrida, Aporias, p. 19. Philosophies of Concealment 
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cannot be. This difference adds another dimension to Derrida’s negative 
performance, as he attempts to express not only something meaningful, but the 
ontological difference itself, albeit negatively. For approaching [th]is ‘inexhaustible 
singularisation,’
27 which cannot be stated positively, Derrida makes explicit what 
he throughout this essay will want his audience to acknowledge the existence of, 
namely, ‘[that] without which there will never be any event, decision, 
responsibility, ethics, or politics.’
28  In short, the ontological difference. 
 
[12]     Like all aporiae, also the experience of the aporia of my own death makes 
me turn around. For from the phenomenal anticipation of what is inconceivable to 
me, I suddenly realize, that my own pure appearance, when I will have nothing left 
to hide, does not belong to me, that my appearance is my death, that my death is not 
only my final, but my only, true appearance. For while I am alive, what is hidden 
to me is my pure phenomenality. Indeed, it is impossible to recognize myself, even 
with eyes open, without making the inference to what is hidden. What is clear from 
this argument, is that we can detect, in Derrida’s Aporias, which is an exposition of 
the aporia of death, a principle of concealment, the ontological difference 
concealed, as clearly as we recognized, in Derrida’s Khora, a principle of 
unconcealment. Derrida does not only speak negatively of the ontological 
difference as concealed, but performs [th]is ontological difference when  he 
attempts to imagine a stage, a site, where he may witness his own death.
29 Since 
                                                 
27 Derrida, Aporias, p. 20. 
28 Derrida, Aporias, p. 20. 
29 In his essays Khora and Aporias, Derrida does something more than merely express an opinion. 
He produces, if not enacts, the apperception of that which is beyond language, succeeds in Being its 
incarnation, whether as concealed, as he is in Aporias, or unconcealed, as he is in Khora. Whereas in 
Khora Derrida performs the khora itself, in Aporias, his performance is entirely negative. It is an 
impossible performance Derrida delivers, which intends to enact and not speak referentially, to be 
beyond that which he is speaking of, the incarnation of his own discourse, when he questions the Philosophies of Concealment 
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death has no subject, no end and nothing to aim for, we could immediately say that 
the statement, ‘I am dead,’ transforms itself into its opposite, the performance of 
the negative affirmation of what is unconcealed, for speaking, ‘I am [truly] not 
dead.’ We should think this statement through without taking the existence of the 
subject of this statement for granted. If we do, no one can doubt that the not offers 
an opening for me to appear, that ‘I am not dead’ or ‘Not-I am dead.’ The last 
variation shows immediately what Derrida essays to express in Aporias, that death 
is without subject, that if we do not take subjectivity for granted, it is, at least 
logically impossible for me to die, for any pronouncement of my death has no 
subject, is without subject.  
 
[13]     To make it perfectly clear, logically I cannot die.
30 If I could, I have already 
from the very beginning denounced what makes the utterance of any meaningful 
statement about my death possible in the first place. For it would, of course, as 
Bertrand Russell says,
31 be senseless to utter statements without a subjects, but 
saying that ‘x is dead,’ that is precisely what I have done, pronounced a statement 
that may not possibly have a subject. This is why Derrida asks the question which 
begs all questions, ‘Is my death possible?’
32 [For] If my death is purely beyond me, 
and it is impossible to speak truly without a subject, it is clear why Derrida opens 
Aporias by questioning the limits of truth. Kleist mourns the coming of the 
philosophy of Kant as it buries any real hope for perennial truths, for, as Kleist 
realizes, reading with horror the Critique of Pure Reason, there would be no truth 
                                                                                                                                               
possibility of his own death, by asking, ‘Is my death possible?’  Or, am I dead?  [Derrida, Aporias, 
p. 21. ff]. 
30 From this perspective even Leibniz’ monadology becomes understandable, as he consider the I as 
an imperishable monad, a unit or entity which no one may look in to or out of, for logically I cannot 
die. 
31 Wright, The Logic of Negation, p. 6. 
32 Derrida, Aporias, p. 21 ff. Philosophies of Concealment 
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beyond the point of subjectivity.
33 But Derrida denounces the commonplace, ‘In 
sum, the truth is not everything, one would then say, for there is more, something 
else or something better: truth is finite [finie].’
34 Derrida takes a prominent place 
in the Philosophies of Concealment, for where Nietzsche pronounced the death of 
God to divert our attention to what is unconcealed, Derrida speaks of the limits of 
truth, to indicate that without hiding anything, without Being untrue, all 
phenomena are soon rendered lifeless. Where nothing is hidden, no beings may be. 
Without a secret there is no life. Being becomes a negative principle, if not a state, 
of concealment. 
§3.2 Kant’s ’Paralogisms of Pure Reason’ 
 
 
[14]     We shall approach Kant from another angle, not by considering his own 
position right away, but by considering the position he destroys. To understand a 
perspective different than our own, we shall proceed metaphorically by likening 
predicates to a masque that masks the subject, a masque she may or may not 
carry, take off or on as she pleases, and stress that this phenomenal masque may 
be available to other [beings]. This masque of predicates may make one [being] 
appear different from another being, may make it stand out through these 
predicative differences as a being in isolation, individuated. As a phenomenal 
disjunction it is, as Kant says in the Critique of Pure Reason, bound to have either 
this or that property. A man is phenomenally not much more than a mannequin 
who has many properties but no substance. To the Greeks of Homer, as well as to 
                                                 
33 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations,’ Schopenhauer as Educator [1874],’ p. 140. 
34 Derrida, Aporias, p. 1. The two paragraphs of Derrida’s Aporias are called, ‘Finis’ and ‘Awaiting 
at the Arrival,’ the last showing again how Derrida explicitly attempts to emulate Heidegger who in 
Identity and Difference speaks of Being as a kind of arrival or overwhelming, Ankunft or 
Überkommnis. [Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 64f]. Philosophies of Concealment 
 
126  
the Inquisition of Kramer and Sprenger,
35 gods or devils, may at any time wear 
this cloak, as that which carries these properties is apperceived as Being different 
from its appearance. The gods, all spirits, can speak through anything, be 
anything, anywhere, anytime. But not after the creation of Metaphysics, which 
makes it impossible for one Being to borrow the predicates of another, for [th]is to 
carry the properties of another. That is, what is created is ‘a metaphysical block.’
36 
Adorno, however much he attacks all kinds of mystification, mourns the 
establishment, the erection of the metaphysical block.
37 For we may no longer 
imagine that the spearman in the opening of Homer’s Iliad is anything but himself. 
That is, it is impossible for Athena to appear through Laokodos.
38 Moreover, it is 
impossible that the appearance of the spearman should cover the substance of 
something different from that appearance, or more concretely, another substance, 
that is, a jealous god, a malicious spirit. With the Law of Non-Contradiction in 
hand, one being is only allowed to express itself and never another. 
 
[15]     In Metaphysics, Aristotle establishes this principle of non-contradiction 
once and for all, making sure that the cape of attributes can, from now on, only be 
                                                 
35 ’Those persons are said to be pythons in whom the devil works extraordinary things.’[Kramer 
and Sprenger, The Malleus Maleficarum, p. 6, cf. p. 3.] In the Iliad, the Trojans and the Achaians 
were about to celebrate the peace after Melanaus overcame Paris in fair battle. But the gods willed 
it otherwise. ‘Athene passed into the mass of Trojans in man’s form, that of Laokodos, Antenor’s 
son, a strong spearman,’ and wearing the mantel of a man, she persuades the godlike Pandaros, the 
archer, to shoot an arrow for glory, the arrow that finds unknowing Melanaus. Thus begins the 
final act of the Trojan War. [Homer, The Iliad, 4:73-152, pp. 55 f.]. 
36 Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 110-112 and p. 175 ff. 
37 Speaking of the metaphysical block, of the Kantian critique as concomitant with the 
disenchantment of the world, Adorno says something very enlightening, ’Underlying that 
duplication [into phenomena and noumena] stand the idea that our world, the world of experience, 
really has become a world familiar to us; the world in which we live has ceased to be ruled by 
mysterious, unexplained powers. Instead, it is something we experience as our world in the sense 
that we encounter nothing that is incompatible with our own rationality. The experience that in this 
world we stand on our own two feet, and that we inhabit a known world without dreading the 
intervention of demons, without magical and mythical anxieties - all that is implicit in Kant’s 
immanent concept of the thing.’ Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 110.  
38 Homer, The Iliad, 4:73-112, p. 55. Philosophies of Concealment 
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carried by one substance, the hypokeimenon.
39 To each person there does only 
belong one hypostasis, which brings the persona together, that ensures the integrity 
of each [being], metaphysical bounds from which one believes no individual is set 
free except through death. From nowhere, there suddenly occurs a principle of 
interpretation unknown to antiquity and the Middle Ages, as unknown to Homer 
as it is to Kramer and Sprenger,
40 that one persona is only allowed to have one 
substance.
41 With Metaphysics this prohibition, [th]is norm for apperception is 
formalized, and, with Aristotle, who never denies the gods but nevertheless 
destroys the possibility for their appearance, [th]is norm becomes the law of non-
contradiction.
42 From now on, the gods have no place, nowhere to go, nowhere to 
appear, as each appearance can only express one substance, the persona only one 
person.
43  
 
[16]     Having been cognitively disciplined, we are no more able to discern through 
one and the same phenomenon, a witch, a ghost, a devil, a god, another man. For 
after the world has become thoroughly and fully anthropomorphized, it has equally 
                                                 
39 Cf. Aristotle’s definition of the principle of contradiction in Metaphysics, Book IV, 1005b19 and 
1011b13. 
40 See the passage where Kramer and Sprenger defines, with reference to St. Thomas, the disbelief 
in the actuality of possession, as ‘heretical,’ an ‘opinion … founded on absolute infidelity. Because 
the authority of the Holy Scripture says that devils have power over the bodies and over the minds 
of men, when God allows them to exercise this power.’ Cf. Kramer and Sprenger, Malleus 
Maleficarum, p. 2. 
41 Boethius clarifies the difference between person and persona once and for all, when he says, ‘It 
was by the masks they put on that actors represented the individual people concerned in a tragedy 
or comedy - Hecuba or Medea or Simo or Chremes, - so also of all other men who could be clearly 
recognized by their appearance the Latins used the name persona, the Greeks prosopa [Latinised]. 
But the Greeks far more clearly called the individual subsistence of a rational nature by the name 
hypostasis [Latinized], while we through want of appropriate words have kept the name handed 
down to us, calling that persona which they call hypostasis [Latinized]; but Greece with its richer 
vocabulary gives the name hypostasis to the individual subsistence.’ Cf. Boethius, The Theological 
Tractates, p. 87. 
42 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV, 1005b9-34. 
43 It is the principle of contradiction, which, of course, is a principle of identity, that turns 
Augustine’s work on The Trinity into an aporia. But, as we said, this is only a norm, to which 
neither our beliefs need adhere nor our experiences comply. Nevertheless, they do, for there are not 
many among us who through an appearance are able to detect another subject, or, more precisely, 
another substance or something more than the substance of the other. Philosophies of Concealment 
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become entirely metaphysical, for we see through the appearance of one man, only 
the same, and, more than that, we discover him in isolation.
44 As Marx would 
habitually say, each man is an island, or even less or better, as Leibniz says, each 
man is a monad, a complete and self-sufficient world from which no one can look in 
and no one can look out. That is, we are suddenly these self-sufficiencies, these self-
sufficient entities, which we are compelled, convinced or persuaded by Metaphysics 
to be.
45 But it is not necessarily so that we are these monads, it may very well be 
that this is, as Nietzsche says, just another superstition, although a very compelling 
one. There is, today not even available the negative experience of a daimon, as 
Socrates had, no one from within who could reach out and say, ‘No.’
46 
 
[17]     In The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger praises Kant for 
attempting to think the ontological difference for the first time since Plato and 
Aristotle.
47 Speaking of Kant’s enterprise as ‘genuine ontology,’
48 Heidegger points 
out that ‘genuine ontology’ is based on making explicit the ontological difference 
between being and the Being of beings,
49 thus offering another ground than the 
                                                 
44 If anyone is searching for the relevance of these remarks, the justification is twofold. Firstly, as 
nothing is understood except through contradiction, one would first need to understand what 
Kant’s philosophy contradicts. Secondly, that Shakespeare, at least superficially, contradicts Kant, 
if we inquire into the beings that are essentially [re]presented, that is, gods, fairies, demons, and 
not, if we are, the Being of beings. 
45 The metaphysical foundation of Capitalism, at least its theories, is apparent. For, without the 
existence of this entity, there is no rational subject to supply and demand, perhaps only the ghost of 
consumption; the spirit of investment. 
46 Plato, Apology, 31d, Complete Works, p. 29. 
47 Heidegger says, ‘Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is the first attempt since Plato and Aristotle to 
think ontology.’ Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 151.  
48 Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 150. 
49 Tracing the revival of ‘the interest in ontology’ back to phenomenology, and, more originally, 
back to Kant, Heidegger makes explicit the philosophical problem of ‘genuine ontology,’ which is to 
clarify the ontological difference.  Heidegger writes, ‘Being is different than beings, and only this 
difference in general, this possibility of distinction, insures an understanding-of-being. Put another 
way, in the understanding-of-being this distinction of being from beings is carried out. It is this 
distinction that makes anything like ontology possible in the first place. We thus term this 
distinction that first enables something like an understanding-of-being the ontological difference.’ 
[Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, p. 152. Emphasis added]. Philosophies of Concealment 
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positive provides for the scientific exploration of beings, the final definition of what 
beings essentially are.
50 However much Kant asserts a double concept of Being,
51 
we shall focus on Kant’s negative presentation of what is concealed, particularly 
the exposition of [th]is production in ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ the 
negative introduction to the noumenological investigations in the Critique of Pure 
Reason.
52 We shall follow the directions of Hegel, Nietzsche, Adorno and Friedrich, 
who all, unanimously, call Kant a ‘mystic.’
53  It is perhaps necessary to contrast 
the mystification of Being which is evident in Kant’s writings, with the infamous 
use of the word ‘mystic’ towards the end of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.
54 For 
however vaguely Wittgenstein speaks of the mystic, the mysterium
55 to him is never 
what is concealed, but what is unconcealed, never what is hidden but that this 
phenomenon appears. The mysterium is undoubtedly understood differently by 
Kant, as Friedrich says in his thoughtful introduction to a beautiful selection of 
Kant’s works, ‘Kant’s transcendental method, the justification for positing 
existence is found in the fact that without thus positing existence we cannot 
understand the possibility of understanding or cognition whatsoever.’
56 That is, 
without the existence of something, i.e. Self, World, God, there would be nothing to 
comprehend, but since we do comprehend something, it must necessarily be. Even 
                                                 
50 As Adorno points out, Kant never uses the word ‘essence’ in the Critique of Pure Reason. Adorno, 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 208. 
51 For Kant’s double concept of Being, one adequate to Sense and one to Reason, see Heidegger, 
Kant’s Thesis about Being, in Pathmarks, pp. 338ff. 
52 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogisms of Reason,’ A341/B399-A405/B432. 
53 See, for example, Hegel’s remark in the Encyclopaedia, where he says, ‘Kant’s Enlightenment 
endeared itself to obscurantism,’ Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 249. 
54 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.522, p. 187. See also Marion’s commentary which 
attempts to isolate das Mystische from all human productions. Marion, God Without Being, p. 59. 
55 We continue to use, ‘mysterium’ and ‘mystic’ in the general sense of the perception or 
apperception of what is hidden. Cf. Paul Rorem’s note to Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, 
The Complete Works, p. 135n. 
56 Kant, Prolegomena, in, The Philosophy of Kant, Edited and Introduction by Carl J. Friedrich, p. 
xxiii. Emphasis added. Philosophies of Concealment 
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when we do not understand, when Understanding does not know what [th]is 
essentially is, its existence is however grasped, apperceived by Reason. This is, of 
course, Kant’s famous X.
57 That is, the first proof of existence in Kant is negative, 
that is, ‘without this,’ ‘without positing the existence of X, I cannot comprehend 
how it is possible for me to comprehend anything at all.’ Again, without [th]is 
existence, which Kant later defines as Subject, World, God, I cannot understand 
the possibility of understanding or any act of cognition whatsoever. If we read 
carefully, we can find a remarkable persistence in Kant’s works. Anticipations of 
Kant’s transcendental method can, according to Friedrich, already be discerned a 
couple of his precritical works, which appeared as early as 1763, The One Possible 
Proof for Demonstrating the Existence of God and Inquiry into the Clearness of the 
Principles of Natural Theology and Morals.
58 
 
[18]     The Poetics of Being will draw nearer to what is unknown, clarifying right 
away, and here Kant is in agreement, that the unknown is experienced as more real 
than what is known,
59 the apperception of noumena experienced as more real than 
the perception of any true phenomena. Or rather, without the simultaneous, if not 
antecedent, apperception of the noumenon, a phenomenon would appear [to be] 
unreal, appear [to be] ‘mere phenomena.’ For taken by themselves, phenomena 
are not experienced as if they are. The lack of [th]is ‘inevitable inference’ is 
perhaps why Nietzsche at times experiences the world like an Indian Sant, as an 
                                                 
57 See for example, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A346/B404. 
58 Friedrich quotes and translates from the first of these works a passage which is rendered thus, ‘If 
all existence is suspended, nothing is posited and nothing is given as material for any kind of 
thought and all possibility whatever is completely eliminated …’ To say that there exists a 
possibility, but nothing real, is a contradiction in itself, because if nothing exists, nothing 
‘thinkable’ is given …’ Kant, Prolegomena, in, the Philosophy of Kant, Edited and Introduction by 
Carl J. Friedrich, page xxiv. The passage is, according to Friedrich, taken from, Einzig möglicher 
Beweisgrund, 1. Abt.,2. Betrachtung, Works, II, p. 83. 
59 Of course, Kant would agree with everything except our use of the word ‘experience.’ For, as we 
shall soon see, what grounds all experience is the apperception of an illusion. Philosophies of Concealment 
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illusion,
60 as he believes the inference to the ‘ground’ or ‘substance’ or noumenon 
is false.
61 Kant does not deny that this inference to what is hidden is false. He 
asserts, however, that it is unavoidable. Nowhere is the falsehood of these 
inferences to what is unknown, more clearly expressed than in what Adorno calls 
the ‘negative part of the Critique of Pure Reason,’
62 ‘The Paralogisms of Pure 
Reason.’
63 When Adorno speaks of Kant’s anti-intellectualism, we should beware 
that Adorno still considers the Kantian philosophy as the philosophy of depth par 
excellence, regardless of the fact that Adorno’s remark is perhaps meant 
derogatory.
64 Again, what Adorno means by speaking vaguely of ‘Kant’s anti-
intellectualism’ is clearly [th]is, that Kant attempted to think beyond beings, the 
Being of beings. Kant attempted to think beyond the ‘essence’ of beings, which is, 
fundamentally, a word Kant completely avoids in both the phenomenal and 
noumenal part of the investigation, the Critique of Pure Reason. For as, Adorno 
makes clear, if we are to judge a philosopher by the words he never uses, Kant 
should be judged by the omission of ‘essence.’ It is this lack of thinking what is 
essential, which gives the Kantian philosophy the impression, the sublime 
impression of depth. For Kant attempted to think more than what merely shows 
itself as what it essentially is, to think beyond phenomena, to the very ground of 
beings, to what is [first].  
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Here, ‘illusion’ is used contrary to the sense above: not as the noumenal ground provided for all 
perceptions, but to coin our perceptions without this noumenal ground. 
61 See for example ‘”Reason: in Philosophy’ and ‘How the “Real World” Finally Became a Fable,’ 
Nietzsche, Twilight of Idols, pp. 16-20. 
62 Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 202. 
63 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogism of Pure Reason,’ A341/B399-A405/B432. 
64 ‘Kant’s philosophy … is renowned as the deep philosophy par excellence.’ Adorno, Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, p. 74. Philosophies of Concealment 
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[19]     If the reader would like to dwell on Adorno’s impression of the Kantian 
depth, we invite the reader to follow Adorno more carefully when, attempting to 
clarify what he believes is the fundamental difference between the Kantian 
philosophy and its misreception, he says, ‘we must note how this concept of depth 
has come into the world.’
65 Adorno continues his exposition by pointing out that 
‘the concept of depth has a catastrophic effect. This is because it is irrationalist 
and hostile to Enlightenment. According to such a concept thinking can only be 
deep if it refers to forces that lie beyond reason.’
66 And finally, to expose the 
difference between Kant and the Kantians, Adorno concludes, ‘To put it mildly, 
then, it stands in flagrant contradiction to the explicit intentions of Kant's 
philosophy. Kant would have retorted that the deepest foundation of his 
philosophy is in fact reason.’
67 However, Adorno fails to inform the reader that 
Kant has redefined Reason as that faculty or that activity which grasps what is not 
phenomenal, but nevertheless, if not all the more, conditions the comprehension of 
any phenomena, and that there from the vantage point of Kant’s transcendental 
critique is no longer possible to think ‘irrationally,’ neither to be irrational, that all 
cognitive activities are indeed rational regardless of content. For so all-
encompassing, so universal is Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason that the irrational 
has been eradicated from the face of the earth. And if anything is irrational in the 
Kantian system, it is Sense. 
 
[20]     The map for the Critique of Pure Reason that the Prolegomena provides,
68 
would have been even easier to follow if Kant were to have said explicitly, ‘Reason 
                                                 
65 Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 184. 
66 Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 185. 
67 Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 185. 
68 Kant, Prolegomena, ‘Introduction,’ The Philosophy of Kant, p. 52.   Philosophies of Concealment 
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is not a tool for looking.’
69 As it is, Kant stresses the point about the unavoidability 
of the inference to what is unknown, the noumenon, nowhere more unambiguously 
than when, in the Critique of Pure Reason, he says, ‘there will be syllogisms which 
contain no empirical premises and by means of which we infer, from something 
that we are acquainted with, something else of which we have in fact no concept 
and to which, through an unavoidable illusion, we nonetheless give objective 
reality.’
70 Reason is that faculty through which we apperceive, although never 
entirely comprehend, the unknown ground of any phenomena. Kant never claims 
that [th]is inference to the noumenon is not false, only that it is, unavoidable, 
inseparable from our metaphysical constitution.
71 Unlike his predecessors, Kant 
appears to not take what lies behind appearances, the existence of a metaphysical 
ground, for granted. Kant states clearly that man himself takes an irreplaceable 
part in the constitution of what lies behind appearances, the soul of subjectivity, 
the World of causes, the God that encompasses it all, which all in all appear to 
coincide in the possibility of that which is singular. That is, not only of that which 
stands apart before us and divided as phenomena, but more so, that which may 
give the false impression of having substance, even, of Being substantial. [Th]is is 
undeniably a false inference, for although we almost invariably make the inference 
to [th]is substance or soul, we cannot know whether [th]is appearance has 
substance. The apperception of the substance of any persona, the noumenon 
grounding the presence of any phenomena, is an effect of Reason/Vernunft, which 
                                                 
69 Speaking of another faculty which conceptualise sensations, Kant simply says, in Friedrich’s 
translation, ‘Our intellect is not a faculty for looking at things.’ [Kant, Prolegomena, §34, in The 
Philosophy of Kant, p. 97.] In the translation of Paul Carus it says, ‘Our understanding is not a 
faculty of intuition.’ Kant, Prolegomena, §34, trans. Paul Carus, p. 77. 
70 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A339/B397, p. 380. 
71 Kant, Prolegomena, §57, pp. 112f. Philosophies of Concealment 
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cannot help but to infer to what makes [th]is appearance possible. That which 
grounds [th]is phenomenal presence is however what remains, entirely concealed.
72 
 
[21]     We shall speak of Kant’s negative introduction to the ‘Transcendental 
Dialectic’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, specifically how Kant names the 
dialectical inferences from phenomenon to noumenon, ‘false.’ The Second Division 
of the Critique of Pure Reason is entitled, ‘Transcendental Dialectic.’ Book II of the 
Second Division named, ‘On the Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason,’ and the 
first Chapter of this book is called, ‘On the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.’
73 It is in 
this chapter, the negative section of the Critique, that Kant specifically names the 
noumenological inferences - the inferences to the singular apperception of 
Substantiality,
74 Simplicity,
75 Personality,
76 Ideality
77 [the four paralogisms] - as 
‘false.’ No more readily are these inferences delineated as ‘false’ than when Kant, 
defining the ‘paralogism,’ says,  
‘A logical paralogism consists in a syllogism’s wrongness/Falschheit as 
regards form, whatever its content may be. A transcendental paralogism, 
however, has a transcendental basis/Grund for inferring wrongly as regards 
form. Such a fallacious inference will thus have its basis in the nature of 
human reason, and will carry with it an illusion that is unavoidable 
although not unresolvable.’
78 
 
The definition of ‘para-logism’ as a false inference to what is hidden, grounds the 
exposition of the whole chapter. The definition is therefore implied in all dialectical 
inferences from what is phenomenal to what is noumenal. And since this is the 
negative introduction to the transcendental dialectic as a whole, it is by definition 
                                                 
72 Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogism of Reason,’ A341/B399-A405/B432.  
73 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A341/B399-A405/B432. 
74 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A348. 
75 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A351. 
76 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A362. 
77 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A367. 
78 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A341/B399. Emphasis added. Philosophies of Concealment 
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applicable to the understanding of the transcendental dialectical as a whole. At 
least, that is Kant’s intention, which is nowhere more clearly stated than when he, 
in the opening of Book II, ‘On The Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason,’ says,  
‘there will be syllogisms which contain no empirical premises and by means 
of which we infer, from something that we are acquainted with, something 
else of which we have in fact no concept and to which, through an 
unavoidable illusion, we nonetheless give objective reality. Hence such 
inferences, should, with regard to their result, rather be called subtly 
reasoning/vernünftelnd inferences than inferences of reason, although they 
may indeed bear the latter name because of how they are prompted: for they 
are, after all, not invented, nor have arisen contingently, but have sprung 
from the nature of reason. They are sophistries/Sophistikationen not of 
human beings but of pure reason itself. Even the wisest among all human 
beings cannot detach himself from them; perhaps he can after much effort 
forestall the error, but he can never fully rid himself of the illusion that 
incessantly teases and mocks him.’
79  
 
 
[22]     In one sense the inference to the noumenon is false, as it is phenomenally 
ungrounded, is an inference to that which no object in experience may possibly be 
given.
80 As Kant states, [transcendental] dialectic is ‘a logic of illusion.’
81 The error 
is made by Reason, which mistakes the object apperceived for the subject 
inapperceived. As Kant says, ‘We may posit all illusion as consisting in taking the 
subjective condition of thinking to be the cognition of the object.’
82 The dialectical 
illusion of pure reason is not an ‘empirical illusion,’ but an illusion of what is 
beyond what may possibly be grasped empirically: Substantiality [A348], Simplicity 
[A351], Personality [A 362], and Existence [A367]. One must, as Kant points out, 
not mistake ‘appearance and illusion.’
83 Nor should anyone deem [th]is ontological 
                                                 
79 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. A339/B397. Emphasis added. It is curious that a fine translator 
such as Werner S. Pluhar has left out ‘false’ from the index to Kant’s major work, no less that a 
systematic commentator such as Howard Caygill has excluded ‘false’ from A Kant Dictionary, when 
the whole exposition of the transcendental dialectic is false, that is, beyond what may empirically be 
proven. 
80 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A341/B399. 
81 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A293. 
82 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A396. 
83 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A293. Philosophies of Concealment 
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deduction as merely an ‘artificial illusion that immediately vanishes once we have 
insight into it, but a natural and unavoidable illusion that still continues to delude 
us.’
84 Rather, it is this metaphysical illusion, ‘these subtly reasoning assertions,’ 
that reveal ‘the dialectical Kampfplatz/combat arena’
85 where later the rationalist 
and the empiricist will  appear, prepares the list for the duel between Leibniz and 
Hume. Placing the knights face to face, Kant’s hope is that ‘after having more 
exhausted than harmed each other, they will become aware … of the nullity of 
their Streit/fight and will part as good friends.’
86 For this is, as Kant states, a 
metaphysical combat where both ‘vigorous knights … will carry off the wreath of 
victory,’
87 but where neither will escape ‘the critique’s ordeal by fire.’
88  
 
[23]     In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant raises the question, ‘How is it possible 
to apperceive the noumenon?’ Should he not rather have asked, ‘How is it possible 
to not apperceive the noumenon?’ Of course, the negative variation of the question 
makes it clear that Kant actually takes for granted what he pretends to doubt - the 
existence of, if not existence itself, the Being of, if not Being itself - that there is 
something hidden, and that Vernunft/Reason plays an irreplaceable part in the 
production of [th]is apperception. If Kant was to take [th]is production seriously, 
what he should have done was to procure the conditions under which or the 
methods through which, [th]is apperception would be produced more or less 
effectively. Instead, Kant takes [th]is production for granted in the sense that the 
inferential chain from phenomenon to noumenon is unbroken, inevitable in any 
perception, in any experience. [Th]is inevitability is what grants Kant the freedom 
                                                 
84 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A422/B450. 
85 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 422/B450. 
86 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ’Antithetic of Pure Reason,’ A423/B451. 
87 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A423/B450. 
88 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A406/B433. Philosophies of Concealment 
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and the justification to not inquire more discerningly, we could almost say, ‘more 
critically,’ into how [th]is apperception is produced. For Kant has given himself, 
autonomically, we might say, a carte blanche to immediately proceed into the 
territory of the unknown, in relation to which the known land is, as Kant says in 
the opening remarks to his noumenal investigations, but a small island in a great 
and tempestuous ocean.
89 It is however true that the inference to and the passage 
from phenomenon to the apperception of singular noumenona is anything but 
certain, never inevitable nor necessary, and that, more discerningly, we would 
have to say, as we will show in the next chapter, that the inference to the unknown 
is more or less effective according to different methods or ways. 
 
[24]     Kant says in Prolegomena, ‘For now the question is: How does our reason 
behave in this linking of what we know with what we do not know and never can 
know?’
90 Never more clearly does Kant ask for the structure of the inference from 
known to unknown, from phenomenon to noumenon. In the subsequent chapters 
we will show that [th]is inference, from the perception of phenomena to the 
apperception of singular noumena, can be most effortlessly accomplished by an 
inference from what is untrue to what is [true]. Contrary to Kant, we will show 
that nothing is more habitual than to reasonably infer from the perception of what 
is not true, to the apperception of what is [true]. Speaking of knowing and 
unknowing, if knowing is not saying too much, we could say that I make an 
inference from what [I know] is untrue to what [I do not know] is [true]. [Th]is 
inference is entirely false, or at least illusory. For even though I am certain that 
these properties do not belong to [th]is, I cannot thereby say that [th]is is. 
                                                 
89 Kant speaks of the ‘vast and stormy ocean’ of the unknown as he opens the noumenal part 
Critique of Pure Reason, B295, p. 303. 
90 Kant, Prolegomena, Paragraph 57, in The Philosophy of Kant, p. 113. Philosophies of Concealment 
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Nevertheless, that is exactly what I do. It is surprising to see that Kant never 
recognized [th]is persuasive paralogism, [th]is inference from what is untrue to 
what is [true], or does appear to be. It should however not astound us, as Kant 
limited his investigation phenomenally to what is true, and therefore, as he fell 
victim to [th]is enlightened prejudice of searching only for the truth, false 
perceptions like false judgments about anything in the phenomenal world were 
never to appear in his investigation, but were simply discarded. We do not blame 
Kant for this neglect, only point out to those who claim that Kant’s critique is 
exhaustive, that the investigation is phenomenally limited to what is true, to true or 
adequate judgments about that [being] which either posits itself or is hidden.
91 For 
the only false or unfounded cognitions Kant has devoted any of his critical patience 
to, were noumenal, but to these illusions he devoted the major part of his major 
work, the Critique of Pure Reason.  
 
[25]     As a theory before it has time to historically develop, Kant’s analysis is 
undifferentiated, for Kant claims that irrespective of whether our perceptions are 
true or untrue, the perceiver would, in either case have to, and this is for Kant a 
necessity, make an inference to the noumenon, be [th]is called, Subjectivity, World 
or God, and whether subjectivity is apperceived as having substantiality, 
personality or existence. What we would like to add, is that [th]is singular 
inference is not as necessary as Kant believes. For as the experiences of both 
Wittgenstein and Husserl indicates, it is possible to experience another human 
                                                 
91 For Kant’s double concept of Being, See, Heidegger, Kant’s Thesis about Being, Pathmarks, p. 
338ff. A concrete display of this double concept of Being as adequate to Anschauung and Vernunft, 
but not Verstand, as that which either posits itself indefinitely or is assumed as the hidden condition 
for what is perceived, see, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A32/B377. Philosophies of Concealment 
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being as an automaton or a mannequin, that is, as a being without self or soul.
92 
What we then say is that we have to persuade the spectator/auditor of the Being of 
this phenomenal appearance, which, as Kant clearly points out, does not reside in 
the phenomenal appearance alone, but in the apperception of something more, 
something hidden, something in excess of what is perceived. We will then say that 
the inference to something more is not made necessary but very compelling and 
almost unavoidable if [th]is appears through an inadequation or is perceived as 
what it is not, or what is essentially false. The perception/apperception of what 
[th]is is not will then persuade me to, instantaneously and without effort infer to 
the Being of [th]is being, which does not have the properties presented, and thus 
remains unknown. 
§3.3 Dionysius’ Mystical Theology 
 
 
[26]     That the Being of beings is concealed and, to some extent, entirely unknown 
is not something Kant discovers, but is a thought that belongs securely to our 
tradition. All traditions have origins, and regardless of origins, traditions have 
some exponents who speak clearer than others. There is then, in the history of 
philosophy, no one who speaks clearer about what is unknown, secret, hidden, and 
by doing so does not fall pray to the easy mistake of reifying what is concealed, be 
they named angels or gods, than Pseudo-Dionysius. When reading Pseudo-
Dionysius’ mockery of literal interpretations of biblical symbols, we are reminded 
of Kant’s ridicule of all reified interpretations of what is concealed in Dreams of a 
Visionary Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics, his ridicule of the transcendental 
                                                 
92 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Fragment 420, p. 107. Ferraris, ‘What is There,’ in 
Derrida and Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret, p. 95.  Philosophies of Concealment 
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visions of Emmanuel Swedenborg.
93 Of all theologians that shaped the Christian 
traditions of positive and negative theology, none expressed himself more 
analytically than Pseudo-Dionysius, who without a trace of rambling enthusiasm 
gave voice to the mystery of what is hidden.
94 The clarity with which Pseudo-
Dionysius expresses [th]is mystery could be summed up by Rosemary Ann Lees, 
who in her magnificent study, says that more than anything else, Pseudo-Dionysius 
method of theology was that of a logician.
95 
96 
 
[27]     Pseudo-Dionysius is, in our Christian tradition, the chief exponent of a non-
reified concept[ion] of a hidden God. The influence he exerts through his Negative 
and Symbolic Theologies on Christian philosophy and art can easily be 
understated. For it is basically through the principles of interpretation and 
production that he invented, through his hermeneutic and poetical principles, that 
                                                 
93 Kant declares, ‘I confess that all stories about apparitions of departed souls or about the 
presumptive nature of spirits and their connection with us, seem to have appreciable weight only in 
the scale of hope, while in the scale of speculation they seem to consist of nothing but air.’ [Kant, 
Dreams of a Visionary Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics [1766], in The Philosophy of Kant, p. 15.] 
The critique could as easily be directed to the likes of Ficino and Giordano Bruno, and to the 
historian that presents their hermetic tradition, Ms. Frances Yates, for all are attempts to reify 
what is hidden, that is, to falsely transform what is concealed into a belief in hidden beings or 
hypostatized powers. 
94 Of Pseudo-Dionysius’ three theologies, the positive, the negative and the symbolic, the first is 
presented in On Divine Names, the second in The Mystical Theology and the third in The Celestial 
Hierarchy. Only the first, the positive depends entirely on faith or revelation for the understanding 
of what is spiritual, while both the negative and symbolical theologies belong, in great part, to 
natural theology. It is clear that to a protestant, who believes in salvation through faith alone, the 
word ‘natural theology’ has long lost its meaning, and only Revelation remains. One may invoke 
the authority of St. Thomas to define the Dionysian corpus as mainly belonging to natural theology. 
Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Truth, Question Eight: Article 1, p. 315.  
95 Making a concise summary of J. Vanneste’s argument in Le Mystère de Dieu, Rosemary Ann Lees 
says, ‘Pseudo-Dionysius’s approach to mystical religion is that of a logician rather than a 
metaphysician or practicing mystic. Aphairesis is defined as a technique of logical progression 
whereby sensible and intelligible phenomena are successively negated: its logical term is the 
condition of unknowing [agnosia], when the soul has finally abandoned natural modes of 
knowledge according to the senses or intellect. At this point, however, the soul is impelled by the 
fact of God’s transcendence to pass beyond itself and enter through ecstasy into a state of union, 
henosis.’ [Lees, The Negative Language of the Dionysian School of Mystical Theology, pp. 110f.].  
96 If one immediately would think that Dionysius’s Mystical Theology bears no influence on modern 
notions of what is [true], notions so effectively and convincingly produced in Shakespeare’s most 
popular plays, one would have to argue that the moon affects the tides even though this was hidden 
for centuries, for millennia entirely unknown. However, as we proceed, the Wahlverwandschaft 
between Dionysius’ theology and Shakespeare’s poetology will become self-evident. Philosophies of Concealment 
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the angels were, and God was, for centuries, both philosophically understood and 
poetically represented. The Reformation, however, eliminated the need for any 
mediating influence, removed all interpretative methods, and so the Gospel 
suddenly became understood, as it always is by the impatient, as immediately 
available to all. This principle of interpretation led inevitably to the demise of 
religion, the withdrawal of all gods in the West, as it gradually became 
commonplace to think that what is not immediately available to the perception or 
apperception of all, what is not essentially available to all or immediately available 
to everyone, does not exist.
97 There are, however, indirect, non-referential means to 
both understand and produce the apperception of what is hidden. The principles 
for [th]is understanding and [th]is production are laid bare by, even open to 
everyone’s view in Pseudo-Dionysius’s The Mystical Theology and The Celestial 
Hierarchy. In the latter he does however say, what he again repeats in his Letter to 
Titus the hierarch, that these teachings should remain the property, the 
possessions of the few, that one should preclude the uninitiated from reading these 
principles that governs the understanding and the production, the hermeneutics 
and the poetics, of Being.
98 We are not merely looking for an interpretation of 
what is hidden, but more importantly, the means for [th]is production, the means 
available for [th]is production which would most effortlessly and without 
affectation, produce the immediate impression of the Being of beings, or that 
which is concealed. One need then first to speak of one’s end, which in the case of 
Pseudo-Dionysius seems obvious, that is, to produce the apperception of the mystic 
                                                 
97 Kant, furthering, as Adorno says, ‘the metaphysical block,’[Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, p. 110] is the main exponent of the view that what is not generally, even universally 
available to all, is not. Or, to state it more positively, hypothetically, if it is not universal, it does not 
exist. Cf. Kant, Dreams of a Visionary Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics [1766]. 
98 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 140B, The Complete Works, p. 149. Pseudo-Dionysius, 
Letter 9, 1105C, The Complete Works, p. 283. Philosophies of Concealment 
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or what is concealed. [Th]is end is ours in two specific senses, firstly as what we 
recognize the systematic production of, secondly, and perhaps more importantly, 
as Being almost in-distinguishable from our own sense of existence. The means to 
[th]is end do however remain unrecognized, a still undisclosed part of our selves, 
and so [th]is end as well as its beginning, remains in the dark, still hidden, a 
mystery.  
 
[28]     We should follow the directives given in a note provided by Paul Rorem in 
the only systematic presentation of the complete works of Pseudo-Dionysius 
available in English, ‘The terms ‘mystic’ … and mysterious both translate 
mustikos, with some reservations. The former translation is not meant in the later 
sense of a ‘mystical’ or extraordinary, private experience transcending one’s self, 
but rather in the more general sense of something ‘mysterious’ or secret or 
hidden.’
99 We should perhaps add another note that Rorem provides elsewhere, 
that when Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of the mystical or the hidden theology, which 
is tellingly how the author of The Cloud of Unknowing translates The Mystical 
Theology in the High Middle Ages as Denis Hid Divinite,
100 the word ‘theology’ 
denotes not primarily the science of God but God himself, not the interpreter but 
the interpreted, not the apperceiver or a system of apperceptions, but the one 
apperceived.
101 Similarly we have what Heidegger, in Parmenides, calls a non-
derivative use of the word logos, which does not signify the act of cognition, 
inference or representation, but rather that which appear to be cognized, that 
which appears to perception or apperception as unconcealed. That is why 
                                                 
99 Rorem, in, Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, The Complete Works, p. 135. 
100 Denis Hid Divinite with its added emphasis on love is available in the translation of James A. 
Walsh as Denis’s Hidden Theology, in The Pursuit of Wisdom - and other works, by the author of The 
Cloud of Unknowing, pp. 51-97.  
101 Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 184. Philosophies of Concealment 
 
143  
theology, the logos of God, announces the appearance of [th]is God or the Being of 
[th]is God, the Being of [th]is Being, and why Pseudo-Dionysius does not 
predominantly, if at all, speak of the revelation of [th]is God, of this God coming to 
light, as he does through Revelation, but stresses another aspect of God, that is, 
how he is, like the Being of beings, inscrutable, that God is [also], if not primarily, 
hidden.
102 
 
[29]     If one ever wanted to write an anti-Heideggerian manifesto, one would have 
to consider that it has already been written. A more logical, more influential 
critique, more overt subversion of what is to Heidegger first, namely the 
unconcealed, be it called time, Lichtung, arrival or aletheia, or quite simply, Being, 
cannot be found in the history of philosophy than Pseudo-Dionysius’s The Mystical 
Theology. Clearly, in his symbolic and negative theologies, Pseudo-Dionysius gives 
a negative expression to the ontological difference as concealed. For at the core of 
all beings that are, at the heart of everything that is, lies something that is, but is 
                                                 
102 If one should think that [th]is mystical concept of the Being of beings is taken care of more 
properly by Meister Eckhart’s obscure writings or his more public sermons or by Ignatus of 
Loyola’s The Dark Night of the Soul, one has not yet acknowledged the clear distinction between the 
three theologians. For what Ignatus of Loyala, even in [th]is mystic night presents, is nothing other 
than a mysticism of light, a mysticism of appearances or unconcealment hardly different from a 
Hildegard of Bingen or a Theresa of Avila, and never a mysticism of what is concealed. And if one 
would think that Meister Eckhart, and not Dionysius, is the one to whom one should more properly 
attribute a lasting influence on the understanding and expression of what is hidden, one has, of 
course forgotten that, after his excommunication, Eckhart was hardly read and has remained a 
scholarly curiosity, but also, that ‘the preeminence of the Aeropagite in the history of Western 
spirituality … justifies the title by which he is now universally acknowledged, ‘The Father of 
Christian Mysticism.’ [St. Thomas, as quoted by James A. Walsh in the introduction to Denis 
Hidden Theology, The Pursuit of Wisdom, p. 52.] But more importantly and materially, that is as 
relates to the content of the philosophical concepts used, it is obvious to anyone who has gone to the 
trouble of actually reading Meister Eckhart, that his apperception of what is, the Being of beings, is 
purely Neoplatonic, that is essential, whereas it never is to Dionysius. For where the latter 
dissociates [th]is, the Being of beings, from any essential characteristics, it is obvious that Meister 
Eckhart subsumes or makes whatever is dependent on what it is. To Meister Eckhart what exists is 
essentially ideas, and in furthering this Neoplatonic conception and interpretation of Christianity, 
one would almost be tempted to say that Meister Eckhart was a heretic, and perhaps not unjustly 
condemned for heresy, for confusing Christianity with Neoplatonism, what is with what is, the 
existent and inscrutable with what essentially is, regardless of how much he speaks about nothing 
which more often than not is only used as an empty phrase to negate everything that is. Philosophies of Concealment 
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not a being, and however it is indispensable to its existence, it remains totally in the 
dark, a mystery. Such is the ontological difference as presented by Pseudo-
Dionysius in The Mystical Theology, which is the shortest and most influential text 
of Medieval Christendom, which on five pages covers everything that is. According 
to Pseudo-Dionysius, there are two separate and distinct ways to produce the 
apperception of what is hidden. One is negative and belongs to negative theology, 
the other is symbolic and belongs to symbolic theology.
103 The major instrument at 
the disposal of negative theology is aphairesis or denial, the only tool available to 
symbolic theology being the symbol which is not valued as a likeness, but as an 
unlikeness of what it is unable to represent. Still, through [th]is incapacity to 
represent what [th]is spirit, angel, God essentially is, it does, invariably produce a 
profound sense of what is concealed, the Being of beings. Both methods present the 
same, and as the relation between the two methods are, as Paul Rorem says, in his 
handsome introduction to the works of Pseudo-Dionysius, ‘very complex and 
complicated,
104 I shall attempt to disentangle this complexity by treating them 
separately as negative and symbolic theology, which is not often done as The 
Symbolic Theology is a title without a book. We shall study in detail these ways to 
unrevelation, The Mystical Theology, which presents the negative way to the 
concealed, to the apperception of what is concealed, and The Celestial Hierarchy, as 
wells as Pseudo-Dionysius’ Letters, which presents the symbolic way to the same, 
what is and remains concealed. 
 
                                                 
103 The symbolic theology is presented in the methodological chapter in Pseudo-Dionysius, The 
Celestial Hierarchy, ‘Chapter Two, That divine and heavenly things are appropriately revealed 
even through dissimilar symbols,’ The Complete Works, pp. 147-153, and in Pseudo-Dionysius, 
Letter 9, in The Complete Works, pp. 280-288. 
104 Rorem says, ‘The combination of negation and dissimilarity is complex and thus requires careful 
explication.’ Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 55. Philosophies of Concealment 
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[30]     It would appear that as his time, Pseudo-Dionysius had more patience than 
we do today, and that he did not immediately proceed with the exposition of what 
is hidden, but patiently and systematically laid down the means, the methods for 
its interpretation and production. There is an image of negative theology which, 
according to tradition, stems from Plotinus and is taken up by Pseudo-Dionysius 
and the mystical tradition to make an image of what is imageless.
105 In this picture 
the mystic is likened to a sculptor that sees the whole world, and everything in it, 
as one colossal, cosmic building block, each individual as no more than scattered 
rocks, unfinished stone. Just as the sculptor removes the stone, as does 
Michelangelo,
106 who himself followed [th]is principle of creation through 
aphairesis, chisels away all superficial aspects to uncover the perfect shape within, 
so the theologian/philosopher removes everything perceptual and everything 
conceptual, until nothing remains but the apperception of what is concealed, not a 
being, but the Being of beings or that which concealed is without essential 
characteristica.
107 In this paragraph we shall follow the process of aphairesis, 
denial to its end, the apperception of, if not the complete union with, the Being of 
beings. For Pseudo-Dionysius has not only found a way to interpret but a way to 
create [th]is apperception, the apperception of what is concealed, by following a 
path of denial whereby what is first, [th]is is denied all phenomenal characteristica 
and then denied all intelligible characteristica until finally nothing remains except 
                                                 
105 Plotinus, The Enneads, I. 6.9. Pseudo-Dionysius uses a similar image in The Mystical Theology, 
1025B, The Complete Works, p. 138. 
106 Principally, Clements discovers ‘the sealed figure concept,’ in Alberti’s De Statua [1464], and 
concretely, creation through aphairesis in Michelangelo’s David. [Clements, Michelangelo’s Theory 
of Art, pp. 22f.] History constantly reminds us that Michelangelo died the same year Shakespeare 
was born, in 1564. We shall later see that Shakespeare adapts this principle of creation through 
aphairesis for his own ends, and if the reader immediately begs to think concretely we could 
perhaps mention, King Lear. Speaking of the concrete production of Being, we shall, however, 
adopt the word elision. For as much as aphairesis is used to deny all properties to everything, we 
use elision to denote the sudden or progressive removal of all attributes from a single being.  
107 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, 1025B, The Complete Works, p. 138. Philosophies of Concealment 
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the apperception of that which without any characteristica remains hidden. 
Finally, also [th]is is denied existence by removing the act of apperception itself, 
for so hopefully to achieve mystical union with that which is no longer 
apperceived.
108 
 
[31]     To get a clear view of Pseudo-Dionysius’ apophatic method, it is helpful to 
compare it to Descartes’ scientific Method,
109 as something is often only understood 
by understanding what it is not, and something complex more easily acquired 
when, as Aristotle maintains, compared to something simple.
110 It is as easy to 
notice the superficial likeness between Pseudo-Dionysius’ and Descartes’ art of 
hyperbolic denial, and hence the influence of negative theology on Descartes, as it 
is to notice the unlikeness between the results of applying the same method of 
aphairesis/denial to so different pursuits. For as Descartes through denial ends up 
with Cogito, Pseudo-Dionysius ends up with God or the Being of beings, and 
whereas Descartes ends up with something substantial, res cogitans, Pseudo-
Dionysius ends up with what is insubstantial, it. Where Pseudo-Dionysius ends up 
with something inessential, it, Descartes ends up with what is essential as the cogito 
is defined through its one essential characteristic, thinking, the cogitans in res 
cogitans. Where Descartes proceeds through doubt and ends up with certainty, 
Pseudo-Dionysius proceeds with certainty and ends up with something doubtful, for 
in the end, Descartes ends up with what is known, res cogitans, whereas Pseudo-
                                                 
108  Superficially, Dionysius provides both Dante as well as any abbot or novice with the three basic 
steps on the ladder to perfection: [ethical/moral] purgation, [cognitive/contemplative] illumination, 
[ontological/theological] union, with God, the Being of beings. Rorem remarks however that these 
three stages, which are distinct in Bonaventure, are all cognitive to the Aeropagite: ‘we are purified 
from ignorance, then illuminated further and then perfected in our understanding.’ See Rorem, 
Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 219. See also, Underhill, Mysticism, ‘Chapter IX, The Dark Night of the Soul,’ 
pp. 380ff. 
109 Descartes, Discourse on Method and Related Writings, Part Four, pp. 24ff. 
110 For this principle of edification, see for example, Plato, Republic, Book VI, 488a, p. 1111. Philosophies of Concealment 
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Dionysius ends up with what is unknown. Nothing could be further apart or more 
distinct than the known and the unknown, which, we could say, separates or 
distinguishes all beings from the Being of all beings. It is, however clear that 
Cogito, as Heidegger remarks in Identity and Difference, is also an interpretation of 
the Being of beings,
111 if it is not more than that, a sign of its forgetfulness or only 
significatory of its withdrawal or reification. So, however similar the process 
whereby Descartes reaches his aim may appear to Pseudo-Dionysius’ apophatic 
theology, it is safe to say that it appears similar, although it is not.
112 
 
[32]     If there remains any semblance between these two methods, we could say 
that the Method by which Descartes reaches his essential foundation in Cogito, is 
the same through which Pseudo-Dionysius takes away all essential foundations. 
For what Pseudo-Dionysius has, through aphairesis, through the gradual process 
of denial, provided, is indeed another ground, the ground for the Being of beings, 
which still, after [th]is long and painful process, remains entirely hidden. What is 
left after everything has been taken away, is nevertheless at the core of all beings, 
and the mysterious or hidden core of all beings is, as Pseudo-Dionysius ends [this 
paragraph in] The Mystical Theology, ‘above everything that is.’
113 To reach [th]is 
end Pseudo-Dionysius begins by denying it all [perceptible] attributes. He proceeds 
by denying it all [intelligible] attributes, and so Pseudo-Dionysius, about to reach 
the conclusion, says,   
                                                 
111 Heidegger, The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, in Basics Writings, p. 438. 
112 It is clear, that regardless of the textual evidence, Descartes’ method is closer to, if not identical 
with Augustine’s method of doubt, which he uses to confront the scepticism of the pyrrhonists and 
the relativism of the Platonists, in Against the Academicians. Augustine turns scepticism against 
itself, arguing that the inability to resolve a contradiction, that is to decide which one of two 
mutually exclusive propositions is true, supports the fact that that which one is unable to reach a 
judgment on does exist, that even doubt proves the existence of that which is doubted. See, 
Augustine, Against the Academicians, pp. 72ff. 
113 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, 1000A, The Complete Works, p. 135. Philosophies of Concealment 
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‘Again, as we climb higher we say this. It is not soul or mind, nor does it 
possess imagination, conviction, speech, or understanding. Nor is it speech 
per se, understanding per se. It cannot be spoken of and it cannot be 
grasped by understanding… It cannot be grasped by the understanding 
since it is neither knowledge nor truth.’
114  
 
It is stunning, and we can never remind ourselves often enough, that at [th]is 
height, or [th]is depth, Pseudo-Dionysius does not ever use, as Hegel says, ‘the 
meaningless word ‘God’,’
115 to create the apperception of what is. 
 
[33]     If Reason only grasps what essentially is, what is apperceived at the end of 
aphairesis is clearly above Reason.
116 There are, however, two interpretations, we 
may even speak of two distinct experiences, of what remains at the end of 
aphairesis. At the end of via negativa, is, according to St. Bernard, a sudden flower, 
a sudden outburst of love, wherein the apperceiver and the apperceived are united 
in love if meditation reaches its end. For what, to Bonaventure or the author of 
The Cloud of Unknowing, is after everything has been taken away is love, the 
experience of the love of God, or quite simply God, which to the world, like the 
lover, like Christ to his bride, the church, remains hidden. When the author of The 
Cloud of Unknowing in the fourteenth century translates Dionysius’ The Mystical 
Theology into Middle English as Denis Hid Divinite, the author adds the aspect of 
love to the unknown, to the interpretation of that which is above beings, the Being 
of beings.
117 [Th]is interpretation cannot be sustained by a close reading of the 
Pseudo-Dionysian corpus. For, like Bonaventure, the author of The Cloud of 
                                                 
114 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, 1045D, p. 141. Emphasis added. 
115 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 22, p. 12. 
116 Evidently, the way we use the concept of ‘reason’ in this passage differs from Kant’s 
interpretation in Critique of Pure Reason, but remains in line with the usage by Dionysius and the 
Dionysian Tradition, where Reason perceives or understands what essentially is, and that which 
cannot be defined, and hence may only be apperceived, is above reason. To Kant, it is obvious, that 
contrarily, it is exactly, Reason that comprehends what is imperceivable. 
117 Hodgson, Phyllis, Introduction to The Cloud of Unknowing, p. lxiii. Philosophies of Concealment 
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Unknowing, anticipated what Pseudo-Dionysius never did, that one would be in 
love after everything had been taken away.  
 
[34]     Whether apperceived as definite or indefinite, as Being in love or simply 
Being, it is clear that that which appears to be above reason, is apperceived as 
something hidden, something concealed, and also that [th]is understanding of love 
as what is concealed,  although being a commonplace to us, is entirely foreign to, 
even unthinkable to Plato or Aristotle. For these Greek philosophers perceived 
love or eros or agape, as that which brings [th]is into unconcealment, as that which 
unconceals, whereas, in contradistinction to [th]is belief, the Christian mystics of 
the Middle Ages, among them St. Bernard and Bonaventure, creates, in an entirely 
Dionysian tradition, love as what remains after everything essential has been taken 
away, and nothing remains except the apperception of what is hidden. For it is to 
that which is hidden that the Christian mystic feels love, towards that which is 
concealed and never to that which is unconcealed. Some may find this mystical 
pathos superfluous, assert that the Being of beings may well be concealed without 
[th]is pathos.
118 Regardless, it is self-evident that our views were shaped by theirs, 
                                                 
118 All scholars, commentators, from Albert Magnus and St. Thomas to Rosemary Ann Lees and 
Paul Rorem, concur that the aspect of love cannot be found in Dionysius’ exposition of the 
unknown, but is an interpretation that securely belongs to the Western reception of the Dionysian 
Corpus, and can be traced back to Eriugena’s first Latin translation in the Ninth Century. As 
clearly as Pseudo-Dionysius presents the Being of beings logically and without pathos, the author of 
The Cloud of Unknowing is unable to transcribe Dionysius’ theology without it. For translating 
Dionysius’ The Mystical Theology, he adds, as Phyllis Hodgson shows in the introduction to The 
Cloud of Unknowing published for The Early English Text Society, the element of love to his 
translation Denis Hid Divinite. And as much as the Latin The Mystical Theology of Eriugena was 
available to Benedictine, Cistercian and Carthusian alike until Henry VIII tore down the Abbeys 
that housed the Dionysian corpus, the Middle English translation, Denis Hid Divinite, was, 
according to the sparse evidence, still widely read, even with fervour, until the English 
Reformation.[Walsh, Introduction to Denis’s Hidden Theology, The Pursuit of Wisdom, p. 67 and 
85n, where it is said, ‘’Phyllis Hodgson argues for he widespread popularity of the Cloud and its 
author’s minor treatises, from the fifteenth-century observation that they ‘walked up and down at 
deer-rates’ (in D. M. McIntyre, ‘The Cloud of Unknowing,’ The Expositor 7, no. 22 {October 1907}: 
373). Cf. P. H. p. lxxxxii. Her view is recently corroborated by P. H. Jolliffe, A Check-list of Middle 
English Prose Writings (Toronto: IMS, 1974).] But overnight one had to read Dionysius in secret in Philosophies of Concealment 
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by Pseudo-Dionysius and the author of The Cloud of Unknowing, by Augustine and 
Bonaventure, to believe that not everything that is not reason is below reason, and 
that calling something ‘irrational’ one may indeed not speak deprecatory but in 
praise. For in unknowing and in unreason, at the end of [th]is transgression, where 
one is prone to recognize a lack, they, the unknown author of The Cloud of 
Unknowing and the man who falsely, and for more than a millennium, went under 
the name of Dionysius the Aeropagite but to this day remains entirely unknown, 
found not something missing but an abundance, not something less but something 
more, an abundance called unknowing through which one may apperceive what 
lies at the heart of all things, but is not a thing, apperceive, perhaps be, what is 
fundamental to all things, but transcends them all, and hence must remain entirely 
unknown, the Being of beings. Only within [th]is docto ignorantia tradition, does it 
remain true, after all knowledge has been taken away, that ignorance is bliss.
119 
 
                                                                                                                                               
England. A cherished copy was available to John Dee,[Yates, Theatre of the World, pp. 10, 12] 
whose library was finally burned in Protestant frenzy, like so many of the books of the Monastic 
Libraries.[Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, pp. 187ff.] It is safe to say that the 
analytic instruments for understanding the poiesis and the hermeneutics of Being were suddenly, 
and violently, taken away. However, judging from the effective history of Shakespeare’s plays 
alone, it is safe to say that what was removed was merely its apprehension, never its influence, 
which like the moon affects the tide even when no one is aware of it. 
119 The author of The Mystical Theology and The Celestial Hierarchy, who is entirely unknown and 
wrote under the pseudonym he borrowed from Dionysius the Aeropagite, the convert of St. Paul in 
Works, is believed to have been a Syrian Monk and to have died in the first part of the sixth 
Century.
119 The evidence for this conjecture is that he is mentioned by the later Maximus the 
Confessor, and seems to be have been influenced by the earlier and last great philosopher of Greek 
antiquity, namely Iamblichus, who among other works wrote the esoteric The Egyptian Mysteries. 
[Cf. Iamblichos, Theurgia or The Egyptian Mysteries, 1911.] Iamblichus himself appear to be clearly 
influenced by Plotinus or a Neoplatonic tradition where the theory of ideas, or a theory of 
procession and return, dominates the ontologies and theologies, which are, at this point, not 
separate inquires. Although it may be true that Pseudo-Dionysius, whatever his actual name is, was 
such a Syrian monk, I do not however support the view that Pseudo-Dionysius wrote within a 
Neoplatonic tradition, and if he did or attempted to emulate and perpetuate such a tradition, he 
clearly subverted it unwillingly. [Th]is is evident from Pseudo-Dionysius’ theory of the Being of 
beings, which is always and without exception presented as inessential, whereas in the Neoplatonic 
tradition, what is is inseparable from what is essential. There could hardly be staked out a greater 
difference than between one who believes the Being of beings is essential and one who thinks it is 
not. For further proof of how the Dionysian theology distinguishes itself from its supposed 
Neoplatonic ancestry, see C8[43]. Philosophies of Concealment 
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[35]     Before we proceed with our exposition of Pseudo-Dionysius’ symbolic 
theology, the exposition of the Dionysian symbol, it is important to notice that the 
key book in Pseudo-Dionysius’ works is The Celestial Hierarchy, and not only that 
a chapter in this book, Chapter II, provides directives for understanding the 
corpus as a whole, but that one single letter, Letter 9, illuminates the meaning of 
this single chapter, and hence one single letter could express Pseudo-Dionysius’ 
theology as a whole.
120 Paul Rorem says of The Celestial Hierarchy, in his Pseudo-
Dionysius - A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their Influence 
[1993], the only systematic exposition of the Dionysian Corpus in English, ‘An 
introduction to the Dionysian treatises should start with The Celestial Hierarchy, 
for several reasons.’
121 Rorem’s argument is not that The Celestial Hierarchy was 
the first to be written by Pseudo-Dionysius, as he himself argues that it follows 
after The Mystical Theology, but rather, that it provides ‘crucial facets of the 
author’s theological method that recur throughout the writings …The author’s 
interpretative method, essential to the entire enterprise, is pursued in this treatise 
…’
122 Rorem marks the importance of Letter 9,
123 and we shall follow his lead, but 
not without listening to what Rorem has to say about the crucial second chapter of 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ The Celestial Hierarchy, called, ‘That Divine and Heavenly 
                                                 
120 Pointing out the differences within the Dionysian corpus, Rorem explains in a note provided for 
The Divine Names, ‘The lost or fictitious Symbolic Theology concerned those biblical symbols for 
God taken from the realm of sense perception …As such, it follows the presentation taken from the 
realm of concepts (The Divine Names) as part of the descent or procession from lofty simplicity to 
lowly plurality …The Treatise (Symbolical Theology) … may be summarized in the Ninth Letter.’ 
[Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, p. 57n.] Rorem also provides another note, where 
the locus of ‘Symbolic Theology’ within the Dionysian works, is more precisely identified. Rorem 
clarifies, ‘The lost or fictitious Symbolic Theology was ostensibly concerned with those biblical 
symbols for God that depend on sense perception, such as the symbols discussed in this letter. The 
title is also mentioned at the end of this letter (1113BC 21-30), and in DN 1 597 AB 5-20, DN 13 984 
11, MT 3 1033AB 13-25, and CH 15 336A 2-9. See DN 1, note 89.’ Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius, The 
Complete Works, p. 280n. 
121 Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 47. 
122 Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 47. 
123 Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 47. Philosophies of Concealment 
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Things are Appropriately Revealed even through Dissimilar Symbols.’
124 ‘The 
second chapter of The Celestial Hierarchy is a sustained methodological argument 
for the use of symbols in depicting the angels and God. It is especially concerned to 
justify those symbols that may seem most incongruous and insulting to the 
heavenly beings.’
125 Invaluably, Rorem adds what is not explicitly stated in 
Pseudo-Dionysius work, ‘The symbols have a double rationale: to reveal and to 
conceal.’
126 Pseudo-Dionysius says,  
‘Among uninstructed souls the fathers of unspeakable wisdom give an 
impression of outstanding absurdity when, with secret and daring riddles, 
they make known that truth which is divine, mysterious, and so far as the 
profane are concerned, inaccessible. That is why so many continue to be 
unbelieving in the presence of the explanations of the divine mysteries, for 
we contemplate them solely by the way of the perceptible symbols attached 
to them.’
127 
 
And concerning the efficacy of these incongruous symbols, Dionysius says, ‘It was 
right … that the Holy of Holies should be kept from the contamination of the 
mob.’
128  
 
[36]     Generally there is, as Pseudo-Dionysius points out, in Scripture, a tendency 
to represent gods or angels with ‘incongruous’ images,
129 for example angels as 
men with wings. These ‘incongruous’ images should first of all make it immediately 
clear that these beings are essentially different from human beings, secondly, and 
more fundamentally, that they are different from the way they are essentially 
                                                 
124 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, The Complete Works, pp. 143ff. 
125 Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 53. 
126 In extenso, Rorem says, ‘The symbols have a double rationale: to reveal and to conceal, to 
accommodate revelation to the capacities of the receivers and to keep it secret from the outsiders.’ 
Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 54. 
127 Pseudo-Dionysius, Letter Nine, 1104B, The Complete Works, p. 281. 
128 Pseudo-Dionysius, Letter Nine, 1108A, The Complete Works, p. 283. 
129 Pseudo-Dionysius does not speak of images but of dissimilarities, but, as dis-similarities to 
Dionysius, in one sense, simply are re-presentations, and images are such re-presentations, we 
speak of ‘incongruous images’ for the sake of clarity. [Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 
137C-D, The Complete Works, p. 148]. Philosophies of Concealment 
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represented, leaving again the beholder with nothing to grasp but what is 
singularly concealed. For, as Pseudo-Dionysius says, ‘These pictures have to do 
with beings so simple that we can neither know nor contemplate them.’
130 Pseudo-
Dionysius considers those who interpret biblical symbols literally, as adequate 
depictions or representations of heavenly beings, not only as naïve, but mad,
131 for 
these images are not adequate, but inadequate [to what they represent]. As 
Pseudo-Dionysius notes,  
‘We cannot, as mad people do, profanely visualize these heavenly and 
godlike intelligences as actually having numerous feet and faces … They do 
not have the curved beak of the eagle or the wings and feathers of birds. We 
must not have pictures of flaming wheels whirling in the skies, of material 
thrones made ready to provide a reception …’
132 And later, ‘The word of 
God makes use of poetic imagery when discussing these formless 
intelligences but, as I have already said, it does so not for the sake of art, 
but as a concession to the nature of our own mind. It uses scriptural 
passages in an uplifting fashion as a way, provided for us from the first, to 
uplift our mind in a manner suitable to our nature.’
133  
 
[37]     Whether or not a symbol is perceived as similar or dissimilar, an adequate 
or an inadequate representation of what [th]is essentially is, depends on the 
capacity of the reader, who may chose, at all times, to perceive [th]is symbolic 
representation naively as an adequate, literal or an essentially true 
[re]presentation.
134 Pseudo-Dionysius does, however, add a word of warning, ‘one 
must be careful to use the similarities as dissimilarities, as discussed, to avoid one-
                                                 
130 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 137B, The Complete Works, p. 148. 
131 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 137A, The Complete Works, p. 147. 
132 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 137A, The Complete Works, p. 147. 
133 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 137A-137B, The Complete Works, pp. 147-148. 
134 Here we may add that to interpret a symbol metaphorically is not considered profound, as the 
metaphorical focus, the transformation that occurs through metaphor, leaves [th]is essentially 
unchanged. In this view, the metaphorical interpretation of, for instance, the four beasts in 
Revelations as the four continents of Asia, Africa, Europe and America, which surrounds the Lord, 
the Host of hosts, is of course, entirely superficial. This metaphorical or allegorical interpretation is 
no less superficial than the literal, which would see God surrounded by four beasts looking upon 
God, whose face is as much hidden to the beasts as their faces are hidden to us. Philosophies of Concealment 
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to-one correspondences.’
135 Symbols are therefore unmistakably made dissimilar 
through interpretation. What is brought or thrown together in the Dionysian 
symbol is the perceptible and the imperceptible, what we can perceive and what we 
can only apperceive, where the road to that which is only apperceived goes 
through the negation of the perceptual characteristics that immediately seems to 
belong to [th]is but does not, so that, finally, nothing remains except the negative 
impression of that which is inconceivable. The symbol is the site of a contradiction. 
It brings together the perceptual and the imperceptual, the conceivable and the 
inconceivable.  It is therefore truly a sym-bol, as it throws opposites together. 
Before we let Pseudo-Dionysius conclude his theory of the symbol, let us say this: 
There are two intertwined, even contradictory movements in the production and 
interpretation of dissimilar symbols. The symbol is both like something and unlike 
something, and that which it is like and unlike is the same. The symbol is 
immediately like what we may phenomenally perceive or imagine, it is mediately 
unlike what it only negatively [re]presents. The symbol is the site of a 
contradiction, it is the crossroads, the intersection between the perceptual and the 
imperceptual which it presents negatively, which it offers the negative impression 
of. Therefore, the dissimilar symbol is truly a symbol as it gathers, or brings 
together, the perceived and the imperceived, the imperceivable at the site of the 
symbol.
136 
 
[38]     The symbol is a way of looking past or through phenomena, even to neglect 
them. The symbol is a way of looking through phenomena or what is unconcealed 
towards what is concealed, even towards what [th]is conceals, and by looking 
                                                 
135 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 144C, p. 152. Emphasis added. 
136 For the etymology of the symbol, as cym-bolon, cym-ballein, see Wilson Knight, The Christian 
Renaissance, p. 23. Philosophies of Concealment 
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through [th]is, past the phenomenon, the symbol, which is undoubtedly 
unconcealed, becomes merely the bridge between the seen and the unseen, the 
known and the unknown, becomes itself what is concealed or hidden, [is] no longer 
apperceived. Dionysius says, ‘My mind was not permitted to dwell on imagery so 
inadequate [i.e. the deformed imagery used by scripture], but was provoked to get 
behind the material show, to get accustomed to the idea of going beyond 
appearances.’
137 No longer do we apperceive what is unconcealed. So the symbol 
gives expression to what is hidden, and by doing so effectively, by reaching [th]is 
end, it obliterates itself, the impression of itself, and does itself become what is 
hidden. If all phenomena are approached symbolically, which Metaphysics does 
either in an essential or in an inessential sense, and if phenomena are what is first 
unconcealed, it is obvious that [th]is symbolic interpretation of and approach to 
phenomena will be what hides the fact that these phenomena are first unconcealed, 
that is, that their appearance is negative, is a movement by which what is removed 
through [th]is appearance, is the concealed. By thus appearing, man is 
unconcealed much like Michelangelo unconcealed his sculpture, through the 
removal of that indefinite matter which conceals, for through aphairesis is [th]is 
unconcealed or brought to life. 
 
[39]     As is well known, the Academia of Plato and the Lyceum of Aristotle 
continued to prosper during the Roman Empire, as the Roman nobility for 
centuries sent their offspring to Athens for culture and education, ensuring a 
continuous academic tradition until the 6
th Century A.D. when the Christian 
Emperor Justinian, in 527, following the desires of his wife, finally closed the 
                                                 
137 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 145B, The Complete Works, p. 153. Emphasis added. Philosophies of Concealment 
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Academy. It is perhaps no coincidence that Plato’s Academy was closed at the 
same time as one today believes whoever took the name of Dionysius wrote his 
highly influential books on The Mystical Theology, The Celestial Hierarchy, On the 
Divine Names and The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, thus signifying the end of one era 
and the beginning of another, the end of Antiquity and the beginning of the Middle 
Ages, the demise of Plato and the surge of Dionysius, whose works came to 
Western Europe as a gift from the Byzantine Emperor Michael the Stammerer to 
the Frankish Louis the Pious, in 827. John the Scot Eriugena (810-77), The Scottish 
or Irish John, was the first to translate the Dionysian corpus into Latin, and the 
first to make The Mystical Theology available in any local tongue was an English 
friar, who translated this influential and popular work into the vernacular as early 
as the fourteenth century under the name Denis Hid Divinite. Tellingly, this work, 
like the one written by the same man, The Cloud of Unknowing, is written by a 
friar or a priest who to this day remains entirely unknown. So much does 
Dionysius write natural theology in The Mystical Theology that the sparse and 
almost absent references to Christ throughout his corpus has made him 
occasionally fall under the accusation of heresy. On the mature Luther’s dislike of 
Dionysius’ theology, what should be noted is that Dionysius’ Mystical Theology is a 
natural theology, whereas to Luther, there is no theology without revelation. What 
should be noted is that through Dionysius’ major and most influential work, The 
Mystical Theology, it is as easy for Dionysius to project a theology without 
Revelation as it is impossible for Luther to perceive a theology without one. 
Obviously, it is the possibility of a pure natural religion or Christianity without 
revelation, which made Dionysius fall into disrepute and later complete neglect in 
the Protestant and Evangelical traditions of Christianity.  
 
C4 THE TECHNE OF BEING 
 
§4.1 The Inadequacy of Mimesis 
§4.2 The Techne of Inadequation 
§4.3 Instruments of Inadequation 
 
C4 EXPOSÉ 
 
 
[1]     Having recognized the two traditions that have exposed the ontological 
difference negatively as Philosophies of Unconcealment and Philosophies of 
Concealment, I will emphasize that like Hamlet, Shakespeare betrays his own 
ideals by producing the ontological contradiction [between Being and beings] as 
concealed. Contrary to T. S. Eliot, who detected no elements of a poetics in 
Shakespeare’s plays, we have discovered a consistent pattern of inadequation, 
which we will have a first look at in [th]is chapter, before we determine the 
different instruments of inadequation within the context of the places provided by 
Shakespeare’s plays. Since techne is the virtue of poiesis, we need first to clarify 
that [th]is poiesis aims at the production of the apperception of the Being of beings. 
Our main thesis throughout is that the apperception of the Being of beings is most 
spontaneously, even effortlessly, produced through unlikeness rather than likeness, 
non-beings rather than beings, a poiesis that works through inadequation rather 
than adequation. As a result of [th]is inadequation, the negative ontological 
difference is not only produced but, most often, also apperceived. Before diving 
into The Techne of Being I offer a preliminary critique of the poetical theory of 
mimesis, which is as much structured on a logic of likeness by which it achieves its 
end of cementing the perception of beings, the perception of what [th]is essentially The Techne of Being 
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is, as The Poetics of Being is structured on a logic of unlikeness. Evidently, mimesis 
is a theory through which we are progressively removed from understanding that 
non-beings offer a more persuasive sense of Being, blocked from apprehending the 
negative ontic-ontological difference. Surprisingly, we are removed from the 
experience of what is ‘true’ or ‘real’ by exactly what we immediately, but falsely, 
would have thought would bring us closer, namely a true [re]presentation, a 
likeness. I shall therefore first speak of the inadequacy of mimesis before we offer 
the theory of inadequation. 
§4.1 The Inadequacy of Mimesis 
 
[2]     As Aristotle says in Metaphysics, what is first is investigated by either 
ontology or theology.
1 Apparently, The Poetics of Being is able to produce the 
impression of that which these sciences merely take for granted. Whereas 
ontology/theology may be the sciences of what is first, there may be an art that 
produces its apperception. Evidently, as no science is higher then the one 
contemplating what is highest, no art is higher than the one making the 
apperception of what is. The success of any dramatic art is surely not measured by 
the extent to which the spectator is led to believe that [th]is is a [re]presentation. No 
dramatic art considers it an achievement to convince the spectator that [th]is is a 
[re]presentation, but rather, that [th]is is. We can even say that if tragedy has only 
convinced me that it has delivered a true [re]presentation, it has failed as art and 
would perhaps be considered more as a true historical record, and hardly be 
perceived as drama.  
                                                 
1 See the theological Book XII of Metaphysics and the ontological Book IV, and a book that 
anticipates them both, Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, esp. 982b8-983a11. The Techne of Being 
 
159  
 
[3]     What Aristotle actually says, as he considers the difference between poetry 
and history, is that, ‘poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import 
than history.’
2 Like Heidegger after him, Aristotle’s never explains why ‘poetry is 
something more philosophic and of graver import than history.’
3 We shall attempt 
to expose the reason for this hierarchy. The reason is not that one craft studies 
what was and the other what may be,
4 but rather, that one craft produces what the 
other takes for granted, namely the ontological difference. To support the 
interpretation/valuation of the superiority of poetry [over science], we would use 
Aristotle’s own argument in Metaphysics, where he evidently considers no 
investigation to be higher than the investigations of what is highest.
5 As Aristotle is 
approaching the question of ‘what is insofar as it is,’ being qua Being, what is 
highest is either the gods or the Being of beings, which are studied by the sciences 
of theology and ontology. The superiority of poetry would be that it is first. For 
prior to what studies what is highest would be that activity which actually produces 
what is highest. Therefore, if poetry produces what the sciences merely 
investigates, poetry would be an activity superior to any science, tragedy superior 
to any scientific inquiry. For as it is evident that it is first to study what is first, it is 
even more primary to produce its apperception.
6  
 
                                                 
2 Aristotle, Poetics, 1451b. 
3 Cf. Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, where he says, ‘Aristotle’s words in the Poetics, although they 
have scarcely been pondered, are still valid – that poetic composition is truer than exploration of 
beings.’ Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings, p. 264. 
4 Aristotle, Poetics, 1451a36-39. 
5 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, 983a4. 
6 In this sense, one could say that Aristotle, like Hegel, values action above contemplation, places 
poiesis above theoria. It is therefore not surprising that one hailed Napoleon as he rode into Jena 
and the other educated Alexander who conquered the world. The Techne of Being 
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[4]     The reason why I in the exposition of The Poetics of Being, feel forced to 
step beyond existing poetologies,
7 is that there is a deep lacuna within tradition 
itself. We are almost tempted to accuse our philosophical predecessors of the same 
as Plato accuses his, namely of laziness.
8 For where Plato’s predecessors failed to 
consider the Being of what is not, our own forerunners failed to consider the 
production of the ontological difference. Like Plato, we cannot simply ascribe this 
lack to ignorance when we are dealing with philosophers. Obviously, as Aristotle 
says in Metaphysics,
9 any lack is a potential, and it was only natural that this 
potential would sooner or later come to be realized as The Poetics of Being.  
 
[5]     It is our task in this chapter to identify and expose the instruments that, for 
centuries undetected, systematically and with surprising ease, produce the 
apperception of the Being of beings. There is, however, one element that blocks the 
possibility for comprehending [th]is production, a concept that has to be removed 
to make possible the identification of the places that convey the most incomparable 
sense of life, namely ‘mimesis.’ Superficially it appears to be a heavy task to 
remove the concept of ‘mimesis’ from the preperception of the relation between 
life and drama, stage and life. However, as soon as one realizes that ‘mimesis’ does 
not explain the relation between life and art, but explains away [th]is relation, the 
concept of ‘mimesis’ is rendered superfluous. We could continue to use Aristotle’s 
concept of ‘mimesis,’ if what we desired was to make another contribution to the 
                                                 
7 The classical contribution is, of course, Aristotle’s Poetics. For contemporary poetologies, see, for 
example, Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Reverie, Tzvetan Todorov, Introduction to Poetics, 
Richard Kearney, Poetics of Imagining. 
8 Plato, Sophist, 267d, Complete Works, p. 292. Neither Kearney, Bachelard nor Todorov are 
accused of laziness, as they indeed have provided us with admirable poetologies, which nevertheless 
does not inquire into what we here are pursuing, the poetics of Being. What they, respectively are 
investigating is the poiesis of imagination, dreams and the structure of storytelling. 
9 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1071a1-1071b2, The Complete Works, pp. 1691-1692. The Techne of Being 
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distortion of the metaperception of art and its experience for another two thousand 
years. Instead, to let the concept of ‘mimesis’ expose its own inadequacy, I will 
proceed negatively, and by letting ‘mimesis’ remove itself from all discourses on 
art by pointing out that one learns more about the relation between theatre and 
life from its conceptual negation, ‘animitation.’ For neglected in the understanding 
of drama as a mimetic representation is that, in any performance that effortlessly 
offer the experience of the Being of beings, [th]is is no longer perceived as a 
likeness. The concept of ‘animitation’ could signal that [th]is negative ontological 
difference comes across, most persuasively, through the experience of an 
unlikeness.  
 
[6]     What we make the spectator aware of through the concept of ‘animitation’ 
is that a successful performance in any theatre takes away the layer of - predicative 
or subjective, essential or substantial - likeness from the apperception of [th]is, 
which is either concealed or unconcealed, but in both cases, apperceived as 
irreplaceable. [Th]is is no longer perceived as a likeness. Speaking teleologically, 
we could say that the eudaimonia of any drama, the happiness of any theatre, lies 
in denying the spectator the experience that [th]is is as an imitation, and by doing 
so, making [th]is come alive. For by erasing the impression of the reference, what is 
created is the apperception of what is first, the apperception that [th]is is [alive]. It 
is animated. [Th]is immediate effect of what appears to be, whose production there 
suddenly is no trace of, we could have called ‘animitation,’ the craft, ‘to animitate.’ 
I will, however, continue to use the concept ‘inadequation,’ not only because it 
sounds more familiar, but because we do not want to give the false impression of 
merely negating a pre-existent theory, when The Poetics of Being is entirely self-The Techne of Being 
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consistent and its theory completely autonomous. ‘Animitation,’ does however 
stake out the distinction of The Poetics of Being, how it differs from previous 
poetologies, most importantly from Plato’s and Aristotle’s.
10 We shall therefore 
attempt a finer definition. ‘To animitate’ would mean ‘to take away, to negate the 
apperception that [th]is is a likeness in order to create the apperception of the 
Being of beings, or at least, as Coleridge would say of dreams, to suspend the 
negative judgment that pronounces these phenomena that appear before us as 
unreal.’
11 Moreover, animitation is not accomplished through adequation, but 
through inadequation, not the presentation of a likeness, but an unlikeness.
12 The 
expert of this art would therefore superiorly master the craft of unlikeness-
making, through which these unlikenesses, that is, these phenomena, are animated.  
 
[7]     In The Poetics of Being, ‘poiesis’ simply denotes the act or art of ‘making,’ 
of bringing forth,
13 an activity, which may or may not reach its telos. Being in 
possession of the ability to produce something with excellence - in this work, the 
apperception of the Being if beings - one would certainly possess a virtue or a 
power. I shall follow Aristotle and say that as much as the virtue that belongs to 
science is episteme and to action phronesis, the virtue that belongs to poiesis is an 
art or a techne.
14 If man by virtue is an animal that thinks, there is, to Aristotle, no 
arête without knowledge of the principle that predictably may produce a 
                                                 
10 Plato’s poetics is found in the Sophist and the Republic, Book II and Book X. 
11 Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, Remains, in Bate [ed].  Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 528. 
12 For Plato’s theory of mimesis as likeness-making, see, Plato, Sophist , 265b ff, and the Republic, 
Book II and the Republic, Book X. 
13 For this fundamental understanding of poiesis, see Plato, Sophist, 265b. Plato, Symposium 205b, 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VII, 1032a11-1034b7. Heidegger, The Question Concerning 
Technology, in Basic Writings, pp. 317f., 339f., and Heidegger, Building, Dwelling, Thinking, in 
Basic Writings, p. 361. 
14 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The Techne of Being 
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particular effect.
15 As much as perspective produces a realistic painting, and 
harmony song, so I will show that in literature, especially in drama, the principle of 
inadequation produces a more emphatic sense of Being.
16 To proceed methodically, 
it is sometimes necessary to mark out the places where one is not going.  I shall 
mark out, already from the beginning, what distinguishes The Poetics of Being 
from Aristotle’s Poetics. To properly understand what we are up against when 
offering a preliminary critique of Aristotle’s poetology, we should bear in mind 
what Heidegger says at the conclusion of Letter on Humanism, ‘Aristotle’s words in 
the Poetics, although they have scarcely been pondered, are still valid - that poetic 
composition is truer than exploration of beings.’
17 By truer, Heidegger simply 
means that poetry unconceals the Being of beings whereas science does not, as it 
limits itself to the investigation of what beings essentially and categorically are.
18 
Poetics transcends this limit[ation]. 
 
[8]     It is obvious that our ways depart from Aristotle’s, for the concept of 
‘mimesis’ offered in the Poetics,
19 is not a concept that furthers an understanding 
of how one play appears more real, convincing or persuasive, than another. To the 
concept of ‘mimesis’ all plays are equal. The theory of mimesis - which we would 
have passed over in silence had not this theory cemented itself as one of the pillars 
of philosophical and literary discourse - takes for granted what is [first] to be 
                                                 
15 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, Chapters 1- 6. 
16 Evidently, a master without techne does not have many followers, so we will not spend much 
time, if any, on attempts that do not reach [th]is end, that does not produce the apperception of the 
Being of beings. 
17 Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, Basic Writings, p. 264. Emphasis added. 
18 Science is, as Habermas points out, the activity through which one attempts to adequately express 
what beings universally are or to make possible the precise understanding of the principles 
according to which these beings work so that in the future their behaviour may be explained and 
their actions modified, predicted and controlled. 
19 Surprisingly, while enumerating the different kinds of mimesis, as Aristotle does in the Poetics, 
1447a, and often speaking of the effect of the tragic kind of mimesis as he does in 1453b, ‘mimesis’ 
itself is never defined. The Techne of Being 
 
164  
proven, namely that [th]is play, [th]is performance offers an impression of 
something that is whereas another play, another performance does not. The 
concept of ‘mimesis’ does not answer its own question. Rather, ‘mimesis’ is a 
concept whereby one avoids questioning, even erases the question as to how the 
apperception of the Being of beings is produced. Aristotle himself shows the 
helpless generality of the concept of ‘mimesis’ when his reliance on this concept 
alone is insufficient to distinguish between historiography and drama,
20 or, for that 
matter, between painting and dance,
21 an actress and a doll, even less between a 
play that reaches its end in persuading the spectator that what it [re]presents is, 
and a play that does not appear to [re]present anything real at all. Aristotle even 
admits the inadequacy of the concept of mimesis, when he attempts to qualify the 
mimesis of drama, by pointing out that ‘tragedy … is the imitation of an action.’
22 
Of course, it is what is added, namely the word ‘action’ that proved such an allure 
to the young Heidegger, and made Heidegger find a better intimation, a better 
school of ontology in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics than he ever did in 
Metaphysics.
23  
 
[9]     A play is only superficially judged by what it represents. More 
fundamentally and prior to any essential considerations - without considering the 
difference between tragedy and comedy - a play is judged by its formal capacity to 
persuade us that what it represents is [true]. A play is not principally judged by 
                                                 
20 Aristotle, Poetics, 1451b. 
21 Aristotle, Poetics, 1460b7-33 and 1447a25. 
22 Aristotle, Poetics, 1449b25 and 1450b23. 
23 The Nicomachean Ethics provided Heidegger with the first intimation of what constitutes, even 
what makes possible, the singularity of any action, presenting Heidegger for the first time with a 
sense of the irreplaceablity of Being, which the general categories of being that Franz Brentano had 
systematically presented to him through his limited exposition of Being in Concerning the 
Multifarious Meanings of Being [Seiende] in Aristotle did not. Cf. Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, p. 40 
and p. 168. See also Heidegger’s reference to the invaluable contributions of the Nicomachean 
Ethics in Heidegger. [Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in Basic Writings, p. 318.] The Techne of Being 
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nor esteemed for its contents, but its form, and without a certain form, its content, 
what it represents, would stand out as helpless as predicates without a subject. 
Aristotle points out that the subject is only known by its predicates.
24 I will 
however point out that without the apperception of an unknown foundation, these 
predicates would appear to be as disintegrated as a persona without a person.
25 
Regardless of how much you did appreciate its masque, you would never mistake 
its expression for something alive. Hence, what a superior theatre creates, is the 
apperception of something that wears this masque of predicates, and without 
giving or providing [th]is sense of depth, it is not likely that a spectacle, however 
violent or daring or sensuous, would furnish us with the apperception of what is 
[true], or, as Wilson Knight would say, what is actual.
26  
 
[10]     It is baffling to see that to this day one continues to refer to Aristotle as an 
authority on poetics, when it is commonly known that half the book - or, if you 
will, the second book - is missing, and that the one part still extant partly concerns 
an art which to this day is still without a name.
27 We should also bear in mind that 
the concept of ‘mimesis,’ which is easily taken for granted, was entirely new to the 
Greeks of Pericles’ Athens. As J. Tate says in Plato and ‘Imitation,’ a somewhat 
fashionable way to present the relation between art and beings, that has never 
                                                 
24 Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Book I, Chapter 22, and Aristotle, De Interpretatione, Chapter 7, and 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, Chapter 3. 
25 Undoubtedly, Shakespeare uses ‘person’ in the sense of persona, when, speaking of the ghost that 
‘perchance … will walk again,’[Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene ii, 243.] at Elsinore Castle, 
Hamlet says,  ‘If it assumes my noble father’s person,’[Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene ii.244] 
that is, his persona, his masque. Evidently, Shakespeare’s intention is not to give attention to the 
masque but to it, not the phenomenon but to what is hidden. 
26 Wilson Knight, The Christian Renaissance, ‘The Shakespearean Art-Form,’ pp. 37-38. 
27 Speaking of this nameless art, Aristotle says in the Poetics, ‘There is further an art which imitates 
by language alone without harmony [i.e. music], in prose or in verse, and if in verse, either in some 
one or in a plurality of metres. This form of imitation is to this day without a name.’ Aristotle, 
Poetics, 1447a28-b1, Introduction to Aristotle, pp. 665f.  The Techne of Being 
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ceased to be in vogue since.
28 It is puzzling to see that in the Poetics the question of 
the Being of beings is never raised, more puzzling still, that the sign or mark of this 
lack of inquiry is precisely what many immediately believe explains the relation 
between art and world, the concept of ‘mimesis.’ The concept of ‘mimesis’ does 
quite simply not acknowledge [the production of] the Being of beings but takes it 
for granted.
29 Without the contradiction between beings and the Being of beings, 
without admitting that there is something that transgresses all appearances to lend 
to them a sense of Being, it is indeed impossible to explain how one play comes 
across as real and another does not.
30 
 
[11]     The concept of ‘mimesis’ keeps secret more than it makes known, which is 
why Aristotle is forced to qualify his definition of drama, by speaking of the 
mimesis of the action of men.
31 The definition of action could indeed have indicated 
the difference between arts and sciences if it was ever defined, but, apart from 
what is vaguely suggested by Aristotle’s emphasis on reversal of fortune,
32 the term 
does, to this day, remain unexplained, tells us, quite simply, nothing. Of course, if 
the arts only aimed at mimetic productions, the emulation of what already is, it 
would be impossible to know the difference - from the concept of ‘mimesis’ alone - 
between arts and sciences, if it were true that poetry only represents what beings 
                                                 
28 For the origin of the concept of mimesis and its fashionable introduction in the 5
th century as a 
neologism with a special emphasis on how the concept was used differently in Book II and Book X 
of Plato’s Republic, see J. Tate, ‘Plato and ‘Imitation,’’ The Classical Review, 1931, p. 163. 
29 For theories of mimesis, see for example, Plato, Republic, Book II and Republic, Book X, 
Aristotle, Poetics, J. Tate, ‘‘Imitation’ in Plato’s Republic,’ Erich Auerbach, Mimesis, and, most 
recently, Arne Melberg, Theories of Mimesis. 
30 The concept of ‘mimesis’ does not acknowledge the ontological difference, the difference between 
Being and beings. Therefore, ‘mimesis’ will always cloud more than it reveals, for through the 
many concepts that breeds from this same nest: metaphor, simile, allegory, ‘mimesis’ appears to be 
the mother of the interpretation of all arts. However, if we wanted to understand the offspring as 
we do their mother, never would we think that they were alive. 
31 Aristotle, Poetics, 1449b25 and 1450b23. 
32 Aristotle, Poetics, 1452a21. The Techne of Being 
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essentially are. The helpless generality of Aristotle’s theory of mimesis is easily 
shown when we consider that his theory does not allow us to distinguish between a 
play we experience as real and a play which to us appear unreal, as both plays will 
simply and indifferently be considered as ‘mimetic.’ ‘Mimesis,’ then, has only 
limited value, because it fails to explain the ontological function of a presentation, 
and this precisely because no one knows its meaning, or its meaning seems so 
obvious that it is impossible to doubt the theory. The Problem with the theory of 
mimesis is not that it is false, but that it is too trivially true, a genuine truism.  
 
[12]     As Aristotle probably intended, knowing how much he loved to be first,
33 
instead of being a good beginning for exploring the ways in which drama works, 
his Poetics, suddenly and unintentionally became the limits within which the 
understanding of drama had to traverse. The reverence for this theory has 
certainly clouded the origin of the basic flaw in Aristotle’s theory. For Aristotle’s 
theory confuses the experience of the character and the experience of the spectator, 
so much so that we can say that Aristotle seems to have written, quite redundantly, 
a poetics for characters and not for spectators, as if these characters were ever 
going to stand up or sit down and write anything that could affect us. Clearly, 
Aristotle takes for granted the Being of these characters when he constructs his 
poetics, when what we need to know is how [th]is or that character come alive or 
appear to be in the first place. The word ‘mimesis’ is not a word that explains how 
[th]is appears to be alive, but rather a word that announces that this question will 
be avoided. For calling [th]is performance a mimetic [re]presentation is to 
announce that it does not give or produce the experience of something alive, the 
                                                 
33 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, Chapter 34, esp. 183b22, 183b34-36. The Techne of Being 
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Being of beings, and to say ‘mimesis’ is not to say that [th]is is, but rather, that this 
is not. So, mimesis is not a concept that may explain that one play and not another 
appear to be more vivid or alive, more true than another, other than in a 
superficial sense. For by saying that this is a [re]presentation one emphasizes either 
that [th]is is not alive or that this is only a [re]presentation of something different 
from itself, the [re]presented that may already be essentially part of our lives. 
Mimesis could never account for the fact that we sometimes do experience [th]is as 
[true/real] and at other times [untrue/unreal].
34 
§4.2 The Techne of Inadequation 
 
 
[13]     To Hegel there is nothing hidden which not man has hidden himself, and no 
serious investigation will ever fail to unconceal its object, make transparent what 
the beholder has made obscure to himself.
35 In [th]is spirit we will investigate how 
the effect, the apperception of the Being of negative beings is produced by 
Shakespeare. We will take nothing for granted, not even our own prejudices. And 
it will be paramount that we, when we look for the means of producing what is, 
should not let our immediate responses slip through our fingers, even search for, 
                                                 
34 Even though we originally wanted to, we shall not here embark on an exposition of the 
forgetfulness of Being that is expressed through metaphor and all similar rhetorical tropes. Not 
showing how Derrida’s The Retrait of Metaphor moves us even further away from the possibility of 
apperceiving the Being of beings than any simple mimetic expression, we shall however say this: 
Like metonymies, allegories and similes, metaphors take the world too lightly, proceed as if the 
world is already essentially there, that there is something essentially given which one may make a 
reference to or depart from in the first place. Finally we understand Lautremont’s obsession with 
metaphor in Maldoror. He wanted perhaps to make, to transform the impression of the world into 
something lighter, before he committed suicide. Of course, even his name is nothing other than a 
metaphor, l’autre mont, another mountain, perhaps suggesting the labours of Sisyphus, again the 
heaviness of existence, to which this very young man, Isodore Ducasse, who tried to make life 
lighter through metaphor, finally succumbed to the heaviness of life, Being. And it is a young man’s 
quest for lightness, the lightness of Being, which also resounds when Rimbaud proclaims, ‘I am a 
metaphor.’ And it does not express anything differently, when Derrida announces the same. Cf. 
Derrida, The Retrait of Metaphor. 
35 Hegel, ‘Inaugural Address ‘as Professor of Heidelberg in 1816, in The History of Philosophy, Part 
I, xliii. Cf. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Absolute Knowing,’ §788-808. The Techne of Being 
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look back to what later reflections have concealed. For it is our mediate responses 
that reify not only ourselves but what we perceive. It goes without saying that self-
consciousness is a very patient process, and that the ontological contradiction is 
apperceived much more swiftly, in a Hegelian sense, almost thoughtlessly. It is our 
mediate responses, our conscious efforts that make us discard the mechanisms, 
disregard the means through which the Being of beings is produced, that bar us 
from discovering the figures that most spontaneously create an apperception in-
different from what is: falsity, dissimilarity, nothing, indefinition, elision, and 
substitution. For, as we shall see, both abstractly and concretely, these are the most 
effective means of producing the apperception of the Being of beings, or, quite 
simply what to us appear to be [true]. 
 
[14]     If it is true that there is no spirit without consciousness, perhaps the final 
step on the spiritual road to enlightenment, is to acknowledge that not only am I 
responsible for perceiving what the other essentially is, but, more fundamentally, I 
am responsible for the apperception that the other is [alive]. To become supremely 
self-conscious, the spirit would have to recognize, as Hegel does, that man is 
nothing but the dialectical activity of the spirit whose absolute subject I am, that 
the spirit is what indefinitely makes itself essentially. But there is a deeper sense in 
which the spirit may become conscious of its own productions, and that is to make 
itself aware that man does not only produce [his perceptions of] the beings that 
are, but also [his apperception of] the Being of beings. We shall therefore not, like 
Heidegger, take the ontological difference for granted, as if it was something 
already given, but inquire into how the apperception of the Being of beings is 
produced.   And to dissociate ourselves from Heidegger completely, we will show The Techne of Being 
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how the negative ontological difference between beings and Being offers a more 
emphatic sense of what is, that non-beings rather than beings, what is not rather 
than what is, produces a more ineradicable impression of life. 
 
[15]     No one in the history of philosophy defines poiesis more readily than Plato 
does in the Sophist, where he lets the Stranger declare that production is ‘any 
capacity that causes things to come to be that previously was not.’
36 We are 
obviously searching for the production of the Being of beings, the poiesis of an 
ontological contradiction, the emphatic impression of life devoid of all content, 
which could not be apperceived without [th]is negative production. Whereas 
Heidegger states that Being produces beings, much like God creates man, in the 
sense of that which brings forth or into true unconcealment,
37 we will look at it 
differently, and lay down the principles through which man may systematically 
produce the apperception of the Being of beings; the apperception of that which 
contradicts the attributes of any being but nevertheless gives the empty 
apperception of its integrity without which it would not appear to be [alive]. But 
we shall depart from Heidegger’s Ways also in another sense,
38 pointing out that 
what is made is predominantly not the apperception of what is unconcealed, but, in 
the main, the apperception of what is concealed, Being much closer to our hearts. 
Heidegger points out that the Greeks knew the virtue of poiesis as the art or techne 
                                                 
36 Plato, Sophist, 265b, The Complete Works, p. 289. 
37 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, Basic Writings, p. 317f, perhaps we should 
particularly note where Heidegger says that ‘man does not have control over unconcealment itself, 
in which at any given time the actual shows itself or withdraws.’ Heidegger, The Question 
Concerning Technology, in Basic Writings, p. 323. Emphasis added. For Gadamer’s insistence on 
Heidegger as a theologian, see Heidegger’s Ways, pp. 169-170 and p. 182, where Heidegger confesses 
that he is not a philosopher but a theologian. Stressing the unsubjectivity of the Being of beings, it 
should not be surprising when Heidegger, in one of his lectures on Nietzsche says, ‘Ontology is 
simultaneously and necessarily theology.’ Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume IV: Nihilism, p. 209. 
38 The allusion is to Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, p. 11, where Gadamer emphasizes that Heidegger 
referred to his corpus as ‘Ways, not works.’ The Techne of Being 
 
171  
of letting ‘things’ appear,
39 pronouncing [th]is techne fundamentally as the virtue 
of unconcealment, of bringing into light what was previously kept in the dark.
40 
What is produced through the techne of inadequation is, however, in most cases, 
something entirely and indefinitely concealed, and one may therefore speak of, if 
that is possible, a virtue of concealment whereby the producer is praised for 
keeping things in the dark, quite simply, hidden. 
 
[16]     Being is the contradiction between the concealed and the unconcealed. 
There is, as we have seen, different expressions of [th]is ontological contradiction. 
All philosophical problems are made up of a contradiction, which, as Aristotle 
points out in Metaphysics, cannot be decided one way or the other.
41 As we have 
seen, the ontological contradiction is such a problem where it seems impossible to 
decide once and for all, whether Being is concealed or unconcealed. But there are 
better ways than to consider a problem in isolation. One may, as Aristotle often 
does, let the many or the best dialectically decide what holds [true], or what most 
convincingly is. The reception history of Shakespeare’s plays alone speaks 
volumes, would prove beyond doubt, whether we consider Herder, Goethe, Schegel 
and Schopenhauer to personify the populace or their superiors, that Modernity 
has sided with what is concealed. As we shall see in the coming chapters, in most 
cases Shakespeare produces the apperception of what is concealed, and where he 
                                                 
39Surprisingly to some, Heidegger speaks of technology and art in the same breath, as both are 
ways of letting something appear, or as Heidegger says, ‘The Greeks conceive of techne, producing, 
in terms of letting appear.’ [Heidegger, Building, Dwelling, Thinking, p. 361.] The same view is 
reiterated by Heidegger in The Question Concerning Technology, and also, in some sense, in the 
Letter on Humanism, where language is what keeps what is unconcealed in unconcealment. 
40 Heidegger says, ‘The Greek for ‘to bring forth or to produce’ is tikto. The word techne, technique, 
belongs to the verb’s root, tec. To the Greeks techne means neither art nor handicraft but, rather, 
to make something appear, within what is present, as this or that, in this way or that way. The 
Greek conceive of techne, producing, in terms of letting appear.’ [Heidegger, Building, Dwelling, 
Thinking, Basic Writings, p. 361]. 
41 Aristotle, Topics, Book I, Chapter 11. The Techne of Being 
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does not, the plays are as forgotten or neglected as the unconcealed apperception 
of the Being of beings which they give expression to. 
 
[17]     If there is a contradiction of Being concealed/unconcealed, it is obvious that 
one may in different ways effect a dialectical, in the sense of inferential, movement 
in either direction, arriving at one moment of the contradiction, beginning at 
another. To illustrate one such movement historically, we could point out that 
Hegel and Heidegger direct our minds in different ways, in different directions. 
Hegel directs our attention from the unconcealed to the concealed, from seen 
object to unseen subject, to finally arrive at the dialectical apperception of absolute 
spirituality, that is, subjectivity, which is the oscillation between the two 
moments.
42 Being is however considered differently, as nothing in the beginning, as 
that which appears to be abandoned by subjectivity, or that which subjectivity has 
not yet conquered or is unable to conquer essentially. In three ways Heidegger 
concurs with Hegel: first that Being is first, second that Being is nothing, and 
thirdly that Being is unknown.
43 Heidegger does, of course, not share Hegel’s 
disregard for unknown beginnings, neither his praise of known ends. To 
emphasize the non-objectivity of what is, Heidegger claims that beings are first 
unconcealed by removing what keeps [th]is [being] from becoming present, by 
taking away, gradually or suddenly, a veil of concealment, that keeps beings from 
Being unconcealed. Heidegger directs our minds towards the apperception of a 
clearing, to that which is no longer untrue, aletheia.
44 
                                                 
42 Hegel, Logic, §79, p. 113 and §88, p. 128. 
43 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 43. Cf. Hegel, Logic, §86, §87. 
44 For Heidegger’s elaboration on the Greek concept, if not experience, of truth as aletheia, see for 
example Heidegger, On the Essence of Truth, in Basic Writings, pp. 130f., 137 f., and Heidegger, The 
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, in Basics Writings, p. 446. However the most sustained 
and thorough exposition of aletheia is found in Heidegger’s lectures on Parmenides as a whole. The Techne of Being 
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[18]     As there are different ways to expose the ontological contradiction, we shall 
emphasize that there is no apperception of Being without [th]is contradiction, but 
more importantly, that there are different ways to produce the apperception of 
[th]is ontological contradiction.
45 The means of producing [th]is ontological 
contradiction will direct us either to the apperception of that which is concealed or 
that which is unconcealed, but never one [way] without the other. That is, to 
produce an almost ineradicable sense of Being, one has not only to produce what 
we perceive or apperceive, but also that from which we are looking away. One does 
not apperceive the Being of beings without making an inference, either from what 
is concealed to what is unconcealed or from what is unconcealed to what is 
concealed. [To the mind] Being is an inference, and, as an inference, it is not that 
which is taken for granted, but what is concluded, not antecedent but consequent. 
That Being is consequent is not obvious. The contrary position, taken by 
Heidegger, is to hold that whatever is known last, is first.
46 That is, we could not 
make the inference to whatever is if we did not already apperceive something that 
was already there, Da, from the very beginning. However, we shall maintain that 
the ontological difference is produced. Again, Being is a contradiction. There is no 
being without [th]is contradiction. This contradiction is produced. In the 
production of [th]is difference something is made to stand out, and something is 
                                                                                                                                               
Inescapably all philosophers direct us one way or the other. Like Pseudo-Dionysius, Kant directs 
from phenomena to noumena, from known to unknown. Plotinus directs us to the unconcealment of 
ideas through his theory of procession and return. And as much as the direction of cognition 
proceeds from the unconcealed to the concealed, ontologically the Being of beings proceeds in the 
opposite direction, from what is concealed to what is unconcealed. 
45 We sometimes prefer to use ‘ontological contradiction,’ as it reminds us that the negative 
ontological difference is either concealed or unconcealed. Furthermore, ‘contradiction’ suggests 
more clearly a movement which ‘difference’ does not. Moreover, ‘contradiction’ indicates that the 
Being of beings supersedes everything we may essentially perceive, as well as suggests that the 
Being of beings may only be apperceived negatively. 
46 Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume IV: Nihilism, p. 160f. The Techne of Being 
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concealed. There is always given cognitive priority to what appears, to what is 
perceived, but one has to offer more than one’s appearance to give the impression 
that one is a being among beings. 
 
[19]     It is not surprising, but still a remarkable observation Nietzsche makes, 
when he says, ‘The difference between art and truth makes me shudder.’
47 
Obviously, Nietzsche shivers on the verge of apperceiving what is not subjectively 
produced, not made by man. To be more specific, we could say that what makes 
Nietzsche shudder, what finally arrested the externalization of his will, was the 
ontological contradiction, the empty transgression of subjectivity that upholds the 
life of all its subjects. It is, of course, Nietzsche’s vain hope, like it was Kant’s, 
Hegel’s, Marx’s and Adorno’s, that man alone makes everything that is.
48 We 
pointed out the contradiction in Nietzsche’s approach. One the one hand he 
completes The Enlightenment, a project that declares not only man’s autonomy,
49 
but lives in the hope that the world Will one day finally become completely 
anthropomorphized.
50 On the other hand, it is this total anthropomorphization 
that makes Nietzsche sarcastically speak of each man as an undiscovered artist,
51 
the ‘subject’ as no more than the daydream of a Governess.
52 It is perhaps to 
announce the completion of the anthropological project, that everything has finally 
become manmade, that makes Marx recognize that there is nothing new under the 
sun, nothing undiscovered, nothing that is not made by man except perhaps an 
                                                 
47 Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume I: The Will to Power as Art, p. 142. 
48 One could easily be corrected if one were to believe the prophet Isaiah, in 45.7, where the Lord 
says to the prophet, ‘I form the light and create darkness. I make peace and create evil: I the Lord 
do all these things… Shall the clay say to him that fashioned it, what makest though?’ 
49 Cf. Kant, What is Enlightenment?, 
50 Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 94. 
51 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, ‘Towards a Natural History of Morals,’ Fragment 192, p. 81. 
52 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 1886, ‘The Free Spirit,’ Fragment 36, p. 35. The Techne of Being 
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undiscovered island off of Australia.
53 We shall take this project one step further, 
asserting that also the ontological difference is produced. Therefore, even though it 
may be true that Being produces or projects beings, we maintain, against 
Heidegger, that beings may produce, more or less successfully, more or less 
deliberately, the apperception of the Being of beings. For it is not alone Da that 
produces or projects Dasein,
54 but Dasein, subjectivity that produces a sense of 
what is Da, and, following reception history, we shall mark how Shakespeare has - 
at least in his most popular plays - produced the negation of what is Da, namely, 
the apperception of what is [hidden]. 
 
[20]     [Th]is investigation will begin where Plato’s investigation in Sophist ends. 
For as clearly as Plato points out that there is a poiesis, a techne of Being, and as 
vaguely as he suggests the means or instruments for [th]is production, so shall I  
lay down the means for the production of the ontological contradiction that Plato 
did not fully discover. I shall not expose this techne without first acknowledging 
that Plato, like a god, however obscurely, indicated the right direction in which 
The Poetics of Being were to be discovered. For as will be exposed concretely in the 
readings of Shakespeare’s drama, non-beings or the appearance of what is not give 
us a more profound sense of what is, the Being of beings. The traditional way of 
grouping the poetics of Aristotle, Horace and Longinus together to the exclusion of 
Plato’s Sophist or for that matter the second or the tenth book of Plato’s Republic, 
                                                 
53 I read the observation in Gesammelte Werke, and I have thus far been unable to find the locus of 
the statement. However, it is suggested that this island off of Australia is completely unspoiled, has 
not only never been touched, but never been seen, neither corrupted by the actions nor the 
cognitions of man. For even cognition corrupts, makes everything appear to be man-made, and 
therefore, in the most fundamental sense, historical. This view is taken, no less by Marx, than his 
forerunner, Hegel. 
54 For the contention that Being projects or produces beings, and not vice versa, see for instance, 
Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, Basic Writings, pp. 252-253, 256, 258. The Techne of Being 
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is therefore a sign of no little ignorance. For reading the Poetics of Aristotle anyone 
can easily see that it begins where Plato’s Sophist ends, that is, with an attempt to 
classify the different categories of imitation. As so often, the teacher outclasses the 
pretentious student, for speaking of imitation, Plato identifies a category that 
Aristotle does not, namely ‘unlikeness-making.’
55 What Plato in effect says - for 
once cutting through the knots of what is an excessively entangled argument - is 
that one may be persuaded of the Being of anything regardless of whether its 
essential characteristica exist or do not exist. This means that when the sophist 
persuades the listener ‘that that which is not somehow is,’
56 what the listener is 
persuaded of is something inessential and inideal. According to Plato, mimesis has 
two parts, ‘likeness-making’ and ‘unlikeness making.’
57 Both are called ‘a kind of 
double production.’
58 What is produced is the perception of the essence of one 
being, but, more fundamentally, the apperception of the Being of this being is 
produced, and the apperception of the Being of beings may be produced regardless 
of whether this essentially is or is not, if not, as we shall see, more persuasively if it 
does not exist. It is therefore untrue to say, as Aristotle does, that the false does not 
exist, when Plato points to, that even if it is true that what is essentially false, does 
not exist, one may nevertheless produces the apperception of its Being, which 
proves that Being is an inessential category, if it is not that which escapes all 
categories.
59 
                                                 
55 For the definition of imitation as likeness-making, see Plato, Sophist, 266d. For Aristotle’s 
definition of ‘imitation,’ one would, indeed look in vain, and it is hard to find a reference where one 
has not been committed. 
56 Plato, Sophist, 241d. Plato, Sophist, 240d. 
57 Plato, Sophist, 236c and 266d. 
58 Plato, Sophist, 266d. 
59 In anticipation of the final definition of sophist and his techne, Plato lets the stranger characterize 
the sophist as ‘a kind of cheat who imitates real things,’ [Plato, Sophist, 235a] ‘a cheat and an 
imitator,’ [Plato, Sophist, 235a] ‘a kind of magician’ [Plato, Sophist, 235b] employed in the ‘craft of 
copy-making.’[Plato, Sophist, 235b] Having defined the ‘craft of imitation,’ [Plato, Sophist, 235c] The Techne of Being 
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[21]     In the Sophist, it is crucial to acknowledge that Plato does not only identify 
the paradoxical Being of what is not, but furthermore the function of what is not in 
the production of the Being of beings. For Plato acknowledges that what is not is 
fundamental to the sophist’s art of persuasion, even inseparable from the sophist’s 
techne, the art through which he convinces the audience that what is not is. About 
the function of what is not, about this invaluable tool in the sophist’s tool-box, the 
stranger asks Theaetetus, ‘Why do we think he’d use it [what is false/what is not] 
and in what connection, and for what kind of purpose?’
60 The question is never 
answered. However, the answer is as simple as it appears at first glance to be 
contradictory, to convince the audience that [th]is is. Obviously inspired, 
Theaetetus comments, ‘Maybe that which is not is woven together with that which 
is in some way like that – it’s quite bizarre.’ The stranger replies, ‘Of course it’s 
strange. Anyway, you can see that the manyheaded sophist is still using this 
interweaving [of what is with what is not] to force us to agree unwillingly [i.e. to 
persuade us] that that which is not in a way is.’
61 Obviously the sophist possesses 
the art of making that which is through what is not, of making what is not appear 
to be. There are three things to point out about [th]is techne or art. First that [th]is 
weaving together suggests the compound of subject and predicate, secondly, that 
this compound of subject and predicate is the main instrument in the sophist’s art 
of producing the apperception of what is [through what is not], and thirdly, what 
                                                                                                                                               
The stranger draws the inference that the sophist is not a master of ‘the art of likeness-making,’ 
[Plato, Sophist, 235d] but rather a master of appearance-making, about which the stranger justly 
says, ‘Wouldn’t appearance-making be the right thing to call expertise in producing appearances 
that aren’t likenesses?’  [Plato, Sophist, 236c] And what are appearances that are not likenesses if 
not [re]presentations of what does not exist, or, as we will see in Chapter 7, dissimilarities.  Already 
Plato indicates what we will maintain throughout this thesis, that it is the perception/apperception 
of what is not that compels the spectator/reader to make the inference from what is not [true] to 
what is [true.] 
60 Plato, Sophist, 237c. 
61 Plato, Sophist, 240c. Brackets and emphasis added. The Techne of Being 
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should be remarked, that Plato does not, as we will do later, separate between the 
inadequate means for [th]is production and the inadequate end of [th]is 
production. To be more specific, if Plato identifies the means, the instruments for 
the production of the Being of beings, that is, subjects and predicates, names and 
verbs, he never discovers or understands how the sophist is capable of using these 
instruments, so cunningly that the auditor is ‘unwillingly forced to agree that that 
which is not in a way is.’
62 
 
[22]     We can with confidence say that the first part of the Sophist is a dialogue 
about what Plato fails to consider in the latter part of the Sophist, namely the 
negativity of the ontological difference. In the latter part of the investigation Plato 
is as unwilling and reluctant to speak of what is false as he in the opening was 
angered by the tradition instigated by Parmenides, who prohibited him from 
thinking of it.
63 Even though Plato, in the end, is unwilling to speak of [th]is 
[ontological contradiction], and seems not to have spoken about [th]is at any 
length, the whole dialogue of the Sophist is, perhaps even against Plato’s will, a 
negative and inessential presentation of the Being of beings. We can on the whole 
think of Plato’s Sophist as an aporia which indirectly presents that which Plato is 
believed to be unwillingly speaking of, namely, that which no idea could possibly 
be without, the Being of beings. Again, the sophist is expert at persuading of the 
Being of what is not, and one would think that this dialogue would display the 
means of this art of persuasion, expose the instruments of ontological persuasion. 
Surprisingly, it does not. For when we expect Plato to identify the means by which 
the sophist is capable of producing the apperception of the Being of beings, to 
                                                 
62 Plato, Sophist, 240c. Emphasis added. 
63 Plato, Sophist, 258c. The Techne of Being 
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thereby convince the reader that what is not is, he stops. And so Plato’s 
investigation comes to an end, exactly where our investigation begins. 
§4.3 Instruments of Inadequation 
 
 
[23]     The Poetics of Being states quite simply that inadequation produces most 
convincingly the apperception of the Being of beings, that non-beings rather than 
beings convey a more persuasive sense of what is. This theory would be 
meaningless if we did not state what propositions are inadequate to. However, if 
are to look for what a statement is inadequate to, we would, indeed, be searching in 
vain. We would first have to investigate the nature of propositions, only then could 
we have any hope of understanding the production of the negative ontological 
difference. According to the principle of non-contradiction, propositions are either 
true or not true, as there cannot be a third or the third term is meaningless.
64 The 
question of the difference between true and false statements, and the difference 
between what a true and a false statement discloses, cannot be answered without 
looking into the nature of statements themselves. Evidently, a statement is an act of 
predication, and predication is the synthetic activity of giving [th]is properties it 
either has or does not have. The theory of inadequation maintains that we cannot 
take [th]is for granted. Rather, we maintain that the apperception of [th]is 
ontological contradiction has to be produced. [Th]is ontological contradiction is 
not where we begin our inquiry but where we end, not what affects, but what is 
effected. We may produce the impression of what x essentially is or the profound 
apperception of the existence of x by showing what it is not. It is obvious that the 
bare impression of x, is much more effectively produced through denial than 
                                                 
64 Russell’s position as clarified by von Wright, The Logic of Negation, pp. 6f. The Techne of Being 
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affirmation, for as much as denial takes away the properties from [th]is, an 
affirmation will provide them. It is also clear that true properties will easily 
misdirect us from the naked apperception of [th]is ontological contradiction, away 
from the apprehension of that which transgresses all attributes but constitutes the 
very possibility of any attribution. As Aristotle maintains in de Interpretatione, 
there is no knowledge without predication, we cannot know any [thing] except 
through its properties.
65 It should, however, be equally obvious that we cannot 
take the Being of the subject of any statement for granted. Rather, we would have 
to assert that the Being of what grounds any utterance would first have to be 
produced. [Th]is production is most effectively achieved through inadequation, 
which effortlessly, and without reminding us of its formal repetition, produces 
[th]is result, the affect/effect of the ontological contradiction. 
 
[24]    Instead of drifting away, I will take the bull by the horns and say that if we 
attempt to understand inadequation by going straight away to what these 
statements are inadequate to, we have taken for granted that which is, in effect, 
produced, taken as a beginning what is in the end. There is nothing to compare an 
inadequate statement to. We cannot say what [th]is essentially is, only point and 
say, [th]is is either concealed or unconcealed, hidden or revealed. Again, we are 
drifting away, for to properly understand what an inadequate statement is 
inadequate to, namely the concealed or the unconcealed, [th]is place or [th]is 
substance, and further how this inadequacy produces the apperception of the 
ontological contradiction, we must look into the nature of judgments. For all 
                                                 
65 Of course, there is to Aristotle no knowledge without demonstration, that is, without logic. 
However, there is no logic without predication. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, 
Chapters 3-6 and Aristotle, de Interpretatione, Chapter 7, 17b. The Techne of Being 
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judgments are, as St. Thomas would say, and Kant, following him, complex.
66 That 
is, one does not speak separately of essences and existents, of what [th]is is and 
[th]is, but of what [th]is is. That is, no judgment, at least no synthetic judgment, is 
ever simple, but a combination of subject and predicate, of substance and 
attributes, existent and essence, [th]is and what this is.
67  
 
[25]     We could say the same of predicates as we do of masques, that they show us 
either what [th]is is or what [th]is is not. Obviously, in the theatre, the original 
intention of the masque was not to hide anything, but rather to show the persona to 
the spectators in the upper rows of the ‘looking-place,’
68 to unconceal what [th]is 
is. However, whereas the persona of the Greek theatre of Aeschylus and Sophocles 
is applied to show what [th]is is, the Venetian masque of the Festival, the 
Masquerade which we are witnessing in the opening of Romeo and Juliet - is 
applied to show what this is not or to not show what [th]is is.
69 Evidently, masques 
may either disclose or hide what [th]is is, may show what [th]is is or what [th]is is 
not or not what [th]is is. For our purposes we shall simplify and say that whereas a 
Greek masque, much like a true appearance/statement, shows what [th]is is, a 
Venetian masque shows what [th]is is not [or does not show what [th]is is]. In 
                                                 
66 Cf. Thomas, On Being and Essence, ‘Chapter 2: Essence in Composite Substances,’ Selected 
Writings, p. 33. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘On The Distinction Between Analytic and Synthetic 
Judgments,’ A7-A10/B11-14. 
67 What is obvious is that an adequate proposition does express what this [is], whereas as an 
inadequate proposition does not express what this [is]. Without thinking, one would expect the 
adequate proposition to more immediately secure our sense of Being. Paradoxically, it is the 
inadequate proposition that throws out the anchor. It is the inadequate proposition that secures our 
sense of Being. Some would argue that it is impossible for an inadequate statement to give us a 
more profound sense of Being as it is precisely the expression of something that does not exist. 
Hence, it does not refer to anything at all, and is entirely meaningless. But, of course, we could not 
state that this utterance was inadequate if [th]is did not assert itself to deny its adequacy, and thus 
persuade us of its existence. 
68 For the Greek understanding of ‘theatre,’ and more specifically the implications of [th]is 
‘looking-place’ as it relates beings to Being, see, Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 147. 
69 For this obvious difference between Greek and Modern theatre, see Michael Ewans’s  
Introduction’ to Aeschylus, Oresteia, p. xix. For Shakespeare’s masquerade in Romeo and Juliet, see 
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act I, Scene v. The Techne of Being 
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isolation there is not much to learn from this distinction, but when we remind 
ourselves of and remember the basic tenet of our thesis, it obviously gives us some 
direction. For, as was said, we are, in the Shakespearean theatre, persuaded to 
make the effortless inference from the perception of what is not [true] to the 
apperception of what is [true]. Clearly, a player with a Greek masque would fail to 
show us what is [true], whereas one wearing a Venetian masque would not.
70 
 
[26]    The courtly Masque is part of the looking place in the Greek sense, of that 
which makes this stand out as what it essentially is, a truly mimetic performance.
71 
And, of course, if you like pictures, and do believe that what attracts the spectators 
to any theatre is more likely to be seen than unseen, we should remind the reader 
of what Burckhardt says, when he comments on the superiority of the English 
stage and the corruption of the Italian stage in the Renaissance. Burckhardt 
attributes the decadence of the Italian stage almost solely to its taste for visual 
display, what inhibited its development to nothing less than the time and money 
spent on elaborate decorations, stage props and costumes. For as the director was 
busy decorating the stage, there was no time to focus on more serious matters, 
namely the play.
72 The courtly Masque of Inigo Jones, would be impossible to 
                                                 
70 Whereas the actors of the Greek theatres of Aeschylus and Sophocles wore masques to make the 
persona distinct, to look definite from afar, to show what the person essentially was, it became the 
function of the Venetian masque to obscure, to make [th]is persona stand out indefinitely, for the 
person to hide. This indefinition of presence, this emptying of persona, [th]is will to obscurity which 
prevail in the Venetian masque, Shakespeare invites us to witness in the opening masquerade of 
Romeo and Juliet, where they both, mutually fall in love with an indefinition, a persona without 
properties, a masque that does not show what [th]is is, but rather what this is not. Adding to the 
mystery of the play, we realize that Romeo and Juliet fall in love while they are still wearing 
masques, doubtless because they are attracted to that which the Venetian masque produces the 
apperception of, namely what is hidden. 
71 For a presentation of Inigo Jones as the superior master of the masque, see for example Yates, 
Theatre of the World, ‘Chapter X, Public Theatre and the Masque: Inigo Jones on the Theatre as a 
Temple,’ pp. 169ff. 
72 Burckhardt, The Civilization of The Renaissance in Italy, ‘The Discovery of Man,’ p. 205. Yates 
makes a similar argument in Theatre of the World, where she says, ‘In the masque, magic in the 
form of mechanization was threatening the rôle of the poet as the most important person in the The Techne of Being 
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understand if one did not recognize that the basic principle of a courtly masque is 
the mimetic display of a true [re]presentation, so true that one would think, from 
the visual impression alone, without a word having been said, that one was riding 
through the Tuscan hills or the Iberian plains, or were caught, like Shakespeare, in 
The Tempest. Through this elaborate display of costumes and stage decorations, 
through each stage curtain illustration, one was given the positive illusion of Being 
there. In the Masque the stage curtains will not fail to [re]present truly and 
pictorially where the characters are, neither the costumes to [re]present the 
historical persona of each character. On the naked stage of Shakespeare’s Globe, it 
is of course an entirely different experience, no such visual display. But, of course, 
some of Shakespeare’s later plays are masques, as for example, The Tempest, 
which was performed in the Blackfriars theatre by the King’s Men.
73 The vogue of 
The Tempest can perhaps be attributed to the newly discovered Americas which 
the spectators hoped to catch a glimpse of through the elaborate representations of 
the Masque. If we disregard the exceptional opening of the play, it is easy to 
recognize its lyrical qualities, the qualities of a play struggling to produce the 
apperception of what is concealed, the Being of beings.  
 
[27]     How reverse the battles of life seem compared to art’s, when the latter 
struggles to produce the impression of what in life by all is taken for granted, that 
which one cannot escape except through death, the ontological contradiction. I 
found inadequation to be the shortest way to that which art produces with such 
difficulty and life with such ease, the Being of beings. That is, the presentation of 
                                                                                                                                               
purveying of dramatic entertainment, and substituting for the poet, and for the actor who spoke the 
poet’s words, the perspective painter and the machinist as the most important of the experts needed 
for the production.’ [Yates, Theatre of the World, p. 172]. 
73 Yates, Theatre of the World, pp. 159-161. The Techne of Being 
 
184  
what is not will, almost invariably, produce the apperception of what is, the Being 
of beings. Although it was not, it should have been easy to detect that the simplest 
way to produce the apperception of [th]is [ontological contradiction] is to 
present/represent [th]is [being] as what it is not. That is, the perception of what 
[th]is [being] is not, will almost invariably produce the apperception that [th]is 
[being] is. The perception of what is untrue in an epistemological sense, will 
produce the apperception of what is [true] in an ontological sense. With no 
intention of speaking hyperbolically, we may therefore say that without question 
the one who will give us the most profound notion of what is [true], is the one who 
appear to be most thoroughly false. [Th]is would be the case, regardless of whether 
it occurred in life or on the stage, that what is untrue would appear to be more 
[alive]. As we have said, and will continue to say throughout [th]is thesis, the 
perception of what is untrue produces invariably the inference to the apperception 
of what is [true], and since there is no one more [truly] false than the actress, there 
is also no one who appear to be more [truly] alive.
74 
 
[28]     As Bacon, Newton and Darwin did all proceed inductively, so shall I proceed 
‘without hypothesis,’ without taking anything for granted, not even that anything 
                                                 
74 Following Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, we could embark on some pulp 
deliberations: ‘No one is more untrue than the actress.’ ‘No one more true than the actress.’ None 
of these statements are false. However, we should point out that we do use different concepts of 
truth in each proposition, an epistemological concept of truth in the first proposition and an 
ontological concept of truth in the other. What is made clear by placing these propositions next to 
each other, is not that we are making an effort to produce a contradiction, but rather, that the first 
proposition leads invariably to the next, that the perception of what is untrue almost without 
exception leads to the apperception of what is [true], and that therefore, since no one appear more 
often as what she is not, even makes a living of appearing as what she is not, no one is more true, 
appear to be more alive than the actress. We can, it seems, never forgive an actress that does not 
betray herself. It is not effortless to be an actress, not easy to be an actor, as they both strive to be 
what they are not. However,  [th]is effort is doomed to fail, and knowing [th]is, that her and his 
efforts will inevitably fail, it is not undeservedly that they are praised. It is not without deserts to 
attempt what is impossible, i.e. to become another. For it is for attempting what is impossible that 
they all appear as demigods and truly as stars. The Techne of Being 
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is.
75 Surely we will not need a vastly greater number of plays to illustrate The 
Poetics of Being than the seven planets Newton needed to prove the universality of 
the theory of gravity. In all cases I shall emphasize that the impression that the 
world is, is produced, and without [th]is continued production, nothing would seem 
to be at all. It is significant to notice, that in Shakespeare’s plays, neither the 
ontological contradiction nor how it is produced is spoken of, that what we are 
attempting to do is not to trace the outline of an already existing discourse, but to 
create a discourse that exposes the production of the ontological contradiction in 
Shakespeare’s plays for the first time. Shakespeare never makes an attempt to 
describe his poetology. The means of production are simply not objectified. 
However, this lack of description makes these means of inadequation not less but 
more efficient in the production of the Being of beings. Of course, a magician 
would no longer appear to be a magician but an artist if he, in front of his 
audience, explained the tricks during the performance. Clearly, we shall see that 
the effect of the Shakespearean play is often the result of an inference that the 
spectator is made to draw from means he does not recognize the existence of.  
 
[29]     Without taking anything for granted, we will investigate the means that 
most efficiently produce the apperception of the Being of beings. To do so, we will 
have to let our own prejudices slip between our fingers, in order to investigate 
what makes possible the production of that which we all take for granted, the 
Being of beings. Then, and only then, will we be able to make transparent how the 
                                                 
75 Cf. Francis Bacon, Novum Organon, 1994, for the negative critique of deduction. For the positive 
assessment of induction, the reader is also referred to Julian Huxley’s introduction to Charles 
Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or The Preservation of Favoured Races 
in the Struggle for Life, 1958, as well as Will Durant’s presentation of Newton in The Story of 
Philosophy, 1927. 
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profound notion of the ontological contradiction is produced. Not surprisingly, it is 
the immediacy with which the effect of Being is experienced which itself hides the 
fact that the apperception of Being was produced. That the immediacy of 
perception/apperception hides the mediacy of production is something we all could 
learn from Hegel.
76 The means for the production of Being appear to be hidden to 
the reader/spectator. When recognizing the means for producing the Being of 
beings – the empty transgression of any appearance that offers the almost 
ineradicable impression of its life - we first of all notice that these instruments 
work so spontaneously, that they are almost impossible to detect, that they pass us 
by and affect us profoundly at the same time. We are surprised to find that the 
means for producing what we all take for granted are the same as when explicated 
we all are inclined to oppose, contradict, object to or right out refuse to accept. 
That what we all unknowingly, and without effort, take for granted, is the same as 
what we would oppose when known, shows again, that Being as such is never 
without contradiction, might even attest to the inescapability of the ontological 
contradiction. 
 
[30]     Before we list the predominant means for the production of the Being of 
beings, without pretending that this enumeration exhausts the possibilities for the 
production of the ontological contradiction, we will remark that what enhances the 
                                                 
76 Concerning naïve immediacy and its ability to hide, how effectively immediacy hides what is most 
apparent to all, Hegel does first and foremost point to science as naïve when it studies its objects 
without ever recognizing itself or the spirit in that which is perceived/apperceived. [Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition, esp. Paragraphs 50 and 51.] More 
interesting, and less obvious, is that Hegel also recognizes the subjective element of production in 
what to the subject seems meaningless. For to Hegel, even the apperception of what is meaningless 
is produced like the sound of the word ‘God,’ which to many would render nothing to the 
imagination. The only true mediation occurs when the spirit, that is, the subject, has becomes 
conscious of the fact that it is the origin of everything that is. [Cf. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 
‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 22, p. 12]. 
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efficacy of these means is that we are prone to look through or even away from 
them, and thus, they are hardly ever recognized. The most effective and 
unrecognized means for the production of the Being of beings are,  
falsity, dissimilarity, nothing, indefinition, elision, and substitution, [and if 
including less persuasive means of inadequation: truth,
77 transformation, 
doubt, aporia, contradiction, nonsense, what is meaningless and what is 
numinous.] 
 
First of all, it is paradoxical that neither of these means are conspicuous, secondly, 
that we do not find the effect/affect of any of them to contradict our notion of what 
is, but rather, that they produce, even enhance our notion of what is without 
themselves being detected. The imperceptibility of these instruments does not speak 
against them, but is a testimony to the fact that they are part of our silent lives. 
They appear to be so ‘natural,’ so artless, that one is inclined to concur with the 
Romantics that Shakespeare produces the apperception of what is in-different 
from [our own] nature, if nature is that which without any properties would carry 
all properties and keep anything alive. These instruments of inadequation, which 
Shakespeare uses in such abundance, are, more fundamentally, almost 
indistinguishable from ourselves, from our very Being, and so immediately 
effective/affective are they in producing [th]is in-distinguishability, that there was 
little hope of finally objectifying that which remained hidden to ourselves, The 
Techne of Being.  
 
[31]     The ontological instruments identified as belonging to The Techne of Being 
are: falsity, dissimilarity, nothing, indefinition, elision, and substitution. We could 
easily have spoken of the meaningless and the numinous, even doubt, contradiction, 
                                                 
77 Truth is here taken in a negative sense, not as what is given, or the correspondence to what is 
given, but as the way in which the world surprisingly, transgresses our expecations or hopes by un-
concealing itself. The Techne of Being 
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nonsense, aporia and transformation, even truth, as a way of producing the 
apperception of the Being of beings, but we shall concentrate on the most 
fundamental means, the instruments that most effortlessly produce the 
apperception of the ontological contradiction. One could always debate the 
meaning of these words, but we shall focus on what is more crucial, their function. 
It is obvious that we do not produce [th]is effect/affect, the impression of the 
ontological contradiction by mentioning any of these words. Except for ‘nothing,’ 
these are functions not of names, but of what is named, namely, what is 
experienced as false, dissimilar, indefinite, elusive, that is what is subject to 
elision,
78 and mistaken, i.e. what is subject to substitution. Prior to being named, 
what is false, dissimilar, indefinite, elusive, mistaken, are, if not completely 
unrecognized, all inadequations that, by exposing what is not, create a more 
emphatic sense of what is. What we have done is simply to recognize the formula 
which, without being named, effortlessly produces the most profound apperception 
of Being of beings: the negative ontic-ontological difference, i.e. the contradiction 
between non-beings and the almost ineradicable sense of Being that they offer.  
 
[32]     Evidently, we need to distinguish the meaning of the word ‘substitution’ 
from the function of what is named substitution. Similarly, we have to separate the 
meaning of the word ‘nothing’ from the function of what is named nothing, and 
further, the function of saying ‘nothing.’ Equally, we must not make 
indistinguishable the meaning of the word ‘dissimilarity’ and the function of what 
is perceived as a dissimilar, the effect of a dissimilar appearance or a dissimilar 
                                                 
78 As we call the process of ab-straction of qualities from a singular subject, elision, we call the end 
of this singular process of aphairesis, that which is crushed out or left over, elusive. Here the 
perception of all or any essential characteristica has been removed, without doing away with, but 
emphasizing, the apperception of th]is. The Techne of Being 
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symbol. Fundamentally we will have to separate between the meaning of the word 
‘false’ and the function of what is named ‘false,’ and we have therefore, to keep a 
clear mind through what seems excessively entangled, to remind ourselves that life 
is so much more than the result of a classification or what can be classified. We 
have to acknowledge that what is indicated by these names predominantly retain 
its function, sometimes only achieve the required affect/effect, when what is named 
through these names remains unrecognized, or, if you will, unknown. We could 
therefore speak of the function of the unnamed, or the ontological affect/effect of 
that which, more often than not, remains unrecognized: falsity, dissimilarity, 
indefinition, nothing, elision, and substitution, and possibly, in an unconcealed , and 
perhaps less emphatic, sense, truth.
79  
 
[33]     Among all the arts of inadequation we have recognized are without doubt, 
also: truth. When speaking of truth as a means of producing the apperception of 
Being, we do use true in the ontological sense of that which is unconcealed, that 
which by simply being there is apperceived as an excess, a trans-gression of that 
which it negates, but nevertheless in silence discloses the negative impression of, 
what is, perhaps must remain, concealed.
80 But the most fundamental, the most 
convincing means of inadequation are unquestionably: falsity, dissimilarity, 
nothing, indefinition, elision, and substitution, instruments that will be defined as 
we proceed. We have never pursued any of these inadequations for their own sake, 
                                                 
79 Throughout this thesis we will also mention the effects of transformation, doubt, contradiction, 
nonsense, aporia, what is meaningless and what is numinous, but, in general we shall remain 
focused on these instruments of inadequation. 
80 The simplest way of understanding truth in an ontological sense would be to liken it to the 
surprising or the unexpected, but with [th]is difference, that not only the aberration, but everything 
natural and conventional, is thus astoundingly unconcealed. Habituation often numbs [th]is sense 
of what is true to such a degree that one is incapable of apperceiving anything but the shocking, the 
new, the news, the revolting or the fashionable as truly unconcealed. The Techne of Being 
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but for the sake of what they affect/effect the apperception of, the ontological 
contradiction. Furthermore, we find it noteworthy that these instruments of 
inadequation are often and by many considered im-moral, un-lawful, ir-rational, 
in-appropriate, that all these arts or instruments, in some sense, are forbidden 
fruits, but that the affect/effect of trans-gressing these laws or boundaries, in a 
certain and clear sense, create the apperception of something that is much more 
familiar than its opposite: adequations. 
 
[34]     To clarify, the concept of adequatio is thought differently by Aristotle, 
Thomas and Wittgenstein. To Aristotle, who thinks essentially or predicatively of 
this adequation, what is adequated, the homoiosis occurs between the thing and the 
intellect.
81 The essence of this thing, the aspect or form/eidos of what is not 
fortuitous,
82 does adequately or inadequately come to expression in the mind of the 
beholder.
83 To Thomas what is adequated is intellectus and res, intellect and 
thing,
84 to Kant, Verstand/Understanding and phenomena.
85 It is of course, easy to 
notice that for both Thomas and Kant it is no longer the essence of the thing that 
may or may not come to expression through the mind, thus simply pronouncing 
that which [beforehand] is either true or untrue, but rather the mind which asserts 
itself freely by expressing itself independently [of whatever is or is not]. For hidden 
in the concept of truth as adequatio is, as Hegel could have recognized, the negative 
                                                 
81 For a further clarification of the conceptual history of homoiosis, see, Heidegger, Being and Time, 
Section 44, and likewise, The ‘Introduction’ to Being and Time. 
82 Cf. Aristotle’s Metaphysics on the difference between what is essential and accidental, that is, the 
fortuitous. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VI, Chapter 2. 
83 The preference of the object is for example made clear in Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IX, 
Chapter X, 1051b1-5. For Aristotle’s theory of homoiosis, see particularly Heidegger, Being and 
Time, Section 44. 
84 Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, I, ‘The Meaning of Truth,’ in Selected Writings, 
p. 172. 
85 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A58-A62/B82-B86. The Techne of Being 
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powers of the subject to express, to imagine, whatever is or is not.
86 The young 
Wittgenstein follows up and cements the understanding of truth as adequatio by 
simply speaking of propositions as pictures that adequately or inadequately depicts 
the world.
87 It should be evident to anyone that if an adequate statement gives the 
impression of what is a true picture, the inadequation, as should have been dis-
covered long ago, will lead to the apperception of what is undepictable, the 
ontological contradiction. It is therefore true that we do not deny tradition by 
speaking of ‘inadequation,’ but have rather realized the hidden potential within 
tradition itself, which was concretely expressed, but abstractly, consciously and 
conceptually, unrealized. For as instrumental as the positive concept or picture 
may be, even more is its negation, as it fascilitates the inference to what is truly 
unimaginable. However, regardless of the different names one may use to 
conceptualize the correspondence or lack thereof, one cannot escape the difference 
between what is adequated, and it is this difference which many of these 
philosophies does not merely want to build a bridge across but have a desire to 
                                                 
86 On the negative powers of the subject to transgress whatever is [given], See, Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Spirit, ’Preface: On Scientific Cognition, Paragraph 32, where it is said on p. 19, 
‘the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure ‘I.’’ 
87 Cf. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2.21, 2.22, p. 43. Rather naively, if one would 
not rather say ‘fundamentally,’ Wittgenstein believes that what is adequated are propositions and 
fact, language and phenomena. We shall not take away this belief, as no concept of truth is now 
more commonplace, or, if you like, adequate. However, we shall point out that, whether or not these 
propositions are expressed, its negation is equally commonplace, and not only is the comprehension 
of its negation commonplace, but more so, the apprehension of its effect, the Being of beings. Sadly, 
we recognize, that neither in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus nor in Philosophical Investigations is what is 
inadequate spoken of at any length, it is almost as if Wittgenstein did desire to pass over 
inadequation in silence, to pass by that which language is inadequate to in silence. And so he 
overlooked the production of that which he in the end took for granted, that something necessarily 
and mysteriously is. For there is as little treatment of what is false in Tractatus as there in 
Philosophical Investigations are reflections on what is ‘not.’ [Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, Fragments 547 and 557] Apart from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2.17, 2.18, 2.21, 
2.22, which mentions what is false merely to discard it, the bulk of the exposition is entirely true.  The Techne of Being 
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close. Now as much as this closure is fatal, the opening is fecund, the difference 
gives life.
88
                                                 
88 It was Jean-Luc Marion’s critique of conceptual idolization in God Without Being that inspired us 
to seek the shadow-side of some treasured concepts within our tradition, wondering if it there were 
not more to learn from the negation of these concepts than the concepts themselves. We learned 
from Marion to turn ‘suspicion of idolatry’ against the concept itself. [Marion, God Without Being, 
36.] We should perhaps all listen when Marion makes a preliminary definition of that which he 
attempts to avoid, ‘the conceptual idol has a site, metaphysics: a function, the theo-logy in onto-
theo-logy, and a definition, casua sui. Conceptual idolatry does not remain a universally vague 
suspicion but inscribes itself in the global strategy of thought taken in its metaphysical figure. 
Nothing less than the destiny of Being - or, better, Being as destiny - mobilizes conceptual idolatry 
and assures its precise function.’[Marion, God Without Being, p. 37.] In our own way we have 
turned tradition against itself, by showing that the negation of its own concepts, adequatio, mimesis, 
truth, that is, inadequatio, animitatio, untruth, turn out to pro-duce something that is more 
familiar, more uncanny, than the idols themselves. However, what is effected/affected is not 
idolatry, as that which is experienced is nowhere to be seen: the Being of beings.  
 
C5 THE TRUE PRODUCTION OF BEING 
§5.1 The Battle for Truth 
§5.2 The Body of Truth 
§5.3 Shakespeare’s True Betrayal 
 
C5 EXPOSÉ 
 
 
[1]     In this chapter, I will have a look at the unfamiliar Shakespeare to prepare 
the way for discussing what makes us think that Shakespeare is indistinguishable 
from ourselves. That this is not always the case we shall see in this chapter where 
we present the tradition of the judicious duel and Shakespeare’s adaptation and 
use of this tradition for dramatic purpose. For underlying the tradition of the 
judicious duel is not only an ontological understanding of truth as that which is 
unconcealed, an understanding from which Shakespeare never sways, but rather 
more specifically, the understanding of truth as what is unconcealed, a true 
apperception of the Being of beings. In most or many of Shakespeare’s more 
popular plays, [th]is sense of Being is subverted and undermined by the technique 
and power of the presentation, which more often than not makes the reader catch 
a glimpse of what is concealed. 
 
[2]     Displaying an ontological grasp of truth as what is unconcealed, 
Shakespeare adopts or presents a Neoplatonic understanding and conception not 
only of truth, but of what is [unconcealed], an understanding of truth, of Being 
unconcealed, which he in his most famous plays betrays in order to convince us, 
still and to this day, that what appears on stage is. We are presenting this chapter 
on the unfamiliarity of Shakespeare, not in order to make an aberration from the The True Production of Being 
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true course or main focus of the thesis, but in order to be more true to Shakespeare 
and not only to ourselves. This chapter will provide a perfectly true setting, for 
nothing is perceived except by contrast. In this way, we will create a true horizon 
against which all false ships may later sail. 
§5.1 The Battle for Truth 
 
 
[3]     There are not many philosophers today who would agree if we said that 
truth is polemos, truth is war, and that whoever wins [th]is war is true. But 
Heidegger and Nietzsche, Burckhardt and Hegel, all make remarks and reflections 
on truth as polemos, perhaps no one more clearly than Heidegger in his lectures on 
Parmenides,
1 and perhaps no one more forcefully than Nietzsche in the opening of 
Twilight of Idols.
2 In all these presentations of truth as polemos, the realization is 
the same, namely that the body upholds the truth. It is the body that upholds 
whatever is, and without [th]is [body], nothing [is]. Instead of speaking of Hegel’s 
infamous presentation of the dialectics of Master and Slave in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit, we shall mention another place where Hegel refers to a curious example 
where a philosopher attempts to uphold what is true with arms and not, as 
Nietzsche later remarked condescendingly of Socrates, only with words or 
arguments. For Nietzsche considered, as does also Heidegger, all argumentation to 
be a kind of decadence, a corruption which takes [th]is for granted, without 
                                                 
1 Heidegger contend to be in good company when he in Parmenides, p. 17-18, asserts that truth is 
war. We may have to trust Heidegger’s word that Jacob Burckhardt is among the contenders, but 
Nietzsche makes it explicit in, Philosophy and Truth - Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the 
early 1870s, ‘The Philosopher: Reflection on the Struggle Between Art and Knowledge,’ Fragment 
47, p. 17. Even Hegel holds the same view, that the ancient Greeks, and no less the Middle Ages of 
chivalry, find truth in battle. [Cf. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Lordship and Bondage,’ p. 111-
119]. 
2 Nietzsche, Twilight of Idols, ‘Foreword,’ p. 3. The True Production of Being 
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thinking, without acknowledging that [th]is is above all else that which should be 
or would have to be fought for.
3  
 
[4]     According to Hegel, the distinguishing feature between Greeks and 
Barbarians is that the former, and pre-eminently the Athenians, put aside their 
arms in times of peace.
4 However, as Hegel relates, a dispute between the Athenian 
Lawmaker, Solon and the tyrant Pisistratus, was settled by force.
5 For Solon 
appeared in the court of the Athenians, ‘accoutred in arms and shield,’ willing to 
protect the Law with his own body. That Solon at the beginning of all lawmaking, 
appears in arms to defend the universal Law against the singular will of the Tyrant 
Pisistratus is, of course, more than a curiosity to Hegel; it conveys the body, the 
will that upholds all truths, all beings, the Being of beings.
6 Another, more recent 
example related in the annals of philosophy, is the story of Tycho Brahe, the 
Danish astronomer, who, while still a student at the University of Rostock, was 
involved in an argument over who was the better mathematician. Satisfied with 
neither arithmetic nor rhetoric, the debate was settled by a duel, which Tycho is 
said to have won. Tycho thereby proved he was the superior mathematician, and as 
a token of his superiority and a souvenir of the combat, he was wearing a silver 
prosthesis in place for the nose he lost.
7  
 
 
 
                                                 
3 For Nietzsche’s tirade against Socrates, see, Nietzsche, Twilight of Idols, ‘The Problem of 
Socrates,’ pp. 11-15. For Heidegger’s understanding of history as a battle not only for truth but a 
battle for the concept of truth, where as he indicates that there is no greater battle, see Heidegger, 
Parmenides, p. 17-18. See also, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume I: The Will to Power as Art, p. 28. 
4 Hegel, History of Philosophy I, p. 159. Hegel is referring to Thucydides (1,6). 
5 Hegel, History of Philosophy I, p. 159. Hegel is referring to Diogenes Laertius, 
6 Even if Hegel admired a man of action, he, more than anyone, knew that the success of any 
Modern Law did not depend on the superficial threat or use of force, but entirely on 
internalisation, that all subjects make the law their own, not on Moralität, but Sittlichkeit. 
7 As related in Boorstin, The Discoverers, 1983. The True Production of Being 
 
196  
[5]     This willingness to take up arms to prove a proposition, does, of course, to 
us, sound strikingly unfamiliar. It is therefore surprising to see that [th]is way of 
solving disputes, of proving what is true, is exactly what in Shakespeare’s plays 
occur again and again, perhaps nowhere more tellingly than in the opening of 
Richard II. For when Lord Bolingbroke and Thomas Mowbray appear before the 
King, they are both willing to take up arms to prove who is speaking the truth, to 
show who is guilty of being a traitor to the Crown and who is not, to decide what is 
true in a duel, when they finally meet at the lists at Coventry.
8 As Shakespeare 
shows, one did not expect to solve a controversy merely by argument, to settle a 
dispute merely with words. To us it may sound unfamiliar, that when claiming to 
speak the truth, one did often – as Bolingbroke does in Richard II  -  swear an oath 
on a precious body-part, saying, ‘by my right arm’, ‘by my head’, ‘by my right 
leg.’
9 Again it shows what was self-evident to every knight, that it is the body that 
upholds the truth and God that upholds the body. For it was commonly believed 
that the one who sur-vived would not be guilty [of high treason], that whoever over-
came was true, as God would not fail to uphold the true.
10  
 
 
                                                 
8 Shakespeare, Richard II, Act I, Scene iii. 
9 Hexter, Equivocal Oaths and Ordeals in Medieval Literature, ’The Act of Truth in Medieval 
Europe,’ p. 5. 
10 That the British Isles was a warrior society is almost equally true at the time of Henry VIII as it 
was at the time of the Norman Conquest in 1066. Tony Tanner notes the relevance of the political 
transition from feudalism to absolutism, from barbarism to political modernity for understanding 
Shakespeare’s plays. In his introduction to Hamlet Tanner refers to the German historian Carl 
Schmidt, who states what should be obvious, that Hamlet, like so many of Shakespeare’s plays, is 
set on the threshold between feudalism and the political or civilized world of modernity where 
states are no longer governed by personal will but by impersonal Law. Certainly, Tony Tanner and 
Carl Schmidt as well as the one they both rely on, namely Hegel, means to speak deridingly of the 
previous age where there was no rule of law. That we do not necessarily follow this enlightened 
prejudice, will, in this chapter, become obvious. [Tony Tanner, Introduction to Hamlet, in 
Tragedies, Volume 1, p. xxiii-xxv]. The True Production of Being 
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[6]     The Normans are said to have imported the judicious ordeal, chief amongst 
which was the practice of trial by combat.
11 It is safe to say, but striking, since it 
evokes such clear impressions of a premodern era with lives and ideals so different 
from our own, that nowhere is the procedure of such a trial presented more 
instructively than in the opening of Shakespeare’s Richard II, which, of course 
starts with a conflict, the accuser and the accused, or rather, two men, who both 
accuse each other of High Treason. The men being summoned have to appear in 
court before the King to present their case. As Knights, they would present their 
own cases, as Shakespeare says, ‘face to face,’ ‘the accuser and the accused freely 
speak.’
12 It is interesting to note what Duke Mowbray says in this context, ‘This is 
not the trial of a woman’s war, The bitter clamour of two eager tongues can/not 
arbitrate this cause betwixt us twain.’
13 Nietzsche echoes this depreciating 
assessment of a trial of tongues when he scorches Socrates for having, indeed, been 
guilty of the charges waged against him, namely of having corrupted the Athenian 
youth. For truly, it was, according to Nietzsche, Socrates who bears the iconic 
responsibility of having compelled the Athenians - the strongest and fiercest and 
most warrior-like of all nations, except perhaps the Spartans - to suddenly, and as 
if from nowhere, instead of asserting their positive will [to be unconcealed], look 
for arguments to ‘prove’ their cause. By asking the nobility to thus ‘prove’ 
themselves through argumentation, and thus inventing, as Aristotle points out, the 
                                                 
11 Millingen, The History of Duellingen, p. 19. Bacon, The Charge Touching Duels, in Francis Bacon 
- A Critical Edition of the Major Works, p. 309, and Hexter, Equivocal Oaths and Ordeals in Medieval 
Literature, pp. 3-9. We should perhaps particularly note where Millingen informs us of what 
occasions the duel formally, ‘The lie - the blow - the most slanderous abuse - were … considered a 
stain upon a man’s character requiring an appeal to arms in order to verify the old saying, that the 
dead are always in the wrong.’ [Millingen, The History of Duellingen, p. 19]. 
12 Shakespeare, Richard II, Act II, Scene i.17. 
13 Shakespeare, Richard II, Act II, Scene i.48-50. The True Production of Being 
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art of dialectics and logic,
14 it is understandable that he made them all, stammer. 
But, as Nietzsche adds, Socrates would have found no ears in Athens had not the 
Athenians already been corrupt.
15 What Nietzsche is suggesting is however clear, 
that any kind of argumentation is as such a sign corruption and degeneration of 
the will to power, the will to be unconcealed. In such gloomy light, it is curious to 
notice that the father of the art of argumentation, the father of logic, should have, 
as Nietzsche points out, willingly killed himself.
16 
 
[7]     What can be said about the Athens of Socrates also applies to the society of 
Pre-Elizabethan England, namely that it was a society of warriors. Evidently, in 
Richard II, neither of the knights have been subjected to the corrupting influence 
of logic, for what they both present are, as they say, not ‘like womenfolk,’
17 
arguments for or against their own innocence or the guilt of the other, but rather 
bluntly and provocatively, accusations and insults. Nay, what is presented here is 
not an argument that slavishly would attempt to explain one’s guilt away, but 
rather accusations and insults that attempt to throw the opponent into an 
unfavourable light. For Lord Bolingbroke will not only invoke the heavens to 
protect and further what he says, he will also protect - the ground of - t/his saying 
with his own body. As Lord Bolingbroke says, ‘For what I speak, My body shall 
                                                 
14 If it is granted that the universal definitions that Socrates sought, later formed the basis on which 
all demonstrations, whether logical or dialectical, are based. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, 
987b1. 
15 Cf. Nietzsche, Twilight of Idols, ‘The Problem of Socrates,’ p. 11-15. As a symptom of this 
decadence, Nietzsche points out that Socrates ‘discovered a new kind of agon [i.e. contest, namely 
demonstration or argumentation],’ and was its first fencing master for the noble circles of Athens. 
He fascinated people by stirring up the agonal drive of the Hellenes.’ Nietzsche, Twilight of the 
Idols, ‘The Problem of Socrates,’ Fragment 8, p. 14] In the note provided, Duncan Large says that 
agon, ‘contest’ is a ‘central concept, the importance of which goes back to one of Nietzsche’s 
earliest (unpublished) writings, ‘Homer’s Contest’ (1872),’ Nietzsche, Twilight of Idols, p. 88n. 
16 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, ‘The Problem of Socrates,’ Fragment 12, p. 15. 
17 More precisely, Mowbray says, ‘Tis not the trial of a woman’s war.’ Shakespeare, Richard II, Act 
I, Scene i.48. The True Production of Being 
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make good upon this earth/or my divine soul answer it in heaven.’
18 Bolingbroke 
does not hesitate to utter his accusation, after he has posited that t/his saying will 
be upheld by his body, that t/his saying, which already partly unconceals him, will 
be furthered and kept in the open, as long as he has limbs to assert it, saying as he 
faces the Duke of Norfolk, ‘Thou art a traitor and a miscreant.’
19 To which the 
Duke of Norfolk replies, ‘I do defy him, and I spit at him, Call him slanderous 
coward and a villain.’
20 Evidently there are no arguments produced in this case.
21  
 
[8]     While Lord Bolingbroke and the Duke of Norfolk are calling each other 
names, and King Richard II is listening to their accusations, and each party is 
attempting to unconceal the other as a traitor, let us consider what is at stake when 
Lord Bolingbroke throws down his gage, his glow to challenge the Duke of Norfolk 
to take up, what he calls ‘mine honor’s pawn.’
22 What is at risk is nothing less than 
the truth. Not only who speaks the truth, not only who is guilty of high treason and 
who is not, but who is [true]. For to the medieval Zeitgeist, which keeps and 
                                                 
18 Shakespeare, Richard II,  Act I, Scene i.36-38. It is surprising to see how correctly the formal 
challenge resonates in Shakespeare’s play, as we listen to what, in The History of Duellingen, 
Millingen says of the judicious challenge, ‘The form of denial was most eloquent: ‘Thou liest, and I 
am ready to defend my body against thine; and thou shalt either be a corpse or a recreant any hour 
of the day: and this is my gage.’ [Millingen, The History of Duellingen, p. 31.] Similarly in The 
Tournament, where, speaking of ‘Trial by Combat in Cases Criminal,’ Coltman Clephan points out 
that the accuser in a trial had to support his accusation by swearing that ‘he was ready to maintain 
the same with his body.’ [Coltman Clephan, The Tournament, p. 150.] 
19 Shakespeare, Richard II, Act I, Scene i.39. 
20 Shakespeare, Richard II, Act I, Scene i.60-61. 
21 It is obvious why Mowbray calls Bolingbroke a ‘coward,’ that is, someone who does not appear 
or runs for cover, perhaps evens someone who is against - con - war. Mowbray claims that 
Bolingbroke is a man that does not appear truly. If there is an implicit definition throughout all of 
Shakespeare’s plays of what a coward is, from Henry VI, Part I to Henry IV, Part I, it should read: 
‘a coward is a man that does not appear as what he is or appear as what he is not.’ One may read 
almost any of the numerous uses by Shakespeare of ‘coward’ and find that the in-definition is 
meant disparagingly. A coward does not appear truly, may even be afraid to truly appear. Nothing 
is more crucial to the virtu, the power of the knight than to appear to be true, to be unconcealed in-
differently and honestly in the open as what he is. More vital still is to uphold your place, that which 
grounds everything that is [true], the Being of all beings. It is for bravely fighting to uphold t/his 
place that Lord Talbot is honoured by his enemies, [Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act IV, Scene 
vii.44.] whereas the one who overcame through flight is deknighted by his own commanders and 
sent into exile. [Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act IV, Scene i.15f.] Thus, the importance of place. 
22 Shakespeare, Richard II, Act I, Scene i.74. The True Production of Being 
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treasures an ontological understanding of truth as what is unconcealed, every 
battle is a battle for what is [true]. In short, every conflict concerns the truth, for 
truth is quite simply polemos. 
 
[9]     One may argue about who is true in the opening of Richard II, but what is 
unequivocally stated are these two propositions, ‘Thomas Mowbray is a traitor’ or 
‘Lord Bolingbroke is a traitor.’ Apparently traitor is the property p given to both 
these men. The predicate ‘traitor’ attempts to describe what [th]is man essentially 
is. What is important to notice in what ensues, is that in a trial by ordeal there is 
never given proof of the existence of these predicates. That is, there is no obligation 
to provide an argument showing that this property p does or does not belong to x. 
Essential proof seems almost entirely irrelevant to the medieval mind. There is 
given no other proof that p belongs or does not belong to x, than that x does or 
does not exist, is or is not unconcealed. In the chivalric battle for love there is given 
no other proof of love other than that [th]is man is unconcealed and the other is 
not. Concretely, when we have two propositions, ‘Palamon loves Emily’ and Arcite 
loves Emily, or ‘no one loves Emily higher than Palamon,’ and ‘no one loves Emily 
higher than Arcite,’ it is obvious that this property p, ‘no one loves Emily higher,’ 
cannot at the same time belong to both Arcite and Palamon. So there will ensue, as 
Shakespeare is well aware of, a trial by battle, an ordeal where love is ‘proved,’ 
that is, ‘tried and tested,’ which is still the meaning of the Norwegian ‘prøve.’  
 
[10]     One would think that Palamon and Arcite would have to defend this 
property and prove that this predicate truly belongs to [th]is subject. But, as is 
shown, there is no other proof given than the unconcealment of the subject itself, x. 
For when x appears, he has proven that this property, ‘no one loves Emily higher,’ The True Production of Being 
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belongs to him. This he has not showed by speaking more loudly of his emotions or 
by giving her more splendid gifts, but by simply Being unconcealed. For, as the 
dying Arcite says, after he has been struck down from the horse parading through 
the streets of Athens to proclaim his victory over Palamon, as he now lies dying, ‘I 
was false.’
23 As Shakespeare undoubtedly maintains an ontological concept of what 
is true, this means simply that. ‘I am not. My body can no longer uphold anything 
that is [true].’ The profundity of this unfamiliar sense of Being is proven by the 
fact that no one runs around looking for evidence of p, whether it is, as in The Two 
Noble Kinsmen, ‘love,’ or, as in Richard II, ‘high treason.’ Neither does one seek 
witnesses that can corroborate nor material that can collaborate the proposition, 
the verdict that ‘x is p.’ They are solely focused on x. The unconcealment of x alone 
will prove its possession or non-possession of p. That, for example, x is truly in 
love, will be established by the fact that he is still there, for otherwise, they 
conjecture, if he was not truly in love, x would not be with her, but he is, so he 
must be truly in love. 
 
[11]     [Th]is logic, however simple, is immediately confusing.  
x is p or y is p    x  is  p or y is p 
y is  not   y  is not 
x is p     x   is not-p 
 
These inferences depend on an intrinsic and immediately perceived relation 
between certain properties and Being and other properties and non-Being, which 
means that Being will announce the presence of positive predicates of 
unconcealment, whereas non-Being will announce negative predicates of 
concealment, conversely, that some properties will further unconcealment/Being 
                                                 
23 Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, Act V, Scene iv.92. The True Production of Being 
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whereas other properties will further concealment/non-Being. This means, for 
example, that when two are accused of high treason, the death of one will prove 
that he was a traitor, while the Being of the other will prove that he was not. 
Similarly, the Being of one will prove that he was in love while the non-Being of the 
other will prove that he was not. The following is a concrete example from The 
Two Noble Kinsmen,  
Palamon is in love with Emily or Arcite is in love with Emily 
Arcite is not 
Palamon is in love with Emily 
 
This unfamiliar syllogism is expressive of an existential logic, [th]is inference based 
on a true logic of Being, and not a predicative logic that merely considers the 
possession or non-possession of certain properties after [th]is or the existence of 
[th]is being has been taken for granted. Just as easily as this positive example 
seems, superficially, to confirm our notions of logic, there appears the negative 
example, which totally and immediately, even effortlessly, destroys any traditional 
or predicative sense of logic and gives us a glimpse of another logic, a logic of 
Being. For if we proceed with an example where the predicate itself is not a 
positive but a negative attribute, we will see that logic runs into, encounter 
unforeseeable obstacles, or that this logic destroys our habitual sense of deduction. 
The example is taken from the opening of Richard II,  
Bolingbroke is a traitor or Mowbray is a traitor 
Mowbray is not 
Bolingbroke is not a traitor 
 
This illustration, which we somehow expected to confirm our habitual notion of 
logical inference, leaves us amiss, stranded at the end of an inference. It is 
obviously and precisely the traitor who will not be and the one who is not a traitor 
who will. This suggests that some properties are identified as promoting life or The True Production of Being 
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Being, whereas other properties are not. We may even sharply distinguish between 
properties of concealment and properties, perhaps even ideas, here taken in the 
original and Platonic sense of the essential idea, of unconcealment. The essential 
distinction will ensure that those who carry predicates of concealment, or rather - 
if we are to avoid dualism and truly think Neoplatonically, not carry properties of 
unconcealment - will sicken or die, whereas the one who bears and brings forward 
properties of unconcealment will live to acquire all the Aristotelian excellences. 
 
[12]     To no little extent does this way of thinking display its Neoplatonic origin, a 
trait which may easily be recognized in the theology of Augustine and the 
philosophy of Plotinus, where what is good is and what is evil is not, where the 
good is unconcealed and the evil is concealed, the one light, the other dark. If you 
suppose that this way of thinking is as alien to Shakespeare as it is to us, you must 
surely not have read Shakespeare. For Henry VI, Part I, considered to be his first 
play,
24 is clearly nothing but a battle between the forces of concealment and the 
forces of unconcealment, and, so prolonged is this battle that the drama can hardly 
be called a play. In the end, the black magic whore, Joan of Pucelle, having slept 
her way into the corrupt hearts of the French nobility and cursed her way onto the 
stake, is lead to the podium where she is finally burned after having renounced her 
own father.
25 Nowhere is the Neoplatonic trait in Shakespeare’s works more 
evident than in Henry VI, Part I, which, with its clear division between black and 
white magic, identifies certain properties with life, and other properties as life-
denying. For having these properties you will, in the end, like Joan of Pucelle, be 
entirely, utterly concealed, sooner rather than later. 
                                                 
24 1589-90. Cf. Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, ‘Chronology,’ p. xv. 
25 Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act V, Scene vi.8. The True Production of Being 
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[13]     We can take another example, which follows an ancient logic [of 
unconcealment], which only on few occasions, like snowy pinnacles, pierce through 
the false and foggy landscape of Shakespeare’s land. Again, if anyone thought this 
logic was unknown or immaterial to Shakespeare, it should be said that this logic 
of unconcealment grounds the final duel between Edmund and Edgar in King Lear 
as well as the closing duel between Macduff and Macbeth as evidently as it 
grounds the duel between Joan and the Dauphin in the opening of Henry VI, Part 
I.
26 Looking more closely at the duel between Edmund and Edgar, we discover not 
only the relationship, but the intrinsic tie between certain properties and Being 
and other properties and non-Being. The inference is as follows: 
Edmund is false or Edgar is false 
Edmund is not 
Edgar is not false 
 
What we discover is a contradiction between what is false and Being, which 
Shakespeare is fully aware of, even makes a conscious effort to display. For in the 
end he lets, as so often, the false be overcome by what is true.
27  
 
[14]     The ontological understanding of truth does not only display an 
unbreakable sense of the ground of all beings, that is, that without which nothing 
                                                 
26 For evidence of these duels, see, Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act I, Scene ii.89, King Lear, Act 
V, Scene iii, Macbeth, Act V, Scene viii, particularly where Macduff cries out in anticipation of our 
preliminary conclusion, ‘I no words, my voice is my sword.’ [Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V, Scene 
viii.7]. 
27 If you would like to view the same logic under a different aspect, you could say,  
 
Edmund is false or Edgar is false 
Edgar is not false 
Edmund is not 
or,  
Edmund is false or Edgar is false 
Edmund is false 
Edmund is not 
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could have any properties. On closer inspection, what is expressed in this logic of 
the concealed and the unconcealed, is a certain and unmistakable connection 
between some properties and life and other properties and death, the basic 
principle that some properties will promote one’s life whereas other properties will 
not, finally, that God will in the end be there to hand out deserts according to the 
properties that one has acquired or been given, a judgement or a final act of 
unconcealment/concealment, from which there is, in the end, no escape. Let us 
have a look at the duel in Henry VI, Part I, where the young Joan encounters the 
Dauphin, and convey what the spectators believe will be unconcealed through 
[th]is duel.  
Joan is the saviour of France or Joan is not the saviour of France 
Joan is 
Joan is the saviour of France 
 
It is astonishing that the mere unconcealment of [th]is, the fact that Joan survives 
the duel with the Dauphin, proves the presence of the predicates that [th]is claims 
to be in possession of. Obviously we are on the verge of another logic, which does 
not belong to us, a logic we are unfamiliar with or a logic so familiar that it is 
overlooked, a logic whose forms and expressions have yet to be finalized, a logic of 
Being. This logic is part of the very fabric of Shakespeare’s plays, even where, as in 
Hamlet, the art of the presentation destroys this existential logic of unconcealment. 
For King Hamlet lives up to an old logic of unconcealment which Prince Hamlet 
and the whole Danish Court are soon about to destroy. But the trace of the old 
logic of unconcealment is still there, and exposed at great length in the exposition 
of the trial, the judicious duel between King Hamlet and King Fortinbras that The True Production of Being 
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precedes all the events in Hamlet.
28 Let me formalize the syllogism that leaves 
nothing in the dark: 
King Hamlet is the ruler of Denmark or King Fortinbras is the ruler of Denmark. 
King Fortinbras is not. 
King Hamlet is the ruler of Denmark. 
 
 
[15]     We know that in an either-or-syllogism, all complex propositions are true 
except one where both elemental propositions are false. It is, of course, easily 
noticed that in these examples as in life, the truth of any of these propositions 
cannot be guaranteed or proven prior to or before the actual battle or ordeal 
occurs. In a grand sense, life is such an ordeal, which means not only that both 
propositions may be true, but that it is Being itself prior to any being that decides 
what is true, what shall, what will be unconcealed or not. What we learn from this 
logic is to appreciate the basis of all predicates, the Being [of beings] that makes all 
properties possible, that without which they could not be or nothing could have 
any possessions. It also makes clear that these properties are something that 
follows upon or after Being, which is, that which, in the first place, is. What is 
acknowledged in all ordeals and in all trials by battle, is that it is the body that 
upholds whatever properties [th]is person has, be they intelligible or corporeal, it 
is [th]is that upholds whatever [th]is is. The medieval Zeitgeist is clearly expressed 
in the practice of ordeals, which Shakespeare presents on numerous occasions and 
in a language that apparently knows the vocabulary of unconcealment, is never 
unclear about the priority of [th]is over what [th]is is, of that without which these 
properties would fall to the ground like a birds without wings. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene i.79-107. The True Production of Being 
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[16]    Nearing a preliminary conclusion, to anticipate the road ahead, it is 
perhaps opportune to present syllogisms for Hamlet and Falstaff, which, as we 
shall see, follow a completely different logic, namely a logic of concealment, a 
gathering into presence of what is concealed,  
Falstaff is a coward or Falstaff is not a coward 
Falstaff is a coward 
Falstaff is 
and,  
 
Hamlet is mad or Hamlet is not mad 
Hamlet is mad 
Hamlet is 
 
For when Hamlet no longer appear to be mad, he soon dies. What Shakespeare has 
done, in this present and disjointed age, is simply to equate what being essentially 
is with madness and cowardice. That is, Shakespeare has turned on its head the 
commonplace notions of the properties that promote Being and which do not. It 
would appear that Shakespeare has incorporated and imperceptibly personified 
these vices, thus making Hamlet and Falstaff appear less as personifications and 
more alive, enabling all spectators to look at what they like best, themselves. It is 
quite clear that it is irrelevant to society whether Hamlet is really mad or only 
looks mad, for it is obvious that it is the masque of madness that keeps him alive at 
the court as much as the masque of death keeps Falstaff alive on the battlefield. For 
almost immediately after Hamlet throws away the masque of madness, he is no 
longer alive, but to everybody’s surprise when Falstaff throws away the masque of 
death, he is.  
 
§5.2 The Body of Truth 
 
 
[17]     There are different kinds of ordeals, or, as Hexter gives the Oldgermanic 
name for it, ‘ordal,’ the memory of which is still carried by the German ‘Urteil,’ 
which today simply means ‘proposition’ or ‘judgement.’
1 It is the same word Kant 
uses in his Critique of Judgement, namely, Kritik der Urteilskraft. But the old ‘ordal’ 
carries a meaning which ‘Urteil’ does not. For what the old ‘ordal’ means is that 
something would have to be brought forth, something would first have to appear, 
for something to be said. Without [th]is having been unconcealed, nothing would 
or could be said, as there would be nothing to speak of, and [th]is, without which 
there would be nothing to speak of, is [called] true. The judicious ordeals by fire, 
water, poison and combat were introduced from the north by the Normans with the 
conquests that began around 800 A.D.
2 In his supremely entertaining book on The 
History of Duellingen, Millingen relates a practice among the Norwegians that was 
not imported to the south, namely holmgang. This duel was performed on a holme 
or an islet, with the tribesmen circling in Viking ships, looking towards the one 
which the battle was about to unconceal. For, in the end only one would remain 
outstanding, only one man would overcome.
3 
4  
                                                 
1 Hexter, Equivocal Oaths and Ordeals in Medieval Literature, pp. 3-4. 
2 Hexter, Equivocal Oaths and Ordeals in Medieval Literature, pp. 3-9. 
3 Millingen, The History of Duellingen, p. 339. Shakespeare displays an almost transparent sense of 
[th]is logic of unconcealment, when he, in his first play, lets Lord Talbot praise the brave Salisbury 
as the ‘mirror of martial men,’[Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act I, Scene iv.74. Emphasis added.] 
to declare with pride, ‘In thirteen battles Salisbury o’ercame.’ [Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act 
I, Scene iv.78]. Even if Heidegger speaks of truth as polemos, it is still surprising to find that in his 
final testament, Identity and Difference, he speaks of Ankunft and Überkommnis, arrival and 
overcoming, when he again attempts to add another dimension to his exposition of the ontological 
difference.[Heidegger, Identity and Difference, pp. 64-65]. Evidently, Heidegger attempts to add an 
experiental dimension to the ontological difference, a logical sense of Being unconcealed, of having 
been granted that place which from Salisbury, and from all sooner or later, is taken away.  
4 It is astonishing to find that the current use of the word ‘holmgang’ in Norway, confirms 
Nietzsche’s history of European decadence, as it today signifies an argument or a debate, a mere 
fight with words. The different ordeals did however have a real history before what announced The True Production of Being 
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[18]     What does ordal, ordeal, Urteil have to do with Shakespeare and the true 
production of Being? No answer is more self-evident, no question more easy to 
answer. For Shakespeare adopts and presents, throughout his plays a form of trial 
by ordeal which was more common and lasted longer, and was common hundreds 
of years longer than any of these trials, that is, the trial by combat. And if one 
thinks that the ‘trial by combat’ at the time of Shakespeare was already an 
anachronism, it should be noted that the last time the right to wage battle, to 
challenge your opponent to a duel in order to uphold your rights or honour, 
occurred as late as 1817 in England.
5 And if one believes that the duel was merely 
an outmoded institution or simply a fashionable dramatic convention employed to 
spice up the play, there would, of course, be no reason for Andrea Alciati to 
condemn the practice in Avignon in 1529,
6 and, certainly, no reason for Francis 
Bacon in London to write a charge against this ‘barbaric practice’ almost a 
hundred years later, in 1614.
7 Evidently, there would be no reason for Bacon to 
write this injunction, if the practice of duelling did not exist. One should remember 
                                                                                                                                               
these real practices became metaphors: The two most common kinds of trial or judicious ordeal or 
prøve, were ildprøve or trial by fire and vannprøve, trial by water. There was also a trial by poison, 
which is not likely to have been a common practice in the North as there is no common word for 
[th]is practice today. The common use in Norwegian of words which are all taken from the practice 
of ordeals, holmgang, ildprøve, vannprøve, does of course, indicate the common, if not widespread, 
use of the practice itself. In the ordeal by fire the accused would walk on glowing hot iron ploughs, 
or be asked to carry burning coal, and if burnished, she would prove her guilt, if not, her innocence. 
It was believed that a sign of guilt would not fail to appear. Thus, showing the [un]truth, she would 
be found guilty, to be false, by unconcealment of [th]is blackened wound. The most common kind of 
vannprøve, trial by water, would be to tie the hands and feet of the accused and throw the accused 
into the water, the river or a well. The guilty party would soon sink, the innocent would float, the 
idea again being that the true will inevitably appear, and God would not fail to further the 
unconcealment of the one who is [true]. In the case of trial by poison, the accused would be found 
guilty if she was to fall sick or die, for it was invariably believed, that the false would not fail to be 
concealed as much as the true would be kept in unconcealment, by God. For a general introduction 
to the history of the different kinds of ordeals by combat, water, fire and poison. see, Millingen, The 
History of Duellingen, ‘Chapter III, The Origin of Duelling,’ pp. 21-43, and Hexter, Equivocal Oaths 
and Ordeals in Medieval Literature, pp. 3-9. 
5 Coltman Clephan, The Tournament, p. 168. 
6 Green, Andrea Alciati and his Books of Emblems, p. 7. 
7 Bacon, The Charge Touching Duels, in Francis Bacon - A Critical Edition of the Major Works, [ed.] 
Brian Vickers, pp. 304-313. The True Production of Being 
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that even if Queen Elizabeth discouraged the practice of duels, as it opposed her 
sole right to bear arms, the privilege to use military force, it was in her time and in 
Shakespeare’s, still lawful to challenge. The judicious practice did however fall 
into disuse after Henry VIII, who is quite tellingly the last King to hold 
tournaments that are more than show and display. For under Queen Elizabeth, 
who controlled her courts as much by entertainment and fashion as by the explicit 
use of power, the tournament was soon integrated into the spectacle that was part 
of the cult of the Virgin Queen.
8 Attempting to find justification in God, Bacon 
opens The Charge by saying, in effect, that the practice of duels is to take up arms 
against the Lord himself and the one who is his substitute on earth, His Majesty 
the King. ‘For the mischief itself, it may please your Lordship to take into your 
consideration that when revenge is once extorted out of magistrates’s hands 
contrary to God’s ordinance, mihi vindicta, ego retribuam.’
9 And suddenly, as if the 
tables of history had been turned, as if History itself had turned around at the bar, 
Bacon states that it is the Law of the Monarchy that is given by God, and not every 
man’s right to unconceal himself, with or without arms. Even if Bacon 
acknowledges that ‘To wear a sword’ is ‘a right enjoyed by Gentlemen,’ he does 
not hesitate to discourage the proliferation of this right. Thus, protecting the 
Monarchy, Bacon may indeed be said to neglect us all, if not he, like his own 
student, Thomas Hobbes, secretly believed in a civil contract whereby all authority 
                                                 
8 The lawful practice of judicious duels had been successfully discouraged by Queen Elizabeth, 
without her making any alterations to the law where this right remained, as Coltman Clephan 
observes, on ‘the statue book’ until 1818, when the law was finally repealed. [Coltman Clephan, 
The Tournament, p. 168.] 
9 The translation is provided by Brian Vickers, ‘Vengeance is mine, I will repay saith the Lord.’ 
Rom. 12:19.’ Bacon, The Charge Touching Duels, in Francis Bacon - A Critical Edition of the Major 
Works, p. 685n. The True Production of Being 
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is given the Absolute which guarantees the safety of us all.
10Arguing against the 
practice of duels, Francis Bacon, like so many in the Renaissance, invokes the 
ancients for advice and good example, and points out that the practice of duelling 
was imported from the barbarous north and never practiced among the virtuous 
Greeks or Romans, from which all good people seek advice as if from a previous 
and Golden Age.
11  
 
[19]     The three clearest examples of judicious duels in Shakespeare’s plays, are 
certainly, the one referred to in Hamlet between the Old King Hamlet and King 
Fortinbras, who fought a fair battle in which King Hamlet was finally 
unconcealed.
12 Another judicious duel is the one that opens Richard II, where 
Bolingbroke has challenged Lord Mowbray, although it should immediately be 
                                                 
10 Discouraging the practice of duels, Bacon says, as he speaks for the Monarchy, that it may lead to 
trooping, and from there, to the unwarranted seizure or usurpation of land or property. ‘It may 
grow from quarrels to banding, and from banding to trooping, and so to tumult and commotion.’ 
[Bacon, The Charge Touching Duels, in Francis Bacon - A Critical Edition of the Major Works, p. 
305.] ‘It may cause sudden storms in Court, to the disturbance of his Majesty, and unsafety of his 
person.’ [Bacon, The Charge Touching Duels, in Francis Bacon - A Critical Edition of the Major 
Works, p. 305]. 
11 Both Millingen, Coltman Clephan and Hexter concur when Bacon says that the practice of the 
judicious duel was imported from the north by the Goths, although Colman Clephan prefer to call 
them, ’Normans.’ [Bacon, The Charge Touching Duels, in Francis Bacon - A Critical Edition of the 
Major Works, p. 309. Millingen, The History of Duellingen, ‘Chapter III, The Origin of Duelling,’ 
pp. 21-43, Coltman Clephan, The Tournament, p. 146, and Hexter, Equivocal Oaths and Ordeals in 
Medieval Literature, pp. 3-9.] When reading Bacon’s The Charge touching Duels, one should bear in 
mind that the right to a judicious duel belonged to all gentlemen, and that this right was not 
removed from the statute books until 1818, [Coltman Clephan, The Tournament, p. 168.] that 
indeed this law survived long enough to see the first revolver duels in 19
th Century America. But in 
Europe, this right and this practice to assert oneself and one’s honour by combat was gradually 
taken away from the time of the reign of Elizabeth I and onwards [Coltman Clephan, The 
Tournament, p. 166.] The main issue was, as it still is today, whether there should be an Absolute 
Power of legislation and sanctioning belonging to the King or State or Government alone. Bacon 
emphasizes the crucial point, that to defend duelling is in effect to claim the right to set up a rival 
law [Bacon, The Charge Touching Duels, in Francis Bacon - A Critical Edition of the Major Works, 
p. 305.] For, as Bacon says, attempting to discourage this practice forever by wilfully distorting the 
issue, and with the sole intent of giving all powers to the Monarchy, ‘Every man shall bear the 
sword not to defend themselves but to assail, and private men begin once to presume to give law to 
themselves, and to right out their own wrongs, no man can foresee the dangers and inconveniences 
that may arise and multiply thereupon.’ [Bacon, The Charge Touching Duels, in Francis Bacon - A 
Critical Edition of the Major Works, p. 305]. 
12 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene i.80-108. The True Production of Being 
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said that, like Queen Elizabeth herself,
13 King Richard interrupts the duel and 
forces both parties into exile.
14 We would have to look for Shakespeare’s 
adaptation of Chaucer’s A Knight’s Tale, that is, to The Two Noble Kinsmen, to 
find a judicious duel that is also the climax of the tragedy itself, a duel, which, like 
any true ordeal, does not fail to unconceal the one who is [true]. Of course, these 
are merely the judicious duels, the injudicious duels abound in Shakespeare’s 
plays, and of all unlawful duels not one is more memorable and more 
consequential than the one between Romeo and Tybalt.
15 For Romeo, having 
transgressed the law, having taken the law into his own hands, having executed a 
right which truly no longer belongs to a gentleman, kills Tybalt in an injudicious 
duel, for which he is sent into exile.
16 For Romeo is - by the King, who has, in this 
play as in life, all rights to the lawful execution and use of violence - sent into an 
exile of which we all know the tragic consequences, the separation in life and the 
unification in death of Romeo and Juliet.
17 
 
[20]     Of all Shakespeare’s plays there is only one opening with a judicious duel, 
namely Richard II, where we all expect the trial by combat to bring forth the true 
and bring down the untrue.
18 Shakespeare’s Richard II is the story of how Henry 
IV [1399-1413] succeeds Richard II [1377-1399] to the throne. Set in a time which, 
                                                 
13 Coltman Clephan reveals an incident where Queen Elizabeth personally attempted to interrupt 
the procession of a judicious duel, Coltman Clephan, The Tournament, p. 167. 
14 Shakespeare, Richard II, Act I, Scene iii.119f. 
15 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Scene i. We are reminded of what Brian Vickers says in 
his commentary to Bacon, that King James put a provisional ban on this practice in 1613. [Brian 
Vickers, notes to Bacon, ‘The Charge Touching Duels,’ in Vickers [ed], Francis Bacon – A Critical 
Edition of the Major Works, p. 685]. 
16 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Scene ii.190. And is it not telling that the most concealed 
of all Shakespeare’s characters, Romeo, Falstaff and Hamlet are all, for one reason or another, in 
one play or another, forced into exile, for, having transgressed the law of unconcealment, they do 
perhaps no longer deserve, to be there. 
17 For their final unification, see. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act V, scene iii.165. 
18 The play opens with a challenge, but we are soon gathered in the tiltyard, by the lists at Coventry 
in Shakespeare’s Richard II, Act I, Scene iii. The True Production of Being 
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according to the chronicles, was in turmoil, the succession of Kings often rapid and 
violent, it is not surprising that Henry IV enters the play as Lord Bolingbroke and 
already in the beginning, before the King, is accused of high treason by his fellow 
gentleman and knight, Thomas Mowbray, the Duke of Norfolk. One could present 
arguments for and against these accusations. To defend oneself one could call on 
witnesses, deliver testimonies or invoke gods, but common in disputes over land, 
that is, in civil cases, and equally in criminal charges of treason, one had the right 
to invoke a trial by combat, a duel, a practice that was not uncommon when Queen 
Elizabeth ascended the throne in 1558.
19  
 
[21]     Let us see what happens in Richard II after Bolingbroke has challenged the 
Duke of Norfolk by throwing down his gage.
20 The Duke of Norfolk picks up the 
glove, which he shows to the King and his court, before he turns to his adversary 
and declares, ‘I take it up, and by that sword I swear, Which gently laid my 
knighthood on my shoulder, I’ll answer thee in any fair degree, Or chivalrous 
design of knightly trial. And when I mount, alive may I not light/If I be traitor or 
unjustly fight.’
21 And what does Lord Bolingbroke answer, ‘Look what I speak, 
my life shall prove it true.’
22 Bolingbroke does not forget to add the deprecating 
‘false Mowbray’
23 in the presence of the King, and with mutual accusation of 
falsity and cowardice, each cursing the other for Being untrue, the King prepares 
the lists at Coventry. When Bolingbroke accuses Thomas Mowbray, the Duke of 
                                                 
19 Coltman Clephan, The Tournament, p. 116 and p. 166. If one still insists on confusing Bacon with 
Shakespeare, one has of course, failed to consider that in 1614, not long after Elizabeth’s reign, 
Francis Bacon did write, as Attorney General, an official injunction against the practice of duels, 
The Charge Touching Duels.   
20 Shakespeare, Richard II, Act I, Scene i.74. 
21 Shakespeare, Richard II, Act I, Scene i.78-83. Emphasis added. 
22 Shakespeare, Richard II. Act I, Scene i.87. Emphasis added. 
23 Shakespeare, Richard II, Act I, Scene i.97. Emphasis added. The True Production of Being 
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Norfolk, for being false, it is obvious that the understanding of truth here is not 
something derivate. No proposition, no intellect, no picture is called true, for truth 
is not a relation, but is the mark of that which is [unconcealed]. ‘True’ is not the 
one who asserts, brings forth correct opinions or propositions adequate to what is 
already given, but the one who after the battle is and remains outstanding. We 
shall bear in mind, that by simply appearing, someone or something is trumpeted 
as true, as it steps out in to the light, into the clearing, into the open. There it is said 
that some people shine more than others, as Shakespeare speaks of the bright King 
Henry V, shimmering like a star to guide his followers,
24 and some people may 
appear more obscurely, like Falstaff and his companions, ‘the moon’s men.’
25 
 
[22]     Like the spectators, we are all eager to know who the true man is. And are 
not our expectations high? Who looks the truer man? Can we see the true man 
shining forth more clearly than the other, as Heidegger says of Achilles in his 
lectures on Parmenides, where he, quoting from The lliad, marks out that even long 
before the chariot race begins, Achilles appears to be the truer man.
26 There are 
indications, signs showing obscurely, only partly unconcealing who the true winner 
is, i.e. will be. For as much as pseudos, what is false, means partly, aletheia, what is 
true, means completely. And, like a bud indicates a flower, a seed a bulb, a branch 
a tree, so too the Greek experience of what is false,
27 so does pseudos indicate 
aletheia, the false what is true, what is partly unconcealed what is fully 
unconcealed.
28 But what happens in the duel between Lord Bolingbroke and the 
                                                 
24 Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act I, Scene i.55. 
25 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act I, Scene ii.32. 
26 Heidegger, Parmenides, pp. 128f. 
27 Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 29f. 
28 Heidegger, Parmenides, pp. 32 and 43f. We may from [th]is Greek perspective, speak of flowers 
of unconcealment, flowers of truth, and buds of falsity. For to the Greeks, the experience what is The True Production of Being 
 
215  
Duke of Norfolk? Who appears in the clearing unconcealed? Not one, for the King 
throws down his warder and stops the fight, which was his prerogative. King 
Richard simply announces his judgment, a decision which by both parties, by both 
Knights, is considered un-fair, an unjust removal of their given rights as Knights 
to fight and uphold their saying with their true bodies. The King orders them both 
to exile. Lord Bolingbroke for ‘twice five summers,’ and Thomas Mowbray to the 
indefinite, the ‘dateless limit of thy dear exile.’
29 Bolingbroke returns to wage war, 
to topple Richard II and finally become Henry IV, but only after Richard II is 
cowardly killed in the Tower of London, the Tower said to have been erected by 
Julius Caesar in the town he named Trinovantum, or New Troy.
30 
 
[23]     King Richard’s interference in the ordeal reflects the now absolute powers 
of the Monarchy, where the right to execute violence, as Max Weber would later 
say, only belongs to one.
31 This absolute right to wage war, to command combat, 
does not fail to fatally change the course of events in Romeo and Juliet, where 
Escalus, Prince of Verona, halts the battle between the Capulets and Montagues, 
orders the tragic banishment of Romeo who seeks exile in Mantua. It is the 
unfortunate exile of Romeo, which leads Juliet in desperation to follow the plan of 
                                                                                                                                               
false is similar to the experience of seeds, buds and branches, which may or may not be, become 
unconcealed as flowers, bulbs or trees. 
29 Shakespeare, Richard II, Act I, Scene iii.151. We shall not convey what later happens, only say 
that Mowbray dies in Christian field killing infidels on his Crusade to the Holy Land, as he dies in 
Venice, or as it is said of the glories of the battlefield of unconcealment in Shakespeare, Richard II, 
Act IV, Scene i.90, ‘banished Norfolk fought For Jesu Christ in glorious Christian field, Streaming 
the ensign of the Christian cross, Against black pagans, Turks, and Saracens: And, toiled with 
works of war, retired himself, To Italy, and there at Venice gave, His body to that pleasant 
country’s earth, And his pure soul not his captain, Christ.’ Shakespeare, Richard II, Act IV, Scene 
i.92.  
30 And on this occasion, we should point out, as we appear to be moving in circles, that Snorri 
Sturluson claims, in the opening of Edda, ascendancy from Troy, that after being conquered by the 
Greeks, the Trojans migrated North, to Norway, until they finally came to Iceland, where Snorri 
wrote down the saga of his own people, in Edda. Snorri Sturluson, Edda, p. 3. 
31 Certainly it corresponds to Queen Elizabeth’s aversion to the duel and anticipates King James 
later ban in 1619. The True Production of Being 
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Friar Lawrence to feign her own death to thereby avoid marriage with Paris.
32 But 
not all duels in Shakespeare’s plays are interrupted like the duel between 
Mowbray and Bolingbroke or the duel between the Capulets and the Montagues. 
Some or most are indeed fought, like the duel between Macduff and Macbeth at 
the end of Macbeth, or the duel between Edgar and Edmund at the end of King 
Lear or the duel between Prince Harry and Thomas Hotspur at the end of Henry 
IV, Part I - all duels or ordeals by combat that does not fail to finally, in the end, 
secure what to Shakespeare appears to be almost the inevitable outcome, the 
unconcealment of the true. But there is another sense in which Shakespeare’s 
presentation of the duel reflects the times, when he in Pericles presents the 
tournament as what it truly had become during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, 
merely a spectacle.
33 And perhaps it reflects the times, and shows how much the 
institution of knighthood was already seen as an anachronism, when Shakespeare 
attacks what appears to be the easiest and commonest target of ridicule, the knight 
in Twelfth Night.  
 
[24]     Appearing more foolish than any fool, no knight appears more hilarious 
than Sir Andrew in Twelfth Night. It is not without reason that he is accused of  
‘breaking the peace,’ when he is seen dancing the catch.
34 It is also a sign of the 
times that when Sir Andrew Aguecheek is challenged to prove that he is a true 
knight, he does not silently draw his sword, but lets Sir Toby try to defend him 
with an argument. Rather pretentiously, Sir Toby declares to his unconvinced 
niece, Maria, that if she does not believe that Sir Andrew is a true knight, she 
                                                 
32 The plan that will later have such fatal consequences, is presented by Friar Lawrence in 
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act IV, Scene i.89. 
33 Shakespeare, Pericles, Act I, Scene ii and Scene iii. 
34 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act II, Scene iii.65 The True Production of Being 
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should know that Sir Andrew plays the violin and can speak ’four languages 
without a book.’
35 It is obvious that civil society exerts different demands on its 
citizens, and that the true qualities of the battlefield appear to be superfluous to 
civilian society. Instead of fighting for appearance, the rules of the theatre have 
changed.
36 No longer does one need dexterity with weapons or prowess in battle to 
be unconcealed. One does now argue and use wit to conquer, and in that art, Sir 
Andrew admits, he falls short, or as he declares with much regret, ‘O, had I but 
followed the arts.’
37  
§5.3 Shakespeare’s True Betrayal 
 
 
[25]     We find that the knight in Shakespeare’s plays, almost as often as he is 
praised, is a common type of ridicule, as is the case with Sir Andrew in Twelfth 
Night who ends up dancing the jig to prove his knighthood.
38 Another knight of 
ridicule is the living anachronism of Owen Glendower of Wales in Henry IV, Part I, 
who still thinks he lives in the age of Merlin.
 39 Even Hamlet’s own ideals are but 
anachron to the age in which he lives, and what is untimely, is not his life, but his 
ideals and his learning. A contemporary of Shakespeare, namely Sir Francis 
Bacon, Count of Virulam, is the first to point out in his critique of Aristotle and the 
schoolmen, that what was taught at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, 
                                                 
35 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act I, Scene iii.25. 
36 Again, one may, etymologically, if that is to give any guidance or understanding, speak of ‘the 
looking place,’ not only the place where we come to watch what is concealed, but the place where 
[th]is is itself unconcealed, in the playhouse or on the battleground. Cf. Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 
147 and in Michael Ewans’s introduction to Aeschylus, Oresteia, p. xix. 
37 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act I, Scene iii.92. This scene is not without bawdy intent, as Sir 
Andrew is both ‘put down’ by Maria’s wit, similarly he ‘falls short’ of persuading her, for had he 
mastered the art of persuasion, he would almost certainly, and indeed, not figuratively, been able 
‘to accost her.’ Sadly, Sir Andrew is not trained in this new art of persuasion, that belongs to a 
society so unlike the one in which he was brought up to live. 
38 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act I, Scene iii.15ff. 
39 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act III, Scene i. The True Production of Being 
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and perhaps no less at Wittenberg, corresponds to an age long since gone, the 
primary reason for this anachronism being the untimely dependence on Aristotle 
whose ideas about the self-sufficiency of true science
40 makes Bacon refer to this 
science as no more than a sexual vice that leaves no progeny.
41 Unquestionably, 
Shakespeare has given Hamlet untimely ideals and anachronistic learning, with no 
bearing on his life,
42 hence opening up a gulf, an abyss to which no life could 
possibly correspond. But what makes Hamlet tragic is that he perceives the 
difference between these two worlds, so much so that he himself embodies the 
crossing of these incomparable worlds of books and lives, of ideals and actions. By 
contrast, Cervantes’ Don Quixote [1619] has not torn a page away from his 
perceptions, his experiences has not made him tear a single page from his chivalric 
                                                 
40 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, 982b25. 
41 Cf. Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, Book One, in Francis Bacon, ed. Brian Vickers. As we 
learn with almost total surprise from Sears Jayne’s Plato and the English Renaissance, Plato was 
hardly known at the time of Shakespeare, almost completely unheard of in the English Renaissance 
[Jayne, Plato and the English Renaissance, pp. 135-137]. Even Bacon knows almost nothing of Plato, 
whom he merely considers to be a harmless mystic. In the English Renaissance Plato is not much 
more than a rumour. One attributes titles to his corpus that are not his, and even the best of men 
confuse the pseudonymous with Plato’s true works, Alchibiades with Republic. And, as Jayne 
shows, Sophist was unknown, not even mentioned by name. Jayne even goes so far as to particularly 
speak of The Elizabethan Age, as the Platonic blackout [Jayne, Plato and the English Renaissance, 
pp. 135-137]. These acknowledgements do not add a little legitimacy to our argument. For as is 
claimed throughout this thesis, whereas a Neoplatonic preconception of the Being of beings is 
essential, is true or truly unconcealed, as was also showed concretely in the opening paragraph of 
this chapter, the Platonic preapperception of Being is inessential. Not unexpectedly there is 
something that resembles a ban on Plato during Elizabeth’s reign. More fundamentally, there is a 
discrepancy between ideals and lives, nowhere more concretely exposed than in the case of 
Shakespeare, who marks this passage from a Neoplatonic preappreception of truth to a Platonic - 
without, of course knowing anything of Plato - where there is given Being to that which inessentially 
is, or essentially is not, the ontological difference, the Being of beings. If now anyone thought our 
speech did not live up to its promise, point out that we were to speak of the anachronism of 
Aristotle and not of Neoplatonism, he must surely have failed to understand that Neoplatonism is 
Aristotle’s Wirkungsgeschichte. Nothing stands further apart than Plato and 
Aristotle/Neoplatonism. For whereas the one asserts that the untrue/false/non-Being is, the other 
asserts that it is not, and there cannot be found greater disagreement than between one who thinks 
that [th]is is and another that [th]is is not.  
42 There are two anachronistic elements that are concretely to be observed: the anachronistic taste 
for the Virgilian epos and the anachronisms of the chivalric ideals of bravery, honesty, etc. 
Speaking of the anachrony of chivalry, it is, of course, a sign of the times, as Rosencrantz informs 
us, ‘that many wearing rapiers are afraid of goosequills and dare scarce come’ to the theatre, as the 
knights are afraid that they may be[come] subject to satire and ridicule.[Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 
II, Scene ii.351]. The True Production of Being 
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romances, whereas Hamlet, recognizing the abhorring difference, can easily tear 
away the pages of this anachronistic book - and it is likely that Shakespeare, like 
Bacon, could have imagined Hamlet holding a book by Aristotle in his hands or 
one of the chivalric romances - page by page, crumble the pages and throw them 
on the floor. And when Polonius, the caretaker of all anachronisms as well as all 
formalisms at Elsinore Castle,
43 approaches him and asks for the matter and 
meaning of what he read that lies so crumbled on the floor, Hamlet does cry out to 
Polonius, ‘Words, Words, Words!’
44  
 
[26]    Truly, this is the cry of inadequation, for either is his life inadequate to his 
learning or his learning inadequate to his life. That Shakespeare is perfectly aware 
of all contemporary anachronisms, the untimeliness of the times, is again made 
clear when he presents the trial of Sir Andrew in Twelfth Night.
45 In Shakespeare’s 
oeuvre, no knight is more ridiculous than Sir Andrew Aguecheek. What is ridicule 
is not merely an individual, but a whole institution, for, as is well known, the 
                                                 
 
43 It is safe to say, that we would have a stronger sense of Being in Denmark, if the name of this 
place had not been altered, if it instead read Kronenborg Slot or Helsingør Castle. 
44 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.194. Intentionally, we have turned the anachronism on its 
head, for it is obvious that it is a man with a taste for antiquity that throws a modern satire on the 
floor. Hamlet is most likely reading a satire, of which he immediately complains that it lacks 
‘honesty.’ [Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.204]. It is not arbitrary when Polonius observes 
that, ‘Though this be madness, yet there is method in’t.’ [Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene.ii.207. 
Emphasis added] There certainly is, for Hamlet does persistently and anachronistically long for an 
honest method of [re]presentation in a time when, as Hamlet realizes, honesty itself had become and 
anachronism [Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene i.111-115]. Hamlet recognizes this ‘honest 
method’ in Virgil’s Aeneid, [Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.454-529.] a masterpiece of 
literature too ‘caviary to the general,’[Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.447.] that is, as Tony 
Tanner translates, ‘too choice for the multitude.’ When the prince himself begins to recite ‘Aeneas’ 
tale to Dido. [Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.454-529.] he does not expect to satisfy the taste 
of the times, which, as Hamlet points out before he falls into another rapture of [theatre] 
criticism,[Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene ii.1-47.] was only open for ‘a jig or a tale of 
bawdry,’[Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii..511.] obscenities and dances without which the 
spectator would soon fall asleep.[Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.512.] Shakespeare does 
obviously not think highly of his audience as he presents numerous such obscenities and dances, 
perhaps only to satisfy their tastes. To this palate, ‘the honest method’ of The Two Noble Kinsmen, 
which is his last play, appear to be not much more than an act of bad conscience, a final effort to 
relieve the next generation of all the mistakes he made when he was young, to again erect the true 
ideals of chivalry, honesty and bravery, that has so long been lost. 
45 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act I, Scene iii.15ff. The True Production of Being 
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tournaments soon deteriorated to play and spectacle after Queen Elizabeth 
ascended the throne, making the institution of knighthood into an anachronism in 
less than a lifetime. Although Sir Andrew is both tall and moneyed, it is hardly 
enough to convince a doubting Maria that he is truly a knight. So, Sir Toby has to 
find a better way to prove the man’s knighthood, and Sir Toby, trying to come up 
with something to persuade Olivia’s maid, draws out nothing less than an 
argument, which I am sure made all contemporary spectators burst into laughter.
46 
For defending Sir Andrew’s knighthood, Sir Toby says, ‘Fie that you’ll say so! He 
plays o’th’ viol-de-gamboys, and speaks three or four languages without a book.’
47  
No one can doubt Shakespeare’s intention, in what he must surely have perceived 
as both false and peaceful times, when he leaves us with Sir Andrew dancing the 
jig to prove, once and for all and without a word, his knighthood.
48  
 
[27]     Before we continue to map out Shakespeare’s true betrayal, we should 
pause for a moment to think of Shakespeare’s final words to posterity, the last 
words of the last play he ever wrote, before his pen fell silent. To claim, in this 
light, that The Two Noble Kinsmen stems from another hand than Shakespeare’s, 
that is, Fletcher’s, would of course fail to see the most apparent coherence from 
beginning to end in Shakespeare’s authorship.
49 For as it begins with the praise of 
                                                 
46 We should perhaps add that Sir Andrew is an expendable character, introduced only to 
complicate the plot, and, it would seem, for the sake of pure comic relief and ridicule. 
47 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act I, Scene iii.25. 
48 The ridicule of knighthood, is especially telling when compared to Spencer’s heroic The Fairy 
Queen. No wonder as Frances Yates tells us, in The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age, that 
The Fairy Queen went almost unread. [Cf. Yates, The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age, p. 
126].  
49 Even though the contention is disputed, most commentators find reason to believe that 
Shakespeare wrote substantial parts of the The Two Noble Kinsmen. In his thorough and laudable 
introduction to The Two Noble Kinsmen, Eugene M. Waith speaks of a division of labour between 
Fletcher and Shakespeare when he writes, ‘Shakespeare, the senior partner, writing the entire first 
act and the first scene of the second, introduced the characters of both plots, wrote all the scenes of 
the main plot in the last act, and some scene of both plots in Acts 3 and 4.’The Two Noble Kinsmen, The True Production of Being 
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the truly unconcealed Henry V in Henry VI, Part I, the funeral of a man whom in 
[th]is life was truly unconcealed in battle,
50 so Shakespeare’s works ends with the 
duel between Palamon and Arcite in The Two Noble Kinsmen.
51 In the concluding 
stages of this play, Pirithous describes how Arcite, celebrating his victory, was 
‘trotting the stones of Athens,’
52 until he saw the horse suddenly, ‘Cold as old 
Saturn, and like him possessed/With fire malevolent’
53 …’disroot his rider whence 
he grew.’
54 When seeing the dying Arcite being carried in, Palamon cries out, ‘O 
miserable end of our alliance!/The gods are mighty, Arcite. If thy heart,/Thy 
worthy, manly ear, be yet unbroken,/Give me thy last words. I am Palamon,/One 
that yet loves thee dying.’
55 Love is here nothing but a desire to let the other be 
unconcealed, even if I were to be vanquished, I desire you to truly appear before 
me.
56 But Arcite, a dying man, returns the gesture of love as he gives away the 
                                                                                                                                               
Introduction by Eugene M. Waith, p. 62. But we should also give as evidence of Shakespeare 
writing the last scene, the more concrete commentary by Thomas De Quincy, but I let Eugene M. 
Waith proceed with his argument: ‘Thomas De Quincey made one of the firmest commitments to 
Shakespeare (and one of the most laudatory comments on the play) in a note to a review in 
Blackwood’s Magazine (24 (1828)) of Whateley’s Elements of Rhetoric (1828). Explaining his 
omission of Shakespeare from a survey of English rhetoric that he had just given, he wrote: 
“Shakespeare is no doubt a rhetorician, majorum gentium; but he is so much more, that scarcely an 
instance is to be found of his rhetoric which does not pass by fits into a higher element of eloquence 
or poetry. The first and the last acts, for instance, of The Two Noble Kinsmen, which, in point of 
composition, is perhaps the most superb work in the language, and beyond all doubt from the loom 
of Shakespeare, would have been the most gorgeous rhetoric, had they not happened to be 
something far better.’ [Waith’s note: De Quincey reprinted the review as an essay entitled 
‘Rhetoric’ in his collected works. See De Quincey’s Writings, vol. xi. (Boston, 1853), p.280] He [De 
Quincey] then cited ‘the supplications of the widowed queens to Theseus [1.1.25-1.1.235], the 
invocations of their tutelar divinities by Palamon and Arcite]’ [Act/Scene, 5.1.] and ‘the death of 
Arcite’ [5.4.85-5.4.137] as examples of Shakespeare at his best.” Shakespeare, The Two Noble 
Kinsmen, Introduction by Eguene M. Waith, pp. 9-10. Given such evidence, and the fact that this is 
the last scene in the last play that Shakespeare ever handed to us, one should not look lightly upon 
what is said, and should not roam about looking for Shakespeare’s self-image in The Tempest, 
where Prospero vows to never again make use of his magic wand. 
50 For the praise of Henry V, see Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act I, Scene i.1-56. 
51 Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, Act V, Scene i.85. 
52 Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, Act V, Scene iv.55. 
53 Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, Act V, Scene iv.63. 
54 Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, Act V, Scene iv.76. 
55 Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, Act V, Scene iv.85-90. 
56 Those who raise the question as to why Shakespeare would chose to collaborate on this play with 
the young and upcoming playwright Fletcher, must certainly have looked passed the evidence. For The True Production of Being 
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prize of combat, ‘Take, Emilia,/And with her all the world’s joy. Reach, thy hand -
/Farewell; I have told my last hour. I was false.’
57 As in any trial or ordeal, to be 
false does simply mean to not be unconcealed, not that there was a discrepancy 
between words and lives, intellect and thing, propositions and whatever it might be 
that we compare our propositions to before deciding that they are false. For even if 
the battle did bring him forth, life did not unconceal him as Emily’s lover. Whence, 
Arcite was false, only falsely did he appear as Emily’s lover. In the final act of 
Shakespeare’s final play, when he is about to name that which unconceals all 
lovers to all, Shakespeare cannot resist the opportunity to express another 
contradiction. As King Theseus says, ‘Never Fortune/Did play a subtler game: the 
conquered triumphs,/The victor has the loss.’
58 
 
[28]     As we witness Shakespeare’s presentation of Palamon’s and Arcite’s 
invocation of their governing divinities Mars and Venus as they pray for 
unconcealment,
59 we do not forget that the supplication of the widowed queens to 
Theseus for their sons’ lives, is a prayer for the same, a prayer for Theseus to show 
pity, that is to keep their sons in unconcealment.
60 Theseus grants this petition, 
truly showing that the virtues of pity, compassion and mercy, are all virtues that 
keep the unfortunate or the transgressor unconcealed. Pity is one of several 
chivalric virtues that Mr. Waith speaks of in his thoughtful and weighed 
introduction to The Two Noble Kinsmen.
61 On one particular point, however, 
namely the contemporary significance of ‘pity,’ I do honestly disagree with Mr. 
                                                                                                                                               
what is obvious is that Shakespeare wants to end were he began, in true concealment, for he knew, 
that in the middle, so many of his plays, appeared to be false. 
57 Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, Act V, Scene iv.92. 
58 Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, Act V, Scene iv.113. 
59 Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, Act V, Scene i.  
60 Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, Act I, Scene i.25-235. 
61 Waith, ‘Introduction’ to Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, pp. 43-49. The True Production of Being 
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Waith, as it is quite clear that pity or compassion has nothing to do with ‘the 
chivalric tradition of extraordinary politeness,’ as Mr.Waith suggests,
62 but rather 
with the virtue or power to keep manifest or unconcealed, of keeping [th]is, like a 
God, in the clearing. Although Eugene M. Waith has written an excellent 
introduction, he does nevertheless not see the necessity of why Pity should be called 
‘godlike’ by the Third Queen.
63 It is obvious that this godlike quality has nothing 
to do with ‘ethics’ or ‘true humanity,’ but, as the whole play shows, with the 
holiness of Being unconcealed. For it is clear that you become like a god by doing 
what God does, that is, unconceal. In The Two Noble Kinsmen, no one shows more 
clearly than Shakespeare that by emulating God you become as God is. Showing 
pity, by sparing the lives Arcite and Palamon, Theseus truly becomes like a god,
64 
that which keeps [th]is unconcealed, in unconcealment. 
 
[29]     Plays like The Two Noble Kinsmen and Henry VI, Part I, ties, as if with one 
single true rope, a knot around the Shakespearean corpus, goes a long way to show 
that Shakespeare presents ideals and realities in which we do not, perhaps cannot 
recognize ourselves. It has to be added, that this says as much about our lives as it 
says about his times. From the testimony of Shakespeare’s last work and his first, 
The Two Noble Kinsmen and Henry VI, Part I, it would appear that Shakespeare 
mourns a long lost age of light, the passing of the Age of Chivalry as much as the 
writers of the Malleus Maleficarum [1484], quoting St. Thomas [d. 1270], could 
mourn the long lost Age of Miracles.
65 For far from being Dark, the Middle, the 
Chivalric Ages were to Shakespeare, a bright, shimmering Age of 
                                                 
62 Waith, ‘Introduction’ to The Two Noble Kinsmen, p. 45. 
63 Waith, ‘Introduction’ to The Two Noble Kinsmen, p. 46f. Cf. Shakespeare, The Two Noble 
Kinsmen, Act I, Scene i.25-235. 
64 Shakespeare, The Two Noble Kinsmen, Act I, Scene i.225-234. 
65 Kramer and Sprenger, The Malleus Maleficarum, p. 38-39. The True Production of Being 
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Unconcealment.
66 There is an enormous difference between the moon-men of 
Henry IV, Part I and the sun-men of Henry VI, Part I, a marked difference between 
Falstaff and Talbot, between the young Prince Harry and King Henry V who 
through many trials had to prove himself to be true. For so corrupt are the ways of 
the young Prince Harry that his father, King Henry IV desires, indeed hopes for 
his exchange, the substitution of him and the ‘gallant Hotspur.’
67 For as clearly as 
Henry V, at the opening of Henry VI, Part I is praised as a star, a sun-knight, 
Shakespeare lets Falstaff and the young Henry, be declared as anti-knights, ‘Men 
of concealment,’ as ‘Gentlemen of the shade,’
68 who steal away into the night
69 to 
become [truly] ‘the moon’s men.’
70  It is not unintentional that Shakespeare lets 
Falstaff, who in jest accuses Prince Harry for being able to corrupt a saint, 
includes himself among ‘the sons of darkness.’
71 And proving that everything in 
this play is topsy-turvy, and like the times of Hamlet, truly ‘out of joint,’
72 
Shakespeare lets Falstaff offer an ironic prayer, where he, praying for 
unconcealment, desires, ‘hopes’ that he will ‘prove a false thief.’
73 But the only 
                                                 
66 In The Two Noble Kinsmen, there are three scenes which give crystal clear images to these light 
ages, to this Age of Unconcealment, ‘the supplications of the widowed queens to Theseus,’ [The Two 
Noble Kinsmen, 1.1.25-1.1.235] ‘the invocations of their tutelar divinities by Palamon and Arcite,’ 
[The Two Noble Kinsmen, Act/Scene, 5.1.] and ‘the death of Arcite,’ [The Two Noble Kinsmen, 
5.4.85-5.4.137] all which Professor Eugene M. Waith praises, along with Thomas de Quincey, as 
some of the most beautiful scenes within all of Shakespeare’s plays. [Waith, Introduction to The 
Two Noble Kinsmen, pp. 9-10.] 
67 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act I, Scene i.80. 
68 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act I, Scene ii.26. 
69 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act I, Scene ii.13. 
70 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act I, Scene ii.32. 
71 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act II, Scene iv.172. 
72 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene v.188. 
73 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act I, Scene ii.159. Emphasis added, as ‘prove’ is used in the 
above sense of what is unconcealed, that which, because it is, cannot be said to be entirely false. Cf. 
Thomas Aquinas, Truth, Question One, Article 1 and Article 10. The True Production of Being 
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thing they ‘prove,’ is that they are ‘true-bred cowards,’
74 no more valiant than 
wild ducks.
75  
 
[30]     Throughout Shakespeare’s works, there is no clearer presentation of 
cowardice than when four men flee in the face of two. That this episode is not a 
coincidental but intentional trial of truth is made perfectly clear, by the previous 
exchange between Falstaff and Prince Hal, and the latter’s hidden intent to test or 
try Falstaff. For Poins and Prince Henry expects Falstaff and his men to be nothing 
but ‘true-bred cowards.’
76 Poins even anticipates the ‘incomprehensible lies that 
this same fat rogue will tell us when we meet at supper.’
77 Before they meet, 
however, Falstaff has already bemoaned the times, but not without a smile and a 
whistle, when, as if confirming this topsy-turvy world where everything is turned 
upside-down or inside out, he says, ‘A plague upon it when thieves cannot be true 
one to another!’
78 They are all, even the knighted are no better than highwaymen 
that ‘worshippest Saint Nicholas,’ the saint of falsehood, or as the Chamberlain 
says of Gadshill, ‘…thou worshippest Saint Nicholas as truly as a man of falsehood 
may.’
79 But that cowardice and lies and falsity is as much at the heart of [th]is play 
as it lies at the heart of civil society, is not really what is at issue. What is, is how 
real all these lies make all these men appear, how we are made to trust their Being 
because they appear to be so falsely. How much Being is not granted Falstaff when 
he appears as a ‘true thief,’ a ‘false friend,’ a ‘coward knight,’ a man endowed 
                                                 
74 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act I, Scene ii.187. 
75 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act II, Scene ii.99-107. 
76 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act I, Scene ii.187. 
77 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act I, Scene ii.190. 
78 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act II, Scene ii.27. 
79 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act II, Scene i.66: Editors note: Saint Nicholas was reckoned the 
patron of all travellers, including thieves. Emphasis added. The True Production of Being 
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with more oxymorons than other men have titles.
80 But Falstaff objects, saying 
‘Indeed, I am not John of Gaunt your grandfather, but yet no coward.’ To which 
Prince Hal openly replies that one should leave judgment to the Lord, ‘Well, we 
leave that to the proof.’
81 Evidently Prince Hal expects Lord Falstaff to show his 
cowardice, and uses the word ‘proof’ in a sense akin to the one used to describe the 
outcome of a judicious duel. For proven is that which is unconcealed. However, as 
Falstaff is very well aware of, whether or not he is essentially a coward, if he 
remains standing he cannot but be, in the most fundamental sense, true [to life]. 
For, as St. Thomas suggests, no one would be, were they entirely false.
82 But is 
there then anyone in Shakespeare’s corpus who in this sense confess to Being 
false? Of course not, for that would, as Derrida rightly remarks, be impossible.
83 
 
[31]     Nowhere is Shakespeare’s ontological concept of what is false, that is, how 
what is essentially false, truly shows us what is, expressed more clearly than in 
Henry IV, Part I, where the false character of Falstaff appears for the first time in 
all his splendour. It is perhaps noteworthy that Falstaff reemerges from a play 
which does not present an ontological understanding of what is false, that is, from 
Shakespeare’s first play, Henry VI, Part I.
84 Shakespeare appears to have changed. 
The most likely reason would not be that Shakespeare suddenly had changed his 
ideals, which are, as we have pointed out strikingly coherent and almost 
unchangeably medieval and anachronistic, but what has probably changed is 
                                                 
80 Cf. Sonnet 66, where it becomes clear that oxymoron is based on the experience of a 
contradiction.  
81 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act II, Scene ii.66-68. Emphasis added. 
82 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Truth, Question One, Article 1 and Article 10. 
83 Derrida, Aporias, p. 21. Cf, Chapter III, Philosophies of Concealment, §. 3.1 Derrida’s Death. 
84 See particularly the scenes where Falstaff flees the battlefield,[Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act 
II, Scene ii.105] and where he is stripped of his knighthood [Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act IV, 
Scene i.1-42]. The True Production of Being 
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Shakespeare’s experience of his audience, which were not perhaps easily seduced 
by idealities, by what is merely true in a Neoplatonic or ideal sense. Shakespeare 
therefore lets Falstaff reappear to dominate the whole stage where he earlier was 
merely an aberration. An anomaly who deserved no more than exile, now becomes, 
as Mr. Bloom remarks, not only the Queen’s favourite character, but also our one 
and only hero.
85 These considerations are quite superficial compared to the 
understanding of what the reappearance of Falstaff effects, which is to subvert, not 
only the common and chivalric ideals of medieval society, but more fundamentally 
to change our apperception of the Being of beings, to accustom us to an ontological 
understanding of what is false, which simply means, that no one is experienced as 
more true, no one appear to be more profoundly than Falstaff, and [th]is simply 
because no one is more false. 
 
[32]     It is a stark contrast between the two plays where Falstaff features, that he 
in the first is banished and in the other is brought to the height of the battlefield by 
no less than the future King himself, the now brave Prince Harry, whose trial or 
ordeal, the whole play of Henry IV, Part I, is. For, during the battle of 
unconcealment, in this ordeal, Falstaff is the coward that flees, hides or pretends to 
be dead, and as he flees from the battlefield of Henry VI, Part I,
86 he does not only 
save himself but becomes Talbot’s false confederate. For not maintaining his 
position,
87 he is later both dishonoured and deknighted in front of his fellow 
knights, whereas Talbot is explicitly honoured as the champion of truth and for 
bravely maintaining his place, is created earl of Shrewsbury.
88 There is no greater 
                                                 
85 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. xxi. 
86 Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act II, Scene ii.19. 
87 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act II, Scene ii.99-107. 
88 Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act III, Scene iv.19/26. The True Production of Being 
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contrast to the dishonoured Falstaff, who saved himself by flight,
89 and for thus 
not appearing, for not maintaining his place it is almost natural that Talbot, 
stripped of all his titles, is sent into exile.
90  
 
[33]     It is obvious that Shakespeare leans towards a Neoplatonic understanding 
of truth in his first and his last plays, in Henry VI, Part I and in The Two Noble 
Kinsmen, that is, towards an understanding of what is as what essentially appear to 
be true. It is equally clear that Shakespeare’s poetology, in many, if not most of his 
plays, betrays [th]is ideal of unconcealment. It is therefore clear, but to a modern 
man in many ways concealed, that the concept of falsity, most clearly displayed in 
Shakespeare’s earlier plays, like Henry VI, Part I, but equally in his last play, The 
Two Noble Kinsmen, is not an ontological understanding of what is false. We shall 
attempt to present, as logically as possible, what a non-ontological understanding 
of what is false means, and we proceed as negatively as possible by initially saying, 
‘The ontological understanding of what is false is not Neoplatonic.’ It should have 
been demonstrated by the presentation thus far, and is yet to become clearer, that 
whereas Shakespeare’s explicit ideals convey a Neoplatonic understanding of 
truth, his presentation undermines his efforts to uphold [th]is Neoplatonic belief, as 
what is [true/real], in most of Shakespeare’s plays, is experienced only as the 
negation of these ideas, ideas, furthermore, that his characters are unable to 
incarnate. In the Platonic view, this negation does not produce a lack of Being, but 
paradoxically a more profound sense of Being, whereas from a Neoplatonic 
perspective it does not. This is why we find ourselves in agreement with Mr. Bloom 
when he says that only superficially could we regard Shakespeare’s characters as 
                                                 
89 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act II, Scene ii.99-107. 
90 Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Henry VI, Part I, Act IV, Scene i.45. The True Production of Being 
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personifications,
91 for they are regardless of what they essentially represent. More 
specifically, they only appear to be as the negations of the ideas they [re]present [to 
the other]. It is therefore impossible for men and women like Falstaff and Hamlet, 
Viola and Sebastian, Romeo and Juliet, to become lifeless allegorical 
representation because they are simply not perceived as what they essentially are, to 
a large extent only perceived as what they are not. 
 
[34]     Of course, an allegorical representation of virtues and vices rests on the 
Neoplatonic belief in reality-producing ideas, which, through procession and 
return, gathers all beings into Being through inessential and non-existent or 
phenomenal mirrors [of existence], or quite simply, khora. The particular subject is 
only seen through this phenomenal mirror, and comes only alive through [th]is 
khora, mirror or clearing, through which the essential idea comes alive. However, 
Shakespeare shatters these Neoplatonic dreams. As he prepares, even conditions 
his audience, to apperceive the Being of beings as that which is without any 
properties, and not essentially as what is concealed or unconcealed, but what is and 
remains, hidden. It is the same apperception of the Being of beings, that from 
which all properties has been taken away, that remains at the heart of Dionysian 
Theology.
92 Of course, [th]is opens up a cleft between Pseudo-Dionysius, on the one 
hand, and Proclus, Iamblichus and Plotinus, on the other, as they all, more or less, 
identify the Being of beings with this procession and return of ideas, which are 
more real than their inessential mirrors.
93 To identify Pseudo-Dionysius as a 
                                                 
91 Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, pp. 4-5. 
92 Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology. 
93 St. Thomas emphasises the crucial point in Pseudo-Dionysius’ ontology, by pointing out that 
whether the angels are ‘spotless mirrors’ and men are ‘dark mirrors,’ in both cases are they 
mirrors, that which occasions all essential characteristica to come true through [th]is. Cf. Thomas, The True Production of Being 
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Neoplatonist would be as false as to identify Shakespeare as the same. For both 
Pseudo-Dionysius and Kant, and Shakespeare in between them, apperceive the 
Being of beings inessentially, as that which is and remains without attributes, and 
can therefore not be associated with the basically and fundamentally essentialistic 
perspective of the Neoplatonist, which to us, regardless of whether this perspective 
is true or not, regardless of whether this philosophy of procession and return from 
the highest peak to the deepest valley is validated, it remains clear that [th]is 
understanding, [th]is preapperception of Being is totally and fully unfamiliar to 
modern men and women who, like Shakespeare, apperceive the Being of beings 
regardless of its essential characteristic, [th]is without what [th]is is.
94 
 
[35]    Nowhere is the ontological understanding of truth - as that which quite 
simply is - expressed clearer than in the concept of truth as polemos or war. This 
idea of truth as polemos is so simple that it does not even need to be understood to 
have a Wirkungsgeschichte, as it is based on the fact that whomever is out-
                                                                                                                                               
Truth, Question 8, Article 3. For evidence of a more essential approach to the Being of beings, see 
Proclus, The Elements of Theology, Iamblichos, The Egyptian Mysteries and Plotinus, The Enneads. 
94 Shakespeare’s successful presentation crushes his medieval ideals. More often than not 
Shakespeare’s presentation of [th]is contradicts his own explicit ideals, if it is not true that the deal 
of unconcealment only belongs to his characters, and never to the author. The untrue is true, only 
what is inadequately [re]presented creates what to us is apperceived as [real], what is hidden. The 
false is more [real] than the true, the inadequate more [real] than the adequate. A case in point is 
Prince Hamlet who looks with jealousy on Prince Fortinbras. Having similar aspirations, Hamlet 
never envies the young prince, does not wish any harm upon a man he admires for being willing to 
take up arms in a foreign land ‘to wage battle for an eggshell,’ [Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act IV, Scene 
v.53.] to fight for nothing, while he, Hamlet, having so much to unconceal, ends up concealing all. 
Again, the explicit ideals of Shakespeare’s drama, the true ideals contradicts his presentation, or 
rather, his presentation contradicts the explicit ideals trumpeted through the mouths of most of the 
characters, except perhaps Falstaff, to whom concealment is not only a strategy for staying [alive], 
a stratagem for Being, but also, an ideal for a living nowhere more tellingly presented than when 
Falstaff on the battlefield, at the height of the battle, pretends to be dead. [Shakespeare, Henry IV, 
Part I, Act V, Scene iv.75] For whereas the explicit ideals more often than not speak of and for a 
true understanding of Being, of being unconcealed in-differently as what you essentially are where 
[th]is idea upholds you in unconcealement, Shakespeare’s actual presentation favours, more often 
than not, the concealed apperception of the Being of beings. So we could say that the ideals within 
the play speak against its own mode or way of presentation or the presentation against its own 
ideals. But the ideal is unreal and only the destruction, the transgression of [th]is ideal, creates from 
within these ruins, the apperception of something that is - to a modern man. The True Production of Being 
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standing, whomever over-comes, sur-vives, is [true]. Shakespeare expresses [th]is 
ideal of unconcealment and of truth as polemos, indirectly but clearly when he, in 
Hamlet, lets the false and murderous King Claudius through diplomatic and 
cowardly means convince the weak, old and barely seeing King of Norway, to 
persuade his nephew Prince Fortinbras of Norway not to wage war against 
Denmark, that is, to avert the renewed engagement in a true battle of 
unconcealment.
95 That Prince Fortinbras does not hold a very high opinion of the 
virtues of womanly Denmark, even King Claudius himself reveals.
96 The young 
Prince Fortinbras is willing to take up arms against Denmark, not only to rectify 
the rights of a father defeated in a true battle of unconcealment, but more so to 
uphold true ideals of unconcealment in an age of cowardice. For even though King 
Fortinbras was conquered and vanquished in a judicious battle, in a trial by ordeal 
by King Hamlet, and thereby had to give up, concede his rights to the land of 
Denmark, Shakespeare shows that [th]is battle for unconcealment is unending, 
that [th]is ordeal never ends.
97  
 
[36]     Shakespeare’s plays are riddled with gloves, almost with as many running 
away from as accepting the challenge. At the end of Shakespeare’s Hamlet we 
                                                 
95 Cf. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene ii.27. 
96 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene ii.17. 
97 Although Shakespeare would easily have recognized that the corrupt tastes of men have not 
changed much since he made his plays to accommodate this taste for corruption, it is nevertheless 
remarkable that what we consider to be Shakespeare’s major plays have all characters which by 
medieval standards, according to all knightly virtues of honour and honesty, generosity and 
courtesy, would be considered, and by Shakespeare are explicitly called, ‘cowards.’ In [th]is 
Gallery of Cowardice, where none would be represented did they not have something to hide, did 
they not give the impression or apperception of Being hidden, ranks, in Shakespeare’s theatre, first 
among equals: Falstaff, Hamlet, Iago, Macbeth, Romeo and Edmund. For by Medieval standards, 
perhaps by any, Falstaff, Hamlet, Iago, Macbeth, Romeo and Edmund, are all cowards, have all 
earned the right to be called ‘cowards.’ It is astonishing to notice how many times the words 
‘coward’ or ‘cowardice’ may be expressed by Shakespeare without Harold Bloom being able to 
notice that it is not meant as a superlative, but actually meant to deride, belittle, to mock the fat 
man in front of his audience. Notice especially Mr. Bloom’s praise of Falstaff and Hamlet as gods 
and immortals, how he praises Falstaff as ‘the eternal god of my imaginings,’ identifies Hamlet’s 
influence as only second to Jesus. [Bloom, Shakespeare – The Invention of the Human, p. xxi].   The True Production of Being 
 
232  
witness that Laertes and Hamlet are invited to a fenceplay before the King, where 
the winner will not gain the right to be unconcealed and the loser have it taken 
away, but, as this is play and not truly an ordeal, the winner will have a precious 
pearl dropped into his cup of wine, as King Claudius says, ‘Richer than that which 
four successive Kings/ In Denmark’s crown has worn.’
98 On [th]is false occasion 
we shall notice that what appears as the grand finale of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, is 
not a true duel of unconcealment, as we so often have seen culminate 
Shakespeare’s plays, like the true battle between Edmund and Edgar at the end of 
King Lear, the duel between Macduff and Macbeth closing Macbeth. So unlike 
Chaucer’s A Knight’s Tale and Shakespeare’s own The Two Noble Kinsmen, 
Hamlet does not only end with play, but with foul play, where all the false players 
are finally undone by their own machinations. What irony is not intended by 
Shakespeare in the final act when he lets Hamlet, the anti-Knight be killed in a 
mock duel. For not only are Queen Gertrude and King Claudius, false, but Hamlet 
equally appears falsely. When Hamlet appears to be mad, the audience is almost in 
as much disruption as Ophelia, who cannot decide if Hamlet fakes - a suitable 
word in this fenceplay - that he loves her or if he fakes that he does not. After the 
tragic death of Ophelia, Hamlet announces to her brother Laertes that he was truly 
in love. However, there cannot be found one next to Ophelia’s grave who does not 
believe he speaks falsely, as Queen Gertrude and King Claudius exclaim seeing the 
bewildered lover, ‘He is Mad,’ ‘This is … madness,’
99 which he perhaps still fakes. 
 
[37]     To follow the logic of Hamlet: in a play where the main character is an anti-
knight it is almost too obvious that the play itself should end with an anti-duel. 
                                                 
98 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act V, Scene ii.274. 
99 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act V, Scene i.274, 285. The True Production of Being 
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That Hamlet is meant to be experienced as the personification of an anti-knight is 
made unambiguously clear when Shakespeare gives him, like a child, leave to deny 
responsibility for all his actions. To Aristotle, Hamlet would certainly have looked 
more like a passionate woman than a reasonable man. This opinion is not easy to 
deny when we hear Hamlet simultaneously renounce all responsibility and all 
honour by confessing to Laertes before the fenceplay begins, that it was not-
Hamlet who wronged Laertes, who killed his father Polonius, the Kings 
Chamberlain, and drove Polonius’ daughter and Laertes’ sister, the fair Ophelia, 
to her death.
100 For Hamlet claims that Hamlet had been taken away from Hamlet 
by madness, and that which in ecstasy acted was not-him.  How cowardly does not 
Hamlet make non-Hamlet responsible for something he could not possibly have 
done. Thus to renounce one’s actions, leaves, as it were, not only the man without 
spine, but all his actions scattered in the open were they no longer belong to him, 
but to that which he in ecstasy claims to have been possessed by. But how deep will 
not the Being of this being sink when it becomes known that the ecstasy, which 
brings everything [without subject] to light, was merely pretended, that he directed 
his performance; his gait, his gestures, his trembles, his jests, his laughter, his play, 
much like a director from behind the scene, a director who finally shows no other 
desire than to dissociate himself from the Company of all his players. We should 
not hold Hamlet’s renunciation against him. For when he disowns his own actions, 
he certainly creates the false but sublime apperception of that which dissociates its 
self from its appearance, the apperception of Being kept in the dark, hidden away 
from everything men may properly see. In this light it comes to mind that Foucault 
observes that the birth of the [modern] prison and the birth of [modern] 
                                                 
100 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act IV, Scene vii.164.  The True Production of Being 
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subjectivity occur at the same time. We could almost say that by disowning his 
own actions, and leaving everything, himself completely in the dark, Hamlet may 
have anticipated [th]is confluence. Not that Shakespeare is unaware of it, for he 
lets Hamlet declare in mock anguish, ‘Denmark’s a prison.’
101 To which 
Rosencrantz replies in jest, ‘Then the world is one.’
102 One should not from this 
exchange falsely draw the hasty conclusion that Shakespeare is a hermetic, which 
he certainly shows himself not to be when he lets Hamlet, from within the prison 
cell of subjectivity, admire the free man as he passes by outside. When Hamlet 
catches a glimpse of Prince Fortinbras on his way to Poland to fight for an 
eggshell,
103 Hamlet certainly displays a desire to break away and out into the open, 
to take part in the battle for that which unconceal all beings to all, namely nothing. 
But, as if to prove a point, for Hamlet there is no escape from the dungeon of 
subjectivity except through death. Certainly, Shakespeare would have destroyed 
this character much earlier, as easily as Hamlet destroys his ideals, had he not so 
effortlessly and forcefully produced the apperception of the Being of beings, 
convinced the audience that everything they see before them, is. 
 
[38]     In the end Hamlet gets more than it deserves, a true end to a false play.
104 
For who enters at the end, when Hamlet is dying, to reestablish true order and 
harmony, but the shining knight on his white horse, Prince Fortinbras of Norway, 
a true fort in bras. Encountering the false battlefield within the castle, Prince 
Fortinbras signals the reestablishment of true ideals of unconcealment, but more 
                                                 
101 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.247. 
102 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.248. 
103 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act IV, Scene v.53. 
104 Through the comparable failure of his first plays, Shakespeare must certainly have experienced 
that the ontological difference easily escapes a true presentation. For it is Hamlet’s false self-
[re]presentation, which convinces everyone except King Claudius, that makes the spectator infer 
the apperception of what is [true], from the perception of what is false. The True Production of Being 
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so, true lives, when he is given the keys to the Danish kingdom by the dying Hamlet 
himself.
105 For when all are dead, and there is nothing rotten in Denmark alive, on 
the dung of [th]is corruption, the death of the Prince of Denmark and the entrance 
of the Prince of Norway signal the sprout of better, perhaps truer times to come. As 
Prince Fortinbras looks upon the dead lying in the Hall at Elsinore Castle: King 
Claudius, Queen Gertrude, Lord Laertes and Prince Hamlet, he says, ‘Take up the 
bodies. Such a sight as this, Becomes the field, but here shows much amiss.’
106
                                                 
105 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act V, Scene ii.355-358. 
106 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act V, Scene ii.402. Having reached [th]is end, one should perhaps offer a 
few reflections on why Hamlet needed to end so tragically. It is perhaps opportune to make a note 
on the difference between reading beings and the Being of beings. For [th]is purpose no man is 
better fitted than Hamlet, who excels in the one art as much as he neglects the other. Unlike any 
other character in any of Shakespeare’s plays, Hamlet has the cunning, the ability to read minds, to 
read other beings as easily as other people read books, to know what the other is thinking before 
they have uttered a word. Hamlet’s ability to study people’s physiognomies as if they were printed, 
is for example evidenced when he says to Guildenstern, ‘You were sent for, and there is a kind of 
confession in your looks.’ [Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.285. Emphasis added.] More than 
any other character, Hamlet relates to the other, and this is perhaps one, if not the only, way in 
which Hamlet may resembles his author, who knows the mind of all his character’s before they 
have uttered a word. As [th]is reader says to Guildenstern, ‘Man delights not me; nor woman 
neither, though by your smiling you seem to say so.’ [Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.317.] When Ophelia 
returns his loves letters, the profound [Hamlet] has no passion to unconceal. He has no other desire 
than to reveal the mind of the other, when he says, ‘Ha, ha! Are you honest? [Hamlet, Act III, Scene 
i.103] But in the exchange that follows the performance of The Mousetrap, Ophelia finds time to 
ridicule his profundities. Making an ironic remark on his powers of exposition, she says, ‘You are 
as good as a chorus, my lord.’ [Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene ii.252-253. Emphasis added.] 
But still, as Hamlet desires to be the more profound intellect, to be recognized as the most subtle 
wit, he seems compelled to emphasize that what he reads is not words, but looks, smiles, bodies. As 
he replies to Ophelia, ‘I could interpret between you and your love, if I could see the puppets 
dallying.’ [Hamlet, Act III, Scene ii.252-253. Emphasis added.] After The Mousetrap, nothing is 
more natural than that there should appear a fellow reader to interpret King Claudius’s face. For 
Hamlet asks Horatio and all spectators alike, ‘Didst perceive?’ [Hamlet, Act III, Scene ii.293. 
Emphasis added.] Evidently, unlike reading books, there is not much pleasure in reading people 
alone, neither to keep your readings to yourself. And when King Claudius frankly asks Hamlet if he 
knows the purposes they have for sending him away, he answers by using a metaphor that perhaps 
betrays his conceit as the reader above all readers, ‘I see a cherub that sees them.’ [Hamlet, Act IV, 
Scene ii.47-48.] The cherub is an angel of knowledge, number two in The Celestial Hierarchy of 
Dionysius, only surpassed in glory by the seraph, the angel of love. And, as St. Thomas comments 
on the angels in Truth, ‘According to Dionysius, higher angels, such as the Cherubim, have higher 
and more universal knowledge. Lower angels have only particular and inferior knowledge. 
[Thomas Aquinas, Truth, Question Eight, ‘The Knowledge of Angels,’ Article X, p. 367.] Having 
perceived so much, it never discontinues to baffle, that he does so little and so late. Only after 
Prince Hamlet of Denmark meets Prince Fortinbras of Norway, do we understand why Hamlet 
knew so much and did so little. It is not ‘some craven scruple/Of thinking too precisely on th’ even’, 
but ‘bestial oblivion.’ [Hamlet, Act IV, Scene iv.40. Emphasis added.] For even if Hamlet is an 
excellent reader of [human] beings, he is hardly able to apperceive the Being of beings, to uncover 
that ‘plot’ which Prince Fortinbras and his twenty thousand men are willing to die for, [Hamlet, Act 
IV, Scene v.61. Emphasis added.] that place which, like any Thermophylae, unconceals all [living The True Production of Being 
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and dying] beings to all. Unlike many Romans mentioned by Cicero in The Nature of the Gods, 
unlike almost any Greek in Homer’s Iliad, Hamlet is incapable of reading any of the signs given. 
For whether a bird flies or falls, whether a cock cries or a crow crows, it means nothing to Hamlet. 
As is the case when Hamlet is preparing for the duel with Laertes, and discussing with Horatio 
which of the two men is the most capable, Horatio seems content to let his friend proceed with the 
duello, saying, ‘Nay, good my lord -‘ but then there appear something to contradict his validation: a 
sparrow falls to the ground. [Hamlet, Act V, Scene ii.215.] Certainly, Horatio stares or shivers, 
whereas Hamlet calmly says to his scholarly friend, ‘It is but foolery, but it is such a kind of gain-
/giving as would perhaps trouble a woman.’ [Hamlet, Act V, Scene ii. 216.] And Horatio, the scholar 
of Wittenberg, knowing how easily a lie - if not pseudos - may save a man’s life, says, ‘If your mind 
dislike anything, obey it. I will/forestall their repair hither and say you are not fit.’ [Hamlet, Act V, 
Scene ii.218-219.] But Hamlet replies as if Cicero was allowed, like a ventriloquist, to speak 
sarcastically through him, ‘Not a whit, we defy augury. There is a special/providence in the fall of a 
sparrow. If it be now,/ ‘tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now;/ if it be not now, yet it 
will come. The readiness is/ all. Since no man of aught he leaves know, what/ is’t to leave betime’s? 
Let it be.’ [Hamlet, Act V, Scene ii.220-225.] It would not take a scholar like Horatio to interpret 
[th]is sign, to perceive what is unconcealed, nor to understand that Shakespeare had anticipated its 
revelation from the beginning. For already in the opening of the play, when speaking of what the 
unconcealment of the ghost of King Hamlet bodes, Horatio, an able interpreter of signs who shows 
himself a worthy student of history, speaks of the end of a great man, when he suggests, ‘A little ere 
the mightiest Julius fell,/The graves stood tenantless.’[Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene i.114-115.] 
Undoubtedly, Hamlet reads beings as acutely as he is numb to reading the Being of beings, which is 
like a foreign language to him. The paradox is, however, that Shakespeare, through [th]is neglect 
has produced the most profound apperception of that which is [neglected], what is concealed, 
namely the Being of beings. For that which is neglected within the play is observed within the 
theatre, that which dies at the hands of the player is resurrected by the audience who give live to 
that which is ignored, that which otherwise would suffer oblivion. For, as Shakespeare very well 
knows, there is no Being without the spectator.  
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[1]     I intend to explore The False Production of Being in [th]is chapter, by 
focusing almost entirely on the concrete production of the negative ontological 
difference in Shakespeare’s plays. In doing so, we will engage, historically and 
systematically, with those who before us have caught a glimpse of [th]is false 
production of the Being of beings. Thus we hope to pay homage to tradition, not by 
slavishly or mechanically repeating it, but by allegorically developing the work 
that previous philosophers have left undone. We shall approach The False 
Production of Being from two different angles, thus making sure that our concrete 
considerations will not be without theory, and our abstract considerations will not 
be without ground or lack the support of experience. For even the grandest 
sketches of architecture, as for example the drawings of Piranesi, often fail to 
impress us if its buildings are not already erected, if the construction is not already 
there to be admired. It is therefore fortunate for the concrete display of The False 
Production of Being, that a building already exists, Shakespeare’s Theatre. The 
attraction of this theatre is hardly Juliet’s balcony, nor Hamlet’s Castle. Neither is 
it the Caesarean Tower of Trinovantum, where King Richard II is assassinated. 
Albeit such places, in Verona, Helsingør and London, may capture the historical The False Production of Being 
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imagination, it will not hold the spectator for long, if Shakespeare’s theatre did not 
give eyes, voice and hands to what we apperceive as more than what they carry 
forth, the ontological contradiction, the Being of beings, which is nowhere more 
effectively produced than through Shakespeare’s false production of Being. It is 
important for us to notice how Shakespeare lets his characters recognize the false 
by name. However, we are not primarily concerned with opinions about false 
appearances, opinions or judgments about what is false, but the function of what is 
false. We will progress from the rather superficial deliberation on the meaning or 
topos of what is false to the function of what is false, before we finally expose the 
interplay, even the contradiction of meaning and function, to catch a glimpse of the 
paradoxical production of Being.  
§6.0 The History of What is False 
 
 
[2]     [Th]is is the most abstract part of [th]is chapter, where we do not intend to 
paint the landscape, not even map out the terrain, but proceed to glide into orbit, 
hoping that the reader will appreciate the sense of detail when we return to the 
concrete exposition. Concerning the meaning of what is false, there are many 
positions, running from Plato, Aristotle, Dionysius, Thomas, Kant, Nietzsche, to 
Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Russell. It is obvious that some of these positions 
disregard or neglect what is false and some emphasize the eradicable impression of 
the existence of what is false, some focus on what is essential and some on what is 
inessential, nowhere more clearly than in the beginning of this philosophical 
tradition, where, in Plato’s Sophist, the stranger, an anonymous guest who is 
believed to personify Plato himself, states the paradox that ‘What is not in some The False Production of Being 
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way is and what is in some way is not.’
1 Aristotle, who traditionally is believed to 
be Plato’s student, but whom scholars argue was only acquainted with Plato’s 
philosophy through hearsay,
2 is the first in a long scientific tradition, which 
extends to this day, in which the false is neglected almost once and for all, and 
nowhere is this neglect more forcefully expressed than when Aristotle, in straight 
opposition to Plato, says, the ‘false … does not exist.’
3 If we are to immediately 
grasp the essential and inessential fronts in the battle for the concept of what is 
[false], we need to see that in the history of philosophy, one Neoplatonic position, 
which begins with Aristotle’s Metaphysics if not with Parmenides’ poetry, totally 
discards what is false. The influence of this tradition, which runs from Parmenides 
through the philosophies of Aristotle, Augustine and Plotinus, is contradicted by 
another tradition, which we will call Platonic. Beginning with Plato’s Sophist, [th]is 
competing tradition, which runs through Pseudo-Dionysius to Thomas, 
Shakespeare and Heidegger, finds it impossible to deny that the false in some way 
is.
4 
                                                 
1 Plato, Sophist, 240c, Complete Works, p. 261. 
2 See Friedrich Solmsen’s sharp differentiation between the Platonic art of ‘dialectical diaeresis’, 
which  aims at definition, and Aristotle’s ‘dialectical syllogism’ which proceeds from definition, on 
the ground on a definition already found to be established by endoxa, the opinions of the best or the 
many. See, Friedrich Solmsen, ‘Dialectic without the Forms,’ in Aristotle on Dialectic, ed. G. E. L. 
Owen, p. 57. See also Paul Woodruff’s remarks on the lack of influence exerted by Plato’s theory of 
mimesis in Republic on Aristotle’s use of mimesis in Poetics. [Woodruff, ‘Aristotle on Mimesis,’ in 
Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics, ed.  A. O. Rorty, p. 74-75]. 
3 Aristotle simply says, ‘We call things false … either because they themselves do not exist, or 
because the appearance which results from them is that of something that does not exist.’ [Aristotle, 
Metaphysics, Book VI, 1024b24-26]. 
4 The philosophy of Pseudo-Dionysius, who knows both Plato and Aristotle, and in many ways 
marks the end of antiquity and the beginning of the Middle Ages, signals at the same time the end 
of the philosophies of the ancient world and the beginning of the philosophies which are to carry 
the Christian world all the way to the Renaissance. Pseudo-Dionysius is perhaps the major, at least 
the most commonly read Christian Philosopher of the Middle Ages except Augustine, as is 
witnessed by for example the numerous references to Dionysius by St. Thomas
 who may opt for 
either of the two positions. For as clearly as Pseudo-Dionysius affirms that what is not is, Augustine 
holds on to the Neoplatonic view that what is not is not. The common view is to identify Pseudo-
Dionysius as a Neoplatonic philosopher. If this was true, the answer to whether or not Dionysius 
identified the false with Being would of course be self-evident, for if he did follow or adhere to the 
position of Plotinus, as is expressed in the inspired Enneads, he would have to assert that only what The False Production of Being 
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[3]    Aristotle speaks, in Poetics, of ‘the art of framing lies,’ meaning the 
paralogism, the [false] inference from what is to what is not, saying in effect that 
this inference gives us a sense of depth, a more profound sense of Being.
5 Again we 
have, already in Aristotle, recognized the premature, and perhaps only half-
hearted, understanding of the false production of Being, Aristotle’s reference 
appearing no more clear than a god giving indications through bird-song or the 
colour of the sky at sunrise. Obviously, what Aristotle suggests but does not follow 
up except in a concealed manner, is a more profound sense of Being produced 
through the presentation of what is false. It is quite remarkable that Aristotle’s 
reference in the Poetics is to a book where one man does not only speak falsely, but 
appears falsely at the same time, not only speaks of what is not, but also appears as 
what he is not. More remarkable still is that the one whom he speaks falsely of is 
himself, who does not appear, but remains hidden. It is, of course, paradoxical, 
that the Greeks are considered to be visual people,
6 when their major poet, the one 
who educated the whole of Greece, is said to have been, ‘a blind man.’ For as is 
obvious, what Plato could have called the father of the art of appearance-making,
7 
the father of making what is not appear [to be],
8 was indeed, as both Aristotle and 
                                                                                                                                               
is essential is and what is not essential is not, and the false would have no claim to existence. For 
depending on the logic of the essential procession and return of the Being of beings, there would be 
no Being if not [th]is took part in what is essentially true. Pseudo-Dionysius position is then 
obviously not Neoplatonic, which is evidenced from the fact that even angels and spirits, who all 
appear to be false, who all appear as what they essentially are not, whose singular existence is so 
indivisible that they would have to appear falsely, to no little degree are. That is, all spirits, angels, 
gods, cannot help but to appear falsely, but it is this false appearance, that even more profoundly 
gives us a sense, a notion, an apperception of what is inessential hidden, the Being of beings. 
Pseudo-Dionysius position is even more radical than the one who pretends to further his philosophy 
in the splendour of the Middle Ages, namely St. Thomas, who, almost reluctantly, would have to 
confess, that even the false would have to exist in order to be false, or, as he in effect says in his 
Disputations on the Questions Concerning Truth, Nothing that is, is entirely false.[Cf. Thomas 
Aquinas, Truth, Question 1, Article 1 and Article 10]. 
5 Aristotle, Poetics, 1460b20. 
6 Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 145. 
7 Cf. Plato, Republic, Book II, 377d, Plato, Republic, Book X, 598d, Republic, Book X, 606e.  
8 Plato, Sophist, 236c-237a and 265b-268d. The False Production of Being 
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Plato agrees, Homer, of whom Aristotle says, ‘Homer, more than any other has 
taught the rest of us the art of framing lies in the right way. I mean the use of 
paralogism. Whenever, if A is or happens, a consequent, B, is or happens, men’s 
notion is that, if the B is, the A also is – but that is a false conclusion.’
9 
 
[4]     As we will attempt to offer an exposition of what Aristotle says, and what is 
said is nothing but a fragment, it is perhaps only right that we should give an ear 
to what he says in extenso.  
‘Accordingly, if A is untrue, but there is something else, that on the 
assumption of its truth follows as its consequent, the right thing then is to 
add on the B. Just because we know the truth of the consequent, we are in 
our own minds led on to the erroneous inference of the truth of the 
antecedent. Here is an instance, from the Bath-story in the Odyssey.’
10  
 
For us it is only important to say that the paralogism, the false inference which 
Aristotle is speaking of is this, the false inference, or the inference to what is false, 
made by Penelope in the presence of Odysseus whom she does not recognize and 
who does not reveal his identity, but appears as a stranger telling the story of how 
he, as the nameless brother of Idomeneus, who was not present at his arrival, had 
to welcome Odysseus to his palace at Amnisus where Odysseus was forced to seek 
shelter for his men and his ship for 12 days.
11  
 
[5]     The stranger is finally able to put an end to Penelope’s doubt when she 
falsely infers that the man in front of her knew Odysseus as he entered Amnisus to 
seek shelter from the winds. This is the kind of paralogism Aristotle has in mind 
when he indicates that Homer produces the inference to something that is not from 
something that is. But, what Aristotle fails to see, is that the means by which 
                                                 
9 Aristotle, Poetics, 1460a19-22, Introduction to Aristotle, p. 705. 
10 Aristotle, Poetics, 1460a23-26, Introduction to Aristotle, page 705. The Bath-story which Aristotle 
refers to is found in Homer, The Odyssey, trans. E.V. Rieu, Book XIX, 164-260. 
11 Homer, The Odyssey, trans. E.V. Rieu, Book XIX, 164-260. The False Production of Being 
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Odysseus successfully produces the false impression of or inference to the existence 
of a being, is the same which, aimed at the reader, produces the apperception of 
the Beings of beings. For, to the reader, the difference between what is said [to the 
character] and what is shown [to the reader], what is said and what is not, truly 
appears so that whereas Odysseus presentation appears to have an object that 
exists for Penelope, indeed, it has none, a difference perceived by the spectator but 
not the character. Penelope gets falsely rid of her doubts by testing the stranger, 
the disguised Odysseus who, cunningly, is testing the faithfulness of his wife. What 
Penelope in effect is thinking, although wrongly, is [th]is. 
 
[6]     What makes Aristotle’s approach insufficient for a true Poetics, is that the 
poet is not Odysseus but Homer. Aristotle takes Odysseus to be the poet and 
Penelope to be the reader, whereas in fact, Homer is the poet and I am the reader, 
and a poetics is made to persuade the reader and not the character about the Being 
of [th]is being. This mistake shows truly the insufficiency of Aristotle’s approach 
in Poetics, for he only sees how the false impression of the existence of another 
being is produced, but not that through this impression of what is but is not, 
through the perception of what is untrue, follows the apperception of [th]is, which 
appears to not have these qualities, the Being of beings. [Th]is, the Being of beings 
is produced, not to Penelope, but to the reader, to you and me. Which is why you 
and I may cry when reading these lies, this presentation of what does not exist, for 
we do, for to us, both Odysseus and Penelope appear to be, so much more, as 
Odysseus is concealed to Penelope or Penelope appears to listen to a stranger who 
she does not believe until he shows awareness of the sign of her love she gave to 
Odysseus before he sailed off and away twenty years ago.      The False Production of Being 
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[7]     And if this sign of a beloved could mean so much to her, that it could make 
his story appear to be true, how much more would not his presence. And so it 
might be true that the father of all lies, and all rhetoric, is Odysseus, and the father 
of Odysseus, Homer. And hence Homer is, as suggested by Plato in the Republic, 
the father of all lies.
12 But, as much as Plato speaks derogatory of the man who 
invented the art of lying, the art of making what is not appear to be, we are more 
likely to praise the one who invented the art of producing the Being of beings, in 
much the same way we would never blame Shakespeare for being immoral, as, for 
example, Doctor Johnson does in his introduction to the 1765 edition of his 
works,
13 for being able to produce the false apperception of the same, the Being of 
beings. 
 
[8]     But again, lets have a closer look at the paralogism of Penelope, this 
fallacious inference, which is, as we have said, an inference from what is to what is 
not, reminding the reader yet again, that Aristotle does never fully understand or 
shows any sign of understanding that the perception of what is not produces, to the 
reader, the apperception of what is. Penelope’s paralogism: [Premise 1] If this 
stranger truly entertained my husband Odysseus twenty years ago at his palace at 
Amnisus on the Island of Crete, he must know what Odysseus was wearing. 
[Premise 2] This stranger knows that Odysseus was wearing a thick, double purple 
cloak and the bright brooch I gave to him. [And from these two true premises the 
                                                 
12 For implication that Homer is the father of all lies, see Plato, Republic, Book II, 377d, where 
Socrates catches Homer lying about the gods when he asserts that the gods are capable of lying.  
For if it was true it should not be said, or if said, as Socrates encourages his listeners and Plato his 
readers, it should be said only to a few, and kept from the many. For the basis of the opinion that 
Odysseus is the father of rhetoric, and Homer the father of Odysseus, see the first book of The Iliad, 
where Odysseus shows that whereas one may command one’s inferiors to war, one has to persuade 
one’s equals. 
13 Johnson, Preface to Shakespeare, in Daniel Gerould [ed.], Theatre/Theory/Theatre, p. 228. The False Production of Being 
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fallacious inference is made to the false conclusion:] This stranger did truly 
entertain my husband at his - brother’s - palace 20 years ago.
14  
 
[9]    Or: If this stranger entertained my husband at his palace at Amnisus, he 
must know what he was wearing. This stranger knows what Odysseus was 
wearing. Hence it follows, the fallacious inference is made, that this stranger 
entertained my husband at his palace. This is a fallacious inference, an inference 
from a being that is, i.e. the brooch on Odysseus cloak, to a being that is not, 
Odysseus’ host whom she believes is sitting in front of her. For even though 
Penelope thinks that she knows what this person that is sitting in front of her, 
facing her, is, she does not.
15 What Aristotle fails to mention is that what is 
accomplished through this presentation, what Homer forces the reader 
imperceptibly to do, is to make an inference from Penelope’s true recognition of 
the brooch, to her false judgment that the man she’s facing was Odysseus host. But 
more fundamentally, the reader makes the inference from this misperception to the 
apperception of the ontological contradiction, the concealed, the imperceptible 
Being of [th]is being, which it is now almost impossible to deny. 
 
[10]     As scientists we need to be aware that we are likely to be prejudiced against 
what is false. As good scientists we need to discard these prejudices. Clearly, one 
can understand a tradition more easily by what it avoids. It is obvious that our 
tradition, the tradition of modern philosophy ranging from Descartes, through 
Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and down to the 20
th century of Wittgenstein, Russell 
and beyond, there is almost not a word about what is false. If we discard of our 
                                                 
14 Implied is the fallacious premise: Only my husband could possibly remember/know what he was 
wearing 20 years ago. 
15 Homer, Odyssey, Book XIX, 164-260, pp. 289-293. The False Production of Being 
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own prejudices about the false as easily as our own philosophical tradition has 
thrown away the false after it has been identified, we will realize that in keeping 
what is false, we have kept something that remains invaluable to man. For even 
though one may immediately remove all false perceptions/apperceptions, it is 
impossible to remove that which immediately makes these 
perceptions/apperceptions, singularly false. And whereas one may discard what is 
false one cannot discard that which makes these perceptions/apperceptions false 
without being left with nothing. 
 
[11]     There are many ways to express what is false, and before we consider the 
philosophers that support our argument and those against it, we should perhaps 
already now enumerate some of the different ways we may encounter what is false. 
But before we do, we should say that the false would not produce a sense of Being, 
the profound apperception of what is, if our lives were not false, if we were not 
accustomed to Being false. For we have, hold, bear or bring forward; false 
appearances, as Nietzsche says, to please our neighbours;
16 false opinions, as 
Aristotle says the many have of poetry;
17 false perceptions of what is sensible, 
according to Descartes’ methodical gaze,
18 false hopes about the future denounced 
by Löwith in Meaning in History;
19 false apperceptions of our selves and our souls, 
according to Kant,
20 false interpretations of hieroglyphs as a pure and perfect 
picture-language, as identified by Eco
21 and long before him by the German 
                                                 
16 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator,’ p. 127. 
17 Aristotle, Poetics, 1447b12-15. 
18 Descartes, Discourse on Method (and Related Writings), Part 4, p. 24. 
19 Löwith, Meaning in History, 1949. 
20 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A341/B399, p. 382. 
21 Eco, The Search of the Perfect Language, ‘Chapter 7, The Perfect Language of Images,’ pp. 144-
177. The False Production of Being 
 
246  
emblem scholar Albrecht Schöne.
22 Finally, we may carry false names, as the 
author of The Mystical Theology who stole his name from Dionysius, the Greek 
judge who was converted by Paul at Aeropagos,
23 and we may have false notions 
about the decadence of the future and the Golden Age of the past as Plato does in 
Theaetetus or, we may dream of the perfectibility of the future and abhor the 
decadence of the past as Hegel does in his Phenomenology, where the beginning is 
truly nothing and the end is all.
24 
 
[12]     We will speak of that which is excluded from philosophy, speak of what is 
false, and [th]is we shall do with one aim only, that is, to later demonstrate the 
creative and poetic use of what is false in the production of Being. We shall not 
object when Heidegger says that the understanding of truth as adequatio, the 
correspondence of statements or thoughts to something that is already given or 
positive, leads to the neglect of the Being of beings,
25 that the concept of truth as 
adequatio or homoiosis leads to a certain kind of blindness, which Heidegger speak 
of as the withdrawal of Being.
26 One does no longer understand that there would 
be nothing given, nothing true, was it not first unconcealed. What Heidegger 
believes is neglected through the understanding of truth as adequatio is that beings 
are first unconcealed. But even though we agree with Heidegger so far, we are 
                                                 
22 Albrecht Schöne, Albrecht, Emblematik und Drama im Zeitalter des Barock, 1968. 
23 We could, for that matter, mention ‘Plato’ who is only recognized by the nickname he acquired 
as a wrestling champion, for ‘platon’ simply means ‘broad,’ and hardly anyone knows today the 
aristocrat by his true name. However, it may be, if we are to follow Socrates’ argument in Cratylus, 
that since Plato was truly broad, he was the incarnation of the idea ‘broad,’ which, more than 
anything, was his true name. For true is, as is Socrates argument towards the conclusion of 
Symposium, only what is universal, never the singular that may stand out as irreplaceable. 
24 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition, Phenomenology of Spirit,’ 
Paragraph 13, p. 7. 
25 CF. The ‘Introduction’ to Being and Time, where Heidegger says, ‘everything depends on staying 
clear of any concept of truth construed in the sense of ‘correspondence’ or ‘accordance’ 
[Übereinstimmung]. [Heidegger, Being and Time, ‘Introduction,’ in Basic Writings, p. 79]  
26 Cf. Section 44 in Being and Time where Heidegger exposes ‘the derivativeness of the traditional 
concept of truth.’ [Heidegger, Being and Time, ‘Section 44: Da-sein, Disclosedness, and Truth,’ 
S.213/p.197. Emphasis added]. The False Production of Being 
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forced to call attention to that he is himself guilty of neglecting The False 
Production of Being. We consider the philosophical neglect of what is false, where 
‘false’ is, most generally, understood in an epistemological sense, as that which is 
inadequate to my perceptions/apperceptions, as a neglect of the question of Being. 
In Heidegger’s case, however, we consider it as a neglect of the concealed mode of 
Being. 
 
[13]     There has throughout the history of philosophy been a general neglect of 
what is false. We could easily name the exceptions that comes to mind, the first 
being Plato’s Sophist, the second, Aristotle’s reference to Homer in Poetics and his 
almost awesome classification of falsity in Metaphysics.
27 Surprisingly however, 
and completely contrary to our first impression, Aristotle’s classification of falsity 
is the clearest example of the neglect of what is false. We discover to our 
astonishment that the neglect of what is false starts with the classification of falsity 
in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Similarly, his suggestive, elliptical reference to the art of 
framing lies in Homer’s Odyssey is also an example, contrary to what one would 
first be inclined to believe, of such a neglect of what is false.
28 For Aristotle’s 
classification of what is false fails to indicate that also the false gives us an 
apperception of what is. Aristotle does not pose the problem of falsity, but rather 
presents an argument, in Metaphysics, to avoid the problem of what is false by 
simply saying that the ‘false … does not exist.’
29 As we shall see, nothing could be 
further from the truth than saying that the false does not exist. And, we shall sum 
up our defence, by letting St. Thomas, who appear to perpetuate the Aristotelian 
                                                 
27 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VI, Chapter 29, 1024b16-1025a33. 
28 Aristotle, Poetics, 1460a20. 
29 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VI, Chapter 29, 1024b25-27. The False Production of Being 
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tradition, sum up the position we are speaking against, when he says that nothing 
that is, is entirely false.
30 
 
[14]     Having noted the philosophical neglect of what is false, we should look at 
the ways in which Shakespeare uses what is false to produce a more profound 
sense of Being. Perhaps we should open with King Lear, where the false Edmund 
makes the true Edgar flee without reason from his father Gloucester, thus 
confirming the false suspicion thrown on him by his half-brother [Edmund].
31 It is 
obvious to see that just like Homer, Shakespeare knows the art of framing lies. For 
instance, in the case of Gloucester, what is important is not only Gloucester’s 
inference from what is true to what is not true, but the spectator’s inference from 
what is not true to what is [true]. From the events that begin the action of the 
subplot in King Lear, we can easily recognize and formalize the following invalid 
syllogism, that is, a syllogism from what is true to what is false. It is the following 
syllogism that persuades Gloucester, in the opening acts of King Lear, to pursue a 
baseless course of action. For the changes in the fates and fortunes of Gloucester 
and his son Edgar are based on nothing, an incident that never occurred. And this 
is what Gloucester is led to think about his own son, [Premise 1:] If Edgar is guilty 
of attacking Edmund and if Edgar is guilty of conspiring to kill his own father, 
Edgar will run away. [Premise 2:] Edgar runs away. [Conclusion:] Edgar is guilty 
of attacking Edmund and of conspiring to kill his father. But what is again more 
important than the character’s perception of what is not [true], is the spectator’s 
effortless inference to what is [true]. For, as we have said, and will continue to say 
                                                 
30 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Truth, Question 1, Article 1 and Article 10. 
31 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act I, Scene ii. The False Production of Being 
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again and again, from the character’s perception of what is untrue, the spectator is 
made spontaneously to infer to the apperception of what is [true].  
 
[15]     Here again we see how our ways depart from Aristotle, how [th]is poetics 
differs from that of Aristotle, how [th]is poetics goes one step beyond, indeed that 
this poetics is not a poetics of beings, that affirms or denies the existence of beings, 
but The Poetics of Being. For whereas Aristotle is concerned with the character’s 
inference from what is true to what is not true, we are focused on another, a 
different paralogism, the spectator’s false inference from what is not [true] to what 
is [true]. It is therefore obvious that we take a step beyond Aristotle’s Poetics. 
From what has been said it is also obvious that [th]is poetics does not contradict the 
poetics of Aristotle, does not confront or only follow in the footsteps of Aristotle, 
but takes Aristotle‘s Poetics one step further. But perhaps it is possible that this 
next step was already taken by Aristotle himself in the Second Book of the Poetics, 
which to this day remains unknown and unread, in which many believe that, to 
this day, lies buried his explication of the concept and the theatrical effect of 
catharsis.  
 
[16]     We will not proceed to show how effective the false is in the production of 
the Being of beings without assistance. The philosophers, from whom we will find 
direction by elucidating the effect of what they generally examined in isolation, are 
the following; Plato, Aristotle, Pseudo-Dionysius, Thomas, Nietzsche, Heidegger. 
Through the assistance of these philosophers we will not only understand what is 
false, which they considered discretely, but more so, that the effect of any false 
presentation is to produce the emphatic apperception of the Being of beings. Hence 
we will easily, not only recognize but understand the effect of Being produced by The False Production of Being 
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Shakespeare in plays as different as The Taming of the Shrew, King Lear and 
Hamlet. For through the false self-apperception of Sly as the Lord, through 
Ophelia’s false perception of Hamlet as mad and through Lord Gloucester’s false 
apperception of Edgar as Tom-a-Bedlam, all these men are given life, and 
conversely, if these men were not false, we believe they would hardly be consider to 
be at all. 
 
[17]     In the history of philosophy there are, to my knowledge, only four 
philosophers who inquire into or present falsity without prejudice and thinks 
philosophically about what is false, that is, they do not take what is false for 
granted. They are, if you will, in historical order, Plato, Thomas, Nietzsche, 
Heidegger. Pseudo-Dionysius is by all considered a theologian, and Aristotle does 
not pose the problem of falsity, but rather presents an argument in Metaphysics to 
avoid the problem of what is false by simply saying that the ‘false … does not 
exist.’
32 As we shall see, nothing is further from the truth than saying that the false 
does not exist. It is perhaps important to know that of the works on falsity which 
were available and published or made public by the authors themselves, we would 
have to take away the most recent works, for Heidegger does only treat falsity, the 
problem of what is false, at any depth or length in his lectures on Parmenides, 
which were not published until after his death, in 1982, but held in Freiburg as 
early as the winter semester of 1942/43.
33 Nietzsche’s unprejudiced presentation 
and attempt to think what is false, which Heidegger, in his lecture’s on Nietzsche, 
considers to be an extremely important essay, ‘On truth and Lies in a Nonmoral 
                                                 
32 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VI, Chapter 29, 1024b25-27. 
33 Parmenides is as a whole is Heidegger’s most concrete exposition of what is true and false - 
aletheia and pseudos - to the experience of the Greeks belonging to pre-Platonic culture.  The False Production of Being 
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Sense,’
34 remained similarly unpublished in Nietzsche’s lifetime and was not made 
available until 1903 from the publication of Nachlass in 1903/1920.
35 The third to 
present the problem of what is false is St. Thomas, who did not even find time to 
write a book on the issue, but, rather tellingly, presented the problem of what is 
false in his lectures on Truth.
36 The problem of what is false is addressed in what 
looks more like notes than proper lectures. The scholastic style of the lectures is 
mirrored in the style of the transcription, which although having the pleasant form 
of always including the thesis he is speaking against, which rhetorically, or if you 
will, politely, always gives the first argument to its opponent, it is nonetheless true 
that these series of lectures, conducted at the Universities of Paris and Cologne, 
cannot match the beauty of St. Thomas’ On Being and Essence where the 
singularity of what is false is [also] expressed.
37 The only complete treatment of 
what is false is indeed Plato’s Sophist, which speaks for itself.  
 
[18]     It is possible to see Nietzsche’s philosophy as a first intimation of an 
understanding of the false production of Being, although this is only half the truth, 
for nowhere is the false production of Being emphasized more emphatically than in 
                                                 
34 Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume II, p. 90. 
35 See Introduction and Notes on Texts by Daniel Breazeale, pp. lvi and lii, in Nietzsche, Philosophy 
and Truth - Selections from the Notebooks of  the Early 1870s. It should perhaps be added that this 
essay remained, like so much of Nietzsche’s writings, not only unpublished, but unfinished. 
36 Thomas Aquinas, Truth, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, 1994.  
37 Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, in Selected Writings, pp. 30-49. The editor and 
translator of St. Thomas’ Selected Writings, Ralph Mcinerny says of De Veritate, ‘Although the 
written product is far from being a transcript of the public disputations, its literary form bears the 
impress of its origin. A question, a proposed answer and the difficulties to that answer. The master 
must not only respond to those objections but develop arguments on behalf of his own position. 
This was the genre Thomas adapted to his Summa Theologiae. The so-called Disputed Question on 
Truth of Thomas that has come down to us is a collection of some twenty-nine such disputations. 
What they certainly have in common is the time and place of their production: Paris, during the 
three years Thomas’s first stint as a regent master, 1256-9.’ Ralph Macinerny, in, Thomas Aquinas, 
Selected Writings, p. 163. The False Production of Being 
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Plato’s Sophist.
38 Nevertheless, Nietzsche speaks of the uses of falsity in the 
struggle for life.
39 To Nietzsche, all truths are not only untruths, that is, basically 
illusions, but the false, even the lie is itself, first to most people and then to the few 
- as in his early days he only considered the aristocrats among us capable of  truth, 
he later deemed only the highborn capable of being false - more productive of life 
than what is merely true. To Nietzsche, the true does even speak against life, 
against Being. Therefore, the neglect of what is false is understood as a neglect of 
Being. For, according to Nietzsche, why would anyone be true, why would there be 
an ideal of truth if secrets, disguises and lies, further man’s life. It would be a sin, 
an offence against Being, if false appearances and false statements produce life in 
abundance, while truth cuts life short. Taking this position, Nietzsche involuntarily 
and unknowingly reiterates Falstaff’s announcements in Henry IV, Part I. Falstaff 
would rather pretend to be dead on the battlefield to save his life than to die 
honourably as a true hero, for while the latter is not, the former, is.
40 
 
[19]     Nietzsche speaks of a natural inclination towards being false, in what 
Heidegger calls an immensely important essay, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral 
Sense [1873],
41 where Nietzsche says,  
‘As a means for the preserving of the individual, the intellect unfolds its 
principle powers in dissimulation, which is the means by which weaker, less 
robust individuals preserve themselves – since they have been denied the 
chance to wage the battle for existence with horse? or with sharp teeth of 
beasts of prey. Deception, flattering, lying, deluding, talking behind the 
back, putting up a false front, living in borrowed splendour, wearing a 
                                                 
38 As evidenced, Plato speaks of the sophists art as the techne of ‘weaving what is and what is not 
together’ in order to persuade his listeners that what is not is. Cf. Plato, Sophist, 240c, Complete 
Works, p. 261. It is this art, Plato, more definitely calls the art of unlikeness-making, for whereas 
the philosopher represents essential and true likenesses, the sophist makes something that is unlike 
anything that essentially exist, appear to be. Cf. Plato, Sophist, 266d-267b. 
39 Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,’ in Philosophy and Truth - Selections from 
Nietzsche’s Notebooks from the Early 1870s, p. 81. 
40 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.75. 
41 Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 90. The False Production of Being 
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mask, hiding behind convention, playing a role for others and for oneself – 
in short, a continuous fluttering around the solitary flame of vanity – is so 
much the rule and the law among men that there is almost nothing which is 
less comprehensible than how an honest and pure drive for truth could 
have arisen among them.’
42  
 
 
[20]     We will continue the investigation where Nietzsche turned away, clarify 
where Nietzsche only expressed an intuition, only had a vague impression of the 
false production of Being. There is, of course, a Nietzsche, a young Nietzsche who 
is unscathed by his later perspectivism, a Nietzsche unscorched by his later Will to 
Power, a Nietzsche beyond relativism which can be found in The Birth of Tragedy 
and Untimely Meditations, but also, in the remarkable essay, On Truth and Lies in a 
Nonmoral Sense, as well as in the Notebooks from the Early 1870s where Nietzsche 
speaks highly of truth – in an ontological sense - of the weak and the strong, that 
only the strong dares to be true, and that in the struggle for life, the weak have a 
desire to be false. Later, in Twilight of Idols/Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche would 
change his position, turn and face himself and say, only the strong dares to be 
false, the weak are always true. But throughout his corpus, from the beginning to 
the end of his life, Nietzsche is astounded by how a drive for truth, a veridical drive 
could develop in a world of lies.
43 As Nietzsche says in an unfinished essay from the 
early 1870s, ‘The pathos of truth in a world of lies.’ And ads in bewilderment, 
‘How is it that there is any pathos of truth in this world of lies? From morality. 
The pathos of truth and logic. Culture and the truth.’
44 How this ideal of truth 
developed in this world of lies is still is still astounding, and is a question that we 
will leave unanswered. However, Nietzsche gets us back on track by expressing two 
                                                 
42 Nietzsche,’ On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,’ in Philosophy and Truth, p. 80. 
43 Nietzsche, ‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,’ Philosophy and Truth, p. 80. 
44 Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth, ‘The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle between Art and 
Knowledge,’ p. 57. The False Production of Being 
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words in the same breath, two thoughts in one sentence, ‘false’ and ‘Being,’ and we 
would say that the false still gives us a stronger sense of Being than the true could 
ever do, that is, the false produces a more profound sense or apperception of 
Being, so much so that when Kant says that the apperception of Being is 
necessarily an illusion, it is hard, difficult to not agree.
45  
 
§6.1 The Topos of What is False 
 
[21]     Before assessing the function of what is false in the production of the Being 
of beings, we shall show the almost universal expression of what is false in 
Shakespeare’s plays. From these observations, it will be clear that Shakespeare’s 
preoccupation with falsity, borders on an obsession, too true to pass us by. Just to 
name a few instances of false play: There is the extraordinary false pilgrimage of 
Helena in All’s Well that Ends Well which ends with her false death,
46 the 
paradoxical prayer whereby Falstaff asks to ‘prove a false thief.’
47 And if Helena 
and Falstaff featured in Measure for Measure, they could have confessed, like 
Claudio, to a false friar or they could have heard this false priest expound an 
apophatic sermon,
48 and this false confession to be witnessed by, as the Divine 
himself says, ’Millions of false eyes.’
49 However much the false stand to lose by 
being named, we can nevertheless see how dominant, even overwhelming, the 
figure of falsity is in Shakespeare’s plays, from a few explicit, but memorable 
                                                 
45 Nietzsche says, in one of his early essays, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense [1873], that 
falsity is productive of our Being, that the false is more useful in promoting our lives than truth is, 
and that shying away from what is false, we corrupt our own lives. What Nietzsche actually says, as 
he does in one of the Untimely Mediations, ‘Wagner in Beyreuth,’ is that in general people are too 
coward to be true. Later, he expressed himself differently, saying, in fact that in general people are 
too coward to be false, the latter position being taken or expressed in Twilight of Idols/Beyond Good 
and Evil. 
46 Shakespeare, All’s Well that Ends Well, Act IV, Scene ii.50-60. 
47 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act I, Scene ii.159. 
48 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act III, Scene i.5-4. 
49 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act IV, Scene i.60. The False Production of Being 
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encounters. In Macbeth, it is no less than the son of Macduff, soon about to be 
slaughtered, who mirrors Hamlet’s saying, that ‘To be honest, as this world goes, 
is to/be one man picked out of ten thousand.’
50 Being engaged in a conversation 
about the false with his mother, the son asks the naïve Lady Macduff, ‘must all be 
hanged that swear and lie?’ ‘Every one,’ Lady Macduff answers, to which the son 
asks in earnest, ‘Who must hang them?’ Lady Macduff, ‘Why, the honest men.’ To 
which the son finally concludes the exchange by saying, ‘Then the liars and 
swearers are fools; for there/are liars and swearers enow to beat the honest/men 
and hang them up.’
51 Soon after, following a command by King Macbeth who 
himself has sworn to be false,
52 Lady Macduff is brutally killed along with her 
children. And being killed, what are these innocent children accused of if not what 
they are not, namely traitors.
53 For if they were killed as what they were, it is safe 
to say that their deaths would be entirely unconvincing, but now, as their deaths 
are justified by an appeal to what they are not, their death’s appear to be as true as 
their lives. For, from the misperception of what [th]is is, we again infer to the 
apperception of [th]is, the Being of beings. That is, the misperception of what they 
essentially are, traitors, provides the occasion for the profound apperception of 
[th]is, of that which does not have these properties, but nevertheless is brutally 
killed. 
 
[22]     The spectator has perhaps long anticipated these horrific events, for before 
King Duncan arrives at Macbeth’s Castle, Macbeth speaks of how he will ‘play 
                                                 
50 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.178. 
51 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act IV, Scene ii.50-51. 
52 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act I, Scene v.23 and Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act I, Scene vii.79. 
53 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act IV, Scene iii.80. The False Production of Being 
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false.’
54 Being perhaps excited to the point where he no longer trembles, Macbeth 
announces his false appearance before it arrives to greet the unknowing King, ‘I 
am settled, and bend up/Each corporal agent to this terrible feat./Away, and mock 
the time with fairest show:/False face must hide what the false heart doth know.’
55 
One should not be surprised then, when this man sees ‘a false creation’ flying,
56 no 
more that he, in the wake of King Duncan’s death, displays ‘false sorrow.’
57 It is 
not unexpected that all good men flee
58 from this ‘bloody stage,’
59 where the 
innocent are left as defenceless prey for the wicked, and all that remains for a few 
good men like Macduff, is the depthless sorrow for what they loved but 
abandoned. It is the same knight who pronounced the world a ‘bloody stage,’
60 
that appear to inform Macduff of the slaughter of his wife and children while he 
was away.
61 For when Macduff asks Ross, ‘How stands Scotland?’ his reluctant 
answer is that it is, ‘Almost afraid to know itself!’ that Scotland, ’cannot/Be called 
our mother but our grave, where nothing/But who knows nothing is once seen to 
smile.’
62  
 
[23]     In the end the false are not only overcome, but, in what is believed to be 
Shakespeare’s first play, again showing the almost obsessive persistence of this 
topos throughout Shakespeare’s entire production, the false are burned on the 
stake. For in Henry VI, Part I, Shakespeare lets the English burn the French 
                                                 
54 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act I, Scene v.23. 
55 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act I, Scene vii.79. 
56 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act II, Scene i.38. 
57 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act II, Scene iii.138. 
58 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act IV, Scene ii.13 
59 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act II, Scene iv.6. 
60 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act II, Scene iv.6. 
61 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act IV, Scene iii.158-240. 
62 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act IV, Scene iii, 165-167. The False Production of Being 
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whore, the false witch, Jean.
63 And as Shakespeare ends his first play, the intent is 
crystal clear, as he makes Joan cast a black spell of concealment, which proves that 
she is, beyond doubt and above all objections, guilty of witchcraft. For apposite to 
all prayers of unconcealment that abound in Shakespeare’s plays, Joan of Pucelle 
throws a darker spell as she is lead to the stake, not only on those who have 
condemned her, but on her own father, for whom she leaves nothing but a curse.
64 
And so Shakespeare ends the play where the lecherous sorceress, the false witch is 
burned along with her unborn child.
65 
 
[24]     We are not here to condemn anyone for being false, neither to judge 
whatever is ‘rotten in … Denmark,’
66 nor to accuse anyone for making Scotland 
into a ‘bloody stage,’
67 but rather to inquire into the effects of what remains, in 
Shakespeare’s most popular works, a false presentation of Being, a presentation 
which in effect, however much it upholds and in the end carries forth ideals of 
unconcealment, ends up undermining the experience of Being as unconcealed and 
leads us to, accustoms us, not only, if at all, to a false way of life, but to Being 
concealed, to the experience of life as what is hidden. For where nothing is hidden, 
there appear to be no life, no beings [alive], not the Being of beings. We are led to 
where we, more systematically, will continue our investigation. For we shall not 
                                                 
63 Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act V, Scene vi.62-81. 
64 Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act V, Scene vi.85-91. 
65 In Henry VI, Part I, Shakespeare shows that he is supremely aware of the difference between 
white and black magic, and that Joan of Pucelle is clearly presented as a necromancer. For what 
Joan is burned for at the end of Henry IV, Part I, the French are accused of already at the 
beginning of the play. The difference between the white and the black arts is easy to comprehend. It 
was, as Kittredge shows, commonplace to believe in the Elizabethan Age, that as the white arts 
unconceals, so the black arts conceals. As the white arts may project, may bring [th]is into light, so 
one may influence [th]is through the black arts to be, to become utterly concealed. So it becomes 
perfectly understandable, when the Duke of Exeter, in an attempt to explain the untimely death of 
the brave Henry V, accuses the coward France, ‘shall we think the subtle-witted French/Conjurers 
and sorcerers that, afraid of him,/By magic verses have contrived his end?’ Shakespeare, Henry VI, 
Part I, Act I, Scene i.25-27. 
66 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene iv.89. 
67 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act II, Scene iv.6. The False Production of Being 
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speak morally or condemningly of what is false, nor in any prejudiced manner, but 
rather, continue to answer this very simple question: Which presentation produces 
most immediately, effectively and without a trace, the ontological contradiction, 
the apperception that what comes to appear before us is? No doubt we are not 
asking for the meaning of what is said or presented, but its function. For however 
we judge or value what is false, regardless of how low our estimation of what is 
false may be, it is truly beyond doubt that the false is more effective in producing 
the apperception of the Being of beings. And it is The Poetics of the Being, into 
which we now continue to inquire. 
 
[25]     We shall not merely expose the places where the ‘false’ is mentioned by 
name, nor are we simply interested in the character’s high or low opinions about 
what is false. Rather, we are almost solely concerned with the effect of providing, 
like Shakespeare, a false [re]presentation. We do not seek the opinions of 
Shakespeare or of any of his characters, but something more fundamental, the 
function of a false [re]presentation, which more often than not, not only corrupts 
the explicit ideals of the play, but more fundamentally, its sense of Being. If one 
were to hold a low opinion of Falstaff, however forceful one’s condemnation may 
be, one could not deny that almost no one produces the apperception of Being 
more effortlessly, more effectively, and more enduringly than Falstaff. For the 
false produces, imperceptibly, and repeatedly without ever tiring its audience, a 
more profound sense of Being that, moreover, immediately destroys the ontological 
aspirations of any Neoplatonic idea or ideals.  
 
[26]     Nowhere do we more clearly recognize the scales of Being, the double and 
mutually inextinguishable contradiction of Being than in Shakespeare’s plays. For The False Production of Being 
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within the battle for true unconcealment there appears suddenly and 
incomprehensibly the will to imperfection, the will to be entirely concealed, to 
appear as what you are not or not appear as what you are. Falstaff even has to 
conceal that he is on order to be, for only as he pretends to be dead on the 
battlefield, does he save himself in [th]is true theatre of unconcealment.
68 Like an 
omen, as if History had premonitions of its own future, the appearance of Falstaff 
on [th]is stage signals the coming of the Dark Ages of modernity, the gradual 
extinction or withdrawal of beings from their own clearing, where no one any 
longer takes pride in Being truly unconcealed. In this light, it would be surprising 
if, as Rosencrantz reveals to Hamlet, ‘that the world’s/grown honest.’
69 But, as 
Hamlet says, ‘your news is not true.’
70  With few exceptions, the men and women 
of Shakespeare’s plays are all disguised, characters for whom dissimulation seems 
but a way of life. Even Hamlet himself is but entirely concealed. Perhaps the only 
one more obscure than either Falstaff or Hamlet, is Romeo, who appears in the 
dark beneath a balcony, behind a masque or in exile, and finally, as if seeking 
[th]is place all along, is found to take his own life when he is already in the grave.  
 
[27]     The testimony of Francis Bacon, who more than once has been confused 
with Shakespeare, is difficult to doubt. In his Essays, Bacon professes that there is 
no longer an ideal of appearing without difference, to be indifferently true, but a 
propensity in man to love a lie for its own sake,
71 even a desire to be secret.
72 And 
                                                 
68 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.75. 
69 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.239-242. 
70 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.239-242. 
71 Bacon says, ‘It is not only the difficulty and labour which men take in finding out of truth, nor 
again that when it is found it imposeth upon men’s thoughts, that doth bring lies in favour, but a 
natural though corrupt love for the lie itself. One of the later school of Grecians, examineth the 
matter and is at a stand to think what should be in it, that men should love lies where neither they 
make for pleasure, as with poets, nor for advantage, as with the merchant, but for the lie’s sake. 
But I cannot tell.’ [Bacon, Essays, ‘Of Truth,’ p. 61. Emphasis added]. The False Production of Being 
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there is, as Bacon remarks, no secrecy without some kind of dissimulation, that is, 
without being false. We could add, that with the unexpected arrival of men such as 
Machiavelli, Bacon and Grazian, in states as diverse as Florence, England and 
Spain, there is enough historical proof to suggest that, from the Renaissance on, 
modern men were taught to be false, to be secretive, to appear distinct from what 
they essentially are, sometimes even to distinguish themselves from who they are, 
that is, to some degree be concealed. According to Shakespeare, nothing seems 
closer to the hearts of Elizabethans than being false, and if the spectator has 
enjoyed a similar education, nothing is easier than to identify with Romeo, Falstaff 
or Hamlet, men who are but almost entirely concealed, whose selves, throughout 
each play are kept, almost entirely in the dark. 
 
[28]     However much Shakespeare is obsessed with what is false, it seems to be the 
case that he had no natural inclination for being false, but was inspired by the 
Italians he came across, that the false art of Being was patiently learned through 
his numerous adaptations of the Italian novella. To support the view that 
Shakespeare did learn the art of falsity from the Italians, we may point out that 
[th]is art is absent in what is considered his first two works, namely Henry VI, Part 
I and The Comedy of Errors, plays where not one willingly appear to be false, and if 
one does, like Joan of Pucelle, she is finally burned on the stake.
73 To avoid the 
impression of seeming unnecessarily decadent, there was in the English as well as 
the French translations of the Italian nouvellae inserted moralizing introductions 
                                                                                                                                               
72 Bacon, Essays, ‘Of Simulation and Dissimulation,’ pp. 76-78. 
73 Some of the novellae that Shakespeare made adaptations of for the stage are presented in Pamela 
Benson [ed.], Italian Tales from the Age of Shakespeare. Among the novellae Shakespeare used is 
Boccaccio’s Decameron [1350], Day 3/Nouvella 9, which was translated into English by William 
Painter, in The Palace of Pleasure, 1566, as the Tale of Gileta of Narbona, and adapted by 
Shakespeare in All’s Well that Ends Well, 1602-03. For a chronology of Shakespeare’s plays, see for 
example, Harold Bloom, Shakespeare - The Invention of the Human, p. xvi. The False Production of Being 
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and addendums.
74 However, this did not help avoid a tirade of accusations against 
Boccaccio’s Decameron, Painter’s Palace of Pleasure and similar novellae and their 
proliferation into English. As Ms. Pamela Benson says in her ‘Anthology of 
Criticism,’ in a beautifully selected volume, Italian Tales from the Age of 
Shakespeare,  
‘When the translations of novelle were first published, the moralizing 
passages with which they seem to bristle did not please English moralists. 
They associated the books with the evil that they believed Italy to incarnate. 
In the following passage Roger Ascham in The Schoolmaster (1570) seems to 
be referring to Painter’s Palace of Pleasure: he speaks most eloquently of 
the damage he fears the novella can do: “These be the inchantments of 
Circe’s …Ten sermons at Paule’s Crosse do not so much good for moving 
men to trewe doctrine, as one of those bookes do harme with inticing men to 
ill living. Yea, I say farder, those bookes, tend not so moch to corrupt 
honest living as they to to subvert trewe religion.”’
75  
 
[29]     Nothing is more evident in Shakespeare’s plays than that Shakespeare 
allows the unconcealed, the true to finally step forward, to overcome and the 
untrue to finally be concealed. In King Lear we see the true Edgar finally conquer 
the false Edmund in the trial by battle
76 and in Hamlet the true Prince Fortinbras 
is finally given the keys to the Kingdom of Denmark by the false Hamlet,
77 
accepting his fate, as he is dying, just as in Macbeth the false and deceiving 
Macbeth is finally overcome by the true Macduff.
78 In all cases, in all plays, the 
true remains out-standing on the battlefield, towards the end of the play. What 
should be equally obvious is that Shakespeare’s art denies his own ideals. We could 
speak of Shakespeare’s true betrayal, and if these ideals belong to Shakespeare 
                                                 
74 In the English and French translations of the Italian novella, there were, as Pamela Benson 
marks in ‘Anthology of Criticism,’ a tendency to insert moralizing comments and embellishments 
to the stories, which were often thought of as obscene. Pamela Benson [ed.], Italian Tales from the 
Age of Shakespeare, p. 349. 
75 Pamela Benson, Italian Tales from the Age of Shakespeare, ‘Anthology of Criticism,’ p. 346. 
76 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act V, Scene iii. 
77 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act V, Scene ii.355-358. 
78 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V, Scene viii.53. The False Production of Being 
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himself, of Shakespeare’s self-betrayal, as it is obvious that Shakespeare’s art of 
presentation betrays the ideals represented. 
 
[30]     Even though it finally is so, that Shakespeare in the end makes those who 
further [th]is ideal of unconcealment victorious, it is even more evident that 
Shakespeare’s false presentation undermines his true ideals, that the art of 
presentation subverts the ideals [re]presented, just like Hamlet betrays his. 
However, we are not to speak of [th]is betrayal condemningly, but rather, without 
prejudice, attempt to understand that without [th]is betrayal, the betrayal of [th]is 
true ideal of indifference whose angel is Dominion,
79 we would hardly have seen 
the play at all. For as obvious as Shakespeare’s presentation is false, it is 
Shakespeare’s use of [th]is false and inadequate presentation, that makes us see his 
plays again and again. If they were true, they would hardly be seen at all.  This is 
the fortune of Shakespeare’s first and Shakespeare’s last plays, Henry VI, Part I 
and The Two Noble Kinsmen, which in four hundred years have been staged but a 
few times, most likely, because these plays were too true, and therefore not fit to 
please more modern tastes.
80  
 
[31]   In The Two Noble Kinsmen, as we have pointed out, are some of the most 
beautiful scenes of unconcealment in Shakespeare’s plays: the supplication of the 
widows, the prayer for and subsequent battle for unconcealment by Emily, 
Palamon and Arcite, and the intervention of the Goddess of Love to unconceal the 
                                                 
79 As Dionysius says in The Celestial Hierarchy, A Dominion is an angel of indifference, the spirit of 
appearing essentially without difference. According to Dionysius, the Dominions are the fourth of 
the nine angelic hierarchies, and these angels are mirrors/khorae of indifference, through which 
men may become, at least strive to become, indifferent from their ideals. Cf. Dionysius, The 
Celestial Hierarchy, 237C, Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, p. 167. 
80 See, for example Waith’s ‘Introduction’ to The Two Noble Kinsmen, where he remarks, ‘The 
stage history of The Two Noble Kinsmen is very brief.’ Waith, ‘Introduction’ to Shakespeare, The 
Two Noble Kinsmen, p. 30. The False Production of Being 
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true lover Palamon after he has failed to unconceal himself in battle. In King Lear, 
on the other hand, we have some of the most suggestive scenes of concealment. Are 
we not baffled, already in the beginning, when Edgar runs away from nothing to 
falsely ‘prove’ the [non-existent] conspiracy to kill his father. More evocative still, 
and more false, is the encounter in the raging storm where not-Kent, not-Lear and 
not-Edgar are finally led into the safety of a hut by a fool. Perhaps we should 
rather speak of the non-meeting between Kent and Lear and Edgar, as neither 
appears to recognize the other, and they all interact with each other’s masques, 
personae. At the same time they seem to perform a secret discourse that all along 
creates, for the audience, the apperception of that which is not apperceived, the 
Being of these beings, which are so completely concealed. 
 
[32]     It is a welcome coincidence that unknowingly brings the blind Gloucester 
and his son together. Perhaps no scene in the works of Shakespeare is more 
pleasing and sad than the encounter between the blinded Gloucester and the 
disguised Edgar, where Poor Tom leads his unknowing father from the heath to 
the very brim of the cliffs of Dover. Maybe it is because Edgar has forgiven his 
father. For Edgar shows a poetic kindness towards a father that has banished him 
and hunted him down like an animal. But this is only emotional speculation, moral 
conjecture, which is superficial, almost irrelevant, when contrasted to the primary 
constitution of Being. For however suitable ethical and sentimental reflections 
sometimes are, we may and do apperceive that a man is regardless of whether we 
have feelings for him or not. Whereas Heidegger speaks of ‘the happening of 
truth,’
81 we will convey ‘the happening of untruth’ which reveals another aspect of 
                                                 
81 Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art, in Basic Writings, p. 186. The False Production of Being 
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Being, not what is unconcealed, but what is concealed. Compared to what is false, 
it is obvious that we all experience what is true as shallow, only what remains, 
what is false as truly profound. In Shakespeare’s oeuvre the most famous cases of 
[th]is happening of untruth are undoubtedly Edgar’s conspiracy, Desdemona’s 
infidelity, Juliet’s death, Gloucester’s fall and Hamlet’s madness. These events are 
unquestionably the most memorable, make the deepest and most lasting 
impression, makes it almost impossible to think that what is presented before us is 
not [true].
82 
 
[33]     Showing that Shakespeare is completely and fully aware of the profundities 
of what is untrue, the sublime happening of untruth, we should listen to what 
Edgar says immediately after Gloucester falls from the cliff. What is presented is, 
of course, another unhappening, described, only a relation to a non-occurrence, the 
fall that never occurred. And when trying to locate where the witness to this non-
occurrence may be, Edgar answer his bewildered father, ‘Gone, sir, farewell./And 
yet I know not how conceit [that is, imagination] may rob/The treasury of life, 
when life itself/Yields to [that is, allows] the theft.’
83 What is meant is as easy to 
understand, as it is to translate. What Edgar says is simply that the imagination is 
incapable of stealing a man’s life, if life itself steals away from the imagination. 
Again Shakespeare presents life as a transgression, as what is inadequate to man’s 
imagination, beyond a man’s comprehension, his perceptions and reflections. 
[Th]is inadequacy is not only spoken of but presented, not only reflected upon but 
enacted. And in [th]is enactment or as the enactment of [th]is inadequacy, life 
                                                 
82 We will continue to use untrue and unreal interchangeably, however it may ring unfamiliar to 
more modern ears. The alienation of the concept of truth is clearly expressed, can be clearly and 
negatively understood when one does not immediately understand the same when one says, untrue 
and unreal, true and real, when untrue and unreal are no longer synonyms. 
83 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act IV, Scene vi.41-44. Comments added. The False Production of Being 
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stands out as what is truly unimaginable. It is [th]is [ground] which Gloucester 
cannot or is unwilling to think of which nevertheless comes to presence before the 
audience, [th]is inadequacy of imagination/perception and the world, for it is the 
shortcomings of the imagination, the perceptual/perpetual void in which the world 
disappears or is made to disappear, that to the spectator constitutes life, constitutes 
Being to the spectator. To Shakespeare life becomes unimaginable, life becomes 
what is unimaginable, Being beyond the reach of the character’s grasp until it is 
too late and [th]is, that which has been neglected or overlooked appears to take 
revenge, to reappear unknowingly. For whether or not I am aware of [th]is or what 
[th]is is, [th]is will never be inconsequential, never fail to effect me. And it is in 
apperceiving life or Being as what is unimaginable, as that which, indeed, within 
the play is not apperceived by the character, that the spectator for the first time 
identifies with the character, for they realize that even their lives are susceptible to 
[th]is, to that which they cannot comprehend, that is and remains unimaginable, 
the Being of beings. 
 
[34]     In all cases life is, to Shakespeare, what is unimaginable. [Th]is is not only 
spoken of abstractly, but presented concretely, for it is [th]is, the unimaginable, 
that which the character does not think of, the unthought and therefore the 
unknown, which makes Romeo kill himself, [th]is, the unimaginable, that makes 
Ophelia kill herself and again [th]is, the unimaginable, that makes Othello kill 
Desdemona, but it is also [th]is, which remains unimaginable and the character is 
completely unaware of, which makes Old Lord Gloucester rise from his feet, 
resurrected from [th]is fall, as if carried by an angel flying by to catch him in the 
air as he threw himself off the cliff at Dover. For nowhere is the apperception of The False Production of Being 
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the Being of beings or [th]is ground, the ground unconcealed more firmly, created 
more insistently than when it is not perceived, if you were to think, like Gloucester, 
that you are flying. 
 
[35]     That life is unimaginable and that the Being of beings is apperceived as the 
effect of [th]is inadequacy to Shakespeare, is not a far-fetched interpretation 
grabbed out of thin air but what is closest at hand, is confirmed again when Edgar 
says, ‘Had he been where he thought,/By [th]is had thought been past.’
84 That is, if 
Gloucester had been where he thought he was, that is, truly perceived, he would by 
now be dead. That is, if Edgar is telling the truth, Gloucester will die. [Th]is 
inadequacy, which Shakespeare is fully and completely aware of, is here what 
saves Gloucester’s life. The untruth saves Gloucester’s life as easily as it kills 
Desdemona. But whether or not the untruth kills or saves, dooms or resurrects, it 
is the untruth which persuades the spectator of the Being of these beings, convinces 
the spectator that the one who rises from the ground to again gasp for air, to catch 
a first clean breath of air is resurrected, saved as much as the one stabbed and 
catching her last breath is really dying, is truly catching her last breath, that the 
man who catches his first and the woman catching her last breath, truly are.  
§6.2 The Function of What is False 
 
 
[36]     We will separate between meaningless and numinous experiences, 
recognizing that they are both an invariable part of Shakespeare’s tragedies. As 
Shakespeare makes the friar lament after he discovers the body of Hamlet in 
Capulet’s sepulchre, ’A greater power than we can contradict/ hath thwarted our 
                                                 
84 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act IV, Scene vi.44-45. The False Production of Being 
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intent.’
85 Following Schopenhauer
86 and Adorno,
87 the experience of the 
meaningless is simply, as ‘meaning’ here is confused with ‘intention,’ the 
experience of that which transgresses a particular man’s intentions, that which he 
does not understand, that which overcomes or overwhelms him, his hopes, dreams 
or expectations, to such a degree that no trace of personality can be found in what 
appear before him, no trace of subjectivity can be found in what is objectified. 
Coming face to face with a meaningless event, it is what is suddenly made known 
that makes man tremble. For now, we shall loosely define the numinous, without 
yet attempting a strict definition, as the experience of something unknown in front 
of which almost any man would stand truly amazed and tremble or run away. The 
numinous fascinates Shakespeare throughout his writings, from the almost 
overwhelming appearances of Joan of Pucelle and Lord Talbot in, what is believed 
to be Shakespeare’s first play, Henry VI, Part I, to the appearance of the bearded 
witches that opens Macbeth and the armoured ghost that begins Hamlet. As we 
proceed, it will become evident that our focus is not so much the meaningless or 
numinous experiences per se, but how Shakespeare produces the apperception of 
the Being of those who are subject to these experiences.  
 
[37]     There is a marked difference between, on the one hand, the meaningless 
experience of Ophelia hearing of the death of her father Polonius, of Laertes 
hearing of the death of his sister Ophelia, of Macduff hearing of the horrifying 
slaughter of his wife and children, of Romeo experiencing the ‘death’ of Julia, and, 
on the other, Hamlet’s numinous experience of the ghost of his father and the 
tremors witnessed by an affrighted Ophelia, Hamlet’s numinous experience of the 
                                                 
85 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Scene iii. 153-154. 
86 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Book III, §51, p. 161. 
87 Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 187. The False Production of Being 
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ghost next to an unseeing mother, Macbeth and Banquo as they are haunted by the 
three witches on the heath and Macbeth’s numinous experience of the ghost of 
Banquo in the presence the unknowing Dukes. The first are instances of 
experiences of what is meaningless, the other of what is numinous.  
 
[38]     Of all meaningless events, of all encounters with what is meaningless in 
Shakespeare’s plays, no scene is more persuasive than the scene where Romeo 
encounters the ‘death’ of Juliet, which is incomparably more persuasive than, for 
example when Macduff hears of the slaughter of his children
88 or Laertes hears of 
the death of his sister,
89 and [th]is quite simply because she is not dead. Everyone 
will notice two things when watching Romeo and Juliet. First of all, that that the 
final scene of Romeo and Juliet is fundamentally similar to Ovid’s story of Pyramus 
and Thisby,
90 where also the children of two feuding families meet in secret, 
attempt to find their love in concealment, hidden away from all men’s eyes, and 
that they similarly find their end when mistaking what is dead for what is not, that 
Pyramus kills himself having no better proof than a tear from Thisbe’s red dress, 
and Romeo kills himself when he discovers Juliet lying, eyes closed, in the 
sarcophagus. Romeo’s encounter with Juliet’s death is so convincing, simply 
because it does not fail to give proof of another kind than what is perceptible. As he 
himself sees the dead appear before him, Romeo’s mind is fixed on the dead, the 
final appearance of his beloved, his perceptions cannot be but adequate to this 
lifeless phenomenon. However, his mind is inadequate to the noumenal 
[personality], the substantial unity of that which does not appear to be alive, and 
hence, is twice hidden, twice concealed. Again the apperception of what is not 
                                                 
88 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act IV, Scene iii. 159-240. 
89 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act IV, Scene vii. 163-194. 
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[true] creates the apperception of what is. In Kantian terms, Romeo has no idea 
about what appears before him, who she really is.
91 Everything Romeo thinks 
about Juliet corresponds only to the masque of death that she is wearing, a 
phenomenal masque of death that, although it will soon become her own, does not 
express what Juliet is, but what she is not. And if we were to seek out and truly find 
that which corresponds to Hamlet’s composite, synthetic idea about Juliet, we 
would search in vain. All Hamlet’s [composite] ideas about Juliet corresponds to 
nothing, are adequate to nothing that exists, are merely inadequations to which no 
phenomenon that exist could ever be found.  
 
[39]     As we shall soon see, there is another difference, more fundamental to 
tragedy than the difference between the numinous and the meaningless is to the 
task of persuading the spectator that what comes before her is. For the experience 
of the spectator and the character is not the same, and the spectator experiences 
[th]is difference that produces the Being of that character, that event that untruly 
appears before her. Ophelia’s death personifies the meaningless event, as much as 
Juliet incarnates it. That is, Ophelia is merely the masque of the meaningless, its 
surface, which any disastrous event may carry forth the experience of, while Juliet 
is its depth. And it is for [th]is incarnation of what is meaningless that Romeo kills 
himself, and becomes, as Schopenhauer points out, without ever giving the [true] 
reason, the clearest example of a meaningless event in the history of modern 
drama.
92  
                                                 
91 Kant has an inessential concept of ‘idea,’ a concept for which there could not possibly correspond 
a phenomenon. Personality, Substantiality, Existence are, in this sense, ideas. Cf. Kant, Critique of 
Pure Reason, A327/B384, p. 371. 
92 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Book III, §51, p. 161.This is the [true] reason, that 
Schopenhauer does not find time or opportunity to give: Being perceived or apperceived as what 
you are not, produces the apperception of your Being much more persuasively than if you are only The False Production of Being 
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[40]     There is a basic difference between, on the one hand, the experience of what 
is meaningless – as it is defined by Schopenhauer in The World as Will and 
Representation and Adorno in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason - on the other, the 
experience of the numinous presented by Rudolf Otto in The Ideal of the Holy, Das 
Heilige. Both are experiences of [what is] unexpected, that which by being 
unconcealed do transgress our expectations. The meaningless is the overwhelming 
experience of what is unconcealed beyond our thoughts, intentions or desires, be it 
the suicide of a sister [Laertes], the slaughter of a wife [Macduff]. They both 
tremble, Laertes and Macduff, but they tremble in the face of what they know. The 
tremor, even stupor, of Macbeth is of a different kind, for he shivers in the 
presence of what he does not know, he shivers when encountering what is 
numinous. The numinous is, according to Rudolf Otto, the experience of that 
which transgresses our concepts and perceptions, but which we nevertheless have 
been given an apperception of, where there is no promise to abort or suspend [th]is 
inadequation, as the numinous is the experience, the apperception of that which no 
human intellect, no concepts can ever be adequate to. It is [th]is, the immediate 
acknowledgement of what we cannot possibly know, our spontaneous awareness of 
[th]is difference, that makes us tremble, or, as Shakespeare says, makes us stand 
out as truly ‘amazed.’
93 However, there is no immediate transference of the theory 
of the numinous from life to theatre. Even [th]is difference between the experience 
                                                                                                                                               
perceived or apperceived as what you are. Now being perceived or apperceived as what you are not, 
you appear to be dissociated from your self. What you are dissociated from is, however, not your 
self, but what you are essentially perceived as or substantially apperceived as. The self remains. Or, 
if you think [saying] self is [saying] too much, more than there is ground for, we could say that 
[th]is is dissociated from it apprehension, so alone [th]is [ontological difference] remains. 
93 ‘Amazement’ does to Shakespeare name what is truly incomprehensible,  
what the subject had not anticipated or could never have imagined or had any notions of if not 
[th]is was unconcealed. Cf. Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, Act III, Scene ii.148/151 and 
Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act III, Scene ii.344. The False Production of Being 
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of the meaningless and the numinous is shallow, would only make possible a 
superficial theory of theatre - an assessment of theatre confined to the perception 
of phenomena - compared to that which makes the characters that experience the 
numinous or the meaningless come alive [before the audience].  
 
[41]   According to Adorno, tragedy is not believed to be a superior art because it 
renders life more meaningful, but rather, because it renders life meaningless. 
Nothing appear, again according to Adorno, to the bourgeoisie to be more 
profound, deeper than what is meaningless, and as nothing [is] more meaningless 
than tragedy, this makes tragedy, in the eyes of the bourgeoisie, its philosophical 
representatives and literary spokesmen, among them Schopenhauer and Schiller, 
the most profound expression of humanity.
94 For, as Adorno says, the bourgeois is 
the hypostazation of depth, the crowning of everything irrational, and nothing 
appear to be deeper to the bourgeoisie than when man does not recognize his own 
image in the [hi]story that appears before him, not his own subject in the events 
that suddenly appear to be out of control and now seem to determine what to 
Adorno always begins every story, triggers every event, the subject, which to the 
bourgeoisie remains hidden, and to Adorno remains the hidden but negative 
potential for man’s self-empowerment.
95 No genre is more expressive of what is 
purposeless and meaningless than tragedy, which sees its crowning achievement in 
expressing that life is without purpose … that life has no greater, no deeper 
meaning than when it appears to be without purpose … prolonging man’s self-
imposed subjection to a power it hypostatises beyond its control, be this power 
called Fate or Fortune, Devil or God, Nature or Economy, if you will, the Being of 
                                                 
94 Cf. Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 183-187. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and 
Idea, Book III, §51. 
95 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 116. The False Production of Being 
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Beings, which Adorno sees as the latest, the most obscure and alluring, as 
Heidegger’s contribution to man’s self-imposed enslavement to the powers that 
be.
96  
 
[42]     It is admirable that Adorno, like Schopenhauer, finds that some of the most 
profound tragedies produces the impression of what is meaningless, and that the 
meaningless, which to Schopenhauer produces a feeling of resignation in the face 
of destiny or Fortuna, produces a profound sense of depth.
97 What Adorno does 
not notice, being too preoccupied with the content of the drama and therefore 
looking away from or neglecting its form, already taking for granted that what is 
perceived or represented [on stage] in the theatre is, is that even though the 
audience will be inclined to believe in a performance/play which presents the 
meaningless or the numinous, as it is close or remains close to their own experience 
of life, there are nevertheless even more glorious dresses the meaningless and the 
numinous have to wear in order to be persuasive, to convince us that what appear 
before us is. Both Schopenhauer and Adorno take for granted that the numinous 
or the meaningless, by itself, will make theatre more attractive, will persuade us 
that [th]is is. To Shakespeare this is not enough. For in Hamlet’s encounter with 
the ghost, what creates the apperception that [th]is is, is obviously doubt, as it is in 
the scenes where Macbeth, or for that matter, Hamlet, looses his mind in the 
presence of the ghost, the perception of what is [untrue], the misperception of the 
ghost, which is neither seen by Hamlet’s mother nor Macbeth’s court, which 
makes the misperceiver as much as the misperceived, stand out as alive. They 
                                                 
96 It is Adorno’s high regard of Heidegger as an intellectual enemy, as expressing the most 
sophisticated expression of what is irrational, and thus crowing the bourgeoisie tradition of 
hailing/praising what is meaningless, that makes it necessary for Adorno to attack Heidegger in 
Negative Dialectics. 
97 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Book III, §51, p. 160. The False Production of Being 
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appear to be not because they perceive what is, but because they perceive what is 
not, and, from the perception of what is not, we do again infer to the apperception 
that [th]is, is. Obviously, when speaking of the meaningless, both Adorno and 
Schopenhauer takes [th]is for granted.
98  
 
[43]     The final scene of Romeo and Juliet is perhaps the most persuasive example 
of the meaningless production of Being, not simply because it represents a 
meaningless event, but more fundamentally, because [th]is meaningless event never 
occurred. Hence, we are coming face to face with an untrue event, grounded in the 
misperception or misapperception of what [th]is is. If such misperceptions or 
misapperceptions were to be formulated as propositions, these propositions would, 
as Aristotle remarks in both Categories and Metaphysics, describe something that 
does not exist.
99 Apart from Romeo and Juliet, another memorable scene, where we 
again are brought to experience the heartbreaking consequences of an unevent, 
occurs when Hamlet, in tremor, passes before a shattered Ophelia. What happens 
is not only that Ophelia is brought to witness what to her is a meaningless event, 
incomprehensible, but the appearance, if not persona, of Hamlet is made alive as 
Hamlet feigns the numinous tremors, as Hamlet presents himself as what he is not. 
For again, from the perception of what is not [true], we make the inference to the 
apperception of what is [true]. The untrue event is taken from Hamlet, Act II, 
Scene I, where Polonius addresses Ophelia as she enters,
100 
Polonius  How now, Ophelia, what’s the matter? 
Ophelia  O my lord, my lord, I have been so affrightened! 
Polonius  With what, i’the name of God? 
Ophelia   My Lord, as I was sewing in my closet, 
                                                 
98 In The Idea of The Holy, Rudolf Otto’s does generally take for granted the Being of that which is 
represented numinously. 
99 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VI, 1024b24-26, and Aristotle, Categories, 2a35-2b6. 
100 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II., Scene i.74f. The False Production of Being 
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    Lord Hamlet, with his doublet all unbraced, 
No hat upon his head, his stockings fouled,  
Ungartered, and down-gyvèd to his ankle, 
Pale as his shirt, his knees knocking each other, 
And with a looks so piteous in purport, 
As if he had been loosed out of hell 
To speak of horrors – he comes before me.  
Polonius  Mad for thy love? 
Ophelia  My lord, I do not know, 
    But truly I do fear it.
101  
 
But to truly witness the depth of an unevent, the profundities of an unhappening, 
we should not leave [th]is theatre before Romeo is brought face to face with the 
meaningless death of Juliet. Being as he is exiled to Mantua, Romeo is dreaming 
ecstatic dreams of Juliet that are soon to be shattered.
102  
Romeo   I dreamt my lady came and found me dead 
  (Strange dram that gives a dead man leave to think!) 
And breathed such life with kisses in my lips 
    That I revived and was an emperor. 
    Ah me! How sweet is love itself possessed, 
    When but love’s shadows are so rich in joy! 
Enter Romeo’s Man [Balthasar, booted].   
    News from Verona! How now, Balthasar? 
    Dost thou not bring me letters from the friar? 
    How doth my lady? Is my father well? 
    How fares my Juliet?  
[Balthasar is silent, Balthasar does not speak, Balthasar is unwilling 
to speak. May we speak of Balthasar’s silence.] 
      That  I  ask  again,   
  [Confirming  Balthasar’s  silence] 
    For nothing can be ill if she be well. 
Man     Then she is well, and nothing can be ill. 
    Her body sleeps in Capel’s monument, 
    And her immortal part with angels lives. 
    I saw her laid low in her kindred’s vault 
    And presently took post to tell it to you. 
    O, pardon me for bringing these ill news, 
    Since you did leave it for my office, sir. 
Romeo  Is it e’en so? Then I defy you, stars! 
Thou knowest my lodging. Get me ink and paper 
And hire post horses. I will hence tonight.  
Man    I do beseech you, sir, have patience. 
                                                 
101 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene i.74f. 
102 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Scene i.6ff. The False Production of Being 
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    Your looks are pale and wild and do import 
Some misadventure.
103  
 
[44]     It is more persuasive to hear Romeo encounter the death of Juliet than to 
see Laertes hearing the news of his sisters death, Ophelia, simply because Romeo 
perceives what is untrue, whereas Laertes perceives what is not untrue. 
Fundamentally, whereas one inapperception - the perception of death - is [true], 
the other is not [true]. Similarly, what makes Hamlet’s encounter with his father’s 
ghost more effective, more persuasive than Macbeth’s spiritual encounters, is not 
that we in the one case have a manly spirit appear with a beard and the other 
female spirits with beards, but that Hamlet, later, appear to feign, to fake the effect 
of a numinous experience, namely, [th]is trembling. Whereas both Hamlet and 
Macbeth may doubt what they see with their own eyes, more fundamentally, their 
shivering bodies does maintain the positivity of [th]is experience, signal that their 
bodies trust in the reality of what their minds cannot [yet] comprehend. For 
tremor - the mysterium tremendum - symbolizes an experience of what is dissimilar, 
the apperception of what is unlike its phenomenal appearance, an appearance that 
is inadequate to what [th]is truly is. And, more terrifying than to witness, as 
Ophelia, the meaningless unconcealment of a trembling man, is to experience that 
which Macbeth’s tremor is truly inadequate to. For more horrifying than any 
apparition, is that which this unlikeness conceals. 
[45]     About the numinous experience as an inference from what is not [true] to 
what is [true], from what is seen to what is not seen, a deduction from what is 
unconcealed to what is concealed, even to what cannot be unconcealed, the 
noumenon, Otto explains, with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, that 
                                                 
103 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Scene i.28. Brackets added. The False Production of Being 
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the numinous is like the noumena what is inferred to. Whereas the apparition is 
what appears and adequate to the apparition is the tremendum, the tremendum is 
inadequate to what does not appear, the mysterium.
104 Otto claims that what stirs 
the mind to experience, to apperceive [th]is difference, is a certain comportment, 
usually discovered in weak and susceptible bodies, which makes possible that 
certain phenomena may stir the inference from what is seen to what is unseen, 
from what is known to what is unknown.
105 It is obvious that Otto has not himself 
completely understood the way in which his analysis differs from Kant’s. For 
whereas the phenomenon to Kant is a likeness, the phenomenon presented to Otto, 
the numinous apparition that appears before the trembling man, is an unlikeness, 
the one appearing as what it is, the other appearing as what it is not. And, as we 
shall stress throughout this thesis, the inference to what is hidden is immensely 
more rapid when faced with what is untrue. For whereas each familiar 
phenomenon to Kant is true to its condition, the noumenon, be it called, Self, Soul, 
                                                 
104 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, ‘Chapter IV, Mysterium Tremendum,’ pp. 12-24. 
105 Otto speaks of the numinous experience as ‘a peculiar interpretation and valuation of sense 
data.’ [Otto, The Idea of The Holy, p. 113] Even though the numinous does not denote the 
perception of something we can sense, it begins with, even has to begin with, an inference from 
what we can sense to what is insensible. As Otto is surprisingly clear, we shall let him speak for 
himself. ‘The proof that in the numinous we have to deal with purely a priori cognitive elements is 
to be reached by introspection and a critical examination of reason such as Kant instituted. We 
find, that is, involved in the numinous experience, beliefs and feelings qualitatively different from 
anything that ‘natural’ sense-perception is capable of giving us. They [i.e. the numinous 
experiences] are themselves not perceptions at all, but peculiar interpretations and valuations, at 
first of perceptual data, and then - at a higher level - of posited objects and entities, which 
themselves no longer belong to the perceptual world, but are thought of as supplementing and 
transcending it. And as they are not themselves sense-perceptions, so neither are they any sort of 
‘transmutation’ of sense-perception.’ [Otto, The Idea of The Holy, p. 113] Otto writes, ‘In the 
famous opening words of the Critique of Pure Reason [Kant] says: ‘That all our knowledge begins 
with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be 
awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses? … But, though 
all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience.’ 
[Otto, The Idea of The Holy, p. 112f.] Otto issues this comment, ‘The numinous is of the latter kind. 
It issues from the deepest foundation of cognitive apprehension that the soul possesses, and, though 
it of course comes into being in and amid the sensory data and empirical material of the natural 
world and cannot anticipate or dispense with those, yet it does not arise out of them, but only by 
their means. They are the incitement, the stimulus, and the ‘occasion’ for the numinous experience 
to become astir.‘[Otto, The Idea of The Holy, p. 113]. The False Production of Being 
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God or Cause, the unfamiliar phenomenon, or the recognition of what presents 
itself untruly, giving that there is, as Kant says, no hidden essence,
106 would trigger 
the immediate inference to [th]is hidden condition, and thus produce the 
apperception of the Being of beings. 
 
[46]    We shall notice, in the passing, that there is a common expression for the 
experience of both the meaningless and the numinous, namely trembling. Now, 
again, we shall see, that what makes Romeo’s encounter with Juliet’s death more 
convincing, more persuasive than Laertes encounter with the death of Ophelia, is 
not that the one shivers more than the other, but that one perceives what is not 
[true], whereas the other perceives what is [true], and as we have said, we [continue 
to] make the effortless inference from the perception of what is not [true], to the 
apperception of what is [true]. If one for a moment thought that we perceived the 
scene where Romeo faces the death of Juliet as more persuasive because we know 
Romeo more than we know Laertes, this is simply not true. For we do not only 
seem to know Romeo less than we know Hamlet, but we know Romeo even less 
than we know Laertes. For in all of Shakespeare’s plays, no character is more 
shadowy, more hidden than Romeo, who slips between our fingers, a lover behind 
a mask, a man married without witnesses at night, an exile known to no one [not 
even his parents], a lover in the dark hardly perceived, no more than a whispering 
shadow among the trees, a man who disappears, like a ghost before dawn. We shall 
notice, that, as the cock cries, Romeo takes his cue to leave.
107 For of all of 
Shakespeare’s characters, no one is more secret than Romeo. And if you for a 
moment think that you know less about Hamlet than you know of Romeo, you 
                                                 
106 Cf. Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 207. 
107 As Romeo says when he sees the dawn break above Juliet’s balcony, ‘More light and light – 
more dark and dark our woes.’  Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Scene v.36. The False Production of Being 
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have failed to consider that we all know Hamlets ideals, whereas of Romeo’s we 
know nothing. 
§6.3 The Paradox of What is False 
 
  
[47]     We shall in this paragraph go on to present the paradox of what is false, the 
insight that the false is more true, the untrue is more [true] than what is true.  
Obviously, even a reader, who does not or is not immediately able to define the 
concepts of truth here used, does however immediately understand the meaning of 
the two different concepts of truth expressed in the same sentence. For [th]is 
simply means that the untrue is more real whereas the true is less. Our interest is 
hardly in the places where the false is spoken of as such, for when the ‘false’ is 
mentioned by name, it is not properly ‘false’ and has merely become the 
superficial mark of something that was unknown, but is no longer unknown. The 
seal of what is false has truly been broken, and does no longer protect the 
unknown, which persuades any witness of the existence of that which remains out 
of reach, of that which is not grasped or only grasped, superficially, as what it is 
not. Quite clearly, the places where Shakespeare or any of the characters actually 
explicitly speak of what is false, do not produce the ontological contradiction, 
which is most effortlessly affected/effected when the false is not acknowledged and 
[th]is is misperceived, imperceived, inapperceived or misapperceived. Looking up 
the words ‘false’ or ‘falsity,’ in The Concordance to Shakespeare is only of very 
limited use, even runs counter to our intentions. The belief that such a 
concordance would immediately show us something valuable, is exactly what would 
impede, be a major obstacle to the discovery of the production of the Being of 
beings in Shakespeare’s works. For the false does not keep its true powers of The False Production of Being 
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persuasion when it is discovered and named. We could even say that the false loses 
its powers of persuasion as soon as it is dis-covered. For as soon as it becomes 
known, what is false does no longer effortlessly produce the apperception of the 
Being of beings. The false is only as long as it remains undiscovered, unknown, 
unnamed, and when the false is truly discovered, it bears a false name. It is 
maintained throughout this thesis that the false is apperceived as truer than what 
is true. Having here used two different concepts of truth in one and the same 
statement, one epistemological and one ontological, this merely means that the 
inadequate perception of what [th]is is produces a more profound apperception of 
[th]is, which being, as it were, incomprehended, produces a greater sense of depth, 
and through [th]is depth or as [th]is depth, the apperception of the Being of beings.  
 
[48]     By appearing as what he is not, that is, loyal, Macbeth produces the secret 
that he is. [Th]is secret is without content. That is, I cannot apperceive what the 
secret is, only say that what is perceived is untrue. And, from the perception of 
what is untrue, in the epistemological sense, I infer to the apperception of what is 
true, in the ontological sense. This is of course a false inference, for I cannot simply 
say that what[ever] is false compels me to infer to what is [true], that whenever 
[th]is presents itself or anyone presents [th]is as what it is not, I will be forced to, 
and [th]is without force, so effortlessly that [th]is inference appears to be 
indifferent from my own nature, to infer to the Being of [th]is being. But that is 
exactly what we assert, that part of our composition is to, naturally and without 
effort, make the inference from the perception of what is untrue in the 
epistemological sense, to the apperception of what is true, in the ontological sense, 
in short, that all inadequations, every inadequate expression of what [th]is [being] The False Production of Being 
 
280  
is, will make me involuntary believe that [th]is [being] is. In [th]is sense we can say 
that the false is equally true, or even, that the false is more true, that the false 
shows me, even more profoundly, what is [true], for it shows [th]is without 
properties, without anything to grasp or reach out for the existence/presence of 
except [th]is, and nothing to remember except that which brings forward the 
thought that what [th]is is has been forgotten. 
 
[49]     We shall not disregard the inference from the non-existence of what is 
perceived to the existence of what is apperceived, to what is however false it may 
be, but rather say that [th]is invalid inference, from the perception of an untrue 
appearance, to the apperception of something truly hidden is, of course, entirely 
false. That the unhidden is untrue leads me to believe that the hidden is [true], that 
there is something truly hidden. Likewise, not forgetting the difference with which 
Macbeth appears to the spectator within the theatre and the character within the 
play, we could say that the inference, however effortless or natural, from the 
perception of an untrue persona to a true person, that is, an existing person, from 
the perception of the inadequate [re]presentation of [th]is being to the 
apperception of the Being of [th]is being, is both invalid and false. There arises the 
question as to whether [th]is ontological inference is valid or invalid according to 
the standards of traditional logic. If we were to test or try [th]is argument 
according to the standards of traditional logic, which it evidently supersedes, we 
could again say, that we make an inference from, whether [th]is is fully 
comprehended or simply expressed, Macbeth is loyal, to Macbeth is. For loyal is 
not a predicate that belongs to Macbeth, and for this predicate [loyal] to not belong 
to him, he must certainly, be. The False Production of Being 
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[50]     We do agree with Kant, that we cannot and do not simply discard with 
inferences because they are false. We even have to agree with Kant when he says 
that we can only have false impressions of what is. That is, whenever a cognition 
exceeds phenomenal description and attempts to describe [th]is, it will always fail, 
or rather, it will never be able to prove [th]is, only assert that without [th]is 
condition I could not make any assertion at all. Contrary to what Kant says, we 
will say that only false/untrue assertions lay [th]is immediately bare, whereas true 
assertions cloud [th]is foundation, [th]is condition. That is, for both true and false 
statements/assertions there will be a condition, be [th]is called, self, cause, God, but 
[th]is condition, which we necessarily have an apperception of in any perception, 
will nevertheless only be laid bare, appear in full much like a flower in bloom, if 
[th]is assertion is inadequate to what [th]is is. Then, and only then, will the false 
foundation be laid bare. Or we could say, elaborating on Kant, that only false 
assertions, that is, assertions that show inadequately what we are, could lay bare 
the illusory, in Kant’s sense of what is beyond phenomenological description, 
foundation of what we all are insofar as we may apperceive [th]is, the Being of 
beings. We should perhaps notice that when Kant speaks of subject, world, God as 
transcendental ideas, and the subject more singularly as substantiality, personality, 
ideality,
108 he does so from the epistemological perspective that considers any 
proposition for which there is no adequate phenomenological proof to support or 
validate a proposition or phenomenological description, to be illusory. In short, 
[th]is - the Being of beings - is beyond phenomenological description.  
 
                                                 
108 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A335/B392. The False Production of Being 
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[51]     Again the main point is that the inference from what is untrue to what is 
true does not create the apperception of what is unconcealed, but what is 
concealed. In [th]is sense, what is essentially false will invariably show me what is 
true. One could say that what we achieve through [th]is inference from the 
perception of what is false to the apperception of what is [true], is seemingly that 
we returned to were we begun, to negate the apperception of that which first 
appeared without properties, be [th]is called, Anschauung, the unconcealed or 
nothing. We may appear to have come full circle back to were also Hegel begins, 
that is, with Being, and with [th]is [being], with nothing. For, as Hegel says, in the 
beginning, ‘Being is Nothing.’
109 [Th]is is simply not true, for as Kant’s 
Anschauung and Hegel’s Nichts/Nothing presents merely the naked apperception 
of that which is unconcealed, whereas through these false deductions, we make the 
inference to the Being of what is concealed. Truly, we have through [th]is 
ontological inference simply negated the apperception of what Kant calls 
‘Anschauung,’ and Hegel, ‘Nichts,’ negated, through [th]is false inference, the 
apperception of that which to Heidegger is first unconcealed. What we achieve 
through the inference from what is untrue to what is true, have created or been led 
to the apperception of, is [th]is, that which is concealed, and whereas the first, that 
which is negated, may appear convincing enough the other is truly profound. 
Hence, we inquire into the depths of Being. We shall finish as we began, with a 
concrete exposition of [th]is negative ontological experience, returning to find Lord 
Gloucester as he is looking for the way to Dover. 
 
                                                 
109 Hegel says in Logic, ‘But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the absolutely 
negative: which, in a similar immediate aspect, is just Nothing. [Hegel, Logic, ‘Chapter VII, The 
Doctrine of Being,’ § 87, p. 127. The False Production of Being 
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[52]     It is an unseeing man who encounters a son in disguise on the heath, when 
the blinded Gloucester meets Edgar, whom he does not recognize, never 
apperceives, asking the stranger, ‘Know’st thou the way to Dover?’ The 
unrecognized son answers, as he denies his own existence, ‘Give me thy arm:/Poor 
Tom shall lead thee.’
110 Concerning the presentation of what is not, no description 
in Shakespeare’s oeuvre is more convincing than Poor Tom a-Bedlam’s evocative 
description of the waters far beneath the cliff before the fall and his equally 
inspired description of the monster looking down from the edge of the cliff after 
the fall, nothing more false. As Edgar asks after the resolution, and no one more 
falsely,  
Edgar   ‘Upon the crown o’ th’ cliff, what this was that 
Which parted from you?  
Gloucester   A poor unfortunate beggar. 
Edgar    As I stood here below, methought his eyes 
Were two full moons; he had a thousand noses, 
Horns whelked and waved like the enridgèd sea: 
It was some fiend; therefore, thou happy father, 
Think that the clearest gods, who make them honours 
Of men’s impossibilities, have preserved thee.’
111  
 
What we shall bear in mind when we listen to these descriptions is not that they 
are ‘poetic,’ but rather their poetic function which is to produce the hidden Being 
of the storyteller and the eyeless Being of the one offered such false 
representations. This point is too easily missed if one gives too much attention to 
the meaning of what is said and neglects its function, which is, as it is so often to 
Shakespeare, not only to speak with eloquence but to produce the apperception of 
the Being of beings. 
 
                                                 
110 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act IV, Scene i.80-81. 
111 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act IV, Scene vi.67-74. The False Production of Being 
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[53]     Poor Tom describes lyrically what he sees from the [non-] edge of the Cliff 
of Dover,  
‘The fishermen that walk upon the beach 
Appear like mice; and yond tall anchoring bark 
Diminished to her cock; her cock, a buoy 
Almost too small for sight. The murmuring surge 
That on th’ unnumb’red idle pebble chafes 
Cannot be heard so high. I’ll look no more, 
Lest my brain turn and the deficient sight 
Topple down headlong.’
112  
 
These would be fair descriptions if Edgar was not standing in the middle of the 
plain fields, if he did not present himself as Poor Tom. But he does, and through 
the false perceptions that he evokes, and by himself being inapperceived, Edgar 
makes the spectator apperceive the Being of beings, as we draw inferences not only 
from the imperception of [th]is [heath] to its unconcealed existence but also from 
the inapperception of [th]is man [Edgar] to his concealed Being, again making the 
false inference from what is untrue, to what is.  
 
[54]     Edgar’s description is not only a testimony to man’s powers of imagination, 
to the freedom of the imagination to go beyond what is merely true, but more so, 
this imagination has, what is not often if at all acknowledged, a function which is 
quite contrary to the superficial freedom that its words seem to express, words 
which appear to be uttered in total disregard of what might appear before them. 
However, the acknowledgement of the negative freedom of the imagination to 
express what does not exist, to go beyond the expression of what is merely there, 
hides the fact that the expression of what does not exist, does not only evoke the 
perception of what is not there, but more fundamentally, produces the profound 
apperception of what is there, that [place] - even the negation of that [place] - from 
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which not even the storyteller nor the imagination can escape without making its 
own expression impossible. So in its empty freedom, the description or 
presentation of what is not, produces what is, irrevocably what makes [th]is 
presentation, the presentation of what is not possible, in the first place, that the one 
who expresses what is not, and the one listening to what is not, is there. 
 
[55]    Edgar’s description is both beautiful and compelling and if we have any 
imagination at all, we will not fail to have a strong inner impression of what Edgar 
has, through logos, evoked the image of. There is only one rub, his description is 
inadequate to what is there, and it is through [th]is inadequacy Gloucester falls and 
is resurrected, for Gloucester falls from an aporia, a place that simply does not 
exist. Not only does Shakespeare let Poor Tom guide Gloucester to the brink of the 
cliff to there experience, with the wind blowing in his face, an aporia, a place from 
which it is impossible to proceed, to go any further or even jump, but Shakespeare 
lets Gloucester fall from that place which it is truly impossible to fall from, a place 
that does not exist. And from this place that does not exist, Gloucester does not only 
proceed, but he walks away unharmed as if nothing had happened. But it is 
impossible to claim that nothing did. Therefore Being appears to be unthinkable, 
transgressing a poor man’s thoughts and emotions, only expressed as the negation 
of what [th]is man may falsely perceive or apperceive. What appears to be, in all 
cases, is that which is unthinkable, that which [th]is person does not think of or 
that which through [th]is man’s imagination or reflections has not been expressed, 
or that which is only expressed as the negation of what [th]is man falsely perceives 
or apperceives. 
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[56]     More patiently, we come to realize, that when Edgar is describing what is 
far beneath the cliff of Dover, that what is there, what which we can see, if 
anything is presented, is never described and that these fields near Dover, appear 
to be only because they are not described, and as such remain truly indescribable, 
because they transgress Gloucester’s imagination, and hence become truly 
unimaginable. [Th]is difference, rather than its elimination, produces the 
apperception of the Being of beings, the apperception of that which is unconcealed, 
that [th]is, which remains, which is unimagined, unimaginable, is. A similarly false 
presentation occurs in the interrogation of Parolles towards the end of All’s Well 
that Ends Well,
113 which also produces the apperception of what is unconcealed. 
For the false but essential presentation that is without referential subject creates 
the apperception of what is unconcealed as much as the false presentation of that 
which has a referential subject, produces the apperception of what is concealed. 
For the purpose of the production of the Being of beings, it is rather irrelevant that 
Gloucester is blind and Parolles is blindfolded. For the false perception of that 
which does not exist creates the profound apperception of what is unconcealed as 
much as the false perception of what [th]is is creates the profound apperception of 
what is concealed. 
 
[57]     Just as the cliff of Dover is profoundly unconcealed through its non-
existence, as it is and remains imperceived, so is the enemy camp where Parolles, in 
All’s Well that Ends Well, thinks he is being interrogated by the enemy, whose 
incomprehensible tongue makes him fear for his life, but also speak the truth. It is, 
of course, [th]is very imperception, the perception of that which is sublimely 
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shallow, which gives Being to that which, before our very eyes, is not unconcealed. 
For what is obvious, is that [th]is imperception, produces the apperception of [th]is 
as unconcealed, whereas any inapperception produces the apperception of  [th]is 
as concealed. And so it becomes clear that each figure produces correspondingly 
but paradoxically the Being of that which is not perceived or the Being of that 
which is not apperceived. Gloucester senses this imperception, that which is 
neither perceived nor apperceived, saying, ‘But have I fall’n or no?’ To which 
Edgar answers affirmatively, and never have man spoken more falsely, ‘From the 
dead summit of this chalky bourn./Look up a-height: the shrill-gorged lark so 
far/Cannot be seen or heard: do but look up.’ To which Gloucester, looking either 
up or down? says, ‘Alack, I have no eyes.’
114  
 
[58]    Had Gloucester never thought he had been standing on that cliff which is 
not there, and had not Edgar, so evocatively, described the ocean below that does 
not exist, the spectator would never have believed that the one rising from the fall 
he never made, would be. And so we could say that if Edgar had told the truth, not 
only would Gloucester have been dead, but we would never considered him to be 
dying, had he merely crashed into the rocks below. And so it is, not only that 
untruth kept [th]is man alive, but the untruth produced the Being of the man 
which appear before us. For if his thoughts, his perceptions, his apperceptions 
were ever adequate to [th]is or the phenomenal masque, did ever correspond to 
this person or persona, not only would [th]is life be over, but it would indeed never 
have begun, as he, to the audience, would never appear to be. So whether or not 
untruth saves or kills, it is the untrue representation that most convincingly, most 
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288  
effortlessly creates the apperception of that which, according to Hegel, lives and 
dies. And thus Shakespeare has accomplished the production of the contradiction 
that lies at the core of every life, that which to Hegel is most fundamental to every 
being, the Being of beings. For it is, as Hegel says in his Logic, undoubtedly true 
that the same being lives and dies.
115  
 
[59]     Imperception is never an obstacle, but, paradoxically, an undeniable 
inspiration for the apperception of what is, the production of the Being of beings, 
the ontological contradiction. Again [th]is appears as what is unimaginable, the 
world appears as what is indescribably a transgression. And it is [th]is 
transgression, which the world is, which sometimes keeps us alive, and sometimes 
kills us. As much as it saves Lord Gloucester, it kills Desdemona. For it is [th]is 
difference, between what we imagine and what is unimaginable, the mind’s 
inadequate perception of what [th]is is, or for that matter, the inadequate 
apperception of [th]is, that makes not only Romeo kill himself when seeing Juliet in 
the sarcophagus, where she appears to be dead but is not, but also makes Othello 
reach out for a pillow which he places on Desdemona’s face to make her forever 
speechless, turning the wedding-bed into a death-bed.
116 Undoubtedly, it is [th]is 
difference which  makes us all weep as we believe, the spectators truly believe, that 
both Romeo and Desdemona are really dying, and that Gloucester is really saved. 
It is above all else, [th]is difference, the expression of [th]is inadequacy, which 
deeply hypnotizes the audience/spectators with the production of [th]is notion or 
sense of hypostasis or ekstasis, that truly shows that any perspectivism or 
                                                 
115 As Hegel says in Logic, ‘But the truth of the matter is that life, as life, involves the germ of death, 
and that the finite, being radically self-contradictory, involves its own self-suppression. Hegel, 
Logic, ‘Chapter VI, Logic Further Defined and Divided,’ §81, p. 117. 
116 Shakespeare, Othello, Act V, Scene ii.83. The False Production of Being 
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relativism will always fall short of producing the apperception of what is, what to 
us appear to be [real], as [th]is sense of reality is produced by the transgression, 
even the destruction of any [real] perspective. [Th]is apperspective, [th]is 
difference between our own perspective and what [th]is perspective fails to 
acknowledge the essence or existence of, is what sometimes keeps us alive and 
sometimes kills us, but, in both cases, whether [th]is - the apperspective - kills us or 
keeps us alive, it is [th]is difference that produces the apperception of the Being of 
beings, which, in any case, remains indescribable. For in theatre as in life, the 
inadequation kept Gloucester truly alive, or as Edgar says to his father, ‘men’s 
impossibilities has preserved thee.’
117  
                                                 
117 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act IV, Scene vi.74.  
 
C7 THE PRODUCTION OF BEING THROUGH DISSIMILARITY 
 
§7.1 The Topos of Dissimilarity 
§7.2 The Function of Dissimilarity 
§7.3 The Paradox of Dissimilarity 
 
C7 EXPOSÉ 
 
 
[1]     In this chapter I will trace Shakespeare’s use of the figure of dissimilarity, 
which remains as unrecognized as the commonplace of love is known by all. 
Shakespeare adapts, for his own purposes, the figure of dissimilarity, to produce, 
like Pseudo-Dionysius, the apperception of what is hidden.
1 Like Dionysius, whom 
there is clear evidence Shakespeare knew through his theory of the angelic 
hierarchies, Shakespeare produces the apperception of what is mystical. Just as we 
shall in the next chapter see how Shakespeare applies the figure of aphairesis, or 
more concretely elision, in the production of Being, a method nowhere more 
clearly presented than in Dionysius’ The Mystical Theology, so will we in this 
chapter realize how he applies another Dionysian figure, dissimilar similarity to 
produce the same end, the apperception of the Being of beings. I will not only show 
that Shakespeare produces [th]is end, but that he is conscious of [th]is production. 
Showing [un]true craftsmanship, Shakespeare displays three different variations 
on [th]is same dissimilar figure. Firstly, the apparent homage to tradition, where 
Shakespeare presents spirits as dissimilar creatures. Whether it is one of the fates 
                                                 
1 For the general sense of what is hidden implied in Pseudo-Dionysius’ The Mystical Theology, see 
Paul Rorem’s note to Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, p. 135n. Also notice that the first 
English translator knew exactly what is intended in the Greek mustikos, when the author of The 
Cloud of Unknowing translated it as Denis Hid Divinite or The Hidden Divinity of Dionysius. Cf. 
Unknown, The Pursuit of Wisdom, The Pursuit of Wisdom - and other works, by the author of The 
Cloud of Unknowing, trans. James A. Walsh, ‘Denis’s Hidden Theology,’ pp. 49-97.  The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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or a monster, the intention is the same, to produce, through this dissimilarity, the 
perception of an unlikeness, which in turn produces the inference from the 
negation of the appearance, to what is hidden. Shakespeare does, rather cleverly, 
produce another variation, for in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, he not only 
transforms appearances but the perception of appearances and through this 
cognitive transformation, one again perceives a dissimilarity which produces the 
inference to what is hidden. Thirdly, and for the third time within the same play, 
Shakespeare challenges his audience to witness a dissimilar production. 
Paradoxically, no performance is experienced as more real than Pyramus and 
Thisby, no players more convincing than the mechanics, and nowhere is the 
audience, more effortlessly persuaded to confuse theatre and life, the stage and the 
world, thus again showing, the true mechanics of Being.  
§7.1 The Topos of Dissimilarity 
 
 
[2]     Pseudo-Dionysius is the first to attempt a thoroughly systematic and 
logically consistent investigation into the interpretation and production of the 
apperception of spiritual beings. Unlike St. Thomas,
2 Pseudo-Dionysius does not 
speak directly about what angels are,
3 but starts by asking how they are perceived. 
Going through the evidence of the scriptures, Pseudo-Dionysius finds that angels, 
spiritual beings are presented, as they appear, with incongruous images, as unlike-
likenesses, dissimilar similarities, that they are perceived falsely, or quite simply, 
                                                 
2 Thomas Aquinas, Truth, ‘Question Eight, The Knowledge of Angels,’ p. 309-406. 
3 Whereas St. Thomas acknowledges that all men’s formal properties are universal, that the 
individuating principle for all singular men is matter, St. Thomas believes that angels need not be 
incarnated to be individuals as every angel remains indifferent from its form, and no angelic form is 
similar to another. Cf, Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, ‘Chapter 4, Essence in Separated 
Substances,’ Selected Writings, p. 41. This indifference from itself and this difference from all other 
angels, confirms, to St. Thomas, that angels do not [accidentally] carry bodies for their own sake, 
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as what they are not. In other words, they - these spiritual beings - appear as what 
they are not, and through the perception of what they are not, we apperceive that 
they are, as we again make an inference to the Being of beings. We witness the 
material expression of an unlike-likeness when the appearance is phenomenally 
distorted from or phenomenally inexpressive of what it essentially is and the 
difference is acknowledged or the distortion seems apparent. When the 
appearance does not self-evidently announce or give any signs that its self-
presentation is different from what it essentially is, we may formally witness the 
expression of an unlike-likeness, where I acknowledge that what I essentially 
perceive is without Being, without yet ceasing to exist, rather, reinforcing the 
apperception of the existence of that which cannot be identified with these 
properties. Illustrations that mark out the differences are not difficult to find. 
Concerning the material expression of an unlike-likenesses, no episode in 
Shakespeare is perhaps more telling than the horrific apparitions of the ghostly 
messengers, the harbingers of the future that, in a concealed manner, announces 
the end of Macbeth, not to mention the appearance in the beginning of Macbeth of 
the three bearded witches. But no play is perhaps more populated by these 
dissimilar appearances than A Midsummer Night’s Dream.
4 
 
[3]     I will not follow the many trails into Shakespeare’s drama searching for 
whatever trace of mysticism or shadow of magic there may be in any of his plays.
5 
Rather, we shall enjoy the most spectacular, the most magical of all Shakespeare’s 
                                                 
4 A man in disguise, is only formally and not immediately and perceptibly an unlike-likeness, if the 
disguise is not detected, whereas a monster or an angel, as they are, like ghosts, presented 
immediately and perceptible as what they are not, a man with wings or a man with the head of an 
ass, are. 
5 For a superficial but clear and concise presentation of the magical places in Shakespeare, see, L. 
W. Rogers, The Occultism in the Shakespeare Plays, New York:  The Theosophical Book Company, 
1909. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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plays, and remind ourselves that this play is one of two for which there is no 
original source.
6 Like Love’s Labours Lost, the story of A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream has no single source, and one is tempted to say that this is not only the most 
extraordinary but perhaps the most personal of all of Shakespeare’s plays. In this 
play, the gods, the fairies, the monsters, abound, as if springing from a magical 
well.
7 As always, Shakespeare is clearly not an original. Evidently, one can only 
make nothing from nothing, and Shakespeare’s use of the commonplace of 
dissimilar similarity is here as evident as his use of the commonplace of love. 
However, whereas we are accustomed to recognize the one topos, most of us are 
unable to recognize the other, which makes it all the more effective in the 
production of the ontological contradiction, the Being of beings. 
 
[4]     Love in A Midsummer Night’s Dream is a commonplace so obvious that one 
is inclined not to think of it, which is, of course, why commonplaces work, because 
the audience consider them as their own or indifferent from themselves. As 
Shakespeare shows time and time again, nothing is easier than for man to be 
captured by himself, for man to be seduced, perhaps even caught, by his own 
nature. In this sense we could agree with Harold Bloom, that no one knew ‘human 
nature,’
8 if we are allowed to call what is historically malleable and without history 
shapeless, ‘nature,’ better than Shakespeare. If we are to liken man to the flute 
that Hamlet was so unwilling to be, Shakespeare certainly knew what flute he was 
playing. As Hamlet, perhaps speaking for all audiences, demonstrates to 
Guildenstern, ‘Sblood, do you think I am easier to be played on than a pipe? Call 
                                                 
6 Tony Tanner, Introduction to A Midsummer Night’s Dream, in, William Shakespeare, Comedies, 
Volume 1, p. cxxxv. 
7 As well as being the most spiritual of Shakespeare’s plays, it is certainly the most hilarious. 
8 Bloom, Shakespeare, The Invention of the Human, ‘Shakespeare’s Universalism,’ p. 15. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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me what instrument you will, though you can fret me, you cannot play upon me.’
9 
If the audience confronted Shakespeare with the same objection, we are quite 
confident that his answer would have been, ‘I doubt you are right.’ For however 
unwilling a man may be to be seduced by his own nature, nature is not something 
man may easily escape without seizing to be. 
 
[5]   One of the commonplaces that nourish a Midsummer Night’s Dream is the 
general belief that love is blind. This commonplace is most magnificently, and 
perhaps most influentially, presented by Apuleius in The Golden Ass, where the 
unseen Cupid captures the heart of the unseeing Psyche and then only escapes the 
wrath of Cupid’s mother, Venus, by being hidden.
10 We can easily gather the 
sprouts of this commonplace from Shakespeare’s works, as for example in A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, where Helena says that ‘Love looks not with the 
eyes.’
11 The name of the unseen ‘Cupid’ being declaimed by Oberon, The King of 
the Underworld,
12 who, on this night of transformations, casts a love spell on his 
wife, Queen Titania, to show once and for all that every lover is prone to the most 
ridiculous misperceptions, no more rampantly than when Titania falls in love with 
half an ass. For casting the spell on his wife Titania, Oberon says, ‘May ye love 
whatever appear.’
13 It would appear that Shakespeare continues the experiments 
with love we find in equal measure in Twelfth Night and Romeo and Juliet, trying 
to establish whether or not true or false lovers are more persuasive, whether true 
                                                 
9 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene ii.377-380. 
10 Apuleius, The Golden Ass, ‘The Story of Cupid and Psyche,’ Books IV-VI, pp. 71-106. 
11 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act I, Scene i.234. 
12 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act II, Scene i.157. 
13 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act II, Scene ii.26ff. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
 
295  
or false love is more effective in producing the Being of beings.
14 Clearly, in 
Twelfth Night, Olivia’s love for ‘Cassius,’ the disguised and unrecognized Viola, 
and later, Olivia’s love for ‘Cassius,’ the unrecognized or inapperceived Sebastian, 
seem more persuasive to any modern audience than Arcite’s or Palamon’s true 
and undisguised love for Emily in The Two Noble Kinsmen could ever be, perhaps 
even more persuasive than Romeo’s true, but hidden, love for Juliet. For had 
Romeo not been false to Rosaline we would not believe he was truly in love with 
Juliet, and if Romeo and Juliet did seize to not show their love, if they suddenly 
declaimed their love to the world, it is doubtful whether they would appear to be, 
in love, at all.
15 
 
[6]       For the substantial commonplace of love there is another formal 
commonplace, which is overlooked by the spectator as easily as he recognizes the 
first, namely dissimilar similarity. In fact, the spectators within the theatre, are as 
much [cast] under the spell of the commonplace of dissimilar similarity, as the 
characters, within the play, are kept under the spell of love, the spectators, within 
the theatre, as much ravished by dissimilar similarities as the characters are 
moved, as Plato would say, erotically, by what they love.
16 The argument of this 
chapter is fairly simple and we shall proceed analogically. One could easily justify 
the exclusion of Shakespeare from the history of rhetoric, by referring to his 
                                                 
14 ‘False love’ is either a love of what is untrue or what is untrue, a love of that which does not carry 
this masque of predicates or a love for that masque of predicates for which there appear to be no 
subject or for which the subject has been taken away or removed. Considered from the point of 
view of the lover, false love is either love that is not expressed or that expression of love for which 
no subject essentially or that expression for which no adequate feeling nor sincere emotion does 
exist. So indeed there are, at least, four expressions of false love. We shall not dwell on the 
commonplace of love, only remark the obvious that, in the production of the ontological difference, 
false love rather than true love is much more successful in attaining its true end, the apperception 
of the Being of beings. 
15 Clearly, throughout the play Romeo never shows his love for Juliet in public, and for this 
[in]transgression, he dies, violently, as if love was reinforced by the strength of guilt. 
16 Plato, Symposium, 211c. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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meagre use of the word ‘rhetoric.’
17 What one has thereby proven is that 
Shakespeare is not engaged in a discourse on rhetoric. However, anyone who does 
not express the word ‘rhetoric’ can of course use rhetoric, anyone who does not 
speak of ‘symbolic theology’ can in fact use symbolic theology. In fact, the one who 
does not use the word ‘rhetoric’ is often more successful, more effective at reaching 
his persuasive aim, his affective goal, than the one who does, if not one seeks, like 
Plato, the final triumph of rhetoric through its denunciation.
18 Similarly with 
Shakespeare’s adaptation of Dionysius’ symbolic theology, more specifically, his 
use of the inadequate figure of dissimilar similarity, an inadequation that never 
fails to reach its end: to produce the apperception of the Being of beings, the 
ontological contradiction. For dissimilar similarity, unlike likeness, is a device 
formalized by Pseudo-Dionysius, to both interpret and express, to understand and 
produce the apperception of what is concealed, the mystical, quite simply what is 
[hidden]. What Pseudo-Dionysius then offers is not only a hermeneutics for what is 
[hidden], but also a poetics. It is as easy to identify Shakespeare’s application of 
the method of dissimilar similarity, as it is to spot Aristotle’s use of dialectics in On 
the Heavens.
19 If Aristotle does not mention the word ‘dialectics’ in the 
presentation of his axiomatic argument in On the Heavens,
20 one should not be 
surprised that Shakespeare does not speak of ‘dissimilar similarity’ or ‘unlike 
                                                 
17 In fact, Shakespeare’s place in the history of ‘rhetoric’ seems comparable to the instances he used 
the word, which is not too often. For anyone interested in the exact number the reader is referred to 
Marvin Spevack, A Complete and Systematic Concordance to the Works of Shakespeare, Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung Hildesheim, 1968. 
18 See the anti-rhetorical opening of Socrates’ Apology in Plato, Apology, 17a-b. 
19 It is, of course, difficult to locate the non-use of any one term in Aristotle’s On the Heavens, and 
for ‘dialectics,’ we can do no less than refer to all its chapters. 
20 I am specifically referring to the influential and dialectical argument in On the Heavens where 
Aristotle demonstrates, dialectically, the existence of ether, that is, the quintessential element of 
which all heavenly beings are made. For proceeding dialectically, that is, from opinions that are 
self-evident to the many or the superior few, Aristotle claims that it is undoubtedly so that to all 
movements there is a corresponding element, hence, a quintessential element adequate to the 
circular movement of all heavenly beings. Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens, 268b12-269b16. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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likeness,’ concepts that define a certain procedure for presenting what is invisible, 
a method for expressing what is concealed, more widely known as symbolic 
theology.
21  
 
[7]    As Ernst A. Gombrich makes clear, Dionysius’ Symbolic Theology
22 was 
extremely influential in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,
23 exerted no little 
influence on the plastic arts, and, as we shall see, [th]is method, which at the time 
of Shakespeare had been a commonplace for theologians and artists for more than 
five centuries, clearly underpins and guides some of Shakespeare’s most 
persuasive plays, if not the success of the dramatic performance. Speaking first 
more generally of the influence of Dionysian elements on the Shakespearean 
corpus, we find an unmistakable Dionysian scent in the soliloquy where Macbeth 
deliberates whether or not to kill the sleeping King, where whispering he accuses 
himself indefinitely of having ‘no spur/To prick the sides of [his] intent.’
24 For 
Macbeth is anxious that the angel of knowledge will disclose the horrible crime, 
                                                 
21 Obviously there are more profound ways to recognize correspondences, if you will, 
Wahlverwandschaften, than by recognizing names. A machine could recognize a name. Similarly, a 
machine could think that having found ‘dialectics’ in Plato, Aristotle and Hegel, he had found 
something similar. Evidently, what we are studying is not the different applications of the same 
word, but similarities of thought, presentation and expression. Diving into the actual reading of the 
different books of Plato’s Sophist, Aristotle’s Analytics and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, the 
reader soon discovers that ‘dialectics’ is a homonym, that one and the same word expresses entirely 
different methods, as easily as different words may be attempts to express the same thought.  At 
other times, similarity is not expressed by words in isolation, as if we were only able to recognize a 
thought in isolation and never the pattern or structure created by these words or the worlds which 
these structures or patterns creates the perception or apperception of. Plainly, there are similarities 
of structure or process, and this structure may be without name, that is, itself not be the object of a 
discourse however much its structure carries forward its presentation through its use. It is 
therefore not difficult, for example, to recognize the dialectical mode of presentation in Aristotle’s 
On the Heavens however much the word ‘dialectics’ is never used, and not even mentioned. 
22 We use the name ‘symbolic theology,’ knowing very well that it refers to a doctrine and not a 
body of work. And if indeed it does refer to a book, this book may never have been read. Surely, it 
is no longer extant. See Paul Rorem’s Comment to Letter Nine, in Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete 
Works, p. 280n, and his comments to the reference made by Dionysius in The Divine Names, 
Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, p 57n. 
23 Gombrich, On the Renaissance, Volume 2: Symbolic Images, ‘Icones Symbolicae: Philosophies of 
Symbolism and their Bearing on Art,’ pp. 123-195, esp. pp. 150-152. 
24 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act I, Scene vii.22-24. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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that ‘heaven’s cherubim horsed/Upon the sightless couriers of the air,/Shall blow 
the horrid deed in every eye.’
25 Shakespeare’s reference to the cherub as an all-
knowing angel of unconcealment is likewise made in Hamlet. In the exchange 
between King Claudius and Hamlet, Shakespeare lets the first speak of purposes, 
and the other, a cherub that sees them all. Regardless of whether Hamlet, like a 
true sceptic, is simply suggesting that he, like an all-knowing cherub, knows the 
purpose of the King of sending him away, it is evident that Shakespeare knows his 
cherub.
26  
 
[8]     There is however another, more persuasive Pseudo-Dionysian element in 
Macbeth, which reminds us quite clearly of the Hermetic Symbolism that Giordano 
Bruno expressed in his final writings, and that Ficino, already in his Theology was 
advocating, offering, as he did, not only the first translation of the Hermetic 
Corpus, but a new translation of Dionysius’ The Mystical Theology.
27 For the 
English there was, however, never any need to wait for a Latin translation of The 
Mystical Theology or a lecture tour by Giordano Bruno to obtain an understanding 
of spiritual phenomena as dissimilar similarities, as the theory had been 
widespread in the West for more than 700 years and had been available in the 
clearest English more than 200 years before either Bruno or Shakespeare were 
born.
28 Symbolic theology, which dominated European minds for centuries, and 
                                                 
25 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act I, Scene vii.22-24. 
26 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act IV, Scene iii.48. For the cherub or cherubim as an angel of knowledge, 
see, Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, ‘Chapter Seven: Concerning the seraphim, 
cherubim, and thrones, and theirs, the first hierarchy,’ The Complete Works, 205B, p. 161. 
27 See, Yates, Giordano Bruno and The Hermetic Tradition, ‘Chapter VI, Pseudo-Dionysius and the 
Theology of a Christian Magus,’ esp. pp. 117-120. 
28 See evidence of Eriugena’s Latin translation of the Greek text to Dionysius’ The Mystical 
Theology, where Michael A. Selles explains: ‘In 827 C. E., the Byzantine emperor Michael the 
Stammerer sent a gift to the Frankish king Louis the Pious. His gift was a copy of the Greek 
writings attributed to an Athenian companion of St. Paul, Dionysius the Aeropagite. …Charles the 
Bald, the successor to Louis the Pious, commissioned the Irish scholar John the Scot Eriugena (810-The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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whose theory is presented in the clearest English in Denis Hid Divinite - a book as 
popular at the beginning of 16
th century England as De Mystica Theologia 
remained compulsory reading for so many novices across the convents on the 
continent - is no less than the art of presenting what is concealed through dissimilar 
similarity, the art of presenting, producing and interpreting what inevitably 
remains, what is concealed through dissimilar symbols, where the producer and 
the interpreter are aware that what is hidden is different from its image, distinct 
from its essential presentation. As the perceiver is barred from comprehending, 
from grasping what [th]is essentially is, he is lead to the apperception of what [is] 
and remains [in]essentially hidden, the mystery of the Being of beings.
29  
 
[9]     The symbolic presentation of the prophesying spirits in Macbeth, bears a 
striking resemblance to the spirits that Giordano Bruno speaks of in his lectures.
30 
The spirits of [un]concealment that these witches, these fates conjure up in 
                                                                                                                                               
77) to prepare another version. Eriguena translated all the major surviving texts attributed to 
Dionysius.’ [Selles, Mystical Languages of Unsaying, p. 34.] Of the importance of these translations, 
one cannot speak more pregnantly than David Knowles, whom in The English Mystical Tradition, 
says, ‘On the topic of mystical theology Dionysius’s short treatise of that name was destined to have 
an immense influence, for it exactly filled … a gap in the teaching of the Western Fathers.’ 
[Knowles, The English Mystical Tradition, p. 29].  
29 Suspending the decision of whether Shakespeare was Catholic or not, and disregarding that the 
Pope, following the royal propaganda and under the auspices of the Privy Council often was 
without disguise presented as the Devil/Satan, regarding Shakespeare’s religion, we shall not need 
to mention that his father most likely maintained his allegiance to the pope throughout his life, as 
Stephen Greenblatt does in his book on Hamlet in Purgatory.[Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory, pp. 
248-49, 254.] His aunt, being a nun, most likely was one of many recusants in a region, as David 
Knowles notes in his thought-provoking history of the dissolution of the monasteries,[I believe 
Knowles mentions Shakespeare’s aunt somewhere in Bare Ruined Choirs - The Dissolution of the 
English Monasteries, although I have been unable to rediscover the statement.] which according to 
the statistics remained for a long time silently Catholic, as A. G. Dickens concludes in his careful 
study of the Reformation in different parts of England, Late Monasticism and the Reformation, 
‘Where did Protestantism Most Readily take Root?’, pp. 117.] To show that Shakespeare was not a 
religious man, it would be especially irrelevant, and highly and self-evidently anachronistic, to 
assert that Shakespeare’s plays are without moral, or that Shakespeare’s bawdy plays have no 
sense of decency or morality except towards the end, when the plays have reached their end, to 
support the view that Shakespeare was not a Christian or does not adhere to a particular kind of 
creed or theology, when it is obvious that Shakespeare nowhere falls pray to the modern prejudice 
of confusing belief with religion, of confusing ethics and theology, never confounds God with man’s 
transient and ephemeral perceptions of what man, quite flimsily or fortuitously, defines, at one time 
or another, as ‘right,’ ‘just’ or ‘good.’ 
30 Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, pp. 331-337. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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Macbeth are presented as dissimilar similarities, symbolic apparitions through 
which future fates or fortunes are unconcealed to us, to Macbeth, through the 
apparition of a head armed with a sword and a shield, a bloody child and a child 
crowned with a tree in his hand.
31 Shakespeare is aware that there are different 
ways to experience ghosts, spirits or angels. The healthy if not Montaignesque 
scepticism of Hamlet makes him, for a while, until the ghost returns to haunt him 
in his mothers chamber,
32 believe that he saw something that does not exist, 
whereas Macbeth, less convinced of his own doubts, believes he has perceived what 
to him remains incomprehensible, something whose essence he cannot simply 
fathom, whose essential appearance is clearly false, but whose existence he is 
unable to deny.
33 Hamlet even fakes the experience of the mysterium tremendum to 
the naïve Ophelia, as he for a while believes the spectre is only the projection of his 
own guilt, whereas Macbeth, without the assistance of Banquo or his wife, seems 
unable to shake off the tremor of its impression without assistance. On two 
occasions Banquo and Macbeth’s wife are forced to pull him out of amazement, 
the tremble being only the physiological residue that remains after he is no longer 
stupefied, after [th]is is no longer there to be misperceived/misapperceived.
34  
 
[10]    Perhaps profoundly, Derrida asks in The Gift of Death, ‘What does the 
body wish to say when it trembles?’
35 Giving an answer where Derrida does not 
                                                 
31 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act IV,  Scene i.50ff. 
32 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene iv.102-137. 
33 In effect, Hamlet says that what he saw, this spectre was only true to his imagination, for 
cowardice does cleverly convince him that [th]is has no Being without him, which is, of course, as 
Kant reiterates, always the secret of the Being of beings, that there is no Being without me. 
34 On the difference between tremor and stupor in the apperception of what is spiritual or ghostly, 
see, Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 26. Obviously, Shakespeare has fashioned different ghosts 
for different spirits, the one ghost appearing, as Horatio says of King Hamlet, exactly as he did in 
life, a mere replica of what he was down to his very armour, which even there, from beyond 
signifies the same, a readiness for war. [Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene i.39-59]. 
35 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 55. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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provide one, we could say that the body wishes to express that which the soul 
cannot essentially comprehend, but whose empty apperception it cannot yet deny. 
To [th]is inessential apperception there would sometime belong no other feeling 
than boundless nausea, no other sign of what is hidden would surface than the 
phenomenal tremors of the apperceiver, who may become as stupefied as Hamlet is 
when seeing the ghost of his father enter his mothers chamber at Elsinore Castle.
36 
Of course, if Hamlet, like a modern sceptic, merely doubted, as he does in the 
beginning of the play, the existence of the ghost that appears before him, he would 
not shiver. But he does, and [th]is time without dissimulation. Again we reach the 
point of stammering, like Heidegger who, according to Gadamer, more stutters 
than speaks when he attempts to unconceal the Being of beings.
37 To set the 
apperception of spirits in perspective we have to say that the sceptic would never 
tremble. The sceptic would not tremble in the face of what he does not know. He is 
used to not knowing, not knowing has become part of his constitution. To the 
sceptic, a ghost could never be the ‘object’ of fear. For if the existence of the ghost 
or the spirit is merely doubted no one would ever tremble.
38  
 
[11]     In Macbeth we witness a spiritual spectacle, the three spirits that appear to 
tell the future, be they called fates or witches. In line with the current or 
contemporary understanding of how these spirits should be fashioned, 
Shakespeare has made them appear as what they are not, for these fates/witches 
appear with beards much like angels appear with wings throughout the bible, 
dissimilarly, not because witches actually have beards or angels have wings, which 
                                                 
36 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene iv.102-137. 
37 Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, pp. 135, 19. 
38 There are indeed indications that Shakespeare was visited by an angel, but as nothing can be 
known about [th]is visitation, whereby the dissimilar appear as what it is not, to horrify the many 
and gladden the few, there is no need to elaborate, indeed, it is impossible. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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is, as Pseudo-Dionysius points out, only the the belief of the mob,
39 but because we 
are meant to infer from these incongruous images, the perception of these 
monsters, to the existence of beings who are different from their appearance, to 
apperceive that, indeed, [th]is is different from its appearance. Clearly, I am 
invited to infer from the perception of what is untrue, that there are simply no 
women with beards, no men with wings, to the apperception of what is [true], to 
that which does not have any of the properties which [th]is appears to have. This 
mode of presentation, which is repeated by Shakespeare later in Macbeth when he 
lets these three witches evoke to Macbeth the three harbingers of the future who 
also appear dissimilarly,
40 follows a Medieval tradition, prolonged well beyond the 
Renaissance, of presenting that which is, spirits, through incongruous symbols or 
images.
41 Undoubtedly, the theory of presenting [th]is, spirits through incongruous 
images or unlike likenesses or dissimilar symbols is presented most forcefully, 
logically and systematically by the theologian who began [th]is tradition, and who 
still at the time of Shakespeare was, in the Catholic church, the most revered of all 
theologians except Paul, namely, Dionysius the Aeropagite.
42  
                                                 
39 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 137A, The Complete Works, p.147, and Pseudo-
Dionysius Letter Nine, 1108A, The Complete Works, p. 283. 
40 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act IV, Scene i.68-93. 
41 Although Dame Frances Yates does not acknowledge it, it is of course striking that the way in 
which Shakespeare presents the three fortune-telling spirits in Macbeth is similar to imagery used 
by Giordano Bruno in his last published work, [Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, 
pp. 331-337] and although we only note the similarity, it is perhaps, as Mrs. Yates suggests, less 
than an historical coincidence that Bruno went on a lecture tour of England, to Oxford, in 1583 to 
present his spiritual theories. Unlike Yates, we are not thereby suggesting or indicating a casual 
connection between Bruno and Shakespeare, not suggesting that Shakespeare was among Bruno’s 
audience at Oxford, but clearly stating that the commonplace of using incongruous symbols to 
express what is spiritual or ghostly, was certainly adopted by Shakespeare. 
42 Why was St. Dionysius the most highly regarded of all theologians, second only to St. Paul, before 
Luther’s Reformation corrupted his authority and the Catholics, the Counter-Reformation, 
countered by scattering angels across the domes of all churches in Europe to reemphasize his 
baroque authority? It is simply a matter of succession, as Dionysius was believed to be the first 
theologian after Paul, the convert of St. Paul at Aeropagos in Athens, the very man who went out to 
preach the gospel in a philosophical manner more suitable to Greek tastes. However, as Lorenzo 
Valla discovered in 1538 through his text-critical studies, finding no references to Dionysius before The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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[12]     Now we have to clarify the difference between the Dionysian and the 
Shakespearean procedure [from the beginning]. The most obvious difference is 
that Shakespeare does not, never speaks of the end of his productions, what he 
already from the beginning attempts to produce the apperception of, while 
Dionysius explicitly states the end discursively already from the beginning. 
Whereas Dionysius non-objective is universal, Shakespeare’s non-objective is 
singular. Whereas Dionysius attempts, in The Mystical Theology, to speak 
universally of God, of what is and remains hidden, and therefore speaks of it, 
which remains after all predicates have been taken away, be they perceptual or 
intelligible, Shakespeare, like St. Thomas, expresses what is singularly hidden by 
compelling his audience to infer that which in/to every appearance remains 
hidden. To St. Thomas this remains essentially hidden simply because nothing can 
be reduced to what it essentially is, or its quiddity. For whereas properties are 
universal this is not [universal], that which has or incarnates these universal 
properties cannot be universal.
43 Having acknowledged that Dionysius, in The 
Mystical Theology, speaks of what is universally hidden, we also have to 
understand that in his Symbolic Theology, rather than speaking universally, he 
speaks singularly of [th]is hidden Being. That is not surprising, for whereas 
Dionysius in The Mystical Theology refers to the one God, in The Symbolic 
Theology, or, more precisely, in the works in which this lost work is summarized, 
that is, The Celestial Hierarchy and Letter 9, he speaks of the many angels.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Comenius in the Sixth Century, ‘Dionysius’ became the name of a theologian whose true name to 
this day is still unknown, which is why to Humanist and Reformist alike he soon became known as 
Pseudo-Dionysius. 
43 Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, in Selected Writings, pp. 38, 41. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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[13]     The difference between symbolic and mystical theology has to be stressed 
again, for whereas Dionysius in The Mystical Theology speaks of it, of what is 
universally hidden, in The Symbolic Theology, he speaks of how to interpret and 
produce the impression of what is singularly concealed. Having noticed [th]is 
difference between the singular and the universal, we should on the other hand not 
exaggerate the difference between the two theologies. First of all because they both 
speak of what is as what is concealed, and, perhaps even more fundamentally, that 
it, which remains when we deny the world all sensual and conceptual properties, is 
exactly what returns, what reappears, to make up the foundation of [th]is singular 
being, be [th]is an angel or a man, whose Being is concealed. We should also note 
that the procedure of aphairesis, of removal, may as easily be applied to achieve 
[th]is singular end, as it is, in The Mystical Theology, employed to produce the 
understanding, at least the apperception of what is universal, namely, God, the 
Being of all beings. 
§7.2 The Function of Dissimilarity 
 
 
[14]     Let me point out the unfamiliar familiarity of Shakespeare’s creatures, but 
not without first giving a word of caution. As modern men, we do not simply forget 
Kant’s ridicule of Swedenborg in Dreams of a Visionary Explained by Dreams of 
Metaphysics,
44 nor Kant’s continued mockery of those who appear to have seen or 
experienced angels in Prolegomena.
45 Kant truly believes that nothing may be 
apperceived beyond what Adorno, in his measured lectures on Kant, rightly calls 
                                                 
44 This forewarning appears as early as 1766 in Kant, Dreams of a Visionary Explained by Dreams of 
Metaphysics, ‘Part I, Fourth Chapter: Theoretical Conclusion From the Whole of the 
Considerations of the First Part,’ in The Philosophy of Kant, pp. 14-18.  
45 Cf. Kant, Prolegomena, ‘§ 57, The Determination of the Bounds of Pure Reason,’ in The 
Philosophy of Kant, pp. 108-117. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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‘the metaphysical block,’
46 which bars all men from experiencing what is 
essentially hidden. Evidently, the experience of what is dissimilar, be it ghosts, 
spirits, powers or angels, was never given to Kant, and being inclined to 
generalization, he erased centuries of human history, with no other justification 
than his own limited experience. In contradistinction to centuries of human history 
he even changed the definition of ‘experience’ itself by excluding everything that 
may not, perhaps cannot, phenomenologically be described.
47 For Kant did not 
consider history, which is the historein of experience, to be significant compared to 
the transcendent conditions of any experience, the transcendent conditions that, 
moreover, makes the experience of anything like angels, spirits, powers or Gods, 
essentially unavailable to man.
48 
 
[15]     If one for one moment believed that A Midsummer Night’s Dream is familiar 
to us, it is evident that [th]is familiarity has nothing to do with what is essentially 
                                                 
46 As for the metaphysical experience implied in the Kantian block, see Adorno, Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason, pp. 110-12, 175ff. 
47 For Kant’s definition of ‘Erfahrung’ or ‘experience’ and how it is differentiated from 
‘Anschauung’ or ‘sense,’ see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A51/B75. We should remind the reader 
that Kant also emptied the world ‘idea’ of all its contents, which means, he simply stole the Greek, 
the Platonic idea and removed all essential attributes. Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
A327/B384. 
48 When attempting to make a judgment about the essential composition of the universe, man 
encounters, according to Kant, the cosmological antinomies, which make no final decision about 
either its components, its causes, its limits, its necessity, possible. However, even if Kant makes no 
judgment about what is either revealed or hidden, neither giving the final word to the empiricists 
following Hume nor the rationalists following Leibniz, he nevertheless, and without exception, 
presents the Being of beings, whether as Subject, World or God, as entirely hidden, unavailable to 
perception, in Kant’s sense, unavailable to Erfahrung or phenomenal experience. Still, what is 
hidden is within the reach of Reason, which almost necessarily sense what is beyond the 
phenonomenal experience as noumenon, be [th]is apperceived as Subject, World or God. It is 
important to notice that Kant considers the transcendental ideas of Subject, World and God [Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, A335/B392] as ‘regulative principles’ for the use of Reason,[Kant, Critique 
of Pure Reason, ‘Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic: On The Regulative Use of The Ideas of 
Pure Reason,’ A643/B671-A668/B696, esp. A643/B671-A644/B672] thus showing, once and for all 
the normative basis of his ontology. For ‘the metaphysical block’ is not one given by nature, but one 
ascribed to by man. We should also note that when speaking of soul as a distinction or condition 
that cannot be denied in any [act of] cognition, Kant does, of course, reiterate Descartes’ argument 
without making the mistake of hypostatizing that which is hidden, as Karl Ameriks justly remarks 
in his enlightening Kant’s Theory of Mind – An Analysis of  the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, as 
either permanent, identical or substantial. See, Ameriks, Kant’s Theory of Mind, xxix. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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[re]presented but with the method of presentation itself, not the beings it 
[re]presents, but the sense of Being it conveys. For all these gods, angels, spirits and 
powers, do appear abundantly before us in what continues to be one of 
Shakespeare’s most popular plays. That the spectator almost regardless of what is 
essentially represented may experience what appears before him as real, as not 
merely representations but divulging a glimpse of life itself, is nowhere more clear 
than in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, whose essential content would have alienated 
the spectator completely, had it not conveyed an experience indifferent from life 
itself, an obscure notion of what is [hidden]. A few illustrations of what is likely to 
alienate the spectator, but does not, showing again how essential considerations are 
almost irrelevant for the establishment of the Being of beings, the production of 
the apperception of what is, will suffice. To modern and enlightened men, nothing 
is familiar about Oberon’s spell, when he conjures up the experience of love at first 
sight for his wife, Titania, by saying, ‘May ye love whatever appear.’
49 Perhaps 
even Helena’s God forsaken experience is today unfamiliar to most, when she 
humbly admits that ‘The more I pray, the lesser is my grace.’
50 But most strikingly 
unfamiliar, of course, are all the fairies and monsters, the demigods and nymphs 
that populate this play, inhabit this drama, where Oberon is only the King of all 
unfamiliar beings.   
 
[16]    Even when Shakespeare speaks mythologically, he expresses the hidden 
charms of the play, what attracts the audience and makes the spectator stay, when 
he lets Helena at length speak of the blind, the unseeing Cupid.
 51 And being 
surrounded by so many unfamiliar beings, what does Shakespeare do but abandon 
                                                 
49 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act II, Scene ii.26ff. 
50 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act II, Scene ii.89. 
51 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act I, Scene i.234. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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his characters in the dark, to there separate the lover from the beloved, making a 
young couples urge to make ‘the double backed monster’ on A Midsummer Night 
into nothing more than a Dream. For where do these lovers hope to be unified, but 
in the dark, confused landscapes of the forest, where one loses sight of the other, of 
anything visible, to be ravished, misled, intoxicated and provoked by the gods and 
the fairies that remain imperceived by the character, but through [th]is 
imperception become alive. For no one appears more alive than the imperceived. 
For when the pure animistic personifications, like Dew and Fire, dance around the 
enchanted in [th]is dark forest, and the demigods whisper in their ear, and neither 
is seen, but all move the unseeing, [th]is forest becomes truly enchanted, not by 
spells, but by the magic of all these imperceptions.
52 It is a fundamental trait of the 
presentation of these dissimilar creatures throughout the play, that they all, except 
Bottom, who experience a physiological metamorphosis, for a while becomes one of 
these spirits, that these half-creatures remain unseen, imperceived.
53 It is, however, 
through these imperceptions that these creatures are incarnated, for the 
imperception of [th]is will not fail to produce, and [th]is most convincingly, the 
profound apperception that [th]is is alive.
54  
                                                 
52 See for example, Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act II, Scene i.186. 
53 We should notice that except for Bottom after he has become a monster, no one, no character 
within the play, is able to perceive the gods, the fairies, which throughout the play remain invisible 
to all except to the spectators [within the theatre]. Again we encounter another Shakespearean 
variation on the same figure of inadequation. Whereas one normally would persuade the spectator 
to make the inference from the perception of what is untrue to the apperception of what is [true], in 
this case, the spectator is led to infer from the non-perception of what is [true], to its apperception. 
But, as is said, as much as inapperception produced the apperception of what is concealed, 
imperception produces the apperception of what is unconcealed, of that place which no being may 
escape without seizing to be. 
54 There is a difference between imperception and inapperception. Whereas we apply imperception 
where there is a total lack of perception of that which presences itself, we speak of inapperception 
where one does not apperceive the soul, subject or substance of that appear to have these properties. 
We could therefore say that apperception of what is [untrue], any untrue apperception or 
inapperception produces, as through substitution, the apperception that [th]is is, the Being of that 
being which does not have these properties or to whom these properties does not belong. However, The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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[17]    We shall attempt to grasp how Shakespeare produces the apperception of 
what is [hidden] by letting Titania, the Queen of the Underworld, fall in love with 
an ass, become intoxicated by the beauty of Bottom the Weaver in A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream.
55 Obviously, Titania falls in love with a monster, for after his 
metamorphosis Bottom is half an ass and only half a man as he walks around with 
the hairy face of a mule and the two legs of a human being.
56 [Th]is is obviously an 
attempt by Shakespeare to produce the apperception of what is hidden through a 
dissimilar [re]presentation, whereby what is, is apperceived as different from its 
essential appearance, distinct from how [th]is is essentially perceived. Clearly, 
Shakespeare succeeds as we all unknowingly, almost inevitably, make the inference 
from not only Bottom’s false appearance, but Titania’s false perception. 
Shakespeare is again towering one figure of inadequation on top of another to the 
point where the phenomenal, that is, essential being becomes almost entirely 
irrelevant, no more than what you look away from to apperceive the hidden Being 
of the misperceiver and the hidden Being of the misperceived, the Being of Queen 
Titania and Bottom the Weaver.  
 
[18]    Evidently, Shakespeare has stolen this monstrous ass from one of the truly 
remarkable pieces of literature, Apuleius’ The Golden Ass, which by some, and for 
long, was believed to have been written by the Neoplatonist philosopher 
Iamblichus and not the Platonist Apuleius.
57 About such monstrous and angelic 
                                                                                                                                               
the imperception of [th]is produces the apperception of that which the imperception contradicts, 
[th]is as purely and without essential characteristics, unconcealed, possibly, as nothing. 
55 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act III, Scene i.129-201, esp. 129, 149. 
56 For Bottom’s transformation, see Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act III, Scene 
i.106-125. 
57 See for example, Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and The Hermetic Tradition, p. 10. Curiously, 
Iamblichus, who is by common consent acknowledged as the last great philosopher of antiquity, is 
believed to have been one of the main philosophical influences on Pseudo-Dionysius. The Dionysian 
philosophy exerts a dominating influence in Europe throughout the Middle Ages, so much so that The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
 
309  
appearances through ‘incongruous’ images,
58 we may say, as does Pseudo-
Dionysius, that they are concrete attempts to express or offer the apperception of 
what is, and sometime has to remain, hidden. Concerning the interpretation of 
such incongruous images, of such dissimilar appearances, where Bottom certainly 
is one, what Dionysius says, in his Symbolic Theology, is that when confronted with 
a symbolic appearance or a symbolic presentation, the mind is adequate to the 
appearance, but inadequate to what is hidden. Not knowing what is essentially 
hidden, we would rather say that we perceive what is untrue, and through the 
perception of what is untrue, the awareness of properties that do not belong to 
[th]is, we apperceive what is [true], but hidden. It is, in both cases, the 
shortcomings of our perceptions or the appearance, which inadequately expresses 
what [th]is essentially is, that again and again, and effortlessly, makes us infer to 
the existence of that which we do not know what is. And from the awareness that 
the apprehension of the essence of [th]is is inadequate to what [th]is is, we 
apprehend the Being of [th]is being whose essence we know nothing of, or at least 
whose essence Titania knows nothing about. And again, from the essential 
inapprehension, the misperception of what [th]is is, the inability to apprehend, to 
perceive what this essentially is, we apperceive the existence of [th]is [being].
59  
                                                                                                                                               
except for Augustine, whose rhetorical style hardly can be said to earn him the prize of being 
considered a philosopher, and Aristotle, whose works in the early Middle Ages were not known 
beyond the Analytical works, makes it safe to say that the Middle Ages belongs to Dionysius. We 
should perhaps not fail to mention the lively tradition Dionysius influenced within the plastic arts, 
the art of symbolic [re]presentation, of presenting spirits and angels through dissimilar symbols, a 
mode and method which dominated not only the Middle Ages, but still was in vogue throughout the 
Renaissance, and even beyond as is clear from Rubens love affair with Pseudo-Dionysius. See 
particularly Erick Wilberding, ‘A Defense of Dionysius the Aeropagite by Rubens,’ Journal of the 
History of Ideas, Volume LII, Jan.-March 1991, Number 1, pp. 19-34, and generally, Cf. E. H. 
Gombrich, On the Renaissance, Volume 2: Symbolic Images, pp. 150-157. 
58 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, 137C/D, The Complete Works, p. 148. 
59 As has to be noted again and again, Pseudo-Dionysius does not only offer a hermeneutic for the 
interpretation of dissimilar symbols but also a poetology for its production, but not without 
assuring the reader, his beloved Timothy to whom his major writings are addressed, that one is, The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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[19]     After the spell of Oberon, which naively makes Titania fall in love with the 
first thing she perceives, the Queen of the Underworld wakes up to fall in love with 
Bottom, who now walks around not only with the name but with the face of an ass. 
The affair between Titania and Bottom is certainly a pastiche of Apuleius’ The 
Golden Ass, does not fail to evoke the memory of the obscene Book 10, where the 
dame who plays Pasiphae finally has her way with Lucius.
 60 Titania is as much 
infatuated by Bottom as the lady ‘playing Pasiphae’ in The Golden Ass cannot get 
enough of the big ass. However, only the first is truly in love, and [th]is difference 
makes one episode come across as a fable and the other as real. Again the spectator 
is compelled to make the inference from Titania’s untrue perception of Bottom’s 
beauty, to the apperception that he is [true]. For Titania is under a spell whereby 
she perceives what is not essentially [true], namely Bottom’s beauty. And again, 
from witnessing the perception of what is not [true], the spectator involuntarily 
infers to apperception of what is [true].
61 After the spells of Puck and Oberon, 
hardly anyone in A Midsummer Night’s Dream is perceived as what they essentially 
are. The change in perceptions are not, not even in the case of the infatuation of 
Titania, due to a change in what is perceived, which throughout, to the beholder, 
remains the same, but depends on a change of judgment, a sudden reversal of 
perspective whereby the beholder values, evaluates what he perceives as distinctly 
                                                                                                                                               
through these symbols, given the apperception of what is hidden, inscrutable, impenetrable, the 
Being of beings. 
60 Pasiphae is, according to legend, the mother of the minotaur. Cf. Apuleius, The Golden Ass, Book 
X, 19-23, pp. 184-186. 
61 We should notice the marked difference between the lady that falls in love with Lucius and how 
Titania falls in love with Bottom. For whereas both Lucius and Bottom appear as what they are not, 
Asses or Monsters, the lady in The Golden Ass falls truly in love with what she perceives, whereas 
Titania, would not fall in love if she was not transformed, if she did not untruly perceive Bottom’s 
essential beauty.[Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act III, Scene i.149] For where the 
Lady in The Golden Ass falls in love with what she truly perceives, no matter how much she remains 
a deviant, Titania falls in love with what she falsely perceives, and this false perception is not due to 
some objective transformation or disguise but to a transformation of the subjective, the perceptual 
faculties. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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dissimilar from what it is. For what is magically affected is a transformation of the 
common sense, the sensus communis.
62 Whether the reason for the untrue 
perception is subjective or objective, what remains is the same, namely that we are 
made to infer from the untrue perception of what essentially is, to the apperception 
of what is [true]. In [th]is case, it is obvious that the emphasis is on the perceiver 
and not simply the perceived. When Titania openly adores Bottom’s beauty,
63 
admires his singular eloquence,
64 Titania simply perceives what is not true, and 
from the perception of what is not true, we are again, repeatedly, even 
unknowingly, made to infer to the apperception of is, not only the Being of the 
misperceived, but also, the Being of the one who perceives so falsely. 
 
[20]    We may conclude this section by saying, with the confidence that stems 
from so numerous misperceptions, such bounty of false perceptions, that the whole 
of A Midsummer Night’s Dream is simply a conscious experiment by Shakespeare 
to produce the apperception of the negative ontological difference by offering 
crystal clear perceptions of what is essentially untrue, not [only] through the 
objective means of disguise and dissimulation, but more so through the subjective 
means of altering the mind, by magically transforming the perceptual faculties. In 
the Induction to The Taming of the Shrew, we have a similar and recurring figure, 
and in both cases we are made to infer, from the perception of what is untrue, to 
the apperception of what is [true]. That is, when Sly perceives the luxury that 
untruly belongs to him and Titania admires the eloquent speech of Bottom, we 
suddenly, as if by some effortless magic, apperceive the Being of the subject that 
                                                 
62 For an enlightening presentation of the history of the common sense, see David Summers, The 
Judgement of Sense - Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics, ’The Common Sense,’ pp. 
71-109. 
63 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act III, Scene i.149. 
64 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act III, Scene i.149. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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perceives so untruly as much as the Being of that which is so untruly perceived. 
For in the end as in the beginning, nothing is more true than what is untrue.  
 
[21]     Similarly with the transformations that occur throughout A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream. We may be amused when Lysander suddenly falls in love with 
Helena, whose skinny, tall, figure he in the opening had been openly mocking. As if 
the world was suddenly turned on its head, Hermia becomes worthy of ridicule. 
For Hermia is given the unfortunate experience of being misperceived, misjudged 
nowhere more disturbingly than when Lysander cries out, ‘Get you gone, you 
dwarf.’
65 What is hilarious in this play is that hardly anyone is perceived as what 
they essentially are. Shakespeare is, of course, supremely aware of his construction 
of these misperceptions, as can be gleaned throughout the play with all its 
persistent focus on eyes.
66 What is effected through these spells, these [perceptual] 
transformations, is nowhere more clearly stated than when Hermia in anger cries 
out what could be the motto of the whole play, ‘O hell! To choose love by another’s 
eyes.’
67 
                                                 
65 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act III, Scene ii.328. 
66 Shakespeare’s conscious experiment with the sudden, the magical metamorphosis of the 
perceptual faculties is evidenced in the play’s obsession with visual metaphors. More often than 
not, phenomena only provide the occasion for the false perceptions that effortlessly lead the 
spectator to make the inference to that which is imperceivable, the Being of beings. Let us draw 
attention to the many ‘eyes’ through which Shakespeare watches his audience in A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream: ‘Cupids Archery,’ may easily hit the ‘apple’ of a lovers’ ‘eye.’ [Act III, ii.104-105] 
For often, what I see is merely a projection of my own desires, as ‘with half ‘ a ‘wish the wisher’s 
eyes be pressed.’[Act II, Scene ii.65.] To change the perceptual faculties of another, I would 
perhaps, for better or for worse, ‘Anoint his eyes,’ [Act II, Scene ii.261] and ‘streak her eyes,’ [Act 
II, Scene ii.257.] And if I did, I could ‘see things with parted eye,’ [Act IV.i.192] or I could continue 
to solely seek ‘the pleasure of mine eye.’ [Act IV.i.173] And if I found a woman to perceive things 
falsely, I could always blame ‘This hateful imperfection of her eyes,’[Act IV, Scene i.66.] And if I 
saw truly many sad things, I could sleep and ‘shut up sorrow’s eye.’ [Act III, Scene ii.435] And with 
my eyes closed like Psyche’s I would perhaps know that, ‘Love looks not with the eyes, but with the 
mind,/And therefore is winged Cupid painted blind.’ [Act I, Scene i.234-235.]  but if I saw my 
beloved she would more engild ‘the night/Than all yon fiery oes and eyes of light.[Act II, Scene 
ii.187-188] But it would not be easy to find my love ‘in the tempest of my eyes,’[Act I, Scene i.131] 
and if I did, it would perhaps occasion nothing better than ‘idolatry.’ [Act I, Scene i.109].  
67 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act I, Scene i.140. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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§7.3 The Paradox of Dissimilarity 
 
 
[22]     The ontological paralogism we are speaking of is different from Kant’s,
68 
even different from the paralogism mentioned by Aristotle in the Poetics.
69 First of 
all, Aristotle says that we are accustomed to infer what is untrue from what is true. 
Aristotle is here concerned with the fact that we often, if not habitually, make an 
inference from what is essentially [true] to what is not essentially [true]. The false 
inference brought about may, for example, have the formal structure of 
confirming the consequent, for believing that the consequent is true we may falsely 
believe that the antecedent is [true]. In general this syllogism makes it possible to 
infer what is not from what is, what is not true from what is true. The logical form 
of this invalid inference to what is false, need not concern us here, because Aristotle 
is solely occupied with what is essentially false and what is essentially true, whereas 
we are concerned with the inference from the perception of what is not true to the 
apperception of what is [true], or quite simply [th]is ontological contradiction 
which is either concealed or unconcealed through [th]is inference. The ontic 
paralogism exposed by Aristotle is the possible, the false inference from what is 
true to what is not true.
70 The Kantian paralogism is the inevitable, the necessary 
but illusory inference to what grounds all phenomenological perceptions.
71 Distinct 
from the paralogisms identified by Aristotle and Kant is the inference from the 
perception of what is phenomenologically false to the apperception of what is 
[noumenologically] true, that personality who is substantially apperceived as a 
                                                 
68 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A341/B399-A405/B432. 
69 Aristotle, Poetics, 1460a20. 
70 Aristotle, Poetics, 1460a20. 
71 See especially, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A341/B399. 
The fundamental structure of Kant’s negative presentation of the concealed, most clearly conveyed 
in Prolegomena, most extensively in Critique of Pure Reason, does resemble the method of 
producing the apperception of what is concealed through dissimilar similarity, unlike likeness. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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living being, however much [th]is impression is false.
72 Let us see how Shakespeare 
achieves [th]is end of producing the apperception of what is [hidden] in his 
adaptation of Ovid’s famous love story of Pyramus and Thisby in A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream.
73 Bearing in mind that the trope of incarnation we are about to 
illustrate, and which Shakespeare uses with such ease is the most difficult to grasp, 
we ask the reader to show as much patience with the explanation as he shows 
immediacy when being seduced by [th]is figure into believing that what appear 
before him is. We should again name the figure before the illustration, dissimilar 
similarity, but without yet again attempting definition let us look at the scene were 
the mechanics are preparing and the spectators are awaiting the performance of 
the play of Pyramus and Thisby. 
 
[23]    Deep in the woods outside Athens the mechanics, the artisans who more 
than anyone would know the meaning of poiesis, the virtue of having a techne, are 
practicing the play of Pyamus and Thisby, which they will offer as a surprise gift to 
King Theseus and his court on midsummer night.
74 As with all plays, as mimesis 
superficially appears to be the virtue of drama, one would expect the mechanics to 
                                                 
72 Concerning the singularity of the noumenal apperceptions, of whether or not they are a necessary 
addition to what is generally apperceived or not, one would have to add the following: Whereas you 
cannot deny that there is something to behold, you can deny that what is apperceived is [alive]. 
Therefore only Subject, World and God reveals the added, the transcendental depth of the 
noumenon, and the depth of subjectivity is only revealed by substantiality, simplicity, personality and 
existence – i.e. the paralogisms of pure reason – inferences without which one would hardly 
consider a man to be a living man or a man at all. Only when one we add personality, substantiality 
and ideality to the subject encountered as one phenomena among others, do we definitely and 
singularly apperceive [th]is man as a living, a thinking being.  Without [th]is singular apperception 
of the noumenon, there would only be one [thing] apperceived. The difficulty however is not to 
apperceive that there is anything at all, but among all things, which one gives the impression of life 
and which does not; among all performances/plays, to understand why one being/character appear 
to be alive and another does not. For if all we did apperceive was the noumenon and only [th]is was 
apperceived, there would be no difference between the apperception of a dead and a living man. 
However, there is. For some men appear to be alive, while others do not. 
73 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act I, Scene ii, Act III, Scene i, Act V, Scene i. Ovid, 
Metamorphosis, Book IV, pp. 95-98. 
74 For the practice for and performance of this play within the play of Pyramus and Thisby, see 
Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act I, Scene ii, Act IV, Scene ii and Act III, Scene i, The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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attempt verisimilitude, but they don’t. For the artisans notice likenesses that they 
think may prove unbearable to their courtly audience, [re]presentations which they 
fear might unsettle the high-born spectators, as for example, a lion about to tear 
out the heart of Thisby before she manages to escape only to leave her red, 
shattered, torn scarf behind to be found, to be picked up by a devastated Pyramus, 
who on this evidence alone, raises his sword to kill himself.
75 You would expect 
them to attempt verisimilitude, but they don’t. As Bottom says, ‘We cannot leave 
the killing out, but we can say, that I Pyramus is not actually killed, and, to assure 
them, I would tell them that “I Pyramus am not Pyramus, but Bottom the 
weaver.”’
76 Thus, Bottom tells us that he is unlike what he represents, an unlike-
likeness or dissimilar from that with which he is supposed to represent. Similarly 
Bottom tells Snug the joiner, who is supposed to represent the lion, that he has to 
tell the audience that he is not a lion, to avoid creating fear.
77 Again, the symbol, 
the actor, states that he is unlike what he represents, the symbol is presented as 
different from what is symbolized, in short, the actor confirms that he is an unlike-
likeness. However, this exposition remains merely a distraction, does totally lack 
direction if we do not, if we fail to consider the effect of presenting such unlike 
likenesses, such dissimilar similarities. Evidently, similar to a mystical tradition, 
which presents angels as men with wings, these dissimilarities are consciously 
presented to evoke the apperception of what is hidden, or quite simply what 
appear to be alive. 
 
[24]    How does Shakespeare begin and end his adaptation of Pyramus and 
Thisby, but by letting one of his characters complain about how Ovid’s story may 
                                                 
75 Ovid, Metamorphosis, Book IV, p. 97. 
76 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act III, Scene i.20. 
77 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act III, Scene i.43. Emphasis added. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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be performed almost without a single word.
78 Evidently, there is a difference 
between theatre and dumbshow, which Shakespeare uses to let his characters 
speak with discontent about the irreality of that which is led to appear without a 
word. Shakespeare has to make his actors speak, and through this speech 
transform what appear to be similarities into dissimilar-similarities. This, in turn, 
achieves the end of producing the apperception of what is concealed, the 
appearance of that which no longer is like but unlike what it is meant to 
represent.
79 The players, Bottom and his company of mechanics, express 
themselves explicitly as inadequate representations, and stress repeatedly that they 
are unlike likenesses, dissimilar similarities. They are simply too anxious to 
frighten their courtly audience. Therefore, the mechanics think it necessary to say 
that they are not what they are perceived as. Surprisingly, what is false in this 
performance is not the spectator’s perception, but the players’ self-perception, for 
they perceive themselves as that which they are afraid to look too much like: the 
moon, a lion, a wall, a dead man, in their staging of the love and death of Pyramus 
and Thisby. What is [untrue] in this case, is not the perceptions of the spectators, 
but the self-perception of the players. We could say that in this case, the figure 
which makes these mechanics come alive like Pinocchio, is that we are made to, 
however falsely, infer from the self-perception of what is untrue, to the 
apperception of what is [true]. And what makes the scene, these scenes so 
exceedingly hilarious, is the remarkable difference between what they think they 
are perceived as, and what they actually are perceived as. Hilarious is [th]is 
                                                 
78 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.61-65. 
79 Again, you could say, Shakespeare has to make his actors speak, and thereby, through their 
voices which negates their appearance, or even, voices which even speak against their own 
appearance, the appearance of that which upholds the voice [which speaks], the ground of the very 
voice whose appearance is being negated, make present dissimilar similarities that produces the 
unseen Being of what is presented. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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inadequate self-perception, and strangely, it is [th]is inadequate self-perception 
which makes us apperceive nothing but the self, to which this discrepancy is a 
witness, and in the face of which we laugh. For even though the man in the moon is 
ridiculous, it is difficult to doubt that he is. 
 
[25]     It would seem that the whole mechanical scene is directed by Shakespeare 
to make fun of those who think of theatre as only a stage for what does or what 
may possibly exist.
80 Shakespeare knows all along that it is not the adequate 
representation of what [th]is is, never veri-similitude, but rather the inadequate re-
presentation of what this is, that makes us believe that [th]is is. No one likes this 
scene less knowing that its representations are inadequate or contradictory, no, we 
love it more because its representations are completely inadequate. King Theseus 
may even anticipate what we all later think of the performance, that it is like ‘hot 
ice and wondrous strange snow,’
81 in short that it is entirely unfamiliar, and not 
without posing the ontological riddle in Shakespeare’s place, ‘How shall we find 
the concord of this discord?’
82 For paradoxically, when witnessing these 
unfamiliarities, we effortlessly make the inference, and Shakespeare was not 
unaware of [th]is inference, from the perception of what is untrue, to the 
apperception of what is [true], without ever knowing what [th]is is, only that [th]is 
is different from what we perceive it to be. We are left with nothing but the 
negative impression of [th]is being different from its untrue appearance.
83  
                                                 
80 Aristotle’s definition of drama is that it stages not what is but what may possibly be. Aristotle, 
Poetics, 1451a36. 
81 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.59. 
82 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.60. 
83 Both being inadequations, the difference between falsity and dissimilar similarity, is that what is 
false cannot be discovered without losing the right to its name, whereas a dissimilar 
[re]presentation has to be discovered to deserve its name. A dissimilar [re]presentation is therefore 
a conscious way to both produce and apperceive, both interpret and make the apperception of that The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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[26]     Conversely, when Hamlet announces that the players will play something 
‘like the murder of my father,’
84 we may already know, if the players live up this 
promise, that the result will not be apperceived as real, that the players will be 
experienced as no more than representations and the play never come true.  
However, if the players, already from the beginning, were to announce that they 
would play something ‘unlike the murder of my father,’ we could anticipate that 
the play would be experienced as real. From a mimetic perspective this may sound 
incomprehensible, but this is nonetheless what occurs in A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, where Bottom and his Company of Mechanics, clearly states, and later 
make their audience strikingly aware of, that they have no intention of displaying 
anything like The Tragic Story of Pyramus and Thisby, that indeed, they will 
perform the same story but make sure that the audience never mistakes the 
representations for the represented which stands out as entirely unlike what they 
do not even intend to express adequately. If we compare Pyramus and Thisby with 
The Mousetrap in Hamlet, it is easily seen that the one play effortlessly produces 
the apperception of the Being of beings while the other play does not. Again we are 
speaking of that which unnoticeably is taken for granted, that which, although 
always experienced immediately, is hardly ever spoken of, that which in itself 
remains unnoticed, but nevertheless is what make us lean forward or close our 
eyes, and if not experienced would make us walk away, were we not brought face 
to face with the Being of beings. In Hamlet it seems apparent that we, in the staging 
                                                                                                                                               
which is hidden, which Dionysius called it, and we simply, and without any aspirations of 
knowledge, call [th]is. 
84 [Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.607-608. Emphasis added.] Compare to Hamlet’s mimetic 
understanding of art as ‘the mirror of nature,’[Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene ii.21] which he 
holds, of course, so unlike his author, who gallantly gives time for Hamlet to emphasize the veracity 
of the play to Horatio even before the play begins.[Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.77-79] 
Shakespeare does not miss the opportunity to ridicule this mimetic sense of art, when he in A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream lets Bottom the Weaver advice his company, ‘Let not him that plays the/ 
lion pare his nails.’[Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act IV, Scene ii.40]. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
 
319  
of The Mousetrap, only are brought forward to see the meaning, only are leaning 
forward to grasp the meaning of the play. For the play’s function does not seem to 
extend beyond the mere meaning of the play, its intention only to reveal to the 
spectators what essentially happened to King Hamlet, to possibly reveal a 
deception.
85 Therefore, as likenesses, nowhere do these boy players come alive, as 
they are only perceived as what they intend to be, mere representations, like 
likenesses. So it would seem that Shakespeare in this case, in the staging of The 
Mousetrap, does not achieve the end of animating the play, of producing the 
apperception of the Being of beings.  
 
[27]    As we remember Wittgenstein’s mute adoration of that in front of which 
man must remain silent,
86 and equally recall the praise that concludes Heidegger’s 
Letter on Humanism, that language is to Being no more than clouds are clouds in 
the sky,
87 nothing is more evident than that both Wittgenstein and Heidegger 
praises that which is unconcealed without a word. Conversely, nothing is more 
easily discerned than Shakespeare’ depreciation of the same, a depreciation 
consistently expressed throughout A Midsummer Night’s Dream, but with a slightly 
different accent in Hamlet, where the most renowned, if not infamous, of all 
theatre critics denounces the staging of ‘inexplicable dumbshows,’
88 and at the 
same time regrets the current impossibility of presenting that which is [to the 
many], the Being of beings, persuasively, without spectacle.
89 That Shakespeare 
                                                 
85 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii.299-300. 
86 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 7, p.189. 
87 Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings, p. 265. 
88 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene ii.12. 
89 Hamlet says to one of the boy-players whose beard has grown since they last met, ‘I heard the 
speak me a speech once,/ but it was never acted, or if it was, not above once, for/ the play, I 
remember, pleased not the million; ‘twas/ caviary to the general.’ Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, 
Scene ii.444-447. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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consistently mocks the Ovidian dumb show may be gleaned from the way he both 
opens and shuts the play of Pyramus and Thisby.
90 For the last words of Francis 
Flute, who has made clear to his audience that he is not Thisby and that what he 
will soon thrust into his bosom is not a knife, declares, after discovering the lifeless 
Pyramus, ‘O Pyramus, arise!/Speak, speak. Quiet dumb?/Dead, dead? A 
tomb/Must cover thy sweet … lips.’
91 Even before the opening of the play, 
Philostratus, master of the revels, the ceremonials at the Athenian Court, presents 
the argument of the play to King Theseus, depreciating the dumb character of the 
play, a presentation whose lips are sealed almost before they are opened, ‘A play 
there is, my lord, some ten words/ long,/Which is as brief as I have know a 
play;/But by ten words, my lord, it is too long,/Which makes it tedious. For in all 
the play/there is not one word apt, one player fitted./And tragical, my noble lord, it 
is.
92 Philostratus does even try to discourage Theseus from seeing the play, as he 
expects ‘nothing,’
93 from the performance of these ‘hard-handed men.’
94 To the 
King’s delight, however, his expectations are soon disappointed, for they truly 
speak and by speaking they become, as Theseus soon realizes, true. For when the 
Wall speaks, and we mark how Shakespeare deliberately distances himself from 
                                                 
90 Before the performance Pyramus and Thisby is deprecated as a play almost without a single word. 
[Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.61-65] During the play, Shakespeare 
allows the spectators to mock the unintelligible but O so mimetic performance, as they say, ‘Well, 
roared, Lion. Well run, Thisby. Well shone, Moon.’[Shakespeare,  A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act 
V, Scene i.266-268]. 
91 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.326-332, Emphasis added. 
92 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.61-65. 
Should we suggest Pyramus says, ‘I love you,’ and Thisbe answers, ‘I love you,’ and the final words 
are whispered by Pyramus when he says, ‘Meet me in the woods,’ before they part, never to see each 
other alive again. 
93 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.76-78. 
94 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.72. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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the Ovidian dumbshow, we hear King Theseus in delight exclaim, ‘Would you 
desire lime and hair to speak better?’
95  
 
[28]    We recognize a recurring figure of inadequation in Shakespeare’s works. 
[Th]is figure is not applied for its own sake, but with the aim of producing the 
ontological contradiction, the almost irrefutable apperception of the Being of 
negative beings. We have, in general recognized the animating figure to be the 
spectator’s inference from the character’s perception of what is untrue to the 
spectator’s apperception of what is [true]. In this case, in A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, we have the peculiar twist, a significant variation on this figure. For 
whereas the spectators perceptions within the play are adequate to what they 
perceive, that is, never is Snug the joiner by the spectators perceived to be a lion,
96 
nowhere is Snout perceived to be a chink in the wall
97 or Quince to be the man in 
the moon, never does Francis Flute the bellows mender look like Thisby,
98 and 
nowhere does the spectators stand in danger of mistaking the representation for 
the represented.
99 Even though this is the explicit, unequivocal meaning of what 
the spectators within the play say, Shakespeare’s presentation corrupts [th]is 
meaning, for the effect of the presentation is exactly opposite to what is said. That 
is, whereas the players say that there is nowhere any danger of them mistaking the 
                                                 
95 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.165. When Pyramus draws nearer to 
the wall, what do the mechanics do but contradict the King’s request for ‘Silence! Shakespeare, A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.168. For while Pyramus is waiting to hear the voice of his 
beloved Thisby, Shakespeare can yet again not resist to ridicule, the plainness of a true mimetic 
representation, letting Pyramus perform an ode to the night that mocks silence itself, he declaims, 
‘O grim-looked night! O night with hue so/black!/O night, which ever art when day is not!/O night, 
O night! Alack, alack, alack,/I fear my Thisby’s promise is forgot!’ Shakespeare, A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.169-172. 
96 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act I, Scene ii.65 and Act V, Scene i.223. 
97 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V, Scene i.156. 
98 Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act I, Scene ii.43. 
99 For the preparation for and performance of Pyramus and Thisby, see, Shakespeare, A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream, Act I, Scene ii, Act III, Scene i, Act IV, Scene ii and Act V, Scene i. The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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representation for the represented, the symbol for the symbolized, that is in fact 
exactly what is the effect of this performance, affected through [th]is presentation. 
Fully aware that the effect of the performance to the spectators within the theatre 
is exactly the opposite of the effect of the performance within the play, 
Shakespeare must surely have had a big laugh. Shakespeare must have had even 
more fun of the spectators within his theatre than the spectators within the play 
had of the mechanics, realizing that he through this inadequation, through 
dissimilar similarity, was able to influence the spectators as effortlessly as the 
moon affects the tide. 
 
[29]     Superficially there appear to be no inadequate representations or 
appearances in A Midsummer Night’s Dream. In the case of Pyramus and Thisby 
there appear to be no inadequations: the mechanics are never perceived as what 
they are not, namely, a virgin in love [Thisby], a lion, a chink in the wall, the man 
in the moon. The inadequation of this scene is rather entirely and peculiarly 
hidden, for what is inadequate in this instance is not the perceptions of the 
audience within the play, but the self-perception of the actors, who actually 
mistakes the representation for the represented and even stand in danger of 
mistaking themselves for that which they represent. Their self-perception is 
hilariously inadequate to how they appear, objectively to the spectators within the 
play. What happens and causes even louder laughter for the one who wrote the 
play, and to [th]is day seems to witness [th]is effect from his grave, is that the 
spectators within the theatre are unknowingly persuaded to commit exactly the 
same mistake they laugh at the mechanics for committing. That is, of mistaking the 
representation for the represented. For the spectators within the theatre are The Production of Being through Dissimilarity 
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suddenly and unknowingly, so undiscernibly that they do never expect it to happen, 
are to such a degree left in ignorance that they leave the theatre without ever 
knowing that they have been played like mechanics, that they unknowingly handed 
over themselves, and that Shakespeare - as in a cosmic and recurring joke - has 
made the audience point at and laugh at themselves. Unknowingly the spectators 
do exactly what they laugh at the mechanics for doing, namely mistake the symbol 
for the symbolized, And suddenly, through the mechanics of inadequation, 
through [th]is dissimilar presentation, the audience within the theatre suddenly 
believe that these mechanics really are. And so puzzled are often the audience 
during the performance of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, that their uneasy bodies 
seem to be aware that they are being played although they are not. Surely, the only 
time the spectators laugh louder than the playwright is when Bottom jumps 
around and farts like an ass. Of course, from Shakespeare’s standpoint, he would 
have hoped his spectators were more like flutes than asses, as they certainly would 
be much easier to play.  
 
C8 THE PRODUCTION OF BEING THROUGH NOTHING 
 
§8.0 The Battle for Nothing 
§8.1 Saying ‘Nothing’  
§8.2 Showing Nothing   
§8.3 Being Nothing 
 
C8 EXPOSÉ 
 
 
[1]    There appear to be three ways to produce the apperception of the 
ontological contradiction, which we have to distinguish in this chapter: saying 
‘nothing,’ showing nothing, Being nothing. From the very beginning our hunch 
was that saying ‘nothing’ would immediately and without effort produce the 
apperception of what is unconcealed. As it turned out, the effect of saying 
‘nothing’ depends on whether ‘nothing’ is perceived as an affirmation or a denial 
of the speaker’s own perceptions or apperceptions, that is, whether ‘nothing’ is 
expressed truly or falsely. For whereas the false expression of ‘nothing’ creates the 
apperception of what is concealed, the true expression of nothing creates the 
apperception of what is unconcealed. By showing nothing through indefinition one 
does, however, immediately and without second thoughts produce the 
apperception of that which is unconcealed, and we shall witness a grand 
illustration of [th]is indefinite production of the Being of beings in the opening of 
All’s Well that Ends Well. Finally, elision is seen as the progressive or violent road 
to the inessential or non-essential cognition of [th]is, where denying [th]is 
progressively all attributes, creates the apperception of what is concealed. In the 
presentation of The Production of Being through Nothing, I will not exclude the The Production of Being through Nothing 
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invaluable assistance of those who have confronted [th]is problem before us, as 
have Martin Heidegger philosophically and Rosalie Colie historically by tracing 
the literary topos of nothing from its origin in Antiquity to its vogue in Renaissance 
and Baroque literature.
1 Invaluable as their assistance may be, it is however clear 
that neither Ms. Colie nor Herr Heidegger understand, as does Shakespeare, the 
ontological function of nothing, that nothing immediately and most effortlessly 
produces the apperception of the Being of beings.
2 It is [th]is production, the 
production of what is either concealed or unconcealed through nothing, we shall 
trace in this chapter. 
§8.0 The Battle for Nothing 
 
 
[2]     There is clearly a battle for nothing in the history of philosophy, where the 
main combatants fighting over nothing are Levinas and Heidegger, and long 
before them, Plato and Parmenides.
3 We will not simply speak of the priority of 
nothing, but of the effect of expressing - saying, showing or Being - nothing. 
Heidegger merely reiterates what Hegel announced a hundred years earlier, that 
nothing is first.
4 The problem is not simply solved by, as Plato does in Sophist, to 
disclose the basis of nothing as the not of every negation, to display the ‘no,’ the 
                                                 
1 Rosemary L. Colie, Paradoxia Epidemic - The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox, 1966. 
2 In our elaboration of the function of nothing as indefinition, we will first need the assistance of 
Aristotle and von Wright to point out and define its meaning. The meaning of indefinition is not 
however something we will ponder, but take for granted, as we are consistently looking out for and 
tracing its effects. See, Aristotle, de Interpretatione, Chapters 1, 2 and10, and von Wright, The Logic 
of Negation, pp. 3-8. 
3 John D. Barrows’ recently published The Book of Nothing shows the actuality of nothing. 
[Barrow, The Book of Nothing, London: Vintage, 2001]. Plato’s Sophist shows us the beginning of 
the struggle when Parmenides is quoted as saying: ‘Never shall this force itself on us, that that 
which is not may be; While you search, keep your thought far away from this path. [Parmenides, 
Fragment 7, 11.1-2, as quoted in Plato, Sophist, 237a, Complete Works, p. 257.] 
4 Hegel, Logic, ‘The Doctrine of Being,’ §84-§89, pp. 123-134. Heidegger, What is Metaphysics?, in 
Pathmarks, p. 84. For Heidegger’s exposition of Being as Nothing, see also Heidegger, Basic 
Concepts, pp. 42-47, 61. The Production of Being through Nothing 
 
326  
’not’ as the ground of nothing.
5 Neither is it, which speaks in a similar vein, like 
for example Levinas, to say that every negation is secondary to what is negated, 
and that no thing is derivative and cannot be thought without some thing, hence 
nothing is secondary and not what is first.
6  
 
[3]     It is in the handsome dialogue of the Sophist that the Stranger from Elea 
has to admit that he does not understand what nothing is.
7 However, if Plato had 
allowed Socrates to appear in this dialogue, he could have pointed out to the 
Stranger, that ‘Nothing is darker than what is dark or lighter than what is light.’
8 
Leading us into nothing, we could take Heidegger as a guide, reminding ourselves 
along the way that according to Aristotle, Plato’s Sophist concerns itself with what, 
according to Gadamer, made Aristotle so attractive to the young Heidegger,
9 
namely, the fortuitous, which, again according to Aristotle, resembles nothing.
10 
We could, however, remind ourselves of what Heidegger says in his inaugural 
lecture at Freiburg, What is Metaphysics?, I believe from 1929, where he attempts 
to transgress the bounds of metaphysics, and hence overcome the priority of the 
ontic over the ontological, of that which precedes the perception of this thing, 
namely the apperception of nothing. For like someone clearing the road or the 
land, Heidegger makes way for nothing, for the apperception of the clearing that 
                                                 
5 Plato, Sophist, 257b-258e, esp. 258e. 
6 On the secondary nature of nothing, see for example, Levinas where he argues against Heidegger, 
in Levinas, God, Death, Time, ‘Beginning with Heidegger,‘ p. 129. 
7 Plato, Sophist, 243b-c. 
8 Plato, Republic, Book V, 479c-d. 
9 Although Heidegger already early was given a copy of Brentano’s exposition of the concept of 
Being in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, entitled, Concerning the Multifarious Meanings of Being [Seiende] 
in Aristotle, it was Aristotle’s exposition of phronesis or practical knowledge which to Heidegger 
turned out to carry ontological weight. [Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, p. 22]. 
10 Cf. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book VI, Chapter 2, esp. 1026b14. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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precedes all appearances, the khora that awaits, like the most generous host, all 
phenomena.
11 
 
[4]     To get a clearer understanding of the difference between Heidegger’s 
exposition of nothing and its effects, and to mark out how our analysis of nothing 
differs from Heidegger’s, we shall first of all notice the different effects of saying 
‘nothing’ and saying ‘khora.’ Everyone understands ‘nothing.’ We are however 
not looking out for merely the meaning of nothing, but the function of saying, 
showing or Being nothing. We are not then, and neither is Heidegger, interested in 
nothing for its own sake, but interested in nothing as it makes room for or a place 
for the Being of beings. Rather than Being unconcealed, we could say that nothing 
unconceals, makes place for the apperception, if not the Being, of [th]is prior to 
what [th]is essentially is. Heidegger’s reflections on nothing does in no small 
amount resemble the way khora is thought by Plato in Timaeus,
12 although we shall 
see there is a noticeable difference between khora and nothing. Let us say, ‘nothing 
is different from nothing,’ and ‘khora is different from khora.’ Even though we 
may find one man in the world, who has given deep and sustained thought to the 
similarity of these statements, that he may find the two statements to have the 
same meaning, it is nevertheless obvious to all that the immediate effect of these 
statements, of expressing ‘khora’ and expressing ‘nothing,’ is entirely different. 
For whereas anyone is immediately effected when I say, ‘nothing is different from 
nothing,’ there cannot be found many who think of anything when I say, ‘khora is 
                                                 
11 What is Metaphysics?, Heidegger’s inaugural lecture at Freiburg, is nothing but an attempt, 
through its deliberate, perhaps even thought-provoking exposition of nothing, to free itself from the 
essential grip of metaphysics. 
12 Plato, Timaeus, 48d-52e. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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different from khora.’
13 We shall therefore investigate the commonplace of 
nothing, for evidently, although being the place of all places, khora is not a 
commonplace. 
 
[5]    Ms. Colie shows us that the paradoxist tradition culminates with an 
encomium to nothing, where one, in praise of nothing, may declare that ‘Nothing is 
richer than diamonds and gold.’
14 This is a faint echo of Socrates, who, with the 
assurance of being unaware of his own self-betrayal, in an aporetic defence of 
dualism, declaims in the Republic that, ‘Nothing is darker than what is dark or 
lighter than what is light.’
15 Surely, if nothing unconceals all beings, one could not 
disagree if it was claimed, that ‘Nothing is sacred in war.’
16 But it would sound 
entirely unfamiliar to most listeners, and fail to affect the audience, if we were to 
say, as does Plato implicitly in Timaeus, that ‘Khora is richer than precious stones,’ 
or ‘Khora is nobler than the blood of Kings.’
17 What we have displayed here, is 
                                                 
13 As we said in Chapter 2, Philosophies of Unconcealment, this is precisely what Derrida attempted 
to show, by exposing the anachronism of khora, the Being of beings as it appears to unconceal, to be 
unconcealed. Anachronically, Being is always different, even from itself, however much each being 
remains essentially the same. Moreover, khora is prior to any being, [th]is antecedent to what [th]is 
is, even prior to the possibility of the very substantiality of [th]is. As Derrida says, ‘The khora is 
anachronistic: it ‘is’ the anachrony of being, or better: the anachrony of being. It anachronizes 
being.’[Derrida, Khora, in On the Name, p. 94]. 
14 As Ms. Colie says, ‘There were … many nihils written in the Renaissance, of which the most 
famous was the Latin poem published by Jean Passerat, professor of rhetoric at Henry III’s Palace 
Academy in Paris. This poem was published, republished, imitated, and annotated throughout the 
next fifty years. Nothing, Passerat informs us, is richer than precious stones and than gold; nothing 
is finer than adamant, nothing nobler than the blood of kings; nothing is sacred in wars; nothing is 
greater than Socrates’ wisdom.’– indeed, by his affirmations, nothing is Socrates’ wisdom.’ [Colie, 
Paradoxia Epidemica, p. 224. Emphasis added].  
15 Plato, Republic, Book V, 479c-d. 
16 Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica - The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox, p. 224. 
17 The two statements that follow are implied by Plato, when he, in the Timaeus, likens khora to 
gold, of course, not only because of its malleability, but due to its immense value, as it is what 
unconceals the Being of all beings. [Plato, Timaeus, 50a.] If khora and nothing are interchangeable, 
would that mean that khora is sacred in wars, that khora is richer than precious stones, that khora 
is nobler than the blood of kings? Precisely, for nothing would be more sacred, richer or nobler than 
that which upholds the Being of all beings. As Aristotle would say in Metaphysics, Prima 
Philosophia would be the supreme, the superior, the noblest of sciences if it is the science that 
inquires into what is highest or first, be [th]is the Being of beings or God, the sciences, ontology or 
theology. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b8-983a11. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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that the effect of nothing is not restricted to its meaning, but clearly encompasses 
its function, which is, again and again, untiringly and without ever offering a sense 
of repetition to the perceiver - so effortlessly, we could say, that the impression of 
repetition is erased - to produce the apperception of the ontological contradiction. 
And so it appears that no dogma is truer than creatio ex nihilo.  
 
[6]    Standing in a Christian tradition that, in contradistinction to all Greek 
beliefs, worships a God that creates from nothing, Mr. Wilson Knight suggests that 
Shakespeare, similar to a god, makes Being from nothing, not only upholds, but 
ensures the effect of the old Christian dogma. In his thoughtful book, The Christian 
Renaissance, Wilson Knight speaks at length of Shakespeare’s use of nothing,
18 
saying,  
‘The spiritual alone is a ‘nothing’ - a usual Shakespearean word for the 
‘spiritual’ - it has no place, no meaning, no value until given this body. This 
thought is implicit widely both in Christianity and Shakespeare, extending 
beyond aesthetic theory. ‘Nothing’ represents the dark and mysterious world 
of spirit.’
19  
 
Admirable as Wilson Knight’s efforts are, we are forced by the compelling 
evidence of tradition to point out that Wilson Knight’s understanding of nothing is, 
as his understanding of place, quite insufficient, if not wholly and entirely 
mistaken. For having read any philosophical exposition of place or nothing, be it 
by Aristotle in Physics or by Hegel in his lectures on The History of Philosophy, one 
would find that nothing is, like place and time, not part of the material body but 
inseparable from its existence, indistinguishable from its appearance or its self-
disclosure. Nothing is rather like the immaterial categories of place and time, which 
Heidegger made a lasting effort to not distinguish between, that which makes 
                                                 
18 Wilson Knight, The Christian Renaissance, pp. 12, 27, 41. 
19 Wilson Knight, The Christian Renaissance, p. 27. Emphasis added. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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anything come true.
20 It is therefore entirely false to point out, as Wilson Knight 
does, that nothing ‘has no place,’
21 that nothing does not take place, when place is 
the only thing that nothing has or occasions the apperception of.  
 
[7]    Furthermore, since ‘nothing’ and ‘place’ is that which make the presence 
or unconcealment of anything possible, it is also mistaken to colour nothing and 
say that ‘nothing’ represents ‘the dark and mysterious world of spirit,’
22 when it is 
apparent that nothing is transparent, if not it is, as Plato suggests in Timaeus, like 
gold, that which brings [th]is to light, makes each phenomena shine.
23 It may even 
be true to say, as Socrates does in the Republic, that ‘Nothing is darker than what 
is dark or lighter than what is light.
24 What we are about to point out, is not that 
Shakespeare does not makes use of nothing [in the production of the Being of 
beings], only that Wilson Knight’s understanding of nothing contradicts our 
philosophical heritage and is a valuation or colouring of nothing which is at odds 
with or contradicts our entire philosophical tradition, a tradition which 
Shakespeare himself, moreover, makes himself the caretaker of.
25 
 
[8]    Georg Henrik von Wright, the most illustrious of Wittgenstein’s students, 
speaks very clearly of negations in his paper from 1959, The Logic of Negation. 
Here von Wright, against the tradition of logic propounded by Bertrand Russell, 
                                                 
20 Heidegger says that ‘Aristotle’s interpretation of movedness [is] the most difficult thing Western 
metaphysics has had to ponder in the course of its history.’ [Heidegger, On the Essence and Concept 
of physis in Aristotle’s Physics B, in Pathmarks, p. 216. Emphasis added.] However, as Hegel points 
out, movement implies place, [Hegel, History of Philosophy II: Plato and the Platonists, p. 163.] and 
place cannot according to Heidegger be understood fundamentally as anything but the clearing of 
that which is unconcealed, aletheia. Hence, the most difficult thought would not be kinesis, but that 
which grounds kinesis and hence all movements, namely place. 
21 Wilson Knight, The Christian Renaissance, p. 27. 
22 Wilson Knight, The Christian Renaissance, p. 27. 
23 Plato, Timaeus, 50b. 
24 Plato, Republic, Book V, 479c-d. 
25 Cf. Chapter 2, Philosophies of Unconcealment. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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speaks of different kinds of negation, what is merely a negation and what is a 
negative affirmation. Distinguishing clearly between weak and strong negations, 
von Wright writes against the then common or dominant view, which he considers 
to not be very carefully considered, that there is only one kind of negation. Like 
Aristotle, von Wright recognizes that there are at least two kinds of negations, in 
effect a denial and an affirmation,
26 one which he calls a ‘weak negation’ and the 
other which he calls a ‘strong negation,’ the strong negation being also an 
affirmation of that x whose properties has been denied existence, that x which does 
not have a property p. On the other hand, a weak negation is merely a denial of the 
compound ‘x is p.’ For ‘x is not p,’ means either, in the strong sense, that you 
affirm that x which has not the property p, even affirm the existence of that x 
which does not have this property p. In a weak sense, it means that both x and p, 
more specifically, the compound ‘x is p,’ has been denied [existence]. 
 
[9]     As Aristotle instructs us in de Interpretatione, an indefinition shows us quite 
simply nothing, the statement ‘It is not-this,’ leaves us with nothing to grasp.
27 For 
it is self-evident that there is no necessary inference from ‘It is not-this’ to ‘It is 
that,’ that it is logically invalid to infer from ‘this is not a woman,’ to ‘this is a 
man,’ as [th]is might as well be a kangaroo or an elephant. Even a negation for 
which there does exist a commonplace contradiction, where an historical dichotomy 
has been established, the inference from ‘It is not black’ to ‘It is white,’ however 
                                                 
26 von Wright, The Logic of Negation, p. 4. For Aristotle’s exposition of indefinition, see Aristotle, de 
Interpretatione, Chapters 1-3, 16a1-16b25, and Chapter 10, 19b5-10. 
27 As implied in Aristotle, de Interpretatione, 16b11-25, but perhaps most clearly expressed in de 
Interpretatione, 19b5-10, where Aristotle says, ‘Now an affirmation signifies something about 
something, this last being either a name or a ‘non-name’; and what is affirmed must be one thing 
about one thing. (Names and ‘non-names’ have already been discussed. For I do not call “not-man” 
a name but an indefinite name – for what it signifies is in a way one thing, but indefinite – just as I 
do not call “does not recover” a verb.’ The Production of Being through Nothing 
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culturally or habitually we may be disposed to make such an inference, is evidently 
logically invalid as [th]is may well be blue or green. But of course, prior to [th]is 
actually having the opposite essential attributes, it would have to be, and we assert 
that through a negation, what must first be affirmed, if through an essential 
negation its opposite attribute is implied, is its Being. 
 
[10]     It is obvious, that when Aristotle points out that a negative affirmation 
shows us nothing, Aristotle has made a simplification, an abstraction of language 
from its use, for I may at one time indicate a woman and say, ‘This is not a man,’ 
and, at another time, indicate a boy and say, ‘This is not a man,’ and saying this 
my utterance will not have failed to be immediately effective/affective. It is 
perfectly reasonable to express this indefinition, if the end is to produce the 
apperception of the Being of beings or what is unconcealed indefinitely as the 
apeiron, or that which is undetermined, but yet unconcealed singularly. Contrary 
to Anaximander/Heidegger, St. Thomas calls the general category ‘indeterminate’ 
and the singular, the determined, this. The singular is the determination of the 
essential idea, which is incarnated in or through this, which is, to Thomas, not 
merely a particular, as this is always in excess of the idea incarnated, the existent 
always in excess of its essence. In On Being and Essence Thomas maintains that the 
essential concept is always incorporeal, inevitably indeterminate, that is, empty 
and essential, is not or remains indeterminate without this incarnation, without this 
determination.
28 And why is a concept by necessity indeterminate? Because 
concepts are by nature general while the determinate is singular, and [th]is 
difference cannot be done away with. But, as we maintain, it is not only possible to 
                                                 
28 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, in Selected Writings, p. 36, where Thomas explicitly 
says that the ‘genus is undetermined’ and the species indistinct if not ‘designated by matter, which 
for composite substances or natures is the ‘principle of individuation.’  The Production of Being through Nothing 
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have an inessential apperception of [th]is, but also possible to produce [th]is 
apperception. In short, this is Thomas’ apeiron, ‘This is not a woman,’ ‘This is not 
a man.’ Through indefinition, we are witnessing the unconcealment of [th]is which 
is afforded by an inessential presentation, where [th]is, if it appears, is allowed to 
be unconcealed as what it is not, even prior to having any essential characteristics, 
appear as inessentially Da. We do agree with Aristotle, that in the absence of an 
appearance or prior to any appearance, a priori an indefinition has neither 
meaning nor reference and shows us therefore nothing. However, when [th]is is 
allowed to appear, an indefinition provides the frame through which [th]is is 
unconcealed, through which [th]is may or may not appear [to be], indefinitely. 
§8.1 Saying ‘Nothing’ 
 
 
[11]     Neither Rosalie Colie, who thoroughly and eloquently investigates the uses 
and abuses of nothing in the Renaissance,
29 nor Martin Heidegger, who in nothing 
does not see a literary motif but an ontological Erfahrung, the first notion of Being 
signalled by the Kierkegaardian anxiety when faced with nothing,
30 investigates its 
true function. Clearly, the function of nothing is to produce the apperception of 
that which to Hegel may even be prior to any apperception, namely Being. For, as 
Hegel says in Logic, and Heidegger later reiterates, ‘Being is nothing,’
31 which 
simply means that it cannot be placed as a thing among other things. However 
admirable their works are, neither Colie nor Heidegger recognizes that the true 
                                                 
29 Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica - The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox, 1966. 
30 Heidegger, What is Metaphysics?, in Pathmarks, pp. 80, 88, 89. Anxiety is contrasted to the fear of 
a particular being. Hence anxiety is the first trace of a notion of the ontological difference, the 
Being of beings. 
31 See, Hegel, Logic, ‘The Doctrine of Being,’ §§84-89, pp. 123-134. For Heidegger’s interpretation 
of Being as nothing, notice first the essay What is Metaphysics? from 1929 and, a generation later, in 
1955, his essay on Identity and Difference. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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function of nothing lies not in the paradoxical meaning it produces,
32 nor in the 
anxiety it provokes,
33 but rather in its capacity to immediately and without effort, 
even undetected, create the apperception of the Being of beings. 
 
[12]     It is, of course, clear that Heidegger expresses ‘nothing’ in an attempt to 
avoid metaphysical representation of objects, of what essentially is already given. If 
Being is nothing, as Heidegger says in his inaugural lecture at Freiburg,
34 could we 
infer from [th]is, that if the Being of beings appears to have been forgotten that we 
have forgotten nothing?
35 That is precisely what I will not maintain in this chapter, 
where I assert that nothing is more immediately available to apperception, where 
we present the negative production of [th]is as either concealed or unconcealed, 
through the surprisingly undetected means of nothing under its different aspects 
or forms; ‘nothing,’ indefinition and aphairesis, if not quite simply, saying 
‘nothing,’ showing nothing and Being nothing. We will specifically focus on All’s 
Well that Ends Well and King Lear to find illustrations for that which immediately, 
and almost without a trace, appears too difficult to imagine, but nonetheless never 
fails to achieve [th]is end, namely, nothing. We will, as in previous chapters, not 
merely, if at all, focus on the possible meanings of nothing, but rather, on its 
effects, on how nothing immediately creates the apperception of the Being of 
beings. 
 
                                                 
32 E.g. Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica, p. 38. 
33 Heidegger, What is Metaphysics?, in Pathmarks, pp. 38-39. 
34 See David Farrell Krell’s ‘Introduction’ to What is Metaphysics?, in Basic Writings, p. 90-91. 
35 Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger suggests that if anxiety does not ‘manifest nothing,’ nothing is like 
a chasm, overlooked. [Heidegger, What is Metaphysics?, Pathmarks, p. 88.] David Farrell Krell 
observes, ‘What is metaphysics? Metaphysics is interpretation of beings and forgetfulness of Being 
and that means neglect of the essence of Nihil.’ [Farrell Krell, ‘Introduction’ to What is 
Metaphysics?, in Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 91]. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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[13]     Nothing is not easy to handle, and Plato makes an attempt, in the Sophist, to 
make nothing more manageable by tracing its origin or arche. Since Plato traces 
the origin of ‘nothing’ back to ‘not,’
36 it is evident that the topos of showing 
nothing through indefinition should be presented consequent to the topos of saying 
‘nothing,’ as no one would look for the cause if they had not first experienced the 
effect. Tracing nothing back to its roots, it becomes clear that nothing is either a 
kind of denial or a negative affirmation, an indefinition. The final incarnation of 
[th]is figure of inadequation, namely elision, shows how the apperception of 
nothing is created through a process, where one not only denies [th]is [being] one 
or more attributes, but denies [th]is [being] all essential characteristica, to the point 
where even the understanding of character, which, of course, is essentially defined, 
becomes meaningless.
37  
 
[14]     Within one and the same chapter we will present three figures of 
incarnation, three aspects of the same nihilistic topos: saying ‘nothing,’ showing 
nothing and being nothing, that all succeed in producing the apperception of the 
Being of beings. We also become gradually aware that nothing, in all three cases, 
produces the apperception of the ontological contradiction differently. In the first 
instance, showing nothing through indefinition produces the apperception of the 
Being of beings as unconcealed, whereas through elision or aphairesis, the opposite 
is clearly the case, for denying all properties to [th]is, denying everything that 
                                                 
36 Plato, Sophist, 257b-258e, esp. 258e. 
37 As the investigation proceeds, we will become gradually aware that indefinition, the true 
expression of ‘nothing,’ and denial are different aspects of the same figure, or rather, specifically, 
the negative and the positive aspects of the same figure. Von Wright makes the distinction between 
strong and weak negation, indefinition, the true expression of ‘nothing,’ being a strong negation as 
it affirms the existence of that whose properties are being denied, denial being a weak negation as it 
denies the existence of that which is essentially denied. See, Georg Henrik von Wright, The Logic of 
Negation, pp. 3-9. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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[th]is is or may possibly be, all that is left is the apperception of [th]is, which is 
truly concealed/unconcealed. The third trope or aspect of nothing, actually saying 
‘nothing,’ does however produce both the concealed and the unconcealed, 
depending on whether ‘nothing’ is a denial or an affirmation, that is, if nothing is 
true or false. The false expression of nothing, where ‘nothing’ is a denial of what is, 
produces the apperception of that which is concealed, the existence of that whose 
true properties or existence has been denied. For, as we maintain throughout this 
thesis, the spectator makes the effortless inference from the character’s 
inapperception or misperception of [th]is, created by the [false] denial of [th]is or 
what [th]is is, to its existence. It is likewise clear that when ‘nothing’ is an 
affirmation, or rather, when nothing is truly expressed, as when answering the 
question, ‘Do you feel anything?’ ‘I feel nothing,’ that what is left is not only the 
place where these feelings may or may not be unconcealed, the blank through 
which these feelings may or may not appear. That is, when saying ‘nothing,’ I have 
not only denied the existence of any or all feelings, but I have equally affirmed the 
existence of khora, of nothing or that place through which these feelings may or 
may not appear, so, even where ‘nothing’ appears to be a denial, that is, when it 
appears to deny an attribute, an event, an occurrence, it is in fact simultaneously 
an affirmation of the singular possibility for whatever attribute, event or 
occurrence that is being denied.  
 
[15]     We could easily say that even prior to any historical investigation, nothing 
is a commonplace, although it is safe to say that this commonplace has, as Ms. 
Colie shows in her marvellous book Paradoxia Epidemica, a history, and that just The Production of Being through Nothing 
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like not, ‘nothing’ is a language game.
38 We could, of course, attempt to think 
nothing as it immediately [is] available to everyone, but we shall emphasize that 
nothing is immediately available except through tradition, that nothing, like all 
other words are part of a language game which sustains not only their meaning 
but, more importantly, their function. The Book of Nothing shows that nothing has 
a tradition, but even more so does Paradoxia Epidemica, which exhibits the vogue 
of nothing in the Renaissance. As Rosalie Colie says in the introduction to her 
splendid study of paradox, ‘’nothing’ was crucial in Renaissance thought.’
39 As 
Wittgenstein suggests in Philosophical Investigations, like all other words, not is a 
language game.
40 In contradiction to Wittgenstein we will however suggest that 
‘not’ has not one but three primary meanings: as that which transgresses the limit 
of the particular or that which has not reached the limit of a particular telos, and 
finally that which obliterates the essential perception of what is particular 
altogether. 
 
[16]     As easily it is to recognize that the aside, so commonplace in the Elizabethan 
drama, has become an unbearable anachronism,
41 we notice that the Elizabethan 
convention of nothing is very much alive, that nothing is not a convention that has 
discontinued to immediately effect and spontaneously bemuse, even carry away its 
audience. Even though some of the conventions of Elizabethan literature may seem 
                                                 
 
 
 
39 Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica, p. ix. 
40 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Fragments 547-556. 
41 For a view on what is outmoded in the Elizabethan conventions of drama, see T.S. Eliot’s 
comments on Mr. Willam Archer’s book, The Old Drama and the New, Heinemann, 1923, in Eliot, 
‘Four Elizabethan Dramatists,’ Selected Essays, 111. As an example of such an outmoded 
convention, Mr. Eliot chooses to mention the now ridiculous convention of the aside, which to most 
modern spectators simply is unbearable. Eliot, ‘Four Elizabethan Dramatists,’ Selected Essays, p. 
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outdated, we could say that nothing is ever outdated, or better, that nothing is 
never out of fashion. There is evidently an Elizabethan convention of nothing, 
extending all the way back to Antiquity, which Shakespeare exploits in his 
production of the ontological contradiction. While Paradoxia Epidemica may 
enlighten all its readers about this nihilistic tradition,
42 one does not there gain any 
knowledge of the effect that nothing has, which is, almost irrepressibly, to produce 
the apperception of the Being of beings. The artlessness of Shakespeare’s plays 
may some times even be ascribed to his extensive use of nothing, which often 
produces the apperception of what is indistinguishable from our selves, the 
ontological contradiction. It is therefore safe to say that so long as we continue to 
be affected by nothing, King Lear will never be anachronistic, or, rather, King Lear 
will not become an anachronism until we are no longer affected by nothing. 
 
[17]     Rosalie Colie recognizes in Shakespeare’s tragedies what she calls a 
‘remarkable use of nothing.’
43 Distinguishing between ‘the ‘nothing’ of the bawdy 
play, the metaphysical ‘nothing’ of the rhetorical paradoxists, and the 
psychological sense of not-being,’
44 she even recognizes, with great sense of 
refinement, a possible in-difference between nothing and love, that ‘love poetry 
often has recourse to the notion of ‘nothing.’
45 Rosalie Colie even points to the 
unfamiliarity of Shakespeare’s use of nothing, when she reveals that ‘part of the 
fun of that grim comedy, Much Ado about Nothing, is in the sexual reference of the 
                                                 
42 Making a swift panorama of the history of nothing, Ms. Colie says that ‘the major philosophers 
of Greece were wary of ‘nothing,’’ that ‘Platonic plenism and Aristotelian horror vacui denied 
existence to ‘nothing,’’ and that ’Christian orthodoxy followed them in this respect, canonizing a 
single divine creatio ex nihilo at which nihil was transformed … by the blast of God’s mouth into 
omnis, the cosmos.’ Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica, p. 221. 
43 Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica, p. 233. 
44 Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica, p. 233. 
45 The explicit reference is to Shakespeare’s use of ‘nothing’ in Sonnet 72. Colie remarks that 
throughout The Sonnets Shakespeare uses ‘nothing’ ‘ in contrast to the notion of his beloved’s 
intrinsic worth and worthiness.’ [Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica, p. 229]. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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word ‘nothing,’ now fairly submerged, which spoke at once to the Elizabethan 
ear.’
46 To see how concretely Shakespeare looks at nothing as the place, the khora 
of unconcealment, Colie even remarks that, ‘Shakespeare managed, in Hamlet, to 
make ‘nothing’ refer to a great deal more than the female genitalia, though that 
fundamental vulgarity lay at the base of much of the play’s ‘nothing,’ as well as at 
the base of much of the play’s action.’
47 For when Hamlet bawdily asks if she 
thought he meant ‘country matters’ when asking to place his head upon her lap, 
Ophelia answers, truly or untruly, affirmatively or in denial, ‘I think of nothing, 
my lord.’
48 And, feeling encouraged rather than spurned, Hamlet continues his 
advance, saying, ‘That’s a fair thought to lie between maid’s legs.’ ‘What is, my 
lord?’ says Ophelia, ‘Nothing,’ says my Lord Hamlet.
49 
 
[18]     It sounds, as Rosalie Colie says, almost self-evident when King Lear 
declares, ‘Nothing will come of nothing.’
50 We should not, however, take literally 
what Shakespeare has written tongue-in-cheek. The reason why Colie does not 
detect the contradiction between the meaning expressed and the function 
effected/affected, is that she solely, like most humanistic scholars, remains focused 
on meaning. Therefore, the function, in relation to the audience, escapes Colie, 
perhaps precisely because she excels in the execution of her historical craft. As a 
scholar Rosalie Colie is fundamentally trained, like most humanists, to read and 
interpret meaning, whereas for reading Being, she has no more practice than 
anyone who has not yet been made aware that she is inclined to, almost by 
necessity, to apperceive the ontological contradiction. Not surprisingly, nothing 
                                                 
46 Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica, p. 232. 
47 Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica, p. 232. 
48 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene ii.120. 
49 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene ii.120-124. 
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works more effectively on those who do not detect it, which is most of us. That 
nothing escapes the attention of its audience, without therefore seizing to make an 
ineradicable impression, makes almost anyone entirely defenceless against 
someone who, like Shakespeare, uses nothing to impress on his listeners the 
negative notion of the ontological difference. Evidently, Shakespeare exploits the 
techne of nothing, precisely because it is the epitome of an art that does not leave a 
trace of the instruments used to reach its end, the apperception of the Being of 
beings.  
 
[19]     To some extent Rosalie Colie is aware of the poetic potential of nothing, the 
implicit contradiction of meaning and function, when she says, ‘All affirmations 
about “nothing,” it turned out, might be taken as analogous to God’s original act 
of Creation, bringing ‘something’ out of ‘nothing’ - or, contradicted the truism of 
King Lear.’
51 The truism of King Lear being, of course, that ‘Nothing will come of 
nothing.’ We shall speak of the paradox of nothing, how the inapperception of 
[th]is produces its apperception, how the imperception of what [th]is is, produces 
the apperception of its existence. One of the clearest examples of how Shakespeare, 
by allowing one of his characters to say ‘nothing,’ produces the apperception of 
that which is denied through denial, occurs when after the second apparition of 
King Hamlet’s ghost, a horrified Hamlet indefinitely asks his mother, ‘Do you see 
nothing there?’ To which the Queen answers by/in denial, ‘Nothing at all; yet all 
that is I see.’
52 By thus saying ‘Nothing,’ Queen Gertrude truly denies Hamlet’s 
perception of the ghost of his father, whom the Queen calls, nothing but ‘the very 
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coinage of your brain/This bodiless creation of ecstasy.’
53 What we realize by 
listening to Queen Gertrude’s almost hysterical denial of Hamlet’s perception of 
King Hamlet, is that only an expression of ‘nothing’ that truly denies the speakers 
own perceptions or apperceptions, will create the apperception of that which is 
concealed, whereas conversely, the denial of a phenomenological perception creates 
the apperception of the phenomenon as unconcealed. The example also shows how 
highly conscious Shakespeare is of the inference from what is not perceived to its 
apperception, how triumphantly Shakespeare is aware of the ontological function 
of the inadequate expression of ‘nothing’ as a trope of incarnation. Undeniably, we 
do see the ghost of Hamlet, but our perceptions are denied, considered to be 
nothing, and it is the denial of our own perceptions, which makes what we perceive 
appear to be alive. 
 
[20]    We shall not object to Rosalie Colie’s splendid presentation of the 
commonplace of nothing in the Renaissance and beyond, a presentation to which 
we have nothing further to add and could not be without, a presentation 
indispensable to our studies. But what we have to tell the reader is that however 
admirable Colie’s studies of the topos of nothing is, she has, while focusing on the 
meaning of nothing, entirely and totally neglected its function, which is to produce 
the Being of beings. [Th]is would have been easy to forgive if the function did not 
contradict the meaning expressed, but when the function of nothing contradicts its 
meaning, it seems almost unforgivable to neglect its function. Rosalie Colie is not 
reading the paradox of poetic creation into what she so finely discerns when she 
says, ‘By his rash deed, King Lear has in fact reversed God’s great act of Creation: 
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he has brought ‘all’ to ‘nothing,’ turned form back into chaos.’
54  Rosalie Colie 
shows how persistently she neglects the production of Being through nothing, for 
the effect of the presentation is exactly contrary to its meaning. By removing all his 
properties, [th]is man appears to be, and none appear to be more than King Lear 
when he is, as he yells out into the storm, nothing. Ms. Colie has however an 
intimation - as if in a dream - of the paradoxical function of nothing, as is quite 
clear when she says, ‘”Nothing” paradoxes tend to turn inside-out; beneath the 
linguistic paradox of “nothing” in this play lies the moral anomaly reversing the 
first meaning of the paradox, for King Lear is not, as we painfully learn with him, 
“nothing.” Nor is any man, no matter how close to nothing he may come.’
55 
Similarly, when she says, speaking of nothing, ‘Not only is the logical problem 
raised, of affirming what is “not,” but also, by the affirmation,  “nothing” seems to 
be transformed exactly into ”something,” a positive entity.’
56 The true function of 
‘nothing’ is either to produce what is concealed or what is unconcealed. For, 
nothing produces the singular reference which it appears not to have, whether 
[th]is singular reference is concealed or unconcealed. That is, even though nothing 
is essentially empty, it does produce the apperception of that which no essence can 
be without – if it aspires to be more than an impersonal, unincarnated or abstract 
idea - that without which nothing could be essential, namely the ontological 
contradiction, which is either concealed or unconcealed depending on whether the 
expression of ‘nothing’ is true or untrue. For the true expression of ‘nothing’ 
creates the apperception of what is unconcealed as much as the untrue, the false 
expression of ‘nothing’ creates the apperception of what is hidden. And it is 
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precisely by noticing nothing that Brabantio, in the opening scene of Othello, gives 
Being to the one who is not there, the one whom he does not find when he is 
encouraged to look for Desdemona, and ends up with nothing. It is paradoxically, 
the fact that Desdemona is not found that creates, without content, the 
apperception of her place, that she is not there, that produces the empty possibility 
for her presence, the pure apperception of Desdemona’s place.
57 
 
[21]    ‘Nothing,’ immediately seem to turn into its opposite, by instantly creating 
the apperception of the Being of that which is denied. That Shakespeare himself is 
completely aware of the difference between the meaning and the function of 
expressing ‘nothing,’ becomes clear, when Shakespeare lets the Fool say, ‘Can you 
make no use of nothing, Nuncle?’ to which King Lear answers, ‘Why, no, boy. 
Nothing can be made out of nothing.’
58 Proving again how the function of what is 
said is opposite its meaning, after deridingly reminding King Lear how he has 
given all his titles away for nothing,
59 the Fool, affirms [th]is indefinite, [th]is 
fortuitous existence when he points to the King and says, ‘Now thou art an O 
without a figure. I am better than thou art now: I am a Fool, thou art nothing.’
60 
Rosalie Colie reminds us that Edgar, after he is forced to disguise himself as Poor 
Tom, similarly says, ‘Edgar I nothing am.’
61 The meaning of this simple statement 
is perfectly clear, ‘I am not Edgar.’ However, this statement is untrue, and even if 
‘nothing’ is falsely expressed, it does not fail to produce the opposite of what is 
expressed, namely the existence of that being whose existence is being denied. But 
whereas a true expression of nothing simply creates the apperception of what is 
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unconcealed, the untrue expression of ‘nothing’ creates the apperception of what is 
concealed. As we have seen, the function of saying ‘nothing,’ is the exact opposite 
of its meaning, for the apperception of the Being of beings is created for that 
existence whose Being is denied. More concretely, the false apperception or the 
inapperception of Edgar, that is created through his disguise, where Edgar is even 
on the verge of not being able to apperceive himself, of denying himself completely, 
creates again the profound apperception of the Being of that which is 
inapperceived, if not only denied. 
 
[22]     We will not need many illustrations to show how the function of nothing is 
entirely contrary to, works in the opposite direction of the meaning expressed, for 
whereas non-Being is expressed through nothing, the function is to create the 
apperception of the Being of beings. Of all uses of nothing in Shakespeare’s works, 
none is perhaps more memorable than the encounter between King Lear and his 
daughter Cordelia in the opening of King Lear. For where King Lear expects to 
hear an expression of Cordelia’s affection and admiration for his person, all he 
hears is, ‘Nothing.’ As King Lear says, begging his dearest daughter to continue, 
‘Nothing can come of nothing. Speak again.’
62 It is clear that the function of 
nothing is entirely opposite, even diametrically opposed to its meaning, which is 
why we may call nothing the figure of instant reversal, for it creates the exact 
opposite of what is expressed. Whereas King Lear warns Cordelia, before she 
present her testimony to the glory of her father, that ‘Nothing will come of 
nothing,’
63 that she stands to lose everything if she says, ‘Nothing,’ and she soon 
does, it is evident that it is precisely the expression of ‘nothing,’ and later the 
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removal of her inheritance, the disinheritance of Cordelia which makes, through 
aphairesis, nothing come true, that produces the apperception of the Being of 
Cordelia, which appear to be not despite, but because she has been stripped of her 
privileges and disinherited, not despite but because she has truly displayed no 
feelings nor admiration for her father. It is therefore Cordelia’s expression of 
‘Nothing,’ this embarrassing lack of respectful display which she presents in front 
of the courtiers, that leads not only to an instant change of fortune, but gives her, 
in exact contradistinction to what is said, Being, as the attributes of what appear 
before us are taken away. 
 
[23]    Rosalie Colie marks, ‘All Lear’s troubles come from Cordelia’s firm 
‘Nothing, my Lord,’ in answer to her father’s formal request for a record of her 
affection. Edmund starts the troubles in Gloucester’s family with exactly the same 
words, ‘Nothing, my lord,’ in answer to his father’s request for a report on the 
false letter in Edmund’s hand. Both Cordelia and Edmund, for quite different 
reasons equivocate with that traditionally equivocal word “nothing.”’ And neither 
lies.’
64 Superficially we would disagree with Ms. Colie and assert that while 
Cordelia speaks truly, Edmund lies, and that without acknowledging [th]is 
difference it would escapes us that whereas the false expression of ‘nothing’ 
produces the apperception of what is concealed, the true expression of nothing 
generally produces the apperception of what is unconcealed. In [th]is case we must, 
more profoundly, agree with Ms. Colie, for as Lord Gloucester is aware of what is 
falsely denied [as nothing], the false expression of ‘nothing’ is turned into an 
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indefinition, an indefinition through which this letter is unconcealed, as much as it 
falsely appeared, was unconcealed under the door. 
 
[24]    As often as not Shakespeare uses nothing truly but indefinitely to affirm 
what is not. Cordelia obviously affirms that she has nothing to say about her 
father, and by thus expressing ‘Nothing,’ Shakespeare makes the spectator 
immediately infer to the apperception of what is unconcealed, to the one whom she 
says ‘Nothing’ of, namely King Lear. However, Cordelia’s ‘Nothing’ hides her low 
estimation of her own father, so ‘Nothing’ is expressed falsely, is an attempt to hide 
her own judgment. By thus expressing ‘Nothing,’ Cordelia without effort gives the 
spectator, as well as all those witnessing what she is unwilling to speak of, the 
apperception of what is concealed.
65 To expose the final contradiction of meaning 
and function of saying ‘nothing,’ we need to proceed more patiently. When King 
Lear asks Cordelia, ‘What do you have to say?’ he expects to hear how highly he is 
loved by his daughter. Cordelia answers, ‘Nothing,’ King Lear replies, ‘Nothing 
will come of nothing.’
66 However much nothing is the meaning of what is said 
within the play, and even if nothing in [th]is case is true, as Cordelia truly ends up 
with nothing, this expression is, of course, immediately contradicted, and 
Shakespeare is well aware of [th]is, by the effect of the presentation, where indeed, 
saying ‘nothing,’ more effortlessly than silence, creates the apperception of the 
Being of beings. For when Cordelia says, ‘Nothing,’ she does not only deny that she 
has any feelings for her father, but more so, she affirms the place, the blank 
                                                 
65 To confirm what she is unwilling to speak of, whether it is the true judgment of her more 
pragmatic sisters or the depreciation of King Lear’s wits, that by saying, ‘Nothing,’ she is indeed 
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66 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act I, Scene i.92. The Production of Being through Nothing 
 
347  
through which these feelings may or may not be unconcealed, and so, what is 
affirmed by saying, ‘nothing,’ is again what Hegel would say Being is already in 
the beginning, ‘Nothing.’
67 
 
[25]    To sum up we can say that the effect of expressing ‘nothing,’ depends on 
whether ‘nothing’ is expressed truly or untruly, affirmatively or in denial. 
Evidently, the untrue expression of ‘nothing’ produces the apperception of that 
which is concealed, whereas the true expression of ‘nothing’ produces the 
apperception of that which is unconcealed. If one through ‘nothing’ denies the 
perception of the essential but true characteristics of [th]is or if one denies the true 
apperception of [th]is, the effect is nevertheless the same, namely, the apperception 
of what is unconcealed. If ‘nothing’ denies the essence or existence of any being, if 
[th]is is falsely denied by calling it ‘nothing,’ we are simply, and without effort, 
made to infer from the imperception or inapperception of [th]is to its concealed 
existence.
68 Finally, we would have to say that whether truly or untruly, an 
affirmation or a negation, ‘nothing’ produces the opposite of what it states, 
namely, Being. It is remarkable that [th]is effect is achieved so spontaneously, 
almost thoughtlessly achieved, that one never needs to ponder at the means to 
arrive at the end. This suggest that ‘nothing’ is a commonplace so immediately 
available to all, so undistinguishable from our composition, that it may well be 
indifferent from what is more fundamental than the meaning of our lives, our 
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Being. And if the commonplace that produces [th]is effect is so close to our hearts, 
even more is the place which it produces the apperception of. 
§8.2 Showing Nothing 
 
 
[26]    The function of nothing in drama, is not to make anything particular, 
evidently, as a particular is an instance of the universal which is defined by what it 
essentially is, but to make possible the experience or apperception of the Being of 
[th]is singular [being]. Plato lets the Stranger in the Sophist think that the origin of 
nothing is negation or denial, and that nothing is secondary to that something 
which nothing negates.
69 At least for a while, until Theaetetus and the Visitor 
become so baffled, so entangled by the investigation that they have to admit that 
they know neither what Being nor non-Being is.
70 However difficult the exposition, 
the analysis of nothing is, looking at a negative affirmation, an indefinition, we see 
how effortlessly we arrive at the apperception of nothing through negation. We 
could take as our example, the simplest illustration, the negative affirmation, ‘x is 
not-p,’ to witness how the apperception of nothing is produced, but we will not 
proceed abstractly without first mentioning Shakespeare’s most well-known, if not 
infamous, indefinition. Evidently, what distinguishes a grand playwright from a 
good playwright is that he makes something out of nothing, that he, like a god 
creates ex nihilo. 
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[27]     The most famous indefinition in Shakespeare’s oeuvre is surely Othello’s 
opening statement, ‘I am not what I am.’
71 Saying this, Iago has not only signalled 
how self-conscious he is of his own appearance - as an instrument, as a means to 
and end, as a device for machinations - but has, even more, given indications to 
how consciously Shakespeare goes about producing the apperception of the Being 
of beings. For, as was said, the only difference between a false statement and an 
indefinition is knowledge, for knowledge transforms a false perception, a false 
proposition into an indefinition. For whereas the untrue perception of what [th]is is 
gives the spectator an apperception of [th]is as truly concealed, the awareness that 
these attributes, these properties does not belong to [th]is, makes the perception of 
what [th]is is into an indefinition whereby the predicates with which [th]is man or 
woman is associated are taken away, and, knowing nothing else, nothing else 
remains. 
 
[28]     We include indefinition among the figures that most effortlessly produce the 
[negative] apperception of the Being of beings. Evidently, nothing is nowhere more 
affective than when nothing is not detected. Clearly, nothing is not likely to reach 
its end, to be consumed by its own ontological function, if nothing is [detected], 
that is, if nothing is reified.
72 Elaboration on what is actually expressed, but more 
so affected, when Othello says, ‘I am not what I am,’ we could start by confirming 
what is self-evident. Not-p obviously denies the existence of p, and by saying that p 
                                                 
71 Shakespeare, Othello, Act I, Scene i.62. We should not be surprise to hear Viola makes the exact 
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is not, we do of course have to admit that we have said even less of x, if it is true 
that not-p is a denial of p. That is, if, as Russell says in The Problems of Philosophy 
where he simply states The Law of Contradiction, ‘Nothing can both be and not be 
[at the same time].’
73 If, however x is affirmed through the negative affirmation ‘x 
is not-p,’ and if it is true that not-p denies the existence of p, and not-p is not simply 
a definition of the limits of p, where p is not denied, but an assertion of what is 
beyond the limits of p, either through lack or excess, privation or abundance, but 
that when denying p we have said that p is not, having said that ‘x is not-p,’ it 
becomes clear that we have said nothing of x or that x is nothing, which is precisely 
what Aristotle says, that a negative affirmation, an indefinition shows us nothing.
74  
 
[29]    As much as Shakespeare successfully produces the apperception of what is 
hidden, he equally masters the art of producing the apperception of what is 
outstanding, the apperception of what is unconcealed. Beginnings are crucial, and 
in the beginning of All’s Well that Ends Well, Shakespeare produces, so contrary to 
Twelfth Night where everything is concealed, the impression of what is 
unconcealed. In All’s Well that Ends Well we are brought to witness the ecstasy that 
precedes hypostasy, the ekstasis that precedes hypostasis, the unconcealed that is 
prior to [th]is Being concealed. In a primary sense therefore, Shakespeare 
produces, in the opening of All’s Well that Ends Well, the apperception of what is 
outstanding, men and women who appear to have transgressed beyond the bounds 
of concealment, lingering in [th]is fortuitous clearing, indeterminately, indefinitely 
as undead.
75 We could say that in concealment, as in a cocoon, every moment, 
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every appearance, every saying and every thought remains hidden, concealed 
before it is unconcealed. In [th]is sense, all appearances, every phenomena are 
ecstatic, in ecstasy before it is grounded or anchored by an inference to what is 
concealed, be [th]is called, hypostasis, hypokeimenon, substance or soul. [Th]is, 
Being is unconcealed before it is concealed. For, in a primary sense, in an original 
sense, what is not unconcealed would not be. It is [th]is ecstasy that Shakespeare 
produces the apperception of through inadequation, more precisely, the 
inadequate figure of indefinition. For, as Aristotle says, an indefinite presentation 
shows us nothing, provides no more than a frame for each phenomena to appear as 
what it is not.
76 
 
[30]     In the opening of All’s Well that Ends Well there appear four personae on 
stage: an elderly Lady accompanied by her Son, an elderly Lord and a young 
Lady. All are nameless, appearing in black on a black stage where they would 
disappear did they not have pale, powdered faces, masques. The elderly Lady, 
whom it is true we know nothing of, says, ’In delivering my son from me I bury 
a/Second husband.’
77 It is obvious that the Countess, who is executing the funeral 
of her husband, awaiting her son to leave, likens his departure to the death of her 
husband. The meaning is clear. What we shall do is to make the reader aware of 
the function of providing such a sombre opening. For it is obvious that 
Shakespeare’s presentation provides, in contradiction to the meaning expressed, a 
                                                                                                                                               
that modern men, which most of us have been since the time of Shakespeare, have a natural 
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clearing for these characters to appear as beings among beings, an opening, a place 
through indefinition.  
 
[31]    Obviously, the son resembles the father only in this, that he will soon, 
against his mother’s will and wishes, be concealed. However, having not yet 
departed, he appears before his mother as unconcealed, having not yet suffered the 
cognitive death of imperception, been buried by his own non-appearance. As 
Bacon says, so contrary to Heidegger’s ontological exposition of death in Being and 
Time
78 and in opposition to Derrida’s anachronistic treatment of death in 
Aporias,
79 ‘Death makes all men equal.’ Evidently, the countess is as unwilling to 
see her son leave for Paris, to serve His Majesty The King of France, as she was to 
see her husband die. This is however expressed, not in the absence of the one who 
is about to leave, but in his presence. The proposition becomes a negative frame 
through which [th]is young man may appear to be unburied, to have escaped the 
cognitive grave of imperception, of being imperceived. Hence the son, who is still 
there without a name, stands out as unburied, as unconcealed, if you will, entbergt, 
and there is produced the apperception that [th]is man is. The apperception of 
[th]is remains moreover indefinite, for he appears as [th]is indefinition much like 
Anaximander, through his shocking non-poetry,
80 presents the apeiron, not as 
concealed, but as the place through which anything is, all things are, 
indeterminately unconcealed.
81 
                                                 
78 Heidegger, Being and Time, Sections 46-53. 
79 Derrida, Aporias, pp. 21-25. 
80 We recall that Anaximander was the first to write philosophy without the use of verse, the first to 
establish a long line of Logographoi, the Scribes of Reason. See, Will Durant, The Story of 
Philosophy, 1927. 
81 Heidegger would say, maintaining death as a negative principle of Being, that it is death that 
makes everyone stand out as singularly unconcealed as it is death that makes each man’s life, the 
essential project of Dasein, inevitably incomplete. Da-sein ends in ‘unfulfillment,’[Heidegger, Being 
and Time, Section 48, S. 244/p. 227.] and this ‘unfulfillment’ belongs to me, for ‘No one can take the The Production of Being through Nothing 
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[32]    According to Anaximander, each phenomenon, each appearance gives a 
glimpse of what is concealed, but only after it is first unconcealed, indefinitely, 
indeterminately as the apeiron. Heidegger interprets apeiron not as something 
hidden, but as that through which any phenomenon, indistinctly, prior to what it 
is, prior to its essential distinction, hovers as yet undetermined, as the apeiron.
82 It 
is not difficult to recognize that Shakespeare, through indefinition, produces the 
apperception of what is unconcealed. Undeniably, [th]is young man stands out as 
unconcealed, indeterminately, he is the apeiron, [th]is prior to its essential 
distinction, prior to [th]is taking on its essential masque that more often than not 
keeps [th]is from being discovered. Speaking metaphorically, which we only do 
hesitantly, using metaphor as a heuristic device, we could say that indefinition 
creates the apperception of light at the end of a tunnel. In [th]is light, even, as 
[th]is light, man hovers fortuitously, as the apeiron. Having not yet suffered the 
cognitive death of imperception, [th]is appear to be saved from the immemorial 
death of non-perception, and therefore it appears to be true.
83 
 
[33]    [Th]is negative production of Being is not random. For in the beginning of 
All’s Well that Ends Well, Shakespeare introduces, in only five sentences, merely 
four lines, three deaths: the actual death of a perished father, the cognitive death 
of a departed son [through sudden and potential imperception], the potential death 
of a King suffering from an incurable illness. Evidently, death is not arbitrarily 
related to the presencing of these beings, to the apperception of the Being of these 
                                                                                                                                               
other’s dying away from him.’ [Heidegger, Being and Time, Section 47, S. 240/p. 223. Emphasis 
added]. 
82 Heidegger, Basic Concepts, pp. 82-106. 
83 Obviously, the concept of truth applied in this paragraph is not epistemological but ontological, 
in the sense that what stands out is experienced as real, as Being there, and [th]is self-disclosure is 
experienced,  apperceived as a negation of what is not revealed. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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beings. For it is by being apperceived as indefinitely Da, that these men and 
women appear as living beings, that the play appear to confront the spectator with 
the happening of truth through which these men and women appear before us as 
unconcealed.
84 To make the unconcealment of these beings more precarious than it 
already is, Lafew, the old Courtier, contradicts himself without any reservations. 
For as clearly as he in one sentence speaks of the King of France as a true pillar of 
unconcealment that graciously upholds the Being of all his subordinates, in the 
next, and without giving a thought to this contradiction, he reveals that the King 
has now not only fallen ill, but equally abandoned all physicians and all hope for 
survival. The virtu of the King, which was believed to be the underlying power of 
unconcealment in the Kingdom of France, is suddenly enfeebled, transformed into 
the emptiness of a moral virtue that has no power, is without virtue. What is 
surprising, is not that the King is forced to face that which he will not, death, 
which will close the gap in which he, like all beings, is unconcealed, but that with 
his death, the life of all his subjects, all those who depend on [th]is alliance, will 
suddenly be without ground.
85 
 
[34]    As we were about to accuse ourselves of overplaying the topos, if not the 
function, of death in the opening of this play, attending [th]is funeral, we come to 
realize that in what are merely the opening few lines of [th]is play, which have 
scarcely given time for the gravediggers to close the grave of a beloved father, we 
are soon cleared of all accusations, proclaimed innocent when brought to witness 
in sentence number six, line number five, death number four. Again, the 
                                                 
84 On the happening of truth, see Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art, in Basic Writings, pp. 
186-187. 
85 When commenting on the subject matter of Plato’s Sophist Aristotle points out that its subject 
matter is the fortuitous, clearly that which Shakespeare here produces the apperception of. Cf. 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book VI, Chapter 2, esp. 1026b14. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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fortuitousness of [th]is gap of unconcealment, the precariousness of [th]is existence, 
is only made graver, when the Countess, says, ‘This young gentlewoman had a 
father.’
86 But how does she describe her father, but to simply say that he was a 
physician, adding naively, that if this physician was alive, nature would be 
immortal, and ‘death should have play for lack of work.’
87 Implied is not only that 
immortals would have to play to be dead, but that death is, at any one time, more 
than play for anyone who cannot claim immortality. Again Shakespeare directs 
our gaze towards the ephemeral clearing where his company, like all men and 
women, ecstatically, are unconcealed, as they stand next to a grave of utter 
concealment.
88 
 
[35]    We are tempted to continue, but knowing that the time the reader is 
unconcealed is limited, we will end our exposition of Shakespeare’s indefinite 
presentation of the ontological contradiction in the opening of All’s Well that Ends 
Well here. However, we cannot leave out that Helena is soon about to ‘die for 
love,’
89 and that already in the next scene, where Helena asks Parolles how a girl 
should best protect her virginity, Parolles answers bluntly, that ‘He that hangs 
himself is a virgin, virginity murders itself.’
90 Again, the reader is assured that in 
this play, death is neither expressed nor understood symbolically, but as that 
which each one of its personae negates, to thereby stand out as alive. It is therefore 
not coincidental that, in the end, Bertram only returns to his beloved Avignon 
from his Italian exile after he hears the news of Helena’s death. Having sworn to 
                                                 
86 Shakespeare, All’s Well that Ends Well, Act I, Scene i.19. Emphasis added. 
87 Shakespeare, All’s Well that Ends Well, Act I, Scene i.23. 
88 Cf. For Heidegger’s remarks on the ecstasy of Being, similarly, his critique of the superficialities 
of Sartre’s existentialism, see Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings, pp. 230-231. 
89 Shakespeare, All’s Well that Ends Well, Act I, Scene i.98. 
90 Shakespeare, All’s Well that Ends Well, Act I, Scene i.145-146. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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make the not eternal,
91 to never give Helena any children, Bertram returns only to 
find that he has unknowingly made her pregnant. For having been conceived in the 
dark, a dead woman finally appears to be with child on this stage, to close [th]is 
theatre, to shut this ‘looking place,’
92 about to unconceal another one, to unconceal 
[th]is as it was in the beginning, as an indefinite light appearing in total darkness, 
Being the negation of everything that [it] is not.
93 
 
[36]     It is paradoxical that precisely in the beginning of the play, in the opening 
of this theatre or that looking place, when those who appear before us should seem 
most superficial, as merely masked, when we are disposed to mistrust the Being of 
all appearances, that they appear to be most profoundly. However, it is a regular 
mark of the Shakespearean play to produce unreal ends, the relief of unreality, as 
much as real beginnings, to make the beginning more real than the end, the end 
more unreal than the beginning.
94 By having [th]is effect on his audience, 
Shakespeare is, of course, entirely unHegelian, for to Hegel, the beginning is as 
unreal as the end is not.
95 But, we ask, what is it that Shakespeare produces the 
apperception of in the beginning if not the very same that Hegel identifies as the 
very beginning, that which, completely empty of any essential characteristica and 
apperceived as nothing, is, namely Being.
96 If Shakespeare produces the 
                                                 
91 Shakespeare, All’s Well that Ends Well, Act III, Scene ii.23. 
92 For the etymology of the Greek theatre as ‘a looking place’ opposed to the Roman auditorium or 
‘hearing place,’ see, Michael Ewans’s ‘Introduction’ to Aeschylus, The Oresteia, p. xix. 
93 Helena enters this final stage in Shakespeare, All’s Well that Ends Well, Act V, Scene iii.304. 
94 Maintaining an ontological concept of truth, we could even say that Shakespeare produces untrue 
ends as clearly as true beginnings. 
95 For Hegel on untrue/unreal beginnings and true/real ends see, Hegel, Phenomenology, ‘Preface: 
On Scientific Cognition,’ esp. §12, p. 7. 
96 In ‘Doctrine of Being,’ Hegel says that Being through predication soon ‘lose that integrity and 
simplicity it has in the beginning,’ as ‘these beginnings are nothing but empty abstractions.’ Hegel, 
Logic, §87, p. 128 To those who may object and say that there are no such beginnings without 
thinking, Hegel makes the argument,’ It be replied that Being and Nothing are both of them 
thoughts, so that thought may be reckoned common ground, the objector forgets that Being is not a The Production of Being through Nothing 
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apperception of what is already in the beginning, which is exactly what he does, 
Shakespeare does at times produce the apperception of nothing. 
 
[37]    Heidegger says in his lectures on Nietzsche, that what appears to be the end 
of apperception is what in the beginning makes any perception possible, for the 
unknown is not what is last but what is first, Being not the end but the beginning.
97 
Even though the apperception of the ontological difference appears to be the result 
of an inference, and therefore to be consequent to the being perceived, consequent 
to what is essentially perceived, Being is not the end but the beginning. For what is 
to apperception the end of a process of cognition, is to Being the beginning of all 
processes, and hence, what we attempted to approach, what we thought was the 
end of an inference, is already there, Da from the very beginning. However, what 
Heidegger fails to acknowledge, is that the apperception of [th]is beginning is 
produced more or less effectively.
 One of the means of producing the apperception 
of the ontological contradiction is indefinition, the negative framing through which 
[th]is is allowed to appear as unconcealed, to appear as if it was already there, Da 
from the very beginning. Clearly, what to art is an end, which may or may not 
successfully be attained by poiesis, which is unattainable without techne, is in life 
already unconcealed in the beginning. The apperception of life is not however 
produced without a certain techne, and knowing what is first and what is last, and 
knowing how successfully Shakespeare creates the apperception of [th]is end, we 
could speak of All’s Well that Ends Well and the Beginning of Philosophy, if 
                                                                                                                                               
particular or definite thought, and hence, being quite indeterminate, is a thought not to be 
distinguished from Nothing.’[Hegel, Logic, ‘The Doctrine of Being,’ §87, p. 128]. 
97 Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume IV: Nihilism, p. 160f. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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‘Philosophy’ is the activity whereby one attempts to grasp or comprehend what is 
first,
98 what is there, already Da from the very beginning. 
 
[38]     It is clear that Shakespeare in the opening of All’s Well that Ends Well, have 
decided to present the characters indefinitely, to make them all singularly appear, 
as apeiron allows [th]is to appear, indeterminately. For these characters appear as 
negative appearances, indeterminately shunning away from death by simply Being 
unconcealed. By doing so, what is mystical, unexplained, ineffable in the opening of 
[th]is play, is not what they hide or that they are hidden, but that they appear. 
Through yet another inadequation, Shakespeare has created the simple 
astonishment at their appearance. For through indefinition or negative 
affirmation, Shakespeare has made frames where they appear as negations of what 
in the end conceals all, death. In the light of Shakespeare’s indefinite presentation, 
these phenomena appear to be, mystically, their simple appearance what cannot be 
explained. We could have spoken of mystical appearances, for they all appear, and 
this time in the light, as what they are not, namely dead. That each and every one 
of us is beyond the grasp of death by simply appearing, by Being unconcealed, is at 
the heart of Heidegger’s inessential idea of the ontological contradiction as he 
presents it in Letter on Humanism, where existence is understood ecstatically, as 
ekstasis. Heidegger maintains that Being is not merely what is posited by the will, 
as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche assert,
99 nor is it the concealed substance or soul of 
each appearance, the noumenon that accompany every phenomenon, as Kant 
                                                 
98 Metaphysics, Prima Philosophia or First Philosophy, is philosophy exactly in this sense, the study 
of what is highest or first, perhaps the beginning and the end, the Gods and the Being of beings. Cf. 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, Chapter 2, Book IV and Book XII, Chapter 7. 
99 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Nietzsche, The Will to Power. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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would maintain,
100 but rather, each being stands out as the negation of its own 
concealment, and by thus standing out, [th]is appears truly or simply to be.
101  
§8.3 Being Nothing 
 
 
[39]     When I began research for this project, I intended to show that 
Shakespeare had read Dionysius the Aeropagite or The Cloud of Unknowing, 
whose author translated The Mystical Theology into Middle English as Denis Hid 
Divinite in the 14
th Century.
102 As it turned out, that was not an easy enterprise. 
We found only two authors who suggested that Shakespeare had read Pseudo-
Dionysius, the one Tillyard, who believed that a passage in The Merchant of Venice 
showed a great knowledge of Pseudo-Dionysius’ The Celestial Hierarchy.
103 The 
passage that Tillyard indicates, which has an indisputable Dionysian flavour, is 
Lorenzo’s lofty speech to Jessica,  
‘Sit Jessica. Look how the floor of heaven 
Is thick inlaid with patens of bright gold. 
There’s not the smallest orb which thou behold’st 
But in his motion like an angel sings, 
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubins;  
Such harmony is in immortal souls, 
But whilst this muddy vesture of decay 
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it.’
104  
 
The other indication to Shakespeare’s familiarity with Pseudo-Dionysius was 
found in Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition,
105 a third was 
implied by Rosalie M. Colie in her spectacular study of a Renaissance literary 
                                                 
100 Cf. Kant, Prolegomena, §§31, 33, 57. 
101 For Heidegger’s theory of the ecstasy of Being or ek-stasis, see Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, 
in Basic Writings, pp. 230-231. 
102 Unknown, Denis’s Hidden Theology, translated and with and introduction by James A. Walsh in 
Unknown, The Pursuit of Wisdom and works, by the author of The Cloud of Unknowing, pp. 49-97. 
103 E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture, pp. 56-57. 
104 Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, Act V, Scene i.58-65. 
105 Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, p. 121. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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topos, Paradoxia Epidemica.
106 Ms. Colie does not however speak superficially of 
angelic hierarchies, but more profoundly of negative theology, which will occupy us 
in what remains of this chapter as much as symbolic theology, another of Pseudo-
Dionysius’ creations, did occupy us in the previous.
107 Beyond the recognition of 
angels, evidence of Shakespeare’s affinity to the Dionysian tradition is found in the 
Duke’s apophatic sermon in Measure for Measure, which clearly is held in the 
fashion of negative theology. Being disguised as a friar, the Duke praises life in the 
following apophatic manner, as ‘not noble,’ ‘not valiant,’ as not itself, ‘not happy,’ 
and ‘not certain,’
108 and Being neither young nor old, life has neither ‘heat, 
affection, limb, nor beauty,’ The Duke concludes by offering an aporia, ‘What’s 
yet in this/That bears the name of life?’
109 No sermon could more evocatively 
awake the ghost of negative theology, which reaches its end by denying God his 
name, then to deny his attributes, before finally denying the existence of that which 
is nameless.
110 There is similarly an element of elision in the graveyard, when, 
                                                 
106 Ms Colie indicates in her wonderful study, Paradoxia Epidemica, that ‘the remarkable uses of 
nothing’ one find in Shakespeare’s tragedies is suggestive of a negative theological trait.[Colie, 
Paradoxia Epidemica, p. 233]. However vaguely Ms. Colie conceptually considers ‘negative 
theology,’ she is certainly pointing in the right direction. 
107 Concerning Shakespeare’s knowledge of the angels in The Celestial Hierarchy, we are first of all 
struck by his precise knowledge of the principality, what Dionysius defines as the angel of ‘princely 
hegemony,’[Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, Chapter Nine, 257B, The Complete Works, 
p. 170.] when he lets Valentine liken Love to ‘a principality,/ Sovereign to all the creatures on the 
earth,’[Shakespeare, The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Act II, Scene iv.151-152.] and how consistently 
Shakespeare have avoided to speak of the Seraph, the Angel of Love. The exclusion of the Seraph 
from Shakespeare’s works is especially striking when compared to how many times the Angel of 
Knowledge, the Cherubim – [Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, Chapter Seven, 205B, The 
Complete Works, p. 161] features in Shakespeare’s works: Macbeth, Act I, Scene vii.22; Hamlet, Act 
IV, Scene iii.48; Cymbeline, Act II, Scene iv.88; The Merchant of Venice, Act V, Scene i.62, Sonnet 
114, A Lover’s Complaint, 319. Perhaps the last entrance, if it can be ascribed to Shakespeare, could 
explain why the Seraph has been left out. For the lover is seduced by one like the Angel of 
Knowledge, who knew so much and loved so little. Hence, the ‘Cherubin’ betrayed 
her.[Shakespeare, A Lover’s Complaint, 328.] 
108 The Duke’s apophatic sermon can be found in Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act III, Scene 
i.5-41.  
109 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act III, Scene i.38. 
110 Compare to Pseudo-Dionysius, who, towards the culmination of The Mystical Theology says, 
‘There is no speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it. … It is beyond assertion and denial. We 
make assertions and denial of what is next to it, but never it, for it is … beyond every assertion, and The Production of Being through Nothing 
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upon his secret return from England, Hamlet picks up a skull, and, speaking in a 
tongue that is as distinctly Thomasian as it is apophatic, Hamlet says ‘May not that 
be the/skull of a lawyer? Where be his quiddities now, his qualities, his cases, his 
tenures, and his tricks?’
111 However, what separates the living from the dead is, as 
Shakespeare very well knows, that which unites all quiddities, that which keeps all 
quiddities together, that which [th]is man is without, the Being of beings.
112 Clearly 
suggestive of a Dionysian tradition are also the remarks about transcendence that 
Lafew offers in All’s Well that Ends Well,
113 where Lafew pronounces what 
Parolles calls ‘the rarest argument of wonder/that hath shot out in our latter 
time,’
114when he says, ‘They say miracles are past, and we have our/philosophical 
persons, to make modern and familiar, things supernatural and causeless. Hence is 
it/that we make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves into seeming knowledge, 
when we should submit ourselves to an unknown fear.’
115 Evidently, these remarks 
could hardly have been presented without the framework of negative theology.  
 
[40]    Not only is it evident that Shakespeare has a clear understanding of ghosts, 
angels and gods as dissimilar similarities,
116 but, more so, he is also aware of the 
process of aphairesis, that when taking away all the properties from [th]is, and, as 
it were, lay it bare, the apperception of the ontological contradiction will ensue. It 
                                                                                                                                               
… free of ever limitation … it is also beyond every denial.’ [Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical 
Theology, ‘Chapter Five: That the supreme Cause of every conceptual thing is not itself 
conceptual,’ 1048B, The Collected Works, p.141. Emphasis added]. 
111 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act V, Scene i.99. 
112 It is not unreasonable to suggest that Shakespeare had read or heard Thomas’ definite 
expression of the ontological difference, ‘Therefore, it is clear that to exist is other than the essence 
or quiddity.’[Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, ‘Chapter 4, Essence in Separated 
Substances,’ in Selected Writings, p. 40.] Especially considering what Shakespeare lets his hero, 
Lord Talbot, announce in his first play, ‘No, no, I am but shadow of myself:/You are deceived, my 
substance is not here,/For what you see is but the smallest part/And least proportion of 
humanity.’[Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part I, Act II, Scene iii.50-53] 
113 Shakespeare, All’s Well that Ends Well, Act II, Scene iii.1-5. 
114 Shakespeare, All’s Well that Ends Well, Act II, Scene iii.6-7. 
115 Shakespeare, All’s Well that Ends Well, Act II, Scene iii.1-5. Emphasis added. 
116 See Chapter 9, The Production of Being through Dissimilarity. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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should perhaps be noted that if there is an essential difference between heavenly 
and creaturely beings, it would reside in [th]is, as Dionysius says, that these 
heavenly beings cannot be essentially known, whereas man essentially can. The 
difference may be explained by, as St. Thomas indicates, that angels are beings 
without essence whereas man almost appears to be nothing without essential 
characteristics.
117 No play is more forcefully expressive of this negative theological 
trait than King Lear, although we are the first to acknowledge that there is in King 
Lear, unlike Measure for Measure, where there is a pronounced attempt to deliver 
an apophatic sermon,
118 not so much a question of discourse, but more so, of a 
process of elision,
119 an elusive progression, marked by the action itself. That 
Shakespeare is fully conscious of [th]is progressive elision/elusion, is, of course, 
evident when he lets King Lear, in the storm speak of man as nothing after he has 
taken away everything that [th]is man may essentially be. That Shakespeare is fully 
aware that he not only presents spirits but men as dissimilar similarities, is obvious 
when he lets King Lear, after he has heard the news of his daughter’s death, 
wander around as what he is not, namely, a man dressed in flowers, a flower 
man.
120 This signifies, as Shakespeare very well knows, not what [th]is man is like, 
but rather, what [th]is man is unlike, namely nature. And, as [th]is unlike-likeness, 
                                                 
117 On the basic unknowability of the heavenly angels except through revelation, see Dionysius, The 
Celestial Hierarchy, Chapter One, The Collected Works, pp.145-147. On St. Thomas demarcation of 
men from angels and the principle unknowability of angels as they are, according to St. Thomas, 
without essence, and therefore unpredictable, ungraspable, see, Thomas Aquinas, On Being and 
Essence, ‘Chapter 5, Different Beings, Different Essences,’ in Selected Writings, p. 45, where it is 
said, ‘The proper accidents of immaterial substances are unknown to us.’ [Emphasis added.] 
118 The Duke does himself deliver this apophatic speech towards the end of Measure for Measure. 
Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act III, Scene i.5-41. 
119 Whereas the concept of aphairesis is applied to an apophatic discourse or to a conceptual process 
whereby all perceptual and intelligible qualities are denied all beings, to life as a whole or 
everything that is, the concept of elision is applied to mark the gradual chiselling away or the 
violent removal of all perceptual and intelligible properties from an individual being, who, through 
[th]is process of elision is rendered elusive, and thus appear to be [alive]. 
120 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act IV, Scene vi.79. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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as [th]is dissimilar-similarity, King Lear wanders as a spirit among spirits, or 
simply, as a man among men, quite simply alive. 
 
[41]    The first and foremost example in Shakespeare’s plays of the negative 
production of Being through elision, the gradual removal or violent ab-straction of 
many or all properties from an individual being, is clearly King Lear, whose visible 
signs of Kingship are all given or taken away from him. Then, after having given 
away the visible signs of his authority, his royal powers, his intelligible qualities 
are soon removed, even his intelligence seems soon to falter. Before he dies, King 
Lear is nothing but [th]is ontological contradiction, that which everything has been 
taken away from, experienced as that which is simply alive. On the heath, in the 
storm, when he appear to have lost everything, King Lear himself says to the 
miserable men of his company, before tearing off his clothes, that without p, 
without q and without r, ‘thou art the thing itself.’
121 Offering an encomium to 
nothing, King Lear cries out to Poor Tom-a-Bedlam who stands uncovered on the 
heath in the storm,  
‘Thou wert better in a grave than to answer 
with thy uncovered body this extremity of the 
skies. Is man no more than this 
Consider him well. Thou ow’st the worm no silk, the beast no 
hide, the sheep no wool, the cat no perfume. Ha! 
here’s three on’s are sophisticated. Thou art the 
thing itself; unaccomodated man is no more 
but such a poor, bare, forked animal as thou art. 
Off, off, you lendings! - Come, unbutton here [Tearing off his clothes.]’
122  
 
Borrowed are, of course, all the properties we pride ourselves with, for we appear 
to live, to be alive even without them, which is again to show, or Shakespeare shows 
again, the priority of that which upholds the integrity of these properties. And, 
                                                 
121 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act III, Scene iv.102-111. 
122 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act III, Scene iv.102-111. Emphasis added. The Production of Being through Nothing 
 
364  
having announced himself as nothing, King Lear says to the freezing Poor Tom, 
before they enter the hovel, to seek shelter from the wind and the rain, ‘I will keep 
still - quiet like the winds - with my philosopher.’
123 That there really is no sense of 
communication in this scene, is clear from the fact that whereas King Lear is 
begging to be enlightened on questions of natural philosophy, Poor Tom addresses 
questions of moral philosophy, where he inadvertently sees himself as illustrating 
vices, confesses to sins he has never committed and King Lear has never asked to 
be confessed. However, admitting to sins or transgressions he never made, we do 
again apperceive [th]is man’s Being, as he again presents himself and is perceived 
as what he is not, if at all King Lear listens to what he says. This is, of course, the 
hidden or second sense, in addition to Being the incarnation of nothing, in which 
Poor Tom is a philosopher, for he does not, never does he, like Augustine before 
him and Descartes after him, merely speak of false perceptions, he is what is 
perceived falsely. 
 
[42]    Again the formula is simple; not knowing the predicates creates the 
apperception of the Being of the subject, not knowing what [th]is is, produces the 
apperception of [th]is as concealed or unconcealed. We could even speak of 
purification through loss of identity, a ritual process through which all properties 
are taken away and ‘I’ am laid bare, a negative, an elisive process which is never 
more sad, no more purifying than in King Lear where the King is left with nothing, 
dancing around in the tempest with only what nature immediately can bring. For 
King Lear may grab a flower here, tear off a garment there, as easily as his 
daughters, Goneril and Regan, plucked away everything that belonged to him; his 
                                                 
123 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act III, Scene iv.179. We should perhaps quietly add that King Lear 
here uses ‘philosopher’ in the contemporary, the premodern, sense of ‘scientist,’ one who possesses 
the virtue, and perhaps enjoys the favours, of scientia, episteme or knowledge.  The Production of Being through Nothing 
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land, his majesty, his army. [Th]is elusive process of taking away and leaving what 
remains concealed with next to nothing, does not only show how vulnerable we are 
to the vicissitudes of life and the wrong-doings of others, the ill effects of our own 
bad judgments. If we also remove our own prejudices, we will see that [th]is 
progressive elision, whereby the properties that are indispensable to the essential 
identity of an individual being is hammered away, creates the apperception that 
[th]is, which alone remains, or that from which everything has been taken away, 
is.
124 More generally, we could speak of a figure of incarnation which Shakespeare 
uses extensively, that is, the production of Being through loss of identity, not 
without, of course, identifying this figure in Shakespeare’s works more concretely, 
which we will do in Chapter 9, The Production of Being through Substitution, with 
a special focus on Sly in The Taming of the Shrew. Superficially, we could say that 
the loss of identity we are speaking of is the incapacity to comprehend oneself 
essentially, that is to misperceive oneself, but, more profoundly, to lose oneself is no 
longer to apperceive one’s self, in your own place, to apperceive another. 
 
[43]    There are two major traditions in the philosophical exposition of nothing, 
the one Platonic, giving Being to what is not, in strong opposition to the philosophy 
of Parmenides,
125 which later takes on the garb of Neoplatonism where only what 
essentially is, is granted existence. The Neoplatonic position is expressed most 
clearly and influentially in the philosophies of Plotinus and Augustine, but equally 
in the works of Iamblichus who by most is considered the last grand philosopher of 
                                                 
124 Another man, who gives away everything, but only for a few days, as if the play was no more 
than an extended Saturnalia, is Vincentio, the Duke in Measure for Measure. 
125 See the puzzling and sustained critique of Parmenides’ position in Plato’s Sophist, esp. 241d-
242c. Parmenides doctrine of Being is quoted at the outset by Plato in Sophist, 237a. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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Antiquity.
126 Evidently, Plotinus, Augustine and Iamblichus heed Parmenides’ 
warning to never think that what is not is.
127 Within the Neoplatonic tradition, 
Being is considered as that which essentially encompasses everything that is, and 
that which does not partake in Being, any essential idea, is within this tradition 
certainly considered to be nothing. [Nothing] is devalued as non-Being, merely 
considered a privation or lack of Being.
128 Heidegger, obviously in sharp 
contradistinction to this Neoplatonic position,
129 continues the tradition of Plato as 
expounded in the dialogue of the Sophist, by granting Being to what is not. 
Heidegger already politely announces his debt in the programmatic quote that 
opens Being and Time, which is, indeed taken from Sophist, where Heidegger 
quotes the Visitor’s sudden bafflement, when faced with the question of what 
                                                 
126 See for example, Iamblichus’ renowned The Egyptian Mysteries and Proclus’ lesser known, The 
Elements of Theology, translated and commented by Mr. Dodds, 1933. The Neoplatonic element is 
clearly present in the theurgy of both Iamblichus and Proclus, that is, a theory of how the cosmos is 
connected and may be influenced, perhaps magically, through essential likenesses, some visible, 
others invisible. 
127 If one should object and say that Plotinus as well as Iamblichus point out a Being above all 
beings, [Iamblichos, The Egyptian Mysteries, p. 34, Plotinus, The Enneads, Ennead V, Book 5, 
Chapters 1-13.] consider the nature of what is beyond the intellect, namely the One, which, 
although granting Being to everything that is, is above being,[Plotinus, The Enneads, V.5.6.] 
ineffable, it is clear that one has failed to considered what the One grants being to. The essential 
perspective or approach to the Being of all beings is made readily available to the scrutiny of all 
when Plotinus says, ‘Just as there is, primarily or secondarily, some form or idea from the monad in 
each of the successive numbers - the later still participating, though unequally, in the unit - so the 
series of Beings following upon The First bear, each, some form or idea derived from that source.’ 
[Plotinus, The Enneads, V.5.5.] … ‘This produced reality is an Ideal-form - for certainly nothing 
springing from the Supreme can be less.’[Plotinus, The Enneads, V.5.6] It is in this light almost 
irrelevant to point out further that Plotinus considers the Being of individual ideas. For what 
provides the ground, the Beings of all beings, is, as both Plotinus doctrine on matter as an in-
substantial mirror [Plotinus, The Enneads, III.6.7] and his doctrine of individual and essential 
substances that preexist their projection into this world, [Plotinus, The Enneads, V.7, ‘Ideal 
Archetype of Individual Beings.’ Emphasis added.] entirely and completely essential.  It is forgotten 
that what is considered to have being is an individual idea. And to Plotinus ideas are essential, 
whereas to Kant they are not.[Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A327/B384].  
128 Considering the non-Being of what is not, Ms. Collie exposes one of the main representatives of 
this Neoplatonic position, ‘Augustine, generalized the problem of evil into ‘defect,’ into ‘privation.’ 
emptiness, or lack, of God. So the devil, in Augustine’s scheme, is not, has not being …’ [Colie, 
Paradoxia Epidemica, p. 235.] Like vice, nothing is merely a privation. And, as vice is a lack of 
virtue, nothing is a lack of any ideal or essential Being.  
129 The Neoplatonic disposition to only consider what beings essentially are, is continued by the 
scientific search for the essence of every being, a probing crowned at Heidegger’s time by nuclear 
physics and today by the genome project. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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Being and non-Being is.
130 The false assurance with which the Neoplatonist 
neglects, removes nothing from the face of the earth, to thereby consider his 
position superior, can be ascribed to an essentialistic doctrine of Being where 
everything that is, is what essentially is and otherwise [nothing], a position 
apparently reinforced by the Scientific Revolution.  
 
[44]    The point at which we identify Ms. Colie’s preoccupation with meaning, her 
essentially Neoplatonic predisposition and her consequent disregard for the Being, 
function or effect of the Shakespearean play, is when she interprets Macbeth as a 
figure that comes to signify nothing. Showing her true Neoplatonic disposition and 
no understanding of the contradiction of the meaning expressed and the function 
attained, Ms. Colie explains that Macbeth is quite simply nothing, because he fails 
to incarnate any essential virtues. ‘Macbeth speaks more truly than he knows, 
then, when he says, fearing Banquo’s insight into his mind, ‘To be thus is nothing’ 
– according to the Augustinian morality, to be “bad,” or wicked, is exactly to be 
“nothing.”’
131 Again Colie looks essentially at nothing, a perspective from which 
nothing disappears and its ontological function evaporates. Neglecting the effect of 
the Shakespearean presentation, Ms. Colie repeats the same point in her valuation 
of Iago, showing again that coherence does not prove that any doctrine or 
interpretation is true, when she considers Iago as a nobody,
132 and therefore a 
clear candidate for non-Being, when it is precisely the misperception of Iago, that 
he is truly not like anything he is perceived as, neither loyal nor true, that most 
emphatically, creates the apperception of his Being. 
 
                                                 
130 Heidegger, Being and Time, xix. Cf. Plato, Sophist, 244a. 
131 Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica, p. 235. 
132 Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica, p. 246. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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[45]     Neither Hamlet’s madness, nor Macbeth’s or Iago’s loyalty essentially exist. 
But, as we have maintained throughout [th]is thesis, it is the representation of what 
is not that most effectively produces the apperception of the Being of beings, a 
point which crucially escapes any interpretation that does not free itself from an 
essentialistic doctrine of Being. Considering the ontological effect without the 
prejudices of Neoplatonism, a persona that lacks essential being, and likewise, a 
man without true character, would appear to be more true than any man who is 
indistinguishable from or truly upholds his essential attributes. Is it not obvious, 
that apart from what the spectators know they are not, knowing that Hamlet is not 
mad and that neither Iago nor Macbeth is loyal, the characters within the play 
knows almost nothing. Obviously, Shakespeare cannot be placed within a 
Neoplatonic tradition of philosophy, which he superficially at times may adhere or 
express, but which his art, the success of his techne, clearly betrays. For the 
function or the effect of Shakespearean presentation is entirely opposite to what is 
represented. The Neoplatonic meaning of the play or [re]presentation is often 
obvious, as when Shakespeare lets Cordelia say, ‘Nothing,’
133 or when Queen 
Gertrude replies to Hamlet’s ‘Do you see nothing there?’ by saying, ‘Nothing at 
all; yet all that is I see,’
134 or Edmund answer his father Gloucester, while holding 
a letter behind his back, that he has ‘Nothing,’ behind his back.
135 However, the 
function of the presentation does contradict the meaning, for the expression of 
‘nothing’ creates the apperception of that whose existence has been denied, 
regardless of whether nothing is expressed truly or untruly. 
                                                 
133 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act I, Scene i.91. 
134 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene iv.132-133. 
135 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act I, Scene ii.32. Lord Gloucester lets us know once and for all that 
nothing cannot be hidden, but is always out in the open, when he says, ‘The quality of nothing hath 
no such need to hide itself. Let’s see. Come, if it be nothing, I shall not need spectacles.’ 
[Shakespeare, King Lear, Act I, Scene ii.34-36]. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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[46]   [Th]is is and remains a paradox, that a certain and inevitable twist of 
cognition, apprehension or apperception, a certain dialectical twist is always 
involved in the apprehension of what which appears or is presented as what it is 
not whereby it achieves an effect, which is quite clearly, in contradistinction to the 
meaning of the presentation. For again, the function of the presentation runs 
counter to the meaning represented, for the less Macbeth appear to be – within the 
play or to the characters within the play - the more he appear to be in the theatre - 
which is, of course quite paradoxical, though hardly a paradox Rosalie Colie has 
recognized in her otherwise fabulous book. Although Ms. Colie has recognized 
many other paradoxes, she has not recognized the most fundamental paradox, 
which is that the representation of what is not produces the apperception of what 
is. [Th]is shows that paradoxes are not merely riddles or puzzles meant for 
afternoon entertainment, but for something tremendously more crucial, to create 
or recreate most profoundly our apperception of what is, or that which nothing 
can be without seizing to be. It is stunning to hear Macbeth finally, having heard of 
his wife’s death, as he is about to enter his last battle with the certainty that he will 
not overcome, cry out,  
 
‘Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage 
And then is heard no more. It is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury 
Signifying nothing.’
136 
 
  
                                                 
136 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V, Scene v.24-28. Emphasis added. Again Ms. Colie repeats the same 
inconsideration of the ontological difference, if not the total neglect, of [the experience of] the 
audience, when she says, ‘After all the doing – the murdering, the suffering, the tyranny, the 
rebellion – “nothing” is literally what Macbeth gets. His kingdoms is no kingdom.’ Colie, Paradoxia 
Epidemica, p. 234. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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[47]     It is a striking aspect of Shakespeare’s major plays that the main characters 
have, from the beginning of the play, lost themselves, that their selves have been 
taken away. Neither Hamlet nor Romeo appear in the beginning to be themselves. 
This is similarly true of King Lear and Macbeth. The one [King Lear] loses himself 
to madness, giving everything away in unnatural abundance, the other [Macbeth] 
to amazement, following a destiny marked off by creatures he cannot fathom. The 
third [Romeo] falls in love, loses himself completely, first to Rosaline, then to 
Juliet, and had he not died so young, he would almost certainly have lost his heart 
to a third. But the fourth [Hamlet] only appears to have lost himself, to have given 
himself away. Quite remarkably, the fourth [Hamlet] only appears to have, only 
gives the impression of having lost himself when he has not. Therefore, compared 
to the others, he appears to be much more profound. In all Shakespeare’s major 
plays, it is only Othello who appear to bear the name of a man who is indifferently 
himself, as Kittredge says, a heroic man who trusts his fellows,
137 who believes that 
appearances are adequate representations of what the world is. Alas, in an attempt 
to keep his [sense of] self, he loses everything. For Othello is made to, already from 
the beginning, through the elaborate and patient machinations of Iago, perceive 
what is not [true], and from the perception of what is not true - Iago’s loyalty, 
Desdemona’s infidelity - the spectator is again made to infer to the apperception of 
what is [true], the Being of beings. We could even go so far as to say that adequatio 
makes Othello a killer, and that if he believed these [re]presentations were false he 
would certainly have saved his lover’s life. Therefore, it is not unnatural that he 
will finally renounce himself, condemn himself for being a ‘fool! Fool! Fool.’
138 
                                                 
137 Kittredge, An Address, p. 35. 
138 Shakespeare, Othello, Act V, Scene ii.319. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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Even Hamlet has to confess, to finally admit what everyone has noticed since the 
opening of the play, when he in the final scene comes face to face with Laertes, his 
accuser, in the duel that will prove his death, that when he killed Polonius and 
trashed Ophelia, Hamlet was not Hamlet. As Hamlet says to Laertes,  
 
‘Was’t Hamlet wronged Laertes? Never Hamlet. 
If Hamlet from himself be ta’en away, 
And when he’s not himself does wrong Laertes, 
Then Hamlet does it not.’
139 
 
  
[48]     In the leisurely opening of Romeo and Juliet, Romeo is approached by his 
comrades who easily notice that he is beside himself, how completely unsociable 
Romeo is. This begs the explanation that Romeo gives to Benvolio, ’Tut! I have lost 
myself; I am not here;/This is not Romeo, he’s some other where.’
140 Only after 
Hamlet has crashed the Capulet’s masquerade, and he appears to his comrades 
with the masque of a jester, does Mercutio find reason to say, ‘Now thou art 
sociable, now thou art Romeo.’
141 Shakespeare’s intentional eironeia,
142 is of course 
that Romeo becomes himself, only becomes part of society, when he is beside 
himself, when he, like other men, is willing to wear a masque, when he appears 
with the desire to be recognized as ‘the very pink of courtesy.’
143 Nowhere is 
                                                 
139 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act V, Scene ii.234-237. Emphasis added. It is difficult to denounce 
subjectivity more passionately and at the same time produce the - false, illusory - apperception of 
its substance more effectively. 
140 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act I, Scene i.200-201. Emphasis added. 
141 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene iv.92. 
142 One can understand irony in the Aristotelian or the Kierkegaardian sense, simply as that which 
is depreciated or as that which dissociates or alienates [th]is from its properties through laughter. 
Only after the subject had securely established itself, did eironeia create laughter. The most eironic 
of all characters according to Aristotle, namely, Socrates, does not make us laugh, but rather 
wonder.[Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV, 1127b25] For, as Freud maintains, what is 
depreciated in irony is the subject, which is, in some sense disassociated from its properties, which 
are too low to identify it/with. What is considered high or low are, of course, commonplaces. The 
dialectics of laughter is simple. For nothing would fill the theatre with laughter if it did not play on 
these commonplaces, whether depreciating the commonplaces to save the subject or depreciating 
the subject to save the commonplaces, whatever they might be. 
143 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene iv.61. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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Romeo considered to be more sociable than when he appears with the masque of a 
jester, as the superior wit who considers life as no more than a transcendental joke 
that provides the grand occasion for all jokes to come true.
144 On this occasion, 
Shakespeare does not resist the opportunity to exaggerate his social commentary 
when he likens the social masque to a ‘pump,’ a ‘sole,’ a shoe.
145 Again the function 
of the analogy is more significant than the meaning. For through this analogy, not 
only does it appear that the world is turned upside-down through social 
conventions, that all social beings are no more familiar than antipodes, but also 
apperceived that at the heart of all beings is that singular jest, which ‘remains, after 
the wearing, solely singular.’
146 When Mercutio suggests that [th]is jest lies - like 
the noumenon - at the heart of all things, Hamlet can do no more, no better than to 
cry out, ‘O single-soled jest, solely singular for the singleness!’
147 If what has been 
achieved through these apophatic gestures is the apperception of what ‘remains,’ it 
is only fitting that Mercutio would call on Benvolio for help - to separate the 
inseparable, to distinguish what is indistinguishable - and say, ‘Come between us, 
good Benvolio! My wits faints.’
148 For if [th]is jest has reached its end, what has 
been effected is the apperception of that to which the Understanding is forever 
bound to be inadequate to: the Being of beings. 
 
[49]    It is not often recognized that Romeo and Juliet fall in love while they are 
still wearing masques, nor that these masques does not conceal the faces of 
profound human beings, but create the false apperception of the profundity of 
these superficial social creatures. As if intentionally creating the mystery of their 
                                                 
144 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene iv.37-107.  
145 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene iv.66. Emphasis added. 
146 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene iv.67. Emphasis added. 
147 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene iv.69-70. 
148 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene iv.71-72. The Production of Being through Nothing 
 
373  
love, their hearts are captured, they lose themselves while they are still wearing 
masques, long before they perceive each other’s faces.
149 It is however impossible to 
lose oneself completely. More often than not, ‘to lose oneself,’ is a misnomer, a 
name given to something else. For having lost all my properties, [th]is self, or 
nothing but the apperception of my self remains. So, when Hamlet, in the opening 
of Hamlet, appears to be beside himself and Romeo, in the first scene of Romeo and 
Juliet, seems to have lost himself completely, what they have lost or what has been 
taken away is the immediate impression of what essential defines these men, what 
essentially makes these men recognizable, whereas the apperception of [th]is 
invariably remains. It is the same figure, which already in the beginning - of each 
play - persuades us that these men are. For [th]is is first perceived as what [th]is is 
not, or as what no one expects [th]is to be. And from the perception of what is not 
[true] or what is not true to our expectations, we do make - like all spectators - the 
inference to - the apperception of - what is [true].  The power of this figure is 
shown by how little it matters whether Romeo loses himself to Rosaline or to 
Juliet. One may furthermore reverse the figure, first take away the self and then 
provide it with properties it cannot truly claim to be in possession of, as we shall 
see in the next chapter, is abstractly the case with substitution, and concretely the 
case with Sly in the Induction to The Taming of the Shrew. Shakespeare applies 
two figures that complement each other, elision and substitution, for in order to be 
perceived or apperceived as another, the self or its attributes, the subject or its 
predicates, if not both, has first to be taken away. 
 
                                                 
149 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act I, Scene v. The Production of Being through Nothing 
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[50]    The figure of inadequation repeats itself like a wheel of fortune, endlessly 
throughout Shakespeare’s plays, so much so, that it seems almost impossible that 
this figure of inadequation was not discovered until now. But, of course, man saw 
the planets revolving around the sun in elliptical orbits for thousands of years 
before he finally ‘discovered’ that they did. What has been blocking the 
understanding of this figure of poetic production is quite simply that, as with the 
astronomical prejudices, man was too busy looking at himself, too busy observing 
the world from his own perspective. And, of course, if we perceive or attempt to 
understand Shakespeare’s plays trough the subject’s self-consciousness or through 
the character’s self-perception, we are, of course deluded or misguided as much as 
Goethe was when he said that in Shakespeare’s plays everything is transparent. 
Laudably, Goethe added, if we are allowed to paraphrase, ‘… and yet I 
understand not how he made [th]is come true, how [th]is appear to be before 
me.’
150 
                                                 
150 Goethe, ‘Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship,’ in Bate [ed.], The Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 68.  
 
C9 THE PRODUCTION OF BEING THROUGH SUBSTITUTION 
 
§9.1 The Topos of Substitution 
§9.2 The Function of Substitution 
§9.3 The Paradox of Substitution 
 
C9   EXPOSÉ 
 
[1]    Substitution is a topos much used throughout the whole of Shakespeare’s 
plays, from the beginning of The Comedy of Errors to the end of Henry IV, Part I. 
No place of substitution is more conventional, perhaps more infamous, than the 
bed of substitution, where one goes to bed with another who is not apperceived or is 
apperceived as another. In All’s Well that Ends Well Helena loses herself in Diana’s 
chamber without ever being apperceived by her own husband, Bertram, to whom 
she remains entirely hidden. No place of substitution is more intimate than the 
bed, where men and women arrive with the desire to be mistaken, to be 
apperceived as who they are not, and by not being recognized, they create, as we 
shall see, effortlessly, the apperception of the Being of beings. Even in The Comedy 
of Errors, where not one character desires to be another, it is nevertheless so, that 
willingly or unwillingly, mistaken identities produce the apperception of what is 
apparently contradicted, identity. In All’s Well that Ends Well Helena does however 
desire to be apperceived as Diana, as much as Sebastian, in Twelfth Night is happy 
to be mistaken for Claudio. However, no one is more willing to not be himself than 
Sly is in the Induction to The Taming of the Shrew, and no one does so perhaps 
more convincingly than Sebastian in Twelfth Night, as he is married to one who 
thinks he is another. Throughout all these substitutions we shall mark, that what is The Production of Being through Substitution 
 
376  
confused are not appearances, what mistaken not phenomena, but souls, selves, 
substances. The persona remains the same. This is why one speaks of substitution, 
for not only is that which is confused but what is, through [th]is confusion, created 
the apperception of, something entirely hidden. 
§9.1 The Topos of Substitution 
 
 
[2]    The Comedy of Errors is a story about two godly sons, indistinguishable by 
appearance,
1 who were separated at birth in a calamitous storm, a misadventure 
which later leads to the unlawful appearance of the Syracusean tradesman 
Antipholus in Ephesus, where he is unknowingly mistaken for the brother he never 
suspects to be alive, Antipholus of Ephesus. We shall notice that Antipholus of 
Syracuse and his man, Dromio of Syracuse, only appear in Ephesus at the cost of 
death,
2 that they both make an unlawful appearance,
3 and through [th]is 
transgression their khora is already announced as all Syracuseans are prohibited 
by decree from entering [th]is place. So truly, already from the beginning, they are 
out of place, and their appearance alone is a transgression. But it is not 
appearances that are confused or mistaken in The Comedy of Errors, for the 
persona remains the same. What is confused is what cannot be perceived, namely 
substances, which remain truly unimaginable. 
 
[3]    We shall bear in mind that no one is more consciously aware than 
Shakespeare of what is at stake throughout The Comedy of Errors, namely the self, 
which contrary to the events themselves, is what is produced the apperception of. 
                                                 
1 Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, Act I, Scene i.50. 
2 Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, Act I, Scene ii.50. 
3 Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, Act I, Scene i.25. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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For as Antipholus of Syracuse goes into the streets of Ephesus and we enter the 
play, Antipholus announces what soon enough will become apparent, stating 
artlessly the topos of the play itself already from the beginning when he says, ‘I 
will go lose myself.’
4 But what appears to be a mystic dissolution of self
5 is in fact 
what creates the apperception of self to the spectator. For it is the loss of self, the 
self that is not recognized or falsely recognized, and at times seems almost 
irrevocably lost, that most emphatically produces the apperception of self. 
Paradoxically, the self lost within the play reappears within the theatre, the self 
that is taken away by the personae that populates the play, is kindly, effortlessly, 
and inconspicuously given back to the character by the spectator, who seems 
almost incapable of imagining any appearance without a self, no persona without 
soul or substance, when it has, after it has been taken away. For that which is 
removed from the play, is replaced within the theatre, and [th]is reemerges from the 
depth seen through the surface of the persona as richer, fuller and almost 
impossible to doubt the existence of. We shall witness some of these encounters 
where [th]is self, even [th]is sense of self, appear to be almost entirely lost.  
 
[4]    There are numerous places in Shakespeare’s plays where he adapts the 
commonplace of substitution. As we are aware, not only did Shakespeare inherit 
this topos from Plautus,
6 but more recently from Boccaccio,
7 whose stories, as 
everyone knows, were exceedingly popular during the reign of Elizabeth, a 
government that did not, to the regret of some, coincide with a taste for stories 
                                                 
4 Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, Act I, Scene ii.30. 
5 Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, Act I, Scene ii.34. 
6 Cf. Tony Tanner’s thoughtful ‘Introduction’ to Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, in Comedies, 
Volume 1, p. xxvi. 
7 Cf. Pamela Benson’s meticulous notes to Benson [ed.], Italian Tales from the Age of Shakespeare, 
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more pedagogic or moral.
8 Running through some of Shakespeare’s plays like the 
same river through different countries, the topos of substitution emerges in plays 
as different as The Comedy of Errors, Twelfth Night, All’s Well that Ends Well, 
Measure for Measure and Henry IV, Part I, in some plays providing the source of 
life for the play, in others a welcome distraction. From the banks of [th]is river we 
see the topos of substitution driving the plot of Helena’s sweet revenge against 
Bertrand, her unwilling husband in All’s Well that Ends Well, a play based, as is 
well known on one of the favourites among Boccaccio’s many novellas.
9 Perhaps 
we wont forget the two sons that lost and regained their identities in the romance 
of Cymbeline, the two young men that never apperceived themselves, and the 
‘father’ that carried their secrets, their souls inside his chest, that they were 
princes and he was not their father. 
 
[5]    What we shall notice, as the river of substitution floats by, is that even 
though Shakespeare exploits the figure of substitution fully in his adaptation of 
Plautus’ romantic comedy in The Comedy of Errors, he shies away from 
exaggerating the potential for substitution in what must surely have been the most 
beautiful presentation of the figure available to Shakespeare and written in his 
own time, namely The Story of Titus and Gisippus, the allegorical story of true 
friendship that opens Thomas Eliot’s The Governour from 1566. For it is obvious 
that Shakespeare did the same with The Story of Titus and Gisippus in the 
adaptation of The Two Gentlemen of Verona that he did to the, now lost, ‘Chronicle 
of Hamlet,’ that is, he twisted and turned the story until it became almost 
                                                 
8 Benson, Italian Tales from the Age of Shakespeare, ‘Anthology of Criticism,’ pp. 346-354. 
9 Pamela Benson explains, ‘The story of Gileta of Narbona’ appears in Painter’s Palace of Pleasure 
(I, 38). It is a close translation of Decameron III.9. … ‘Gileta of Narbona’ is the source of 
Shakespeare’s All’s Well That Ends Well.’ [Benson [ed.]. Italian Tales from the Age of Shakespeare, 
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unrecognizable. In the remarkable and truly simple The Story of Titus and 
Gisippus, where Shakespeare for once fails to improve on his source, we witness 
how the meaning of the story runs counter to the way the ontological contradiction 
is produced. For if it is a story about changing places, of one woman unknowingly 
marrying a man who has taken her husband’s place, it is not because it is possible 
to do so but because it is impossible, that these personae come alive. Whereas one 
would immediately think that Titus and Gisippus is a story about one man taking 
the place of another, and by offering [th]is place showing true friendship, it is 
actually the impossibility of taking the place of another that ensures the reader that 
both characters come alive, that they both, individually and singularly, suffer true 
fortunes and true misfortunes. 
 
[6]    Elyot’s story of Titus and Gisippus displays beautifully what is later to 
become integral to the Shakespearean art of unknowing. For it is the fact that the 
exchange remains unknown to the bride, that makes the substitution of grooms 
successful in creating the apperception of the Being of beings. For Sophronia has 
unknowingly married a subject whose soul or self she does not apperceive, and it is 
[th]is inapperception, which guarantees not only that [th]is story has depth, but 
that [th]is comes alive, the inapperceiver as much as the inapperceived. Witnessing 
how Sophronia unknowingly marries one she does not apperceive, the reader is, 
indeed, compelled, imperceptibly, to produce the Being of that which not 
apperceived. Clearly, the topos of substitution is more convincingly exploited by 
both Elyot and Boccaccio,
10 as Shakespeare avoids presenting Valentine and 
                                                 
10 The Two Gentlemen of Verona (1592-93) is partly a variation on The Story of Titus and Gisippus, 
which Shakespeare adapted from Elyot’s The Governour from 1566, and Elyot stole from 
Boccaccio’s Decameron from 1350. Cf. Pamela Benson’s meticulous notes to Benson [ed.], Italian 
Tales from the Age of Shakespeare, p. 297. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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Proteus as remarkably similar, as masques without a difference, as spirits that can 
not be discerned by their appearance alone, but only through the apperception of 
something more than persona, the apperception of [th]is, be it called, substance, 
hypokeimenon or soul. The indifference of persona, the shallow cause of all 
substitutions, is, however, convincingly exploited by Shakespeare in The Comedy of 
Errors and in Twelfth Night.
11 
 
[7]    Nowhere is the superficial basis for the topos of substitution, the 
indistinguishability of appearances that provide the superficial ground for the 
inapperception or misapperception of [th]is, expressed more clearly than when the 
one Dromio says to the other Dromio towards the end of The Comedy of Errors, 
after the resolution, I look upon thee as upon a mirror image, or more precisely, 
‘Methinks you are my glass, and not my/brother.’
12 After the veil of unknowing 
has been taken away, and the substituted again are distinguished, the play no 
longer provides the spectator with an opportunity for making the immediate 
inference to that which, through substitution, remains hidden. The stage is 
suddenly materialized with its ‘wooden nullity,’
13 as Herder would say, before the 
spectator, with the relief that only unrealities may provide, exits the theatre and 
enters his own life. For the resolution marks the end of the life of the play as well as 
it, again, marks the beginning of the life of the spectator. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 In The Comedy of Errors Antipholus of Syracuse is unknowingly mistaken for his twin brother 
Antipholus of Ephesus, Dromio of Syracuse mistaken for his twin brother Dromio of Ephesus, 
equally without knowing. For neither knows of the existence of the other. Surprisingly, it is the 
neglect of [th]is existent that heightens the spectators sense of its existence. 
12 Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, Act V, Scene i.418. Emphasis added. 
13 Herder, ‘Shakespeare,’ in The Romantics on Shakespeare, p. 47. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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[8]    That Shakespeare is supremely aware of the shallow cause that triggers all 
substitutions, is again made explicit towards the end of Twelfth Night,
14 
immediately preceding the resolution, where the Duke upon seeing Sebastian 
entering for the first time in Olivia’s presence, exclaims, ‘One face, one voice, one 
habit, and two/persons - /a natural perspective that is and is not.’
15 As Antonio 
approaches his long lost friend, Sebastian, and his double, Shakespeare emphasizes 
again the shallow cause of all substitutions, that which makes the spectator infer 
from these mistaken images, these confounded phenomena, to the existence of what 
is truly unimaginable, the personality, ‘Have you made a division of yourself?’
16 
Antonio does not only stress the identity of appearances, by saying, ‘An apple cleft 
in two is not more twin/Than these two creatures,’ he also struggles, asks for 
assistance, to make the inference to that which is imperceivable, to anchor the 
phenomenon truly in what is hidden, the noumenon, he asks, ’Which is 
Sebastian?’
17 It is perhaps little wonder that Shakespeare, knowing perfectly well 
that the substitution is not of phenomena, but of something deeper, goes on to let 
his confused company, at [th]is hour of entanglement, speak of spirits. For facing 
an appearance indistinguishable from himself, Sebastian conjectures that it must 
be, ‘that deity in my nature, of here and everywhere,’
18 while Viola, who barely 
dares to address her own mirror image, says softly, ‘If spirits can assume both 
form and suit,/You come to fright us.’
19 However, Sebastian ensures Olivia, that he 
                                                 
14 The indifference of personae triggers the substitutions that are made in Twelfth Night, where 
Sebastian unknowingly is mistaken for Cassius, who is, in fact his own sister Viola in disguise, a 
sister whom, moreover, believes that her brother is dead. 
15 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act V, Scene i.216-217. 
16 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act V, Scene i.222. Emphasis added. 
17 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act V, Scene i.223-224. Emphasis added. 
18 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act V, Scene i.227-228. 
19 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act V, Scene i.235-236. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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is neither an angel nor a ghost, but simply a spirit grossly clad,
20 while the 
astounded Duke, being almost convinced that what stands before him is [real] and 
not merely an apparition, exclaims that ‘the glass seems true,’
21 while Olivia, to it 
all, can only say that this is, ‘Most wonderful.’
22 If we remind ourselves that at the 
height of confusion, Viola also believes Sebastian is dead and that the Duke is 
addressing Viola as his own secretary Cassius whose undisguised figure he will 
soon fall in love with, we are witnessing such abundance of disguises, masques 
covering masques, that one can easily hear a sigh of relief in the theatre when all 
masques are finally uncovered and all beings disentangled. And taking a deep 
breath, we are almost certain that only the indistinguishability of personae offers 
the possibility of substitution. However, it does not.  
 
[9]     No place of substitution is perhaps more convincing than the one presented 
in Twelfth Night, where, in the same scene, that which is not apperceived or 
misapperceived, is not only attacked, but loved, where one man is not only 
attacked in the place of another, but soon after ends up marrying the striking 
Olivia in another man’s place. For neither would Toby have attacked [th]is, if he 
knew it was another,
23 nor would Olivia accepted [th]is hand if she knew it 
belonged to another man.
24 It is that which is not apperceived in Toby’s attack that 
again makes us believe that [th]is man is, For when he thinks he is attacking 
Cesario, he is attacking Sebastian, which is, during the violent exchange of blades, 
                                                 
20 More concretely Sebastian says, ‘A spirit I am indeed,/But am in that dimension grossly clad.’ 
Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act V, Scene i.236-237. 
21 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act V, Scene i.265. Emphasis added. ‘True’ is clearly used in an 
ontological sense, affirming the existence of that which appears before him. 
22 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act V, Scene i.225. 
23 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act IV, Scene i.23f. 
24 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act IV, Scene iii.32. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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never encountered nor apperceived [by Toby].
25 Olivia does however interrupt the 
duel, only to emphasize and deepen the misapperceptions when she steps forward 
to intervene. For protecting the misapperceived/inapperceived, she curses her own 
uncle back to ‘the mountains and the barbarous caves,/where manners ne’er were 
preached!’
26  
 
[10]    Sebastian, who remains inapperceived, does not know who she is, knows not 
who she is that appears before him. Showing truly that Olivia merely recognizes 
his persona, that she does not know who has just chased her uncle and Sir Andrew 
away with his sword, she addresses [th]is man by his false name, saying, ‘Be not 
offended, dear Cesario./I prithee gentle friend,/Let thy fair wisdom, not thy 
passion, sway/In this uncivil and unjust extent [display]/Against thy peace. Go with 
me to my house.’
27 Even if Sebastian is and remains inapperceived, and she intends 
to address another, he is more than happy to follow the beautiful persona of an 
unknown woman. If he is anything, he knows perfectly well that he is only the 
cause of her misapperceptions, knowing however much she appears to desire him 
she desires another. However, Sebastian is never unwilling to lose himself, never 
unwilling to be another, and before he runs after her, Sebastian even takes time to 
leave this aside to the audience, ‘What relish is this? How runs the/stream?/ Or I 
am mad, or else this is a dream. Let fancy still my sense in Lethe steep:/If it be thus 
to dream, still let me sleep!’
28 
 
[11]    Superficially, we would have to admit that there is another way to make 
substitutions, to trigger the immediate inference to what is hidden, and that is to 
                                                 
25 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act IV, Scene i.23-51. 
26 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act IV, Scene i.48-49. 
27 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act IV, Scene i.52-54. 
28 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act IV, Scene i.60-63. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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encounter beings in the dark. The topos of changing bedmates, of unknowingly 
going to bed with one that is not apperceived, occurs most beautifully in Measure 
for Measure.
29 We know not if Shakespeare was fond of [th]is topos, but, like 
Shakespeare, we know that his audience was. The topos is not, however, as in the 
Italian nouvella, and that for obvious reasons, presented, as there in the theatre 
would not be much to see, and even behind curtains such a presentation would 
almost certainly have provoked the censorship of the Privy Council.
30 Still, the 
substitution of bedmates drives the plot of both Measure for Measure and All’s 
Well that Ends Well,
31 where one substitution occurs at night in a private garden 
and another in the darkness of a private chamber. Only in the resolution of 
Measure for Measure is the intimate substitution spoken of, where Mariana, veiled, 
steps forward to clear Angelo of fornication. Defending the man who unknowingly 
has shared her bed, Maria says, ‘I know my husband; yet my husband/Knows not 
that he ever knew me.’
32 Taking off her veil, Mariana approaches the accused 
Angelo, to whom she explains,  
‘This is that face, thou cruel Angelo 
Which once thou swor’st was worth the looking on;  
This is the hand which, with a vowed contract,  
Was fast belocked in thine; this is the body 
That took away the match from Isabel, 
And did supply thee at thy garden house 
In her imagined person.’
33  
                                                 
29 Cf. Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act III, Scene i.208-275, Act IV, Scene i.27-76 and Act V, 
Scene i.212/230. 
30 As an institution, The Privy Council was in general more concerned with matters of blasphemy, 
to protect the new Anglican Church against the Papacy, than matters of obscenity. Cf. Gerald M. 
Pinciss, Forbidden Matter - Religion in the Drama of Shakespeare and His Contemporaries. 
31 A presentation would perhaps border on obscenity, a border which Boccaccio clearly 
transgressed in Decameron, Third Day, Ninth story, a novella copied in William Painter’s Palace of 
Pleasure, (I, 38), and providing the unmistakable and barely altered ground for Shakespeare’s All’s 
Well that Ends Well. For a meticulous presentation of some of Shakespeare’s essential origins, see 
Italian Tales from The Age of Shakespeare edited by Pamela Joseph Benson, and for this particular 
source p. 300. 
32 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act V, Scene i.187. Emphasis added. 
33 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act V, Scene i.207-213. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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But this substitution did not occur accidentally. For in Act III of Measure for 
Measure, the false Friar advices Isabella to frame Angelo by setting up a false 
encounter between Angelo and Isabella in a garden at night, where they, in the 
dark, would passionately be able to confuse each other’s limbs. In the corners of 
this garden, Mariana takes the place of Isabella and makes love to the one who did 
not keep his promise to marry her, Angelo. Through this transgression, Angelo 
himself breaks the law, the same law according to which he condemned Claudio to 
death for secretly fulfilling outside wedlock what should belong to marriage 
alone.
34  
 
[12]    Planning the secret substitution, the false encounter in the garden, Isabella 
says to the man disguised as a friar, that is, the unrecognized Duke,  
‘He hath a garden circummured with brick, 
Whose western side is with a vineyard backed; 
And to that vineyard is a planched gate, 
That makes his opening with this bigger key.  
This other doth command a little door 
Which from the vineyard to the garden leads. 
There I have made my promise 
Upon the heavy middle of the night. 
To call upon him.’
35  
 
And as the substitutes, Isabella and Mariana, exit, the Duke says of this garden of 
substitution, confirming again how much Shakespeare tries to lure his audience 
with false flowers,  
‘O place of greatness, millions of false eyes 
Are stuck upon thee; volumes of report 
Run with these false and most contrarious quests  
[cry for the hound on the scent] 
Upon thy doings: thousand escapes of wit 
                                                 
34 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act III, Scene i.208-275. 
35 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act IV, Scene i.26-36. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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Make thee the father of their idle dreams, 
And rack thee in their fancies.’
36  
 
Should we suggest that these ‘millions of false eyes’ belong to men and women, 
who openly or secretly desire to be another. For have we not all, at one time or 
another, had a desire to not be our selves, to be another, a desire, which we all kept 
to ourselves. 
§9.2 The Function of Substitution 
 
 
[13]    Shakespeare adopts a taste for transformations from Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, generally recognized in Shakespeare’s numerous disguises. 
However, when Shakespeare concretely applies the figure of metamorphosis, as he 
does in A Midsummer Night’s Dream by letting Bottom the Weaver be transformed 
into half a mule, to thereby evoke the two thousand year old memory of the 
adventures of Apuleius in The Golden Ass, Shakespeare cannot resist the 
temptation to transform, to distort the figure that he has stolen from Ovid. What to 
this day continues to baffle all audiences, whether high or low, educated or 
uneducated, is that what is transformed throughout [th]is play is not appearances 
but the evaluation of appearances. What is thereby disclosed is not only the gulf 
between the world and ourselves, but we are given the impression of that which is 
and remains beyond perception, that which we are made to infer to through the 
false apprehension of what [th]is essentially is. For when the Queen of all fairies, 
Titania, falls in love with the half-mule, and consider him the most attractive of all 
creatures, not only do we know that she is under the spell of Oberon, the King of 
all fairies, but that she, through the false perception of what [th]is is, effortlessly 
                                                 
36 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act IV, Scene i.60-66. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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makes available what remains hidden to all, the ontological difference, the Being of 
beings. 
 
[14]    It is safe to say that Shakespeare, by adapting the figure of transformation 
for his own ends, with the exception of the superficial metamorphosis of Bottom 
the Weaver, the monster through which Shakespeare pays homage to antiquity, 
ends up changing the figure almost entirely. What is changed in A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream are not appearances but perceptions, or more precisely, the way 
these perceptions are valued by the common sense, the sensus communis, which, 
here, in A Midsummer Night’s Dream is magically, we could almost say, 
dramatically transformed.
37 One should never lose sight of Shakespeare’s aim on 
this night of misperceptions, which is invariably the same, whether through 
external disguise, transformation or a groundless change in the judgment of what is 
perceived, to produce the apperception of the ontological contradiction, which the 
spectator is forced to infer to so unnoticeably that he may consider what appear 
before him as indifferent from his own nature. Whether or not it is nature, these 
misperceptions leaves him with the impression of the ontological contradiction, 
when he from the false perception of what [th]is is, infer to the apperception that 
[th]is is. 
 
[15]    As we witness Viola disguise herself as Cassius in the opening of Twelfth 
Night,
38 as we see Edgar masque himself as Poor Tom in King Lear,
39 as we see 
                                                 
37 For the Renaissance understanding of sensus communis, and the debt it bears to Aristotle, see 
Summers, The Judgement of Sense - Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics, pp. 71, 78, 
108-109. We should perhaps add that at the time of Shakespeare, Aristotle was still the most 
influential philosopher at the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford, and that Plato was hardly 
known. The domination of Aristotle could perhaps be gauged by the force with which his 
philosophy was attacked by Francis Bacon in Novum Organon and The Advancement of Learning. 
38 Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, Act I, Scene iii. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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Imogen dress herself as Fidele in Cymbeline,
40 as we see Vincentio cloak himself as 
the nameless priest, the divinity in Measure for Measure,
41 we recognize that the 
simplest kind of metamorphosis is disguise. However, only a transformation of 
what appears to be indivisible, namely the self, would truly be simple, would truly 
astound. It is with no little amount of disbelief that we witness Sly in The Induction 
to The Taming of the Shrew become persuaded that he is another, that he loses 
himself to such a degree, that he, at least superficially, appears to be a man almost 
totally devoid of substance. However, it is, as we shall see, [th]is inapperception, 
more particularly, [th]is self-inapperception, that most persuasively convince the 
spectator, that [th]is man is.
42 
 
[16]    Generally speaking, ‘metamorphosis’ is an event whereby one being quite 
literally takes on another form or simply changes its essential characteristics. 
However, it is never the form that truly fascinates in any trans-formation, but the 
formless that throughout this transformation remains unaltered. No 
metamorphosis makes us wonder at what has become dissimilar, but at what truly 
remains the same, triggering the perplexed to ask the question, ‘How could it be?’ 
We are not, and never do we believe Shakespeare was, interested in metamorphosis 
as anything other than what affords the inapperception of [th]is, and through [th]is 
inapperception offers the experience of the Being of being. For metamorphosis, 
and likewise disguise, may effect the inapperception of [th]is. It is never the 
appearance, the transformation of the persona that truly fascinates, but rather, 
                                                                                                                                               
39 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act II, Scene iii. 
40 Shakespeare, Cymbeline, Act III, Scene iv. 
41 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act II, Scene iii. 
42 When Sly is no longer conscious of Being himself, but the Lord, he, paradoxically, comes true, 
that is, he is experienced as Being another. Again we maintain an ontological concept of truth, the 
indistinction between - the apperception of - what is and what is true. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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that which remains unrecognized after the metamorphosis, that which, almost 
inevitably, appear through a predicative disguise or masque, namely [th]is, the 
ontological contradiction. There is no disguise that is not a disguise of self, soul or 
substance. Even though the characters mentioned all appear to be perceived as 
what they are not; Viola as a man, Edgar as a beggar, Imogen as a man, Vincentio 
as a priest, it is not the change of essential characteristics that in any of these cases 
is significant. For if we look closer we will see that these characters are not 
apperceived at all, and that the change in essential characteristica, the alteration of 
persona, is merely the prelude to the inapperception of [th]is that the disguise 
affords, again, that the actual inapperception of [th]is, that the disguise offers, 
makes available the most profound sense of Being to the spectator. 
 
[17]    Thoughtfully considered, the depth that both metamorphosis and disguise 
affords is the depth of inapperception, a depth which is truly sublime as it provides 
the immediate opportunity for [th]is to not be apperceived, and through [th]is 
inapperception the dialectical urge to take the other’s place, to provide a sense of 
Being where there appear to be none. It is the non-recognition or unrecognition of 
[th]is, that transformation and likewise disguise affords, that produces a more 
profound sense of Being. For whereas transformation, like any disguise, is a 
change of apparent properties, and therefore a change of what is and essentially 
can be perceived, it produces a sense of what is more profound through the 
inapperception it offers. That is, the transformation of persona, whether subject to 
metamorphosis or merely disguise, makes available the false recognition or 
unrecognition of [th]is, which in both cases remains inapperceived. It is [th]is lack 
of apperception that produces the notion of depth, a more profound sense of Being. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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[18]     One could limit the understanding of what is false to the essential 
misperception of oneself or the other. Transgressing this superficial limit, we did 
expand our investigation to the misapperception or inapperception of [th]is, the 
condition for any perception. That is, we included in our investigation, what 
should be obvious in any theatre, not only misperceptions of what [th]is essentially 
is, but the misapperception or inapperception of [th]is, which likewise, if not more 
profoundly, produces a negative sense of depth, and therefore, Being. It is perhaps 
not surprising that we thought of opening this section as Shakespeare opens one of 
his plays, with someone who completely loses his sense of self, namely Sly, who in 
The Induction to The Taming of the Shrew, entirely and without second thoughts 
substitutes his self for that of another.
43 The most profound kind of inapperception 
is clearly not the inability or incapacity to apperceive the other, but the incapacity 
to apperceive oneself. If it did not occur, one would, of course, think it was almost, 
if not entirely, impossible, but the inapperception of Sly in The Induction to The 
Taming of the Shrew should be sufficient evidence to convince the reader that it is 
not impossible to no longer recognize oneself. However, when Sly enters the 
bedroom in the Lord’s house in the second scene, it is clear that Sly has no 
intention of Being the Lord. For Sly clearly denies that he has any claim to the 
titles by which he is addressed, saying, ‘I am Christophero Sly; call not me ‘honor’ 
                                                 
43 It is perhaps equally unsurprising that we in this Induction witness Shakespeare using at least 
two means of inadequation in conjunction, namely, indefinition and substitution, to not only give 
depth, but surface and opening to the Being of [th]is being to appear as concealed, to appear deeply 
within the frame of [th]is indefinition. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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nor ‘lordship.’’
44 Evidently he has to affirm himself, as if it was crucial, even to a 
tinker, to prove that he is not the Lord.
45 
[19]    Sadly, in the rose-bath, as he’s drinking another ‘pot o’ th’ smallest ale,’
46 
Sly soon realizes that his identity is not much to fight for. Evidently, any sense of 
self is easily lost when there is not too much to lose. Nonetheless, Sly tries to fend 
off the other [identity] by protecting himself with properties that almost certainly 
belong to himself; ‘peddler,’ ‘cardmaker,’ ‘bearherd,’ ‘tinker,’
47 all attributes 
which the servants, and the Lord himself, persuade Sly that he in his lunacy has 
dreamed up.
48 For facing Sly, they ask in anguish the Lord to call his true 
properties back to his person, ‘Call home thy ancient thoughts from 
banishment/And banish hence these abject lowly dreams,’
49 as if the lowest or 
commonest life came across with the lightness of a dream. It is the appeal not to his 
self but to these properties that finally makes Sly betray himself, for as the servant 
says, ‘[O, that once more] you knew but what you are!’
50 Suddenly convinced that 
for the past fifteen years he has been sleep-walking, he bursts out almost 
causelessly, ‘I see, I hear, I speak,/I smell sweet savors and feel soft things.’
51 And 
from these essential pleasures, which all the servants maintain truly belongs to 
                                                 
44 Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, Induction, Scene ii.5. 
45 Tony Tanner, whose name easily could have featured among the mechanics in Shakespeare’s A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, introducing the collected works of Shakespeare in the Everyman 
Edition, remarks in his introduction to The Taming of The Shrew, that its epilogue appears to be 
missing, entirely lost to posterity. [Tony Tanner, ‘Introduction’ to Shakespeare, The Taming of the 
Shrew, in Comedies, Volume 1, pp. liii and lxvii.] Might we guess that this epilogue would have 
ensured a lucky end, where Sly is given back his self? Not entirely. Perhaps we should consider this, 
that since The Taming of the Shrew was a comedy, Shakespeare would perhaps have omitted the 
epilogue purposely, knowing that his audience would not tolerate an unhappy ending. For judging 
from his newfound existence, it would seem that Sly would consider it a better fortune to lose 
himself, Being the Lord a better destiny than Being Sly. 
46 Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, Induction, Scene ii.75. 
47 Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, Induction, Scene ii.19-21. 
48 Shakespeare, The Induction to The Taming of the Shrew, Induction, Scene ii.29. 
49 Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, Induction, Scene ii.31-32. 
50 Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, Induction, Scene ii.78-80. Emphasis added. 
51 Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, Induction, Scene ii.70-71. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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him, he suddenly and willingly, makes the false deduction, ‘Upon my life, I am a 
lord indeed.’
52 Acknowledging that the servants’ prayers for the restoration of his 
wits have finally been answered, he superiorly and without hesitation takes 
possession of his new identity, praising the false restoration of his soul, ‘Now, Lord 
be thanked for my good amends!’
53  
 
[20]     Paradoxically, it is the false apperception which makes [th]is come alive, for 
that which is not apperceived does not acquire less but a more depth by not being 
discovered. Paradoxically, while the meaning of the play is that Sly loses his soul, it 
is precisely the opposite that happens within the theatre where Sly receives the soul 
he has lost so profoundly within the play. Suddenly the spectator believes that 
what is not apperceived conditions everything that [th]is man [is]. For the existence 
of [th]is condition is more persuasive when it is not acknowledged, and leaves an 
even greater impression when it runs the risk of Being discovered, as if we all 
hoped it would not be discovered. When Shakespeare portrays the inapperception 
of Sly in the opening of The Taming of the Shrew, he pays undoubtedly homage to 
Ovid, for nowhere has the profundity of inapperception been more influentially 
expressed than in Ovid’s story of Narcissus.
54 As much as Sly is not apperceived in 
the end, so is Narcissus not apperceived in the beginning, and that proves his end. 
But whereas [th]is lack of self-awareness leads Narcissus to his own death, [th]is 
lack of self-awareness gives Sly, perhaps even not-Sly, a new lease of life. But 
                                                 
52 Shakespeare, Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, Induction, Scene ii.72. 
53 Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, Induction, Scene ii.97. 
54 Ovid, Metamorphosis, Book III, pp. 83-87. It is not entirely arbitrary to speak of Ovid in a 
presentation of Shakespeare, for, as is commonly known, and became evident in Chapter 7, The 
Production of Being through Dissimilarity, Ovid was as influential in the English Renaissance and as 
widely known as Plato at the time remained obscure. See Paul Barolsky, ‘As in Ovid, So in 
Renaissance Art, Renaissance Quarterly 51 (1998): pp 451-74, and Sears Jayne, Plato in 
Renaissance England, esp. pp. 135-139. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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whether [th]is lack of self-awareness leads one man to his own death and another 
to renewed life, it is in both cases [th]is lack of self-awareness that makes the 
spectator think that [th]is man is and the other is not, that one man truly lives and 
the other truly dies. 
55 No story has, for centuries, fascinated man with the 
bottomless depth of its inapperception as has the story of Narcissus, perhaps 
because its true depth remained undiscovered. If there is a forgetfulness of Being, 
it is recognized by its inapperception, an inapperception, which is no more glaring 
than in the reception of Ovid’s story of Narcissus.
56 Apparently, the 
inapperception of the character is only matched by the reader, who paradoxically, 
even profoundly, and to his non-knowledge, reflects the inapperception of the 
protagonist, is unable to penetrate the inapperception that should have belonged to 
the protagonist alone. Nowhere is the withdrawal of Being, the neglect of the 
ontological contradiction, expressed more clearly than when one thinks that 
Narcissus loves himself. For it is unreasonable to contend, even superficially, that 
Narcissus is guilty of self-love, for something he cannot be. If one does, one has 
failed to comprehend the most fundamental difference between that which can be 
perceived and that which cannot, the phenomenon and the noumenon. For 
Narcissus dies because he never apperceives his Self, and falls into the bottomless 
pit of [th]is inapperception. 
 
                                                 
55 The story of Narcissus presents another riddle. That is, however much I describe something, even 
perfectly, I am, as Kant would say and Hegel later emphasize, not part of the picture. Were my 
description of this phenomenon or its image even perfect, the substance, soul or self would not be 
part of the description, would remain indescribable. Being beyond what may phenomenologically 
be grasped, it is therefore crucial to acknowledge, as Kant does, that the Self of the other is always 
unknowingly my own, that the other has no Being without me. Kant says, ‘It is obvious that if one 
wants to have a presentation of a thinking being then one must put oneself in that being’s place, 
and hence must substitute one’s own self as subject for the object.’ [Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason, ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A353, p. 391]. 
56 Ovid is the first to write down the myth of Narcissus in Metamorphoses, and, if anything, it gives 
him perhaps a rightful claim to what he lived and died for, namely fame. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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[21]     Paradoxically, it is exactly [th]is inapperception, that there is nowhere any 
sign of self-obsession, but an obsession entirely without self, that makes us believe 
that no one is more profoundly than Narcissus. For Narcissus does simply not 
apperceive what to most of us is unavoidable.
57 Nevertheless, the spectator appears 
to be much like Narcissus in that he does not recognize himself in the phenomena 
that appear before him, incapable of self-recognition, self-apperception. Speaking 
in Hegelian terms, we could say that the spectator, like Narcissus, is incapable of 
re-cognizing himself in the other, of acknowledging his own subject in what appear 
before him, and that therefore he appear, again in Hegelian terms, to be almost 
totally devoid of spirit, that is, to be without self-consciousness. Unlike Hegel, we do 
not condemn [th]is inability, [th]is incapacity to recognize oneself, but would 
rather emphasize, that it is [th]is non-recognition that provides the apperception of 
something more profound, the Being of beings. For the spirit is most sharply and 
immediately apperceived through its inapperception, and the one utterly incapable 
of such apperception would not fail to produce the impression of what is most 
profound.  
 
[22]     Whereas Narcissus undoubtedly is the most shallow of all personae, there is 
no story with an affect more profound. If the reader, like Narcissus, is the most 
shallow, and we seriously doubt that there is anyone more shallow in the history of 
literature than the reader, he will not fail to provide the apperception of what is 
                                                 
57 A similar case, again showing the true depth of inapperception, [th]is time not the inapperception 
of self, but the inapperception of the other, is the ancient story where the beloved is transformed 
into a tree and therefore not recognized by the lover. It is again the non-recognition that makes 
[th]is story profound. For the beloved is more profoundly apperceived after he has metamorphosed 
into a tree than he ever was before he was transformed. And, of course, as his lover sits under the 
tree, it becomes evident, that he appears to be truer through inapperception than he ever was when 
he was truly apperceived. Also, that we are using an ontological concept of ‘truth’ to point out, if 
not the in-difference between truth and reality, so at least the in-distinction between what we 
experience as true and what we experience as real, what is true in-distinguishable from existence. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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most profound, the Being of beings. Again we encounter the dialectics of 
inapperception, again we stumble over the contradiction between what is 
presented and what is effected, between the meaning of the story and what [th]is 
story effects, for the effect is again exactly opposite to its apparent meaning. For it 
is the fact that the reader does not recognize himself in the story of Narcissus, 
which makes me believe that there is a self that remains unrecognized. The effect 
of the presentation, within the theatre – taking ‘theatre’ here in an extended sense 
as ‘the looking place,’ that place through which anything is unconcealed, be it the 
pages of this book, the stage of this theatre or the ground of this pasture - is exactly 
the opposite of what is represented within the play/story. Within the play/story 
Narcissus is the most shallow, within the theatre he is the most profound. [Th]is 
shows again what we would be missing if we did not acknowledge the contradiction 
between the meaning of the play/story and its effect, for the effect of the play/story 
is exactly opposite to its meaning. For whereas Narcissus does not apperceive his 
own self, that is exactly what the reader/spectator does, and nowhere more 
emphatically than when the character does not. Similarly in the case of Sly in the 
Induction to The Taming of The Shrew, it is the obliteration of Sly’s sense of self, 
the gradual extinction of self-awareness, of thinking he is another, [th]is sudden 
and surprising inapperception that suddenly guards, like ten thousand guards, the 
apperception of the Being of beings as if it was an impenetrable palace, a harem 
from which there is no escape.  
 
[23]    We could say that no one is shallower than Narcissus, but equally, that no 
one is more profound. Oscar Wilde never understood the true implications of the 
discovery he made when he asserted that the shallow are the truly profound, never The Production of Being through Substitution 
 
396  
understood that the shallow, as is the case in his own The Sphinx Without A Secret, 
produces most emphatically the experience of the ontological contradiction, 
regardless of whether they hide something or nothing at all.
58 It is therefore not 
surprising that Shakespeare’s plays abounds with shallow characters, nor that 
these shallow characters make Shakespeare’s theatre the most profound. For 
through everything they do not apperceive, and all their misperceptions, these 
characters suddenly and most enduringly come alive. For further proof of these 
shallow characters on Shakespeare’s stage, we need only point the reader to 
Sebastian, in Twelfth Night, who we find rejoice at his own inapperception, of  
Romeo, who does not apperceive his beloved Juliet as she lies in the open 
sarcophagus, and perhaps leaving the most enduring impression, Falstaff, whom in 
Henry IV, Part I, saves his life by being inapperceived, by playing dead on the 
battlefield. No one can deny that the one who pretends to be dead is truly 
profound. And without exception, never does the one who pretends to be dead 
deny the spectator the experience that he is truly, against all his intentions, alive. 
The one pretending to be dead cannot deny the spectator the experience that he 
truly is, nor can he deny him the experience that he is truly profound without 
taking away the experience of that which to both remains hidden, the Being of 
beings. 
 
[24]     When Hegel, implicitly, states that I am the spirits of all propositions, the 
subject of all statements, he simply, but covertly, repeats Kant’s ignored dictum, 
that the Self of the other is always my own, that without me giving the other his 
                                                 
58 Wilde, ‘The Sphinx Without A Secret,’ in Complete Shorter Fiction, pp. 200-205.  The Production of Being through Substitution 
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soul, he has none.
59 What both Kant and Hegel do, is to present in philosophical 
terms what is commonly experienced, what is commonly available to all. Hegel 
says that what inhibits or blocks the realization of the other as essentially, or at 
least substantially mine, is the inadequate notion of the subject as a point. For the 
understanding of the subject as a point makes, according to Hegel, the knowledge 
of the absolute subject impossible. Hegel says,  
‘The way in which this movement has been brought about is such that it 
cannot belong to the fixed point; yet, after this point has been presupposed, 
the nature of the movement cannot really be other than what it is, it can 
only be external. Hence, the mere anticipation that the Absolute is Subject 
is not only not the actuality of this Notion, but it even makes the actuality 
impossible; for the anticipation posits the subject as an inert point, whereas 
the actuality is self-movement.’
60  
 
What Hegel essentially says, is that there is no spirit without me. There is no other. 
The Spirit, Geist, X, Soul of the other is always my own. I am not only the subject, 
but I am the spirit of all possible propositions. It may appear that these predicates, 
these properties belong to another, but that is simply the way it appears, blosse 
Erscheinung, how it immediately appears to the subject before it recognizes itself, 
externalized in the other.  
 
[25]    Immediately nothing appears to belong to me. Mediately, however, 
everything does, all predicates like all concepts, all essences and substances are 
mine, belongs to the activity of the Absolute Subject, the all-encompassing Spirit, 
whose movement I am. Hegel continues this movement in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit thus,  
‘That the True is actual only as a system, or that Substance is essentially 
Subject, is expressed in the representation of the Absolute as Spirit, the 
most sublime Notion and the one which belongs to the modern age and its 
                                                 
59 Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A353, p. 391. 
60 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 23, p. 13. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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religion. The spiritual alone belongs to the modern age and its religion. The 
spiritual alone is actual; it is essence, or that which has being in itself; it is 
that which relates itself to itself and is determinate, it is other-being and 
being-for-self, and in this determinateness, or in its self-externality, abides 
within itself; in other words, it is in and of for itself.’
61  
 
In other words, what happens in Hegel’s philosophy is the almost complete 
eradication of the other. The other becomes simply the alienated moment of 
subjectivity, which, however unrecognized, belongs to the Self, to Absolute 
Subjectivity, which is both ‘in and for itself,’ the difference between [being] in-
itself and for-itself, being nothing more than a difference of consciousness. For 
whereas the subject is conscious for-itself, in-itself it is not.  
 
[26]     One should not be surprised that even the simplest and most frequently 
used concepts in the Hegelian system speak fundamentally against the Kantian 
concept of ‘the thing-in-itself,’ which is not perceived by Hegel to be anything 
‘higher,’ but something much ‘lower,’ by Fichte even considered a sign of Kant’s 
inability to think,
62 as it lacks the mark of what to Hegel is always superior, 
consciousness, that is, the spirit that has recognized itself or itself in another. Hegel 
says,  
‘But this being-in-and-for-itself is at first only for us, or in itself, it is 
spiritual Substance. It must also be this for itself, it must be the knowledge 
of the spiritual, and the knowledge of itself as Spirit, i.e. it must be an object 
to itself, but just as immediately a sublated object, reflected in itself.’
63  
 
Concretely, the understanding of the other as substantially mine, is nowhere more 
memorably expressed by Hegel than in the opening of the infamous chapter on 
Lordship and Bondage, where Hegel, speaking of the original battle of the two 
                                                 
61 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 25, p. 14. 
62 Cf. Fichte, Die Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, WW I, p. 486, as quoted by Gadamer 
in his essay on ‘Marburg Theology (1964).’ [Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways, p. 36]. 
63 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition,’ Paragraph 25, p. 14. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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opponents facing each other in the perhaps inceptional, the ursprungliche, duel, 
says, ‘Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of 
itself. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an 
other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other as an essential being, 
but in the other sees its own self.’
64 To make sure that the Being of the other 
essentially belongs only to me, that I must produce his self without which he is 
nothing, Hegel remarks,  
‘It must supersede this otherness of itself. This is the supersession of the 
first ambiguity, and is therefore itself a second ambiguity. First, it must 
proceed to supersede the other independent being in order thereby to 
become certain of itself as the essential being; secondly, in so doing it 
proceeds to supersede its own self, for this other is itself.’
65  
 
In short, the other is obliterated in battle, but not without the victorious giving or 
granting the vanquished his substantial Being, and the conquered granting the 
conqueror his essential life through his work. But there are less violent means to 
obliterate the other, to eradicate the apperception of otherness, the most obvious 
being not to hide but to recognize its production. 
 
[27]    Kant already makes explicit, that the only way to experience the Being of 
another is to substitute one’s self for that of another. Without such substitution of 
souls, we would never be capable of apperceiving the soul of the other, but merely 
experience the masque, the persona, or as Kant would say, the phenomenon.
66 
Immediately it would seem to be true that not many would voluntarily make such 
a substitution, not many willing to make such an exchange, to give her or exchange 
her soul for that of another. However, it is not only possible to make [th]is 
                                                 
64 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Lordship and Bondage,’ Paragraph 179, p. 111. 
65 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Lordship and Bondage,’ Paragraph 180, p. 111. 
66 Kant says, ‘It is … impossible for this necessary unity of the subject, as the condition of the 
possibility of any thought, to be derived from experience.’ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The 
Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A353, p. 391. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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exchange, but, according to Kant, part of our very constitution, our faculties, to do 
so, and to do so reasonably, vernünftelnd and seemingly without thinking, so swiftly 
that one thinks that one has done nothing, not given a single thought to the Being 
of the other. But one has. For, as Kant says, without [th]is exchange of souls, 
without [th]is substitution, the other has no soul, no self, no Being.
67 
 
[28]    Wittgenstein however suggests that [th]is inference to what is beyond the 
phenomenal, however much it is possible, is by no means necessary, as it is 
perfectly possible to experience the other as automata.
68 Thus men, women and 
children suddenly and unexpectedly appear to Wittgenstein unensouled. As 
Wittgenstein says, in an undisguised critique of Hegel and Kant, in Philosophical 
Investigations,  
‘But can’t I imagine people around are automata, lack consciousness, even 
though they behave in the same way as usual? – If I imagine it now – alone 
                                                 
67 See Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogisms of Pure 
Reason,’ A348-A380, esp. A353, p. 391, for the splendid exposition of the false inference to what is 
hidden, the noumenon that Reason provides by offering Vernunftsschlüsse, inferences of Reason, 
that wrongly compels the spectator to infer to what is hidden, the noumenon. For, as Kant could 
have remarked in the more available Prolegomena, ‘Reason is not a tool for looking.’ Cf. the 
exposition of Kant’s position in Chapter 3, Philosophies of Concealment, ‘§3.2 Kant’s ‘Paralogism of 
Pure Reason.’’ 
68 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Fragment 420, p. 107. It should perhaps be added 
before we proceed to quote Wittgenstein, that this note in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations, points negatively to what is missing or what Wittgenstein in these investigations is 
searching for but in vain, what he never finds and not even attempts to name, the Being of beings. 
We could here also point to the reason why he never finds what he is searching for and that 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations was bound to end up as an aporia, showing the true 
character of a man who maintained that he would proceed along the same way even though there 
was nowhere to go. For it would be, as is obvious, impossible to name positively that which is 
experienced negatively, and all Wittgenstein was searching for, in attempting, sometimes through 
the most pulp use of language, the singular, the irreplaceable, the most particular but almost solely 
positive use of language, he should have realized before he published his notes, which we maintain is 
not a way, no road but an aporia, that he would not be able to find that which is irreplaceable, the 
singular apperception of the Being of beings through any particular but positive use of language. 
For however particular, even anomal, [th]is use of language or [th]is language-game is, to express 
that which is singular it would have to point beyond itself, beyond the language game, which, as 
Wittgenstein says, primitively shows what is ‘meant’ by hammer and nail, that what he hammer this 
nail into is neither, but simply there, Da. [For the primitive or fundamental learning of language 
through use or referential function, see, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Fragments 1-7. 
For one of Wittgenstein’s many pulp reflections, see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
Fragments 514-515, and finally, for Wittgenstein’s awareness of the shortcomings of his 
investigations, see the ‘Preface’ of January 1945 to Philosophical Investigations]. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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in my room – I see people with fixed looks (as in a trance) going about their 
business – the idea is perhaps a little uncanny. But just try to keep hold of 
this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others, in the street, 
say! Say to yourself, for example: “The children over there are mere 
automata; all their liveliness is mere automatism.” And you will either find 
these words becoming quite meaningless; or you will produce in yourself 
some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort. Seeing a living 
human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing one figure as a limiting 
case or variant of another; the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika, for 
example.’
69  
 
If one intended to conduct a comparative study of how to produce the perception 
of men as machines and the apperception of men as living beings, as we do in The 
Poetics of Being, one could compare Wittgenstein’s notes to Kant’s concluding 
remarks on machines in What is Enlightenment?, Descartes speculations on the 
difference between men and machines in Discourse on Method,
70 and finally, 
Husserl’s perception of men as mannequins, if not Husserl’s inapperception of 
man, in Ferraris’ What is There?.
71 Although we do not intend to investigate how it 
is possible to experience the other as automata, it is nevertheless clear from what 
has been said, that the Being of beings, or the soul of the other is not something we 
can take for granted, but something we have to produce the apperception of, and 
although th]is production may have become habitual to us, it is by no means 
necessary. There is obviously, as Wittgenstein gives testimony to, a possible but not 
inevitable exchange of souls. 
§9.3 The Paradox of Substitution 
 
 
[29]    Substitution is either a case of misapperception or inapperception, the false 
apperception or non-apperception of [th]is ontological contradiction. Through 
                                                 
69 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Fragment 420, p. 107. 
70 Descartes, Discourse on Method, Part Five, p. 40. 
71 Maurizio Ferraris, What is There?, in Derrida and Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret, p. 95. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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substitution one will attach properties to a subject to which they do not belong, 
mistakenly attribute essences to another substance, these accidents to another 
existent or these properties to no being at all. Through these false attributions, the 
other will remain unrecognized, be merely a composite of predicates whose 
singular Being remains inapprehended. One would perhaps immediately think 
that one, through substitution, would apperceive the other as less real, since one 
through misapperception or inapperception fails to singularly acknowledge that 
which to Kant appear to condition every perception. It is however obvious, that if I 
have not apperceived [th]is condition, or if I mistake or have a false apperception of 
[th]is condition, it does not mean that [th]is condition does not exist. Rather, that 
the impression of [th]is existent will be reinforced by the witness to [th]is false 
apperception. We therefore inquire into something Kant never did, the false 
apperception of the Being of [th]is being.
72 However ‘critical’ Kant’s investigations 
may appear to be, even if it may pass for, as Adorno remarks, ‘the philosophy of 
depth par excellence,’
73 it is nevertheless true that even though it remains 
‘dialectical,’ that is, it inquires into the ‘inference’ to the Being of the other,’
74 it 
remains stubbornly one-sided as it never inquires into the false perception or the 
false apperception of any being, neither in itself nor of its effects. It is this half-
hearted, even uncritical aspect of Kant’s theory that blocks every inquiry into 
what is false. Kant simply pretends to investigate the whole when he only 
investigates the half. And pretending the exclusiveness of truth, he excludes what is 
                                                 
72 As clearly as Kant never inquires into false perceptions, he similarly excludes every investigation 
into false apperceptions, whether of themselves, or more importantly, their effects. 
73 Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 72. 
74 Cf. For a clear understanding of the nature of Kantian dialectics, read Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, the sections on ‘Transcendental Logic,’ [A293-A309] and  ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ 
[A310-A338], and concretely, Book II, ‘On the Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason,’ which 
includes the invaluable Chapter I, ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A341-A405/B399-B432. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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false, and through [th]is pretension Kant’s investigation, however admirable it 
otherwise may seem, suffers. We could even say that from not including the false, 
by excluding the misperceptions of Understanding [Verstand] and the 
misapperceptions of Reason [Vernunft], Kant’s investigation suffers deeply. 
 
[30]    Unlike Heidegger, Kant considers the ontological difference to be the end 
and not the beginning.
75 That Kant considers the singular noumenona to be the 
effect, the end of a false inference, is already announced by his use of ‘dialectics’ 
and ‘logic’ in Critique of Pure Reason. For the singular apperception of [th]is 
noumenon is not what is at the beginning, but at the end of [th]is inference. Any 
end, whether it is true or false, is undeniably what is effected. In Kant’s case, the 
apperception of the ontological contradiction is specifically the effect of the use of 
our own faculties, more particularly, the use of Reason.
76 It may be true that [th]is 
- ontological contradiction - is the condition for all my perceptions and 
apperceptions, even my life, that which makes anything come true. However, 
approaching the Being of the other and not merely my own, the false cognition or 
                                                 
75 Cf. Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume IV: Nihilism, p. 160f. Heidegger goes to great lengths to prove 
that what Kant considers to be the end of the ontological inference, ‘The Paralogisms of Reason,’ is 
actually the beginning of all inferences: the ontological difference. Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason, ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A341-A405/B399-B432. 
76 As Kant remarks in the introduction to the exposition of Transcendental Dialectic, ‘dialectic [is] 
as such a logic of illusion.’ [Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A293.] Concerning the difference 
between ‘perception’ and ‘apperception,’ we follow Kant to a certain degree, but simplify 
conceptually for the sake of clarity, saying that there are two kinds of ‘experience,’ that one may 
‘perceive’ phenomena, as much as one may ‘apperceive’ noumena. Any apperception transcends 
what may be properly described, that is, the apperception is always of something indescribable, be 
it of subject, world or God. Furthermore, apperceiving the subject as having personality, 
substantiality, existence, there is, as Kant indicates, no perception adequate to what is signified by 
these empty words or ideas. [Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A327/B384, p. 371.] Kant has, as we 
recall, an inessential concept of ‘idea,’ to be distinguished from the more common and essential 
understanding of idea that stems from Plato. [Cf. Plato, Symposium, 210d-211d.] Adopting a double 
concept of Being, we shall not only demonstrate that [th]is ontological contradiction is apperceived 
as either concealed or unconcealed, but also demonstrate that [th]is [ontological contradiction], is 
not only that which conditions all my perceptions, but equally, that which we, more or less 
effectively, are persuaded to make an inference to. We shall demonstrate that [th]is inference is 
made, most effectively and effortlessly through inadequate perceptions or inadequate apperceptions 
that does not express what this truly is, but what this [truly] is not. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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unrecognition of [th]is [ontological difference] produces a more profound notion of 
Being - to the one witnessing [th]is false apperception - than any immediate or true 
apperception ever will. Without thinking one would perhaps assume that what has 
not been apperceived would appear to be less real than what has. That is not the 
case. For through [th]is misapperception, not only does that which is 
misapperceived appear to be, not only does the spectator unknowingly, suddenly 
and involuntarily, stand up to guarantee the existence of that which is 
unrecognized, but, moreover, the dynamics of inapperception, the dialectics of 
misapperception, also ensures the Being of that character who, falsely, has given 
his own self to that which is not apperceived.
77 For when it becomes clear to the 
spectator that one character has not apperceived the other, it is self-evident that 
what is apperceived – by the character - does not belong to that which is 
apperceived - the character within the play - but only to the apperceiver - within 
the play - who has, perhaps involuntarily, given his self away [to the other], and 
thereby taken his place.
78  
 
[31]     We do not attempt to exhaust the topos of substitution in Shakespeare’s 
plays, only point out that it is a most constant topos, which reappears when one 
least expects it, for instance when Hamlet stabs through the curtains at Elsinore 
Castle and ends the life of one he did not apperceive, Polonius whom he falsely 
                                                 
77 If there is a ‘discrepancy of awareness’ that is truly crucial to the production of any true theatre, 
the most crucial difference is not between the characters within the play, but between the 
characters within the play and the spectators within the theatre. The spectator remains the most 
reliable witness to any incognition that may occur within the Shakespearean play, more reliable 
indeed than almost any character. 
78 In any apperception there is, as Kant and Hegel indicate, a fundamental substitution of the self of 
the apperceiving subject with the subject apperceived. Nowhere is [th]is more true than when the 
subject in question is misapperceived. For if it is true that [th]is has been misapperceived, it will be 
equally true that the ground for [th]is misapperception cannot be other than the misapperceiver, 
who has mistaken himself for the other. As indicated, [th]is subject does not often recognize itself. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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apperceived as Claudius behind the curtain.
79 The death of Polonius shows clearly 
that one cannot take the place of another, and when attempting to or appearing to 
do so, one transgresses a limit no man may step beyond without uncovering his 
true place, that place which no man may escape except through death. More 
fundamentally, however, [th]is substitution creates the apperception of depth, the 
Being of that which is undiscovered. When the head of ‘Claudio’ is falsely 
displayed to Angelo towards the end of Measure for Measure,
80 we are completely 
aware that the inapperception of one man saves, entbergt another man’s life. 
Nonetheless, we all know that however like the head of Ragozine is to Claudio’s, 
however much Angelo has been given the false satisfaction of having carried out 
the Law, that no one can die in another man’s place. No more can Ragozine die in 
the place of Claudio than Titus can step forward and exchange his life for the 
unfortunate and loving Gisippus in Elyot's lovely The Story of Titus and Gisippus.
81 
For even when one is about to think that [th]is man is willing to sacrifice himself, 
one realizes that no one can hang in another man’s place, that indeed, as 
Heidegger says, ‘Insofar as it “is,” death is always essentially my own.’
82  
 
[32]    It is when speaking of Heidegger’s famous definition of death in Being and 
Time, ‘the possibility of the pure and simple impossibility for Dasein.’
83 that 
Derrida suggests the impossibility of writing the history of death as it would 
clearly be a history without a subject.
84 Derrida looks with unhidden amazement 
                                                 
79 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene iv.26.  
80 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act IV, Scene iii.74, 88, 93, 103, 117. 
81 Notice a similar reality-effect when the living are pronounced dead, as when Proteus falsely tells 
to Silvia, ‘Valentine is dead.’ [Shakespeare, Two Gentlemen of Verona, Act IV, Scene ii.110.] 
82 Heidegger, Being and Time, Section 47, S. 238/ p. 221. 
83 Heidegger, Being and Time, Section 50, in Derrida, Aporias, p. 23. For Heidegger’s exposition of 
death in Being and Time, see Sections 46-53. 
84 Derrida, Aporias, p. 25.  The Production of Being through Substitution 
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at Aries, who admits in the preface to The History of Death that the project was for 
long postponed because he had metaphysical problems with death.
85 Similarly and 
with unconcealed ridicule, Derrida speaks of those historians who would search for 
a criteriology of death before commencing on their investigation, when the 
ontological question of death is not even raised, that is, as Derrida says, ‘What 
death ‘is’ or whether death ‘is’ at all.’
86 Despite this negative introduction, Derrida 
goes on to positively assert that it is death that guarantees my singularity through 
the impossibility of dying for another, ‘that it is impossible to die for the other in 
the sense of ‘to die in his place.’
87 Following Heidegger’s ontological analysis of 
death,
88 marking off ontological death from perishing ontically, Derrida says, ‘[It] 
is in dying proper and properly speaking that ‘mineness’ is irreplaceable, that no 
one can die for the other, [not even] in the experience of the hostage or of the 
sacrifice, in the sense of ‘in the place of the other,’ and that no testimony can 
testify to the contrary.’
89 Heidegger basically says that I may indeed [re]present 
what another person is, on stage as in life, but the possibility for [re]presentation 
ends when it comes to [re]presenting that [th]is person is. For I can, as Heidegger 
says, obviously not die for another. Heidegger says, ‘The broad ways of being-in-
the-world in which one person can be represented by another extends only to the 
used-up modes of public being. Here one Da-sein can and must, within certain 
                                                 
85 Derrida, Aporias, p. 50. 
86 Derrida, Aporias, p. 25. 
87 Derrida, Aporias, p. 25. 
88 Heidegger, Being and Time, Section 49, in Derrida, Aporias, p. 28. 
89 Derrida, Aporias, p. 38. In his ontological analysis of death, Heidegger, marking off the 
ontological implications of death from perishing ontically, says, ‘Insofar as it “is,” death is always 
essentially my own. And it indeed signifies a peculiar possibility of being in which it is absolutely a 
matter of the being of my own Da-sein. In dying, it becomes evident that death [Heidegger’s note: 
The relation of Da-sein to death; death itself, its arrival, entrance, dying.] is ontologically, 
constituted by mineness and existence. Dying is not an event, but a phenomenon to be understood 
existentially in an eminent sense still to be delineated more closely.’ [Heidegger, Being and Time, 
‘Section 46, The Possible Being-a-Whole of Da-sein and Being-toward-Death,’ S. 240/ p. 223]. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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limits, “be” another Da-sein.’
90 Heidegger, defining the limits of replaceability, the 
absolute limit of [re]presentation, says, ‘However, this possibility of representation 
gets completely stranded when it is a matter of representing the possibility of being 
that constitutes the coming-to-an-end of Da-sein and gives its totality as such. No 
one can take the other’s dying away from him.’
91 And finally, marking how death 
ends all possibilities of [re]presentation of that which it negates, namely life or 
Being, Heidegger concludes, ‘In ‘ending,’ and in the totality thus constituted of Da-
sein, there is essentially no representation.’
92  
 
[33]     We will immediately assert the superficiality of this view, pass it by much 
like Prince Hal walks away from Falstaff when he appears to be dead on the 
battlefield.
93 For coming across the superficial view that immediately and without 
thinking states that it is impossible for anyone to die for another, we advance to the 
more profound view, that it is the false apperception of [th]is man dying in another 
man’s place, like Sir Blunt appears to die for King Henry,
94 that creates the true 
apperception of his death, the death of that Being which is not apperceived or 
apperceived untruly. For Falstaff is no more apperceived behind the masque of 
death
95 than Sir Blunt is apperceived within King Henry’s armour.
96 However, it is 
exactly [th]is inapperception, which creates the apperception of depth, the Being of 
                                                 
90 Heidegger, Being and Time, ‘Section 46, The Possible Being-a-Whole of Da-sein and Being-
toward-Death,’ S. 239f./p. 223. 
91 Heidegger, Being and Time, ‘Section 46, The Possible Being-a-Whole of Da-sein and Being-
toward-Death,’ S. 240/p. 223. Heidegger elaborates, ‘Someone can go ‘to his death for an other.’ 
Such dying for can never, however, mean that the other has thus had his death in the least taken 
away. Every Da-sein must itself actually take dying upon itself.’ [Heidegger, Being and Time, 
‘Chapter 46, The Possible Being-a-Whole of Da-sein and Being-toward-Death,’ S. 240/p. 223. 
92 Heidegger, Being and Time, ‘Section 46, The Possible Being-a-Whole of Da-sein and Being-
toward-Death,’ S. 240/p. 223. Emphasis added. 
93 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.101. 
94 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iii.13. 
95 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.101. 
96 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iii.1-13. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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that which remains entirely concealed and completely and essentially empty. 
Speaking immediately of the impossibility of taking the place of another, as if [th]is 
was possible without obstacles, as Heidegger and Derrida do, one has indeed 
forgotten that the Being of the other has first to be apperceived. Kant states clearly, 
in the Critique of Pure Reason what Hegel reiterates in Phenomenology, that the 
other, has no Being without me.
97 According to Kant, the other has no substance, 
no self without me unknowingly giving him mine. However unrecognized, the 
Being, soul, self or substance of the other is always my own. And there is, 
according to Kant, an inevitable exchange of selves through which the other comes 
alive.
98 Although [th]is is hardly recognized, there is, as both Kant and Hegel 
asserts, an inevitable indistinguishability between the substance or soul or self of 
the other and my own.
99 We will not go so far as to say that we necessarily 
apperceive the hidden soul/self/substance of the other. What we do say, is that 
through substitution, [th]is inference, the inference to [th]is, the Being of the other 
is almost inevitable. For as is easily recognized, as most of us no longer give Being 
to trees and stones and stars, there may come a time when we would no longer give 
Being to another man, to [th]is man, to that man which appear before us.
100 
                                                 
97 Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A353, p. 391. 
98 Having observed that there appear to be an impression of another thinking being, Kant explains 
that it is only oneself in disguise. Kant says, ‘We wrongly turn this subjective condition into a 
condition of the possibility of a cognition of objects, viz., into a concept of a thinking being as such. 
We do this because we cannot present such a being without putting ourselves, with the formula of 
our consciousness, in the place of any other intelligent being.’ [Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The 
Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A354]. 
99 As made explicit in Hegel, Logic, ‘Preliminary Notion,’ § 20, p. 31 and implied in Hegel, 
Phenomenology, ‘Preface: On Scientific Cognition.’   
100 Heidegger and Derrida simply show how much they are preoccupied with what is true, when 
they maintain that it is impossible to take the place another, to die in another man’s place. 
However, [th]is actual impossibility of substitution does not guard against or prevent one man at 
one point or another to actually apperceive one man as another, and therefore to see him die in 
another man’s place. There is, apparently, an obvious difference between what can be thought and 
what can be done, what we can think of and what can actually occur. It is, as we have maintained 
all along, [th]is discrepancy, [th]is difference between the imaginable and the unimaginable, that 
produces the apperception of the Being of beings. Indeed, the apperception of [th]is ontological The Production of Being through Substitution 
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[34] 
Of all battles in the history of theatre, the most profound to have ever taken place 
on Shakespearean soil, is surely the battle that culminates Henry IV, Part I, where 
Sir Douglas is forced to fight, to unknowingly overcome, men who are not 
themselves, replicas.
101 No battle is more persuasive, because it, like the duel that 
ends Hamlet, is simply false.
102 However, whereas the duel that ends Hamlet 
produces the apperception of the ontological contradiction  through a presentation 
of what is essentially false: Laertes, the dagger, King Claudius, the false battle of 
Henry IV, Part I is an illustrious example of The Poetics of Being through another 
kind of inadequation, substitution. For in this battle, the ontological contradiction 
is produced not through the misperception of what [th]is essentially is, but through 
the misapperception, even inapperception of th]is. What we realize with a tinge of 
astonishment at the height of [th]is battle, is not only that we are witnessing a fight 
between different fractions and hopefuls, but rather that there is, throughout 
Henry IV, Part I, a battle between different concepts of truth.
103 As the battle 
ensues, it does not so without giving a sense of khora, the apperception of that 
incomparable place where only one man may or may not survive. For in the middle 
of [th]is false battle, when hardly anyone or anything is truly apperceived, and the 
stage mirrors the true confusion of any real battlefield, Shakespeare suddenly 
                                                                                                                                               
contradiction is produced more persuasively through inadequation, when I witness Viola being 
misperceived as ‘Cassius’ or Sebastian misapperceived as the same, ‘Cassius.’ However impossible it 
is for Sebastian to take the place of ‘Cassius,’ to die in his place – and, of course, the duel offer 
many occasions for [th]is impossibility to occur - it is nevertheless Olivia’s false apperception of 
Sebastian as Cassius, where one being appear to have taken the place of another, that produces a 
more profound sense of what remains unimaginable to the character within the play, the 
ontological contradiction, the Being of beings. 
101 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iii, Scene iv. The ambiguity is that Douglas does not 
know whether or not he is fighting a replica as he truly is in Scene iii, an uncertainty he is unable to 
shake off when the true King arrives in Scene iv. 
102 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act V, Scene ii. 
103 Again we use ‘truth’ in an ontological sense, expressing an indifference between what is, if not 
only its apperception, and what is true. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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creates the apperception of what is unconcealed by letting Prince Hal and the 
‘gallant Hotspur’ encounter each other like two planets within the same orbit. As 
Prince Hal says to Hotspur before they engage in the duel which will convey the 
successor to the throne of England, ‘I am Prince of Wales, and think not, Percy,/To 
share with me in glory any more/Two stars keep not their motion in one sphere.’
104 
Apparently, Shakespeare has made Henry IV, Part I into the ordeal of Prince 
Henry, who finally proves himself when Hotspur succumbs to his mighty sword.
105 
After the battle, nothing is more appropriate than to let Prince Hal climb to the 
highest point of the battlefield, as he has truly earned the right throughout this 
play to, without allegory, incarnate the ontological contradiction as unconcealed. 
However, Prince Henry is accompanied by one man who, on the scales of Being, 
personifies the opposite aspect of the ontological contradiction, his untrue friend, 
Falstaff, who throughout the play certainly have earned the right to incarnate the 
ontological contradiction as concealed, the right to be concealed. As one cannot live 
without the other, it appears they both personify designs for a living eternally open 
to man, i.e. a true or a false way to promote one’s life or Being. As Prince Henry 
says to Lord Falstaff before they climb the summit, let us ‘to the highest of the 
field,/To see what friends are living, who are dead.’
106  
 
[35]     In order to stay alive, Falstaff deserts himself, when he, on the battlefield, 
saves his own life by pretending to be dead.
107 It is, indeed, impossible to be dead, 
                                                 
104 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.62-64. 
105 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.85. Finally, Shakespeare celebrates Prince Henry 
as a true man of unconcealment, no more passionately than in the praise offered at his funeral in 
the opening of what is considered Shakespeare’s first play, Henry VI, Part I, Scene 1.1-56. 
106 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene v.157-158. 
107 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.73-109. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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but, as Prince Hal passes him by,
108 he does no longer apperceive his soul, and, as 
that which is inapperceived, Falstaff truly comes alive before us, but only as that 
which is concealed.  Even before [th]is battle commences, and again consistently 
showing his inclination to be concealed, his reluctance to shine, Falstaff says to the 
young Prince Hal, later Henry V, ‘I would ‘were bedtime, Hal, and all well.’
109 To 
which the young Prince replies, before he strides away on horseback, ‘Why, thou 
owest God a death.’
110 Then and there, when Falstaff is left alone on the heath, he 
proves once and for all that he is entirely and thoroughly false, performing his 
soliloquy against the medieval virtue of honour before the battle begins.
111 Among 
obscure speeches, among hymns to obscurity, this soliloquy should rank as highly 
as Hamlet’s speech,
 112 but as Hamlet favours the prospects of death,
 Falstaff 
honours the art of concealment in the battle for life.
113 
 
[36]    We may speak of the culmination of Henry IV, Part I as a battlefield of false 
apperceptions, not only Hal’s inapperception of Falstaff, but also Sir Douglas false 
apperception of the King. For Sir Douglas falsely apperceives the man wearing the 
King’s armour as the King himself, and Falstaff is, after a short exchange of blades 
after which he soon falls to the ground, no longer apperceived as he appears to be 
                                                 
108 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.100. 
109 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene ii.125. 
110 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene ii.126. 
111 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene ii.127-141. 
112 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene i.56-88. 
113 Both soliloquies should be recognized for what they are, for speaking out against medieval ideals 
of unconcealment, they both trumpet ideals of concealment. As much as Hamlet yearns for death, 
Falstaff joyously, vivaciously, wish to live. It is in this state of life-assertion, on the morn of the 
battle where he later will pretend to be dead, that Falstaff speaks out against the chivalric ideal of 
honour, of maintaining one’s true place in battle, of appearing indifferently as what you are. Quite 
remarkably, Falstaff’s soliloquy against the chivalric ideal of ‘honour,’ takes the shape of a 
commentary on the meaning of the word, concisely summed up in Falstaff’s conclusion, ‘Honour is 
a mere scutcheon – and so ends my catechism.’ Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene ii.140. 
As Sylvan Barnet points out in the notes he has so kindly and conscientiously provided for the 
reader, ‘scutcheon’ means merely a ‘painted shield with a coat of arms identifying a dead 
nobleman.’ [Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene ii.140n]. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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dead. And so we may say that in the first place another is apperceived in his, 
whereas where we find Falstaff lying on the ground amid the fallen corpses, his 
Being is no longer apperceived. In both cases, [th]is is not apperceived, and it is 
[th]is inapperception that paradoxically gives Being to these appearances, makes 
sure that when Sir Blunt falls and his blood is gushing forth, we think he is really 
dying, and that when Lord Falstaff rises to his feet, we think he really pretended to 
be dead, that he overcame in [th]is battle by Being, remaining, concealed. 
Obviously, identities are confused, when Sir Blunt, wearing the armour of the 
King, sees Sir Douglas approach on the battlefield, and cries out, ‘What is thy 
name, that in battle thus thou crossest me?/What honour dost thou seek upon my 
head?’
114 To which Douglas replies as he draws his sword, reminding us that all 
subjects, some truly, some falsely, are recognized by name, ‘Know then my name is 
Douglas,/And I do haunt thee in the battle thus/Because some tell me thou art a 
king.’ To which Sir Walter Blunt falsely replies, ‘They tell thee true.’ And calling 
Sir Blunt by his false name, ‘King Harry,’ Sir Douglas does not only name, but 
finally overcomes one who he in this battle never did truly apperceive or falsely 
apperceived as the King.  
 
[37]     It does not take long before the cause of Sir Douglas’ inapperception is 
disclosed. For when Hotspur arrives at the scene, he marks the true name of the 
defeated, ‘his name was Blunt;/Semblambly furnished like the King himself.’
115 
However, as if Shakespeare unknowingly was writing under a spell of enthusiasm, 
Sir Douglas act of inapperception is soon doubled. For when the King finally 
appears, unmistakably clothed in the same armour, the same coat of arms, Sir 
                                                 
114 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iii.1-3. 
115 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iii.20-21. The Production of Being through Substitution 
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Douglas apperceives him not. As effortlessly as Sir Douglas gave one man the 
Being that did not belong to him, he is now reluctant to give the other his rightful 
Being. And Being in a state of uncertainty, he says to the one who has pronounced 
himself as ‘The King himself,’
116 ‘I fear thou art another counterfeit;/And yet, in 
faith, thou bearest thee like a king.’
117 Concerning the false production of Being no 
impression of the ontological contradiction is more profound than the one offered 
by its inapperception, the one given by the unquestionable inapperception of [th]is. 
After his pretended death, after he fell and succumbed to the wound from the 
blade that never scratched him,
118 Falstaff rises again to his feet on the battlefield, 
which is budding forth with the crops of dead men. Showing clearly an ontological 
understanding of truth,
119 where there is an indistinguishability between what is 
and what is true, Falstaff says,  
 
‘’Sblood, ‘twas time to counterfeit, or that 
hot termagant Scot had paid me scot and lot too. 
Counterfeit. I lie: I am no counterfeit. To die is to 
be a counterfeit, for he is but the counterfeit of a 
man who hath not the life of a man, but to counter- 
feit dying when a man thereby liveth, is to be no  
counterfeit, but the true and perfect image of life indeed.’
120  
                                                 
116 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.28. 
117 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.75. 
118 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.76. 
119 Concerning the ontological understanding of ‘truth,’ where an in-difference between truth and 
existence is upheld, we could say that nothing is more precarious, uncertain, unsettled, and 
perhaps, as Heidegger suggests, closer to Anaximander’s concept of the indeterminable apeiron. 
For what is fought for in any battle, is not primarily what is essentially true but what is [true]. That 
is, the being that overcomes in any battle is [true]. In an ontological sense, truth is, as Hegel, 
Nietzsche and Heidegger assert, simply the outcome of war, polemos. [For the ontological notion of 
truth as the outcome of war, see Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘Lordship and Bondage,’ p. 111-
119, Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth – Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the early 1870s, 
‘The Philosopher: Reflection on the Struggle Between Art and Knowledge,’ Fragment 47, p. 17, 
and Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 18. 
120 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.112-119. Emphasis added.  
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[1]     Having first climbed to the top of [th]is battlefield, there is no reason to not 
rest and admire the view down below, from [th]is height of inapperception, look 
back on the land made fertile by these rivers, these figures of indefinition, falsity, 
substitution, making as they do the apperception of [th]is through the 
imperceptions, the misperceptions and the inapperceptions they afford. 
Concerning substitution, we see, quite paradoxically, that it is the inapperception 
of [th]is that produces [th]is apperception, much like it is the misperception of 
what [th]is is that more effectively than any true perception produces the 
apperception of the Being of beings. In the case of indefinition, there is, of course, 
only an imperception given, the empty perception of what [th]is is not rather than 
what [th]is is that produces, as it were, the naked apperception of, what Hegel 
would call ‘nothing’ and Kant a pure phenomenological Anschauung, an 
impression more persuasive, however empty it is, in providing a sense of [th]is 
being unconcealed than any true or adequate perception. These three figures of 
falsity, substitution and indefinition, are all aspects or figures of inadequation that 
produces, whether concealed or unconcealed, the same, the apperception of the 
Being of beings.  But there is also the true production of Being, but only if we take 
truth in the ontological sense - to be defined as that which upholds all properties 
and that without which these properties could not be - and not truth in a merely 
epistemological sense where [th]is, the Being of beings is taken for granted, and all 
that concern us is the adequation or correspondence between my description or 
perception of what [th]is is and what [th]is essentially is. For even though we may 
learn much from such descriptions, this approach is merely phenomenological. For The Paradox of Being 
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having inquired into what [th]is essentially is, and having done so even adequately, 
we would still be at a loss to present [th]is, knowing nothing of that which these 
true descriptions, these adequations of mind and matter, these correspondences of 
intellect and thing, of words and appearances, of language and phenomena, take 
for granted, namely the Being of beings, the Being of [th]is [being].  
 
[2]     Again we shall speak of what should have become clear in the preceding 
chapters, that the effect of inadequation is the apperception of [th]is, that which is 
singular and unknown affected through inadequation. It is obvious that as there 
are different kinds of inadequation, they all achieve their end of producing the 
apperception of the Being of beings in different ways. Through falsity, the 
perception of what is essentially false, there is an obvious misperception that 
furthers the immediate inference to that which does not have these attributes and 
as such, as that which does not have these attributes, is apperceived. It is quite 
obvious that the immediate effect of indefinition is imperception and that the 
immediate effect of substitution is inapperception, affecting in turn the 
apperception of [th]is as either concealed or unconcealed. As Aristotle said, and no 
one has said more clearly after him, an indefinition does not express what [th]is is, 
does not express a perception of what this essentially is but only affords an 
impression of what [th]is is not.
1 Through [th]is indefinition what [th]is is, is not 
perceived, and this imperception opens up for the apperception of [th]is as 
unconcealed.  
 
[3]     When it comes to substitution, it is obvious that [th]is is wrongly or falsely 
apperceived. It may be true as, Nietzsche says, that [th]is, be it called substance or 
                                                 
1 Aristotle, de Interpretatione, Chapters 1, 2 and 10. The Paradox of Being 
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soul, is always falsely apperceived,
2 Kant does however take [th]is false 
apperception to be a necessity, to be unavoidable.
3 On the other hand, Kant limits 
his questions to what is true, the true perceptions of phenomena, and however 
‘false’ he may call the inference to the apperception of the [singular] noumena that 
grounds every [single] persona, he only speaks of the false apperception of what is 
hidden. Never does he inquire into how much more effectively we infer to the 
existence of [th]is ontological contradiction when faced with false phenomena. If he 
did, he would have discovered that the truly false perception or apperception of 
[th]is, even the inapperception of [th]is, does more emphatically produce the 
apperception of [th]is than any true apperception could ever do. 
 
[4]   We found, at the crossroads of misperception and inapperception, that 
Shakespeare clearly produces that which they have in common, namely [th]is 
ontological contradiction. Knowing how close to Shakespeare’s heart these means 
of inadequation are, something we may already conjecture from the example of 
Sonnet 72 where he explains to his beloved that thou art everything and I am 
                                                 
2 On the illusion of subjectivity, see particularly Nietzsche, Twilight of Idols, ‘The Four Great 
Errors,’ pp. 26-32, but also Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, ‘One The Prejudices of Philosophers,’ 
pp. 5-24. 
3 [For Kant’s exposition of the transcendental inference to the illusory, almost unavoidable 
apperception of the singular Being of another human being, see, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
‘The Paralogisms of Pure Reason,’ A341/B399-A405/B432.] It may appear to some that I confuse 
the necessity of the noumenal as a grounding condition for all phenomenal perceptions, if not all 
cognition, with the illusory apperception of what is singular. However, we contend that the 
apperception of the Being of beings is singular, and that when we are faced with anything, in 
theatre as in life, it is impossible to doubt that there is something that noumenally effects our 
perceptions, but it is sometimes doubtful whether what effects us is [alive]. For in theatre as in life, 
the challenge is not to prove that there is anything at all, but to prove, to convince the spectator that 
[th]is being is [alive]. The argument that there must be something simply because there is 
something to cognize, is no more helpful in theatre than in life, for also the lifeless may similarly be 
cognized. However, we do not grant Being to dead men, although there are bodies there to perceive, 
not life to characters simply because they can be seen, nor do we grant Being to a play simply 
because we can perceive the stage. The Paradox of Being 
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nothing,
4 we can see that these distinct instruments of inadequation are often 
applied with such ease within the same play, oftentimes even within the same 
scene, as is the case in Twelfth Night, that we are scarcely able to perceive them. 
We can take the experience of Olivia to lie at the crossroads of misperception and 
inapperception. For by perceiving Viola as a man, as ‘Cassius,’ she misperceives 
what [th]is is and hence gives Being to [th]is false appearance, but by apperceiving 
Sebastian as Cassius, she is unknowingly guilty of inapperception, which creates 
an equally profound and immediate apperception of [th]is ontological 
contradiction, as what is mistaken is not only what [th]is is, but [th]is, that which 
nothing can be without. 
 
[5]   We distinguish between imperception and inapperception, that is, between 
indefinition and substitution, as their effects are quite opposite, as the one provides 
a way to the apperception of what is unconcealed and the other to what is 
concealed. Whereas we apply non-perception where there is a lack of perception, 
that is, where we do not perceive what [th]is is, and what remains is an empty 
apperception of Being, or as Hegel would say, nothing.
5 We speak of 
inapperception where one does not apperceive the subject or substance of that 
which appear to have these properties. We could therefore say that 
misapperceptions or inapperceptions produce, through the almost inevitable 
substitution affected, the apperception that [th]is is, the Being of that being which 
                                                 
4 Shakespeare declares to his beloved, ‘O, lest the world should task you to recite/What merit lived 
in me that you should love/After my death, dear love, forget me quite,/ For you in me can nothing 
worthy prove./Unless you would devise some virtuous lie,/To do more for me than mine own 
desert,/And hang more praise upon deceasèd I/Than niggard truth would willingly impart./O, lest 
your true love may seem false in this,/That you for love speak well of me untrue,/My name be 
buried where my body is,/And live no more to shame nor me nor you;/For I am shamed by that 
which I bring forth,/And so should you, to love things nothing worth.’ Shakespeare, Sonnets, 
Sonnet 72. 
5 Hegel, Logic, ‘The Doctrine of Being,’ §87, p. 128. The Paradox of Being 
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is not apperceived, that does not have these properties or to whom these properties 
does not belong. 
 
[6]     Delivering the dialectics of inapperception for the first time, we should 
follow Aristotle’s example by explaining what is more difficult by what is less, what 
is complex through what is simple. We could speak of inapperception as we do of 
what is inappropriate. For as the inappropriate transgresses the law of decency or 
the limit of what is considered appropriate at any given time, so the inapperceived 
is beyond apperception. And as it is inappropriate to not be considerate to one who 
is there, it is even more so to not apperceive one who is. Nonetheless, what is 
inappropriate does not remove, but strengthens our sense of what is [appropriate]. 
Equally, any inapperception will paradoxically reinforce the impression of what is 
not apperceived. If we should find an appropriate concept for what is not 
apperceived, a total lack of apperception, a possibility that is suggested by the 
experiences of Descartes, Husserl and Wittgenstein, however much Kant would 
consider any singular inapperception [to be] impossible, as the singular condition 
for [th]is perception would, according to Kant necessarily have to be apperceived 
as a subject with personality and soul, the testimonies of these three distinguished 
philosophers do however destroy Kant’s claim that [th]is inference is necessary.
6 
We could speak of anapperception in much the same way as we speak of what is 
amoral, that is, where the question of that which is apperceived like the question of 
morality is not even raised.     
                                                 
6 It does not destroy Kant’s claim that for every phenomenal description, there is an indefinite 
noumenal ground to be apperceive as such, but it does destroy the claim that we almost necessarily 
make the inference to the substantiality, the personality and the unity of the other being, i.e. the 
singular Being of the subject apperceived. Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The Paralogisms of 
Pure Reason,’ A341/B399-A405/B432. The Paradox of Being 
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[7]     There is clearly a production of Being that occurs through misperception 
and inapperception. The failed apperception of [th]is will not fall short of creating 
the impression of something that is. Similarly, the failed perception of what [th]is is 
creates the apperception of that which is without properties, what remains hidden, 
but nevertheless is that to which these properties does not belong. Obviously, the 
misapperception of [th]is creates the apperception of what is concealed. However, 
misapperception is not immediately the inability to apperceive [th]is, as for 
example, Descartes, Husserl or Wittgenstein are at one time or another unable, if 
not unwilling, to apperceive the Being of the other, the Being of the being before 
them, calling that which remains inapperceived, that which offer nothing to 
apperception, in historical order, machine, mannequin, automata, but rather, the 
false apperception of another.
7 As Descartes says when he is staring out the 
window, be it in Brussels or Amsterdam, ‘what do I see from the window beyond 
hats and cloaks that might cover artificial machines, whose motions might be 
determined by springs? But I judge that there are human beings from these 
appearances, and thus I comprehend, by the faculty of judgment alone which is in 
the mind, what I believed I saw with my eyes.’
8  
 
[8]     We shall have a final look at some of these Shakespearean places of 
substitution, but not without first acknowledging Kant’s forgotten dictum, ‘The 
Being of the other is my own.’
9 The other has no Being without me. To find an 
                                                 
7 For a reference to Husserl’s experience of men as mannequins, see Maurizio Ferraris, What is 
There?, in Derrida and Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret, p. 95, and for Wittgenstein’s almost 
profound, but necessarily pulp, experience, see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
Fragment 420. 
8 Descartes, Meditations on The First Philosophy, ‘Meditation II: Of the Nature of the Human 
Mind; and that it is more easily known than the Body,’ in A Discourse on Method, Meditations and 
Principles, p. 85. 
9 Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A353-A354. The Paradox of Being 
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intimation of how this could be true, that the other has no Being without me, we 
would first have to consider the contrary case, where the other is given no Being at 
all. The most famous case of inapperception in the history of philosophy, where a 
man is left with motion but no Being, is surely Descartes’ automata,
10 although we 
should not neglect Kant’s machines.
11 For according to Kant, phenomena, like 
machines, seem very well to work without substance, self or soul. In literature, 
there is, of course, merely a generation after Kant, Hoffmann’s famous story of the 
man who unknowingly fell in love with a mechanical doll, whom he wanted to 
marry as he found her to be so mysteriously like him self.
12  
 
[9]     The premise of this argument is that the other does not give the impression 
of having substance without substitution, nor does he give the impression of Being 
unconcealed without indefinition, which creates the apperception of that place 
through which he is unconcealed. In short, the Being of the other is neither 
concealed nor unconcealed if not the ontological contradiction is granted him. As 
Kant in effect says in the Critique of Pure Reason, ‘The other has no being without 
me.’
13 It goes without saying that if, as Kant says in ‘The Paralogisms of Pure 
Reason,’ the inference to the self of the other is both necessary and false, both 
automatic and erratic, an error which we, like machines repeat apparently without 
thinking, it is also the case that in theatre, the spectator is not immediately inclined 
to be so generous with his self. In the theatre, the spectator has to be persuaded to 
                                                 
10 As is generally known Descartes was, like many of his age, fascinated with automata, the 
mechanical dolls that populated the gardens of Louis XIII. 
11 Kant, What is Enlightenment?. 
12 E.T.A. Hoffmann, Tales of Hoffmann, Penguin Classics, Selected and translated by R. J. 
Hollingdale, London, 1982, ‘The Choosing of the Bride, pp. 339-411. As is well known, Hoffman 
wrote also, even a generation before Edgar Allan Poe, what is considered the first detective novel, 
‘Mademoiselle De Scudery,’ pp. 17-84. 
13 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A353-A354. The Paradox of Being 
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give away his self. But if not the spectator gives Being to the player, life to the 
stage, world to the theatre, the player is no more than an actor, the stage is no 
more than a stage, the theatre no more than a theatre. 
 
[10]    Substitution is one of the most efficient ways to produce the apperception of 
self, to make the spectator, unknowingly give his self away to the other, and this 
two times over, and so effortlessly and lightly that the spectator thinks that he has 
done nothing, does not even suspect that he has given anything away. But how does 
[th]is substitution occur, how is it effected, and how is the spectator [mis]led into 
giving his self away, to the other, and then to not recognize his own presence in the 
other, as if he had so secretly given away himself, that he does not know of or 
recognize his own Being in the other, does not realize that he has given himself, his 
self, away. Of course, one would need subtle means to persuade a man to give 
himself away, and of all means none is more subtle, none immediately more 
effective than the act of substitution, where one is mistaken for another, or where 
one takes the place of another and [th]is substitution remains unknown to the 
character within the play, but also, where this second act of substitution remains 
unknown to the spectator within the theatre. And still, even if it is known, it is 
difficult to not give oneself away. 
 
[11]     It is obvious that Shakespeare creates his plays as contradictions, for the 
perception of what is untrue or the apperception of what is untrue, that is 
inadequate perceptions or apperceptions, produce the apperception of what is 
[true]. Paradoxically, but truly, the inapperception of [th]is produces its 
apperception, as much as the misperception of what [th]is is produces the 
apperception of [th]is. Again we notice, what so many have done before us, without The Paradox of Being 
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disclosing its true function nor end, that the experience of the spectator is exactly 
opposite to the experience of the character. The purpose of any inadequate 
presentation is obviously to create the apperception of the ontological 
contradiction, for whereas the character experiences what is not, the spectator 
experiences what is. There is even an inferential chain that draws or pulls the 
spectator from the perception or apperception of what is not, to the apperception 
of what is.  
 
[12]     Clearly, Shakespeare has created his plays as contradictions, paradoxes 
where the direction of the meaning of the play is exactly opposite to the way in 
which the Being of beings is produced. The very thought of identification between 
spectator and character does, from [th]is perspective, seem almost absurd. For 
whereas the play presents [th]is Being as inapperceived, as for example, Sly, Viola, 
Falstaff and Juliet are all, at one point or another, inapperceived, it is [th]is 
inapperception that produces, and [th]is quite convincingly and effortlessly, the 
apperception of [th]is, the Being of beings. [Th]is inapperception does 
paradoxically provide the opening for [th]is ontological contradiction to be 
apperceived. For as clearly as Sly does not apperceive himself, Viola is not 
apperceived by the Duke, and Falstaff is no more apperceived by Prince Hal as he 
lies dead on the battlefield than Juliet is apperceived by Romeo as she lies 
displayed openly in the sarcophagus. When Romeo walks down into the crypt that 
gives birth to all human spirits, and discovers his beloved lying lifeless in that open 
grave, it is obvious that there is nothing wrong or false with Romeo’s perceptions. The Paradox of Being 
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For even though Juliet looks the same, there is something missing, that which 
Romeo no longer apperceives, the Being of [th]is being.
14  
 
[13]     Likewise, any misperception of what [th]is is, as for example Ophelia’s 
misperception of Hamlet’s madness, King Duncan’s misperception of Macbeth’s 
loyalty and Iago’s misperception of Desdemona’s infidelity, will most emphatically 
produce the apperception of [th]is, the Being of [th]is being. It is as Nietzsche says, 
in, I believe, The Will to Power, that arguing against a man’s opinions you may 
prove him wrong, but by offering all the arguments against him, you have proved 
what is more fundamental to any man, his Being. For any misperception produces 
doubly the impression of that from which the person is alienated through this false 
perception, that which no persona, not even a false persona can be without, namely 
substance. So again, the dissociation of appearance from substance, of essence from 
self, produces a more profound sense of self, of substance to the spectator who 
witness the display of that masque which does not belong to [th]is man or that 
woman. 
 
[14]     For the first time, The Poetics of Being offers the dialectics of substitution 
and the dialectics of inapperception. The dialectics of substitution concerns the 
exchange of selves as much as the dialectics of inapperception concerns the 
inference from what is not apperceived or misapperceived to the apperception of 
its existence, even the creation of [th]is apperception by displaying, by Being 
confronted with what is not apperceived. Falstaff appear to be dead on the 
battlefield. And what is a dead man except one who through a masque of death lets 
                                                 
14 We are perhaps reminded that the difference between clones and identical twins is the same as 
the difference between the living and the dead, [th]is, the Being of beings. The Paradox of Being 
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nothing be apperceived, a phenomena that does not yield, like most human crops, 
the fruit of continuous and abundant apperception. Of course, we may become 
conscious of [th]is production, even the necessity of the production of the Being of 
beings in that instance, and perhaps only in that instance, when it is not produced. 
What better way to illustrate the dialectics of inapperception, than with a man who 
is willing to be inapperceived in order to save his life. For Lord Falstaff is as easily 
saved through the inapperception of death as Sir Blunt dies being misapperceived 
as the King on the battlefield. For rather than having his life taken away, Falstaff 
appears, at the height of [th]is battle, to be inapperceived, or as Prince Hal says to 
Prince John, speaking of Falstaff, ‘I saw him dead,/Breathlesss and bleeding on the 
ground.’
15 When Prince Hal astonished sees Falstaff approach fat and well, he 
says, ‘Art thou alive,/Or is it fantasy that plays upon our eyesight?/I prithee speak. 
We will not trust our eyes/Without our ears. Thou art not what thou seem’st.’
16 Of 
course, if Shakespeare distinguished conceptually between perceptions and 
apperceptions, which he in effect does, and if Reason is that by which we 
apperceive what is beyond perception, he should perhaps have let Prince Hal say 
to Falstaff as he approached fat and well, ‘We will no longer trust our Reason.’
                                                 
15 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.132-133. 
16 Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, Act V, Scene iv.133-136.  
  
 
Glossary 
 
Definition is an attempt to grasp the meaning of a concept universally or within a 
particular discourse, here The Poetics of Being. As we in part continue an 
ontological discourse and in part reinvent it, some concepts will be familiar some 
will sound familiar, and still others will be entirely unfamiliar. It is obvious that we 
should offer a cautionary remark for the reader who seeks immediate illumination. 
These definitions are attempts to keep out what is foreign to a concept, and so, even 
if we draw nearer to that which is named by these definitions, the reader may still 
demand greater specificity. 
 
adequation, the commonplace understanding of truth as the correspondence 
between intellect and thing, proposition and fact, perception and phenomenon, in 
short, the correspondence between what we think the world is and what the world, 
or a community of men believe the world, actually is. 
 
affirmation, either the assertion of the properties given to a subject, the assertion of 
the subject itself, or the assertion of the compound. 
 
anapperception, the failure to apperceive the singular Being of a 
phenomenon/persona. To encounter another being where only the phenomenal 
masque is perceived without and apart from that which upholds the integrity of 
any being while it is still alive, the Being of beings. 
 
animitation, to negate the impression that a [re]presentation is a likeness to such a 
degree that it is apperceived as a living being; to facilitate the substitution of the 
symbol with what is symbolized. 
 
aphairesis, the process of abstraction or gradual denial which leaves the reader or 
the spectator with the apperception of that which is without properties. 
 
aporia, the incapacity to name or predicate that which is encountered. An arrest of 
the intellect, a cognitive arrest, that paradoxically invites the mind to proceed by 
dwelling on that which is still unknown. 
 
apperception, the transcendental notion of that which cannot essentially or 
phenomenally be described, but whose impression is as difficult to erase in life as it 
is difficult to create by art, namely the Being of beings. The apperceived is that 
which no perception is adequate to. For an immediate understanding of the 
difference between perception and apperception, one should perhaps try to 
imagine clones or identical twins, for even where there is no perceptual difference, 
there is still a difference to be apperceived. [Th]is ontological difference is, 
moreover concealed or unconcealed, a contradiction. 
 
beings, the things in the world that may one day be perfectly described and 
categorized without yet offering a glimpse of that which grants each phenomenon 
the depth or the shine of life, the Being of beings. 
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Being of beings, what is highest or what is first. 
 
catharsis, the elevating or purifying effect of taking part in or witnessing a 
performance that offers the apperception of the Being of beings, an experience 
indistinguishable from what is, or quite simply, inseparable from life. 
 
clear/clearing, that which is unconcealed or the apperception of that which is 
unconcealed. 
 
concealment [of the ontological difference], the preapperception that grants no 
being to phenomena that do not offer a sense of what is hidden. 
 
contradiction, either to give irreconcilable properties to a subject, or to affirm and 
deny the identity, existence or apperception of this subject at the same time. 
 
dialectics 1, the indefinite or negative progression that leads to definition and hence 
knowledge; the infinite progression from what is unknown to what is known 
[Plato]. 
 
dialectics 2, argument based on opinions that are self-evident to the many or the 
few [Aristotle]. 
 
dialectics 3, the ontological inference that leads from the perception of this 
phenomenon to the apperception of its noumenal ground [Kant]. 
 
dialectics 4, the necessary and often neglected implication of the subject in the 
object perceived or apperceived [Hegel]. 
 
dialectics of imperception, to infer the unconcealed Being of that which is not 
perceived by the other from witnessing an act of singular non-cognition. 
 
dialectics of Inapperception, the spontaneous substitution or I-dentification of the 
spectator with the subject which is in-apperceived; the spontaneous substitution of 
the spectator’s subject with the subject of the person that is not recognized.  
 
dialectics of misperception, the ontological inference to the Being of that being 
whose properties are perceived inadequately. 
 
dissimilarity, unlikeness, that which is [re]presented as essentially different from 
itself. Through the dissimilar display of oneself or another one will convey the 
impression of that which the [re]presentation is inadequate to, namely the Being of 
that which is concealed. 
 
elision, the progressive removal or violent ab-straction of properties from an 
individual being. The more indispensable the properties that are taken away are to 
the essential identity of the individual being, the more will it appear to be [alive]. 
We shall use, elision as a concept to describe the gradual or sudden removal of 
some or all properties from one being, whereas we shall, as tradition, apply Glossary 
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aphairesis to the act of denying all properties to everything that is, so that nothing 
remains but the [apperception of] the Being of beings. 
 
elusive, the end of elision; the singular apperception of that which remains after all 
properties or properties indispensable for the essential identity of a being has 
gradually or violently been taken away. 
 
experience, taken in a less discrete sense than by Kant, to whom experience is 
limited to the assessment or judgement of phenomena, which experience cannot 
pass beyond. That is, to the Understanding experience is limited to perceptions, 
whereas Reason may step, and indeed, does involuntarily step beyond what is 
perceived to what is apperceived, be [th]is apperceived as subject, world or God. 
Here ‘experience’ denotes more generally, both perception and apperception: to 
grasp what [th]is essentially is, whether the assessment is true or false, and the 
apperception of the hidden condition for the Being of [th]is appearance. In one 
sense this is prior to the understanding of what [th]is essentially is, and, in another 
sense, it is the singular depth we make an inference to, the depth of the subject 
apperceived as: substantiality, personality or existence. 
 
false 1, ontological sense, that which is not. 
 
false 2, epistemological sense, the inadequate perception of the properties that 
belong to a subject or the inadequate apperception/identification of the subject; 
the expression or [re]presentation of these inadequations. 
 
function, often denotes the ontological effect [re]presentations may have by 
producing the apperception of the ontological contradiction through different, and 
mostly, inadequate means of [re]presentation. 
 
general/universal, the result of a generalization from particulars to a universalising 
contention that describes a compound, a category which may be universally 
applied to conceptually understand the essence of all particular beings of the same 
class. However, the category itself describes nothing that exists. 
 
hermeneutics, the systematic endeavour to give meaning to that which has been 
rendered meaningless by diachronic or synchronic differences of place, sociology, 
culture, class, gender, religion, fashion, etc. in short, the attempt to understand 
that which has been rendered meaningless by time. 
 
hypostatise, to reify or transform into a thing, what may only be indirectly 
apperceived by inference; pretending to perceive as a thing that which may only 
inferentially be apperceived: God, world, subject; and of the [singular] subject: its 
substance, personality or existence. 
 
idea, in the Platonic/Neoplatonic sense the concept or form that is indistinguishable 
from the essential Being of any phenomena, and to Kant, the apperception of that 
which transcends all phenomena and grounds all beings, the noumenon, be it 
apperceived as subject, world or God, for which the senses provide no evidence. 
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inapperception, whereas we apply imperception where there is a total lack of 
perception of that which presences itself, we shall speak of inapperception where 
one does not apperceive the Being - the personality, substantiality or existence - of 
the subject that appears to have these properties. An untrue apperception or 
inapperception will not, however, fail to produce the apperception that [th]is is. 
Inapperceived is that being which does not offer the true noumenal ground of its 
Being to another being. 
 
Inadequation, a dialectical concept signalling the lack of correspondence between 
what or that a thing is and its [mis]perception or [mis]apperception. 
 
Indefinition, a negation that denies a particular property to a being, whereby the 
apperception of the Being of this being is unconcealed, in short, a negative 
affirmation that affirms the impression of the Being of that which is apperceived 
without properties. 
 
Imitation, see mimesis. 
 
Imperception, the non-perception of a thing or person by one man or woman, who 
is present to, perceived or apprehended by another. 
 
it, the [ontological] mark of that which is at the end of aphairesis/denial, which 
itself may finally be denied if the contemplative ambitions of the mystic, as he 
desires, are finally destroyed, and union achieved. 
 
khora, denotes that place which is inevitably different from itself, and singularly 
unconceals all beings to Being. 
 
logic 1, The deductive demonstration from principles that are self-evident to all or 
subscribed to by most. [Aristotle] 
 
logic 2, The fundamental apperception of the Being of beings [as unconcealed] that 
is implied in the experience that any appearance in time is a negation that denies its 
own concealment whereby it presents itself or itself to another without erasing 
completely the apperception of that which has been negated, the negative 
impression of that which is concealed [by [th]is appearance] [Heidegger]. 
 
logic 3, The dialectic of consciousness implied in considering the subject both the 
essential and inessential content of everything that is perceived or apperceived, 
known or unknown [Hegel]. 
 
logic of Being, a syllogism or demonstration whereby properties are proved to 
belong to a being if this being simply exists, is unconcealed; to be distinguished 
from a predicative logic. 
 
meaning, to predicate or give essential properties to a subject, or to grasp this 
essence conceptually [Hegel], the successful attempt to grasp the essence of what is 
[re]presented. 
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meaningless, the failure to attribute meaning, leaving one with the impression of 
that which is not identified, the object unconcealed and the subject concealed. 
 
metaphysics, the systematic and for long hypostatised inquiry into the Being of 
beings, whereby what is apperceived is reified as substantial beings. The doctrine 
or belief that what is hidden is essential, and that the search for what is essential or 
substantial is more valuable than what is not.  
mimesis, the [re]presentation of a subject, whose being is taken for granted; a 
[re]presentation often implies a reference - the impression of which can be erased - 
to an already existing but imaginary being, as the ‘reference.’ More often than not, 
it is no more than a fictional compound of what separately exists as parts of other 
beings. 
 
mirror, signals either the reflection of phenomena or the understanding that each 
phenomenon itself is a reflection of an idea. The latter is the Neoplatonic position, 
which holds that phenomena are as insubstantial to Being as mirror-reflections are 
to us. 
 
mystic/mystical, that which is singularly hidden and more often than not offers the 
apperception of the Being of beings, the ontological difference. 
 
negation, either the denial of the properties given to a subject, the denial of the 
subject, or the denial of the compound. 
 
nothing, the mark of unconcealment or the denial of that which is unconcealed, 
which in turn offers the apperception of that which is at the end of aphairesis, what 
is concealed. 
 
noumenal, the condition of the phenomenal world. 
 
noumenon, that which sustains the [living] integrity of all phenomena, the unity of 
all the essential properties that may be carried by a [living] subject. 
 
onto-logy, the self-disclosure or self-hiddenness of what is, or the philosophy 
concerned with [th]is revelation or mystery; to be distinguished from another 
meaning of ontology, namely the essential and categorical science of beings whose 
existence are taken for granted. 
 
ontological contradiction, the contradiction between beings and the Being of 
beings; the apperception of the Being of beings as either concealed or unconcealed, 
as well as the negative apperceptual movement from the neglect of the one moment 
to the emphasis on the other. Most fundamentally, that which gives rise to all 
contradictions; and, Being available only to apperception, it contradicts everything 
we may possibly perceive. Furthermore, the realization that non-beings produce 
the most emphatic sense of Being. 
 
ontological difference, the difference between beings and Being, the Being of 
beings. 
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ontological difference, negative, where mere presence is not sufficient to grant a 
sense of Being and the apperception of Being is provided by that which, either 
concealed or unconcealed, transcends any appearance to grant to it the impression 
of life. Furthermore, the apperception of Being is more forcefully granted by what 
is not rather than what is, false rather than true appearances. The exposition of 
Being is expanded by showing that non-beings produce a more emphatic sense of 
Being. [Th]is paradox is also called the ontological contradiction.  
 
ontological difference, positive, the position that mere presence or appearance is 
sufficient to offer a sense of Being to any being, and/or the substratum of this being 
is considered to be substantial and/or essential. More generally where the 
exposition of Being is limited by/to the sole consideration of what beings truly are. 
 
ontological inference, the inference to the apperception of the Being of beings: to 
infer from a phenomenal impression, to the apperception of the noumenal ground, 
the apprehension of [th]is singular being. 
 
paradox, we shall indicate what paradox is by enumerating its particular instances, 
before we finally attempt a general definition that applies to all cases: 
Paradox/paradoxical is that the inapperception of the subject provides the 
apperception of the Being of the subject; that the non-description of a subject 
through indefinition offers the apperception of the unconcealment of this subject; 
that the false perception of what this being essentially is, creates the apperception 
of the true life of this being; that a dissimilar [re]presentation of oneself or another 
offer the apperception of that which is similar to itself, the singular apperception of 
the Being of [th]is being; that by removing everything from [th]is, I have added the 
apperception of the depth of [th]is being, which stands out more emphatically as 
alive without anything than if it possessed everything [in the world]; that by 
showing something untrue to my expectations, I receive a more ineradicable 
apperception of what is true; and finally, by renouncing everything I have said as 
‘nothing,’ by swearing I have said nothing, I add the apperception of Being to what 
is said. In short, I paradoxically grant Being to that which is contradicted. Hence, 
an ontological paradox is a contradiction that produces the apperception of the 
Being of that which is contradicted. The fundamental reason that a contradiction – 
the presentation of irreconcilables – would be impossible [to] present did it not 
have something in common, namely the apperception of [th]is. 
 
paralogism, to infer the apperception of the noumenal ground from that which is 
phenomenologically perceived: the noumenon. 
 
particular, an instance of a generic category or genus. 
 
phenomenon, that which is sensually perceived, whether or not this perception 
corresponds to an ‘actual’ being [in the world]. Hence, that which is perceived in 
dreams, theatre and in nature, are all and equally, considered as phenomena. 
 
poiesis, to produce the perception or the apperception of what previously was not. 
In nature poiesis is without intentions, in art it is the realization of an end, a telos. 
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place, that immaterial location which unconceals alike all beings and all thoughts 
to beings, as much as one being to another. 
 
praxis, the excellence or virtue, i.e. the power that belongs to excellent 
communication with other men, and to the excellent conduct of life in society. 
 
predicative logic, the demonstration of essential attributes by means of a deduction 
from principles which are either universally accepted or taken for granted; or the 
induction - if there is an inductive logic - from the perception of the essence of 
individual beings to the understanding that these properties belong to the genera 
or category as a whole. 
 
problem, two contradictory or irreconcilable propositions where the validity has to 
be decided dialectically by an appeal to the many or the few. Only with reference 
to the opinions or the many of the few can a philosophical problem be [re]solved, 
and then, only temporarily. 
 
perception, refers to the impressions that are gathered by the five senses and 
conceptualised as concrete sensual and essential experiences. 
 
produce, to pro-ject or make something that preciously was not; in The Poetics of 
Being, the ontological contradiction is produced. 
 
reception history, indicates the influence tradition exerts on the attribution of 
meaning or Being in any phenomenological encounter. Neither the meaning that a 
text conveys nor the apperception of Being that a play may offer can be considered 
in isolation, without those who have been affected before us and in turn have 
conditioned the way in which we are affected. 
 
reification, to hypostatise or falsely make what is ungraspable into a thing among 
other things. 
 
singular, that to which a general or particular idea or category must be applied in 
order to distinguish between that which is essentially identical; the apperception of 
[th]is [singular] difference. 
 
techne, the excellence or virtue, i.e. the power that belongs to poiesis, the power to 
create excellently, with excellence. 
 
theoria, the contemplation of that which is in so far as it is, or the systematic 
endeavour to essentially describe and categorize the essence of all beings, so that 
one day man may not only comprehend the essence of all beings, but truly explain 
how they work. In this sense, theoria is the foundation of technologia. 
 
this, Thomas’ singular principle of incarnation without which no general idea 
could be determined, nor any individual being exist. 
 
[th]is, ontological marker that indicates the apperception of the ontological 
contradiction which is either concealed or unconcealed.  Glossary 
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theo-logy, the self-disclosure or self-hiddenness [i.e. logos] of God or the science 
[i.e. logos] of this revelation or this mystery. 
 
topology [of the ontological contradiction], the identification of the places in 
literature where the Being of beings may most spontaneously be apperceived as 
concealed or unconcealed. 
 
topos, place. 
 
truth, [epistemological sense] the adequate [re]presentation of what or that this is, 
the adequate apperception/identification of the subject or the adequate perception 
of its essential properties. 
 
truth, [ontological sense] whatever is [unconcealed]. The ontological definition of 
truth comprehends truth as indistinguishable from what is. This means that a 
proposition will express an ontological understanding of truth if ‘true’ can be 
replaced by ‘real’ without altering the meaning of the proposition. 
 
Unconcealment, where the appearance of a phenomenon is understood negatively as 
the removal of its own state of concealment, the act or happening whereby a being 
is brought to life – through self-disclosure - much like a sculptor dis-covers the 
true man within the block of stone, by removing everything that is obscure. 
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